GEORGIA’S PRO-WESTERN PATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GEORGIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

Fatih Mehmet SAYIN*
Valeri MODEBADZE **

GÜRCİSTAN’IN BATIYA YÖNELİŞİ: SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ SONRASI GÜRCİSTAN DIŞ POLİTİKASI ANALİZİ

Abstract

This article examines the development of the Georgia’s foreign policy in the post–Soviet period. The article claims that change of government and the political regime has little impact on the foreign policy orientation of Georgia. The main vector of Georgia's foreign policy has been defined from the very first days of independence. Since independence Georgia has chosen pro-European path and it seems almost impossible to change this foreign policy direction. Georgians view their homeland as a European country and believe that their traditions and customs are European. According to them Georgia is an integral part of Europe and therefore, think that their homeland should be integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures. Traditionally Georgia has been regarded as one of the most pro-European countries in the Caucasus region.

Keyword: Georgia, Caucasus, Russia, Georgian Foreign Policy, Euro-Atlantic.

Öz

Bu makale, Sovyetler Birliği’nden sonraki dönemde Gürcistan dış politikasının gelişim sürecini incelemektedir. Makale, hükümet değişikliğinin ve politik rejinin Gürcistan dış politikası üzerinde çok az etkisini olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Gürcistan dış politikasının ana vektörü daha bağımsızlığını ilk

*Assistant Professor., Fatih Mehmet SAYIN, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Canik Basari University, e-posta: fmsayin@hotmail.com
**Associate Professor., Valeri MODEBADZE, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Trade and Administration, Canik Basari University, e-posta: valeri@basari.edu.tr

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Introduction

Georgia is the most pro-Western state in the South Caucasus. Since independence Georgia has chosen a pro-Western course and continues to seek a membership in the European Union and NATO. Georgia seeks integration into Euro-Atlantic structures for many reasons. From the security point of view, European Union and NATO can serve as a counterweight to Russia’s economic and military dominance in the Caucasus region. NATO and EU enlargement in Caucasus could destroy Moscow’s geopolitical objectives and could neutralize Russia’s aggressive and imperialistic policies towards Caucasian states.

The West started to pay more attention to Georgia and the Caucasus region over the last decades. The South Caucasus, once seen as the backyard of Russia, is now a region of great strategic importance to the West. Caucasus region is rich in Hydrocarbon reserves. It is also a very important energy corridor. Alternative oil and gas export routes pass through this region which reduces Europe’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. (Nikolai Sokov, 2009) Therefore, the West is interested in strengthening its presence in this region. Although Georgia has no significant oil and gas reserves, it occupies a strategic position in the South Caucasus. Georgia is a necessary bridge connecting Europe with Central Asia and China. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia is a bridge connecting several important global economic regions. The shortest route from Europe to China goes through Georgia and “Silk Road” trade always passed through the Caucasus region. Due to its strategic geographic location Georgia has a great potential to become a wealthy and prosperous European country, but frequent conflicts and political instability are the major obstacles to the economic development and progress. These conflicts prevent Georgia’s integration
into Euro-Atlantic structures. Georgia today must develop a vision for its place and role in the post-cold war world and must achieve economic and political stability.

**Foreign Policy under Gamsakhurdia**

The desire to find a powerful patron has shaped Georgian foreign policy since the middle ages. Georgia, small and powerless country in international system was always seeking for a powerful patron that would protect it from external treats. At first links were established with Russia, which was relatively strong state during that time. (Elder Mamistvalishvili, 2009, p. 159-161) Georgian statesmen hoped that Russia would protect Georgia’s sovereignty and national identity. However, when Russia annexed Georgia in 1801 and Tsarist colonial regime was established in the country, Russian Empire was no longer perceived by Georgians as a reliable “protector”. Freedom-loving Georgian people resisted the attempts of colonization of their country. Numerous insurrections and uprising took place in Georgia which was directed first against the Russian and then, against Soviet colonial rule. The main goal of these uprisings and national liberation movements was the restoration of Georgia’s independence and statehood. (Vahtang Feradze & Levan Mumladze, 2008, p. 3-353)

When Soviet Union began to crumble in 1990s and the country declared its independence, Georgian political circles started to look for a new “protector”. There was a high enthusiasm that Georgia would find a powerful patron that would defend it from Russian aggression and imperialism. On May 26, 1991, when Gamsakhurdia, former dissident and leader of the national liberation movement was elected as the president of Georgia, there was a hope that the country would quickly achieve international recognition. On April 9, 1991, the parliament of Georgia adopted the Declaration of Independence, but this Act was not internationally recognized. (Badri Ambrose Sharvadze, 2008, p. 99,100) International recognition of Georgia’s independence and acknowledgement of Georgia’s sovereignty was delayed.

Gamsakhurdia was faced with enormous economic and political problems especially regarding Georgia's relations with the Soviet Union. A key problem was the minority nationalism and separatism in the autonomous units of Georgia. Moscow supported separatist forces and encouraged them to fight against the central government of Georgia. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia wanted to secede from Georgia and become
independent states. In 1990, South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia. South Ossetia’s aim was to separate from Georgia, unite with North Ossetia and establish an independent Soviet republic. The Georgian government responded by revoking the autonomy of South Ossetia. Its autonomy was abolished on December 10, 1990 by the parliament of Georgia, leading to the first South Ossetian War. The ethnic dispute escalated into open warfare. Soviet Union artificially intensified inter-ethnic tensions in Georgia which led to outbreaks of serious inter-ethnic violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Due to enormous internal problems, Georgian government desperately needed international recognition and assistance from Western countries.

One of the main goals of Gamsakhurdia’s regime was to break out of the diplomatic isolation and establish relations with foreign countries. Gamsakhurdia appealed to the representatives of foreign countries and international leaders to recognize those republics that had declared themselves independent of Soviet Union. However, countries of the world were reluctant to recognize the independence of Georgia, while the Soviet Union still existed. The only exception was Romania, which recognized the independence of Georgia in August 1991. (Glenn E. Curtis, 1994) Universal recognition did not come until 1992. The United States established diplomatic relations with Georgia in 1992 following the Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, but afterwards, they did not show any attention to this country, relying on Russia's role in Caucasus region, considering it a guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet Space. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, USA acknowledged Russia's paramount role in Caucasus and initially treated the region as Russia's "backyard". The US foreign policy focused primarily on direct relations with Moscow, while the newly independent states in the post-Soviet periphery were given much less attention (Wetzinger, 2011, p. 67). During this period the West cared little about Georgia. For this reason, Gamsakhurdia’s regime failed to gain international recognition; it was isolated and easily destroyed by the opposition forces. In 1992, the Civil War started in Georgia. The opposition launched a violent coup d'état and attacked government departments and buildings. Heavy fighting took place in the capital of Georgia between Gamsakhurdia’s supporters and opposition forces. Gamsakhurdia and members of his government were forced to abandon the country and move to the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya.

Foreign Policy Under Shevardnadze
After the violent overthrow of democratically elected regime, former Minister of Foreign Relations of Soviet Union and former member of the Communist party Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia in 1992. He joined the leaders of the coup and became the head of the triumvirate called "The State Council". His return filled large part of the population of Georgia with hope that the prolonged anarchy would end, and the country would stand on the way to stabilization. (Badri Ambrose Sharvadze, 2008, p. 101,102) During the period of his rule, Georgia finally managed to achieve international recognition. On March 23, 1992, independence of Georgia was recognized by the European countries. On July 31st of the same year, Georgia was adopted in the United Nations as its 179 plenipotentiary member. By September 1993, Georgia managed to establish diplomatic relations with seventy-eight countries. Georgia’s international isolation ended, and the country started to act on international arena as an independent state. However, inner political situation in the republic of Georgia was very complicated due to the separatist movements and large number of conflicts. Georgia showed all signs of the failed state and its economy was on the verge of collapse due to the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. Because of the large number of domestic problems, Shevardnadze was initially unable to achieve his foreign policy objectives. His main goal was to move Georgia toward greater cooperation with the West while simultaneously improving relations with Russia. Soon it became clear that Georgia’s foreign policy was largely determined by two main circumstances: One is its regional context and its especially strong dependence on a volatile neighboring Russia, and the second is its internal weakness and disunity, which limits its ability to make independent and confident foreign policy choices. Under such conditions, the achievement of Georgia’s foreign policy objectives, such as a rapprochement with Europe and increased regional cooperation, seemed extremely complicated. Foreign policy during 1992-2003 was a mixture of balancing and bandwagoning strategies towards Russia. In 1993, after the humiliating defeat in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze’s regime was forced to accept Georgia’s integration into CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and legitimize Russian military bases in the country: Russia was allowed to keep military bases in Gudauta, Akhalkalaki, Batumi and Vaziani. Despite the fact that joining CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was a shameful and humiliating act, it brought some benefits to the country: Georgia was able to maintain trade, commercial and economic links with Former Soviet Republics; Russian market was kept open for
Georgian products and there were no restrictions on economic activities between the two countries. Shevardnadze defended CIS membership at home as an absolute necessity for Georgia's survival as well as a stimulant to increased trade with Russia (Glenn E. Curtis, 1994).

Despite the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and strong dependence on Russia, Georgia's foreign policy has become consistently Western-oriented with the goal of final integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Kremlin failed to convert Georgia into a satellite state of Russia. Little by little Georgia managed to get rid of Russian influence and develop strong economic and political ties with Western institutions and nations. In 1994, Georgia joined the NATO run Partnership for Peace Program which marked the beginning of Georgia-NATO relations (Rondeli, 2001). Official relations between Georgia and NATO were established in 1998 when Georgian government decided to open a diplomatic mission and presented an ambassador in North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia developed very close relations with NATO and conducted joint military exercises in 2001 and in 2002 in Poti. Apart from developing close ties with NATO, Georgia has become a member of very important international organizations like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), etc. Georgia received loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and managed to stabilize its economy with the financial assistance from these organizations. During the OSCE summit, which was held in Istanbul in 1999, the governments of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan reached a decision to construct a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for the transport of oil from the Caspian region to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Clinton administration supported the construction of this pipeline because it was seen as the guarantor of safeguarding the independence of newly established Caucasian states. In fact this project played very important role in ending the exclusive dependence of Caucasian states on Russia. In the same summit, Russia undertook an obligation to start the withdrawal of its troops and military bases from Georgia. By the end of 1999, all Russian border guards had left Georgia and were being replaced by Georgian forces. Before the
withdrawal of Russian border guards, USA created a special program and started to train and equip the Georgian border guards. The United States played very important role in strengthening Georgian state institutions and spent considerable amount of money in order to help Georgia in the creation of a viable border protection. In 1998-2001, the United States provided assistance of $72 million to ensure the protection of Georgia's borders which is a significant amount when compared, for example, with a military budget of Georgia, which in 1998 amounted to about 41 million dollars, and in 1999 - 24 million dollars. The decision to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the competition over pipeline routes considerably increased tensions between Georgia and Russia as well as between Russia and the USA. Moscow saw the construction of this pipeline as an attempt of Washington to establish a U.S. sphere of influence on Russia's southern flank, in the Caucasus region (Stanley, 2000, p. 1-10).

In the foreign policy priorities of the United States of America, the territory of the former Soviet Union is one of the most important issues, especially with regard to the Caspian states as owners of energy. The Caspian region is rich in hydrocarbon reserves and therefore, the USA is interested in strengthening its presence in this region. Hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian region are comparable to the deposits in the North Sea. Although Georgia has no significant oil and gas reserves, it occupies a strategic position in the South Caucasus. Georgia to the United States - is a gateway from the Black Sea to the Caspian region and further to Central Asia and the Far East.

Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated drastically when Putin came to power. In 2001, he accused Georgia of supporting Chechen terrorists and seriously considered a military invasion. Russia bombed several times Georgian villages during the Russian-Chechen War (Ghia, 2007, p. 16). The Georgian government requested assistance from United States in order to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. The US military assistance to Georgia increased considerably after the 11 September 2001 attacks on World Trade Centre. USA launched a special program which was named the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). The aim of this program was to increase the fighting potential of Georgian armed forces and train Georgian elite troops for security operations against terrorists. This program significantly enhanced counter-terrorism capabilities of the Georgian army and enabled it to fight effectively against terrorism in the
Pankisi Gorge. The Georgia Train and Equip Program ended in 2004. It considerably increased Georgia's military capability. Despite this success, Georgia remained a relatively weak state and showed signs of the failed state, as the central government showed inability to control some parts of Georgia’s territory.

In the final years of Shevardnadze’s rule, his popularity started to wane mainly due to his failure to achieve political stability and resolve the secessionist conflicts that plagued his country. He also failed to reform a collapsing economy and to curtail rampant corruption. Corruption dominated all aspects of life and Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration did almost nothing to reduce corruption and high rate of crime. The events of November, 2003 displayed how unpopular Shevardnadze’s regime was. In the months leading up to the November parliamentary elections, he was also criticized for the concessions he made to the Russian government in allowing the military bases to remain and over preferential deals in the energy sector. Practically Shevardnadze had no supporters in public and people wanted to get rid of his corrupt regime as soon as possible.

**Foreign Policy Under Saakashvili**

Foreign support for the Shevardnadze’s regime started to decline from 2000 to 2003, and notable figures demanded a democratic transition in Georgia. During this period, Georgia received less financial support and assistance from foreign countries and international organizations. For instance, International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended aid to Georgia in 2002 and refused to give Shevardnadze’s regime any loans. As international support for the corrupt regime deteriorated, Shevardnadze’s popularity inside the country declined and practically he had no supporters in public. The government was unable to eradicate poverty. Socio-economic conditions deteriorated considerably and more than half of the population of Georgia lived below the poverty line. Shevardnadze failed to fulfill his promises and create jobs for ordinary people. Hundreds of thousands of Georgians had to go abroad in order to find employment opportunities. Representatives of foreign countries expected that there would be a peaceful change of government in Georgia after the 2003 parliamentary elections. But Shevardnadze decided to falsify parliamentary elections. The elections of 2nd November 2003 were rigged and the governmental block gained the vast majority of seats in parliament. On November 22, Shevardnadze tried to open the first session of parliament, but widespread protests took place in the streets of Georgia.
Tbilisi. Demonstrators took up the buildings of the parliament and state chancellery, and forced Shevardnadze to resign. The whole world turned its back to Shevardnadze because he falsified the parliamentary elections. Presidential elections were held in January 2004, which brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power with almost 97% of the vote (Muskhelishvili, 2012, p. 537-539).

The opposition that overturned Mr. Shevardnadze is representative of the more westernized sector of Georgian society. When Mikhail Saakashvili, a US-educated lawyer came to power, he started to carry out effective social and political reforms. He stands, in the eyes of Georgian urban society, for getting rid of the bureaucracy, corruption and stagnation that have been a hangover from the Soviet era and for bringing Georgia into the European family. The adoption of anti-corruption legislation played very important role in the reduction of corruption in government departments and administration. Georgia ratified the Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption in 2003 and 2008, and nowadays Georgian legislation is in line with international standards.

Georgia developed closer ties with western institutions, including NATO after the Rose Revolution. Under the government of Saakashvili, Georgia's foreign policy was oriented mainly towards integration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 29 October 2004, Georgia has been linked with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). According to the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Georgia committed to reform its political, security and defense system in accordance with the NATO standards. In September 2006, Georgia moved to a new level of cooperation with NATO. It entered into intensified dialogue with North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia officially declared its intention to join NATO, but the chances of achieving this goal were evaporated during the brief war between Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008.

One of the main objectives of Saakashvili’s administration was the restoration of territorial integrity of Georgia, the reversal of the effects of ethnic cleansing and the return of refugees to their homes. The government efforts to restore Georgian authority in the autonomous republic of Adjara led to a major crisis in early 2004. Saakashvili managed to defeat an autocratic leader of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze very easily and expelled him from Georgia, but failed to achieve any success in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Wetzinger, 2011, p. 72-75). He naively believed that the same methods could be used in South Ossetia. Success
in Adjara encouraged Saakashvili to intensify his efforts to restore territorial integrity of Georgia, but was unsuccessful in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian army easily defeated Georgian forces in 2008 August War and entered deep into Georgian territory, destroyed air and naval bases, blocked the main roads, occupied the cities of Gori and Poti. After the August War, Russia officially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. On 29th of August 2008, Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. The Georgian government decided to withdraw the country from Commonwealth of Interdependent States. Since August 2009, Georgia is no longer a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).

Although during the NATO summit in Bucharest, George W. Bush supported Georgia’s efforts to join Membership Action Plan (MAP), the alliance decided not to offer Georgia a MAP due to opposition from several countries, led by Germany and France. They opposed George W. Bush because they did not want to annoy Russia (Asmus, 2010). After the August War, Russia has restored the credibility of its army, and has strengthened its positions in the Caucasus region. Russia has considerably increased its military forces in the occupied Georgian territories and in Caucasus because of the establishment of pro-Western regime in Georgia. It decided to violate Georgia’s territorial integrity and recognize officially the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to stop Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Georgia’s security environment considerably worsened after the 2008 August War and the deployment of Russian occupational forces in Georgian territories. The presence of Russian troops in the breakaway regions of Georgia, and the construction of military bases there, create a staging ground for new provocative actions and possible renewed military aggression against a sovereign state. Russian military presence in the occupied Georgian territories is regarded as the major threat to the national security of Georgia. Despite all these increased threats to national security of Georgia, Russian government could not change the foreign policy orientation of Georgia and forcibly return country to the Russian political orbit. Russian military aggression could not alter Georgia’s pro-Western course. The Establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission after the 2008 August War and the beginning of implementation of the Annual National Plan, as well as the inauguration of a NATO Liaison Office in Georgia in 2010, gave new impetus to NATO-Georgia relations. (National Security Concept of Georgia, 2011) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s representation in Georgia reflects special relations
between Georgia and NATO and expresses alliance’s support to Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration, its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Since 2008, one of the main goals of Georgia’s foreign policy has been the peaceful restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, deoccupation of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and withdrawal of recognition of independence of occupied territories. After Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, the Georgian government began implementing a policy of non-recognition of the separatist regions, which has been supported by the international community (Modebadze & Sayin, 2013, p. 96).

**Foreign policy priorities of the “Georgian Dream” coalition**

The peaceful transfer of power took place after the 2012 parliamentary election. The new coalition government under Prime Minister Ivanishvili has declared the improvement of relations with Russia as one of its foreign policy priorities. Ivanishvili’s goal was to improve relations with Russia while maintaining Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy course (პროგრამა, 2012, p. 20-22). Since the end of 2012, Georgia gradually managed to resume the dialogue with Russia and to negotiate the return of Georgian wine, fruits and mineral water to the Russian market. Further bilateral talks will address transportation issues, the intensification of cultural relations, but also the possibility of visa liberalization. The rapprochement with Russia is complicated due to the fact that Russia is unwilling to withdraw the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian military presence in the Georgian breakaway regions strains relations between two countries and makes any effort of rapprochement futile. Russia continues its creeping annexation of Georgian territories and is constantly moving the de-facto border between Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Since the August 2008 War, the Russian border troops have constantly increased the size of occupied territories and have moved the so-called “state border” deeper into the Georgian-controlled territory near the villages of Ditsi and Dvani (The Messanger, 2013). Russian soldiers have begun moving the occupation line at places where it cuts through populated areas. They have installed barbed wires through people’s gardens and grazing lands, resulting in villages losing cultivated plots of land, an irrigation water canal and cemeteries (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013). Many Georgian families have lost their source of income because their farmlands, apple
orchards and ancestral homes are now beyond this new demarcation line. The United States, the European Union, and NATO all voiced concern over Russia's creeping annexation of Georgian territories and condemned the actions of Russian government to seal South Ossetia off from the rest of Georgia (Aptisauri & Bigg, 2013).

Creeping annexation of Georgia’s territories demonstrated that Moscow has no intention to improve the relations with Georgia. It is hard to imagine any serious reconciliation and establishment of good neighborly relations between Russia and Georgia as long as the problems of occupied Georgian territories remain. Some experts expected possible changes in the foreign policy of Georgia after the defeat of United National Movement in the 2012 parliamentary elections. They believed that pro-Western foreign policy would be replaced by pro-Russian one. But time has demonstrated that their predictions were wrong. In fact the new government has not slowed the pace of dialogue with European Union and NATO (Konrad, 2013, p. 1-4). Traditionally, Georgia has been the most pro-Western state in the South Caucasus and the integration into Euro-Atlantic structures still remains the main foreign policy priority of the new government. In other words, the new regime follows the same European path like the previous one. The argument that the new regime is undermining Georgia’s stable Euro-Atlantic course has nothing to do with reality. Georgia plans to join the European Union as well as NATO. On 7 March 2013, the Georgian parliament unanimously passed a resolution confirming the integration of Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures as a priority for sustainable democratic development of the country. The above mentioned resolution on basic directions of Georgian Foreign Policy reads “Integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures represents the main priority of the country’s foreign policy course. For the purpose of achieving strategic priority and gaining membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Georgia will take further steps for building and strengthening democratic institutions; establishing a governance system based on the principle of the rule of law and supremacy of human rights; and ensuring the irreversibility of sustainable economic development. Georgia will not join such international organizations, whose policies contradict these priorities” (Resolution on Basic Directions of Georgian Foreign Policy, 2013).

Out of the six Eastern Partnership countries, only Georgia and Moldova have still a desire to continue to the EU integration process. Unlike
Ukraine, Georgia demonstrated firm willingness to follow its European path when it initialed an Association Agreement and signed other important cooperation agreements with the EU at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. From the Georgian side, the association agreement was approved by Deputy Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani. He said that for his country this was a "historic event". According to him, Georgia’s integration into Europe became irreversible. Barroso also stressed the importance of signing this agreement. "This is an important milestone. Marks the beginning of a new phase in our relations," stressed the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso. According to Barroso, these agreements "are the most advanced of its kind ever negotiated by the EU" because "in terms of trade and economic integration go well beyond simply opening the market." (Europa Press, 2013). Strategic Eastern Partnership agreements signed in Vilnius will strengthen cooperation in areas such as foreign policy, trade, environment, energy, transport, education, etc.

All these facts prove that Georgia has no intention to change its Euro-Atlantic course and will continue with its previous strategy of strengthening ties with European Union and NATO.

Conclusion

Georgia has been ruled since its independence by four different leaders who radically differed from each other. However, the regime change has never caused any radical changes in the foreign policy priorities. Changes in government do not normally alter basic directions of Georgian foreign policy. Since independence, Georgia has chosen a stable Euro-Atlantic course. At present, Georgia is actively seeking integration into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and the Western institutions. Traditionally, Georgia has been regarded as one of the most pro-European countries, and it still remains the most pro-Western state in the South Caucasus.

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Elections Program 2012. Elections Program of The Political Coalition “Georgian Dream”


