

## Turkish Foreign Policy during Adnan Menderes Period

Gül Tuba Dağcı\* and Kaan Diyarbakırhoğlu†

**Abstract:** *Adnan Menderes is a unique personality who has an important role within Turkish political life. Democratic Party founded in 1946 by Menderes and his three friends has taken the power from People's Republican Party in 22 May 1950. Hence they have ended the single party period and opened the multi-party period in political life. This study examines the Turkish foreign policy of Menderes period between 1950-1960 as a whole. And it concludes that the most important motives of the Turkish foreign policy making process in Menderes period were the security problem and the maintenance of foreign aid necessary for the development of country.*

**Keywords:** Adnan Menderes, Democratic Party, Turkish foreign policy, Cyprus Issue

---

\* Assistant Professor of Political History at Yalova University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, email: dacituba@gmail.com

† Lecturer at Yalova University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, email: kaandbo@gmail.com

## Introduction

Adnan Menderes was an important figure who left his mark on the history of Turkish political life. He established Democratic Party (DP) with Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan on 7 January 1946<sup>1</sup>. He took over the power from People's Republican Party (CHP) after winning the general elections held on 14 May 1950. Although the domestic and international conditions after World War II affecting the economy and politics played a significant role in the foreign policy formulation of DP, the government programs of this period substantially reflected Adnan Menderes' understanding of foreign policy principles. For example, Menderes put great emphasis on the term of 'security' and explained that the security issues of Turkey are important not only for Turkey but also for the world peace when he announced the 1<sup>st</sup> Government Program of DP on 22 May 1950. This is why he sent troops to Korea in order to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as soon as he came to the power. This decision was made in order to ensure the security of both Turkey and the world peace. Menderes explained the principles of foreign policy in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Government Program on 9 March 1951 as follows:

*“Our government, whose commitment to the United Nations' ideal is intimate, strongly believes that mutually complementary security agreements among independent nations will prevent violations until the establishment of a unique universal security system. We consider developing our relations with our old friends of France and Britain as well as a cooperation with United States as our prior ground for foreign policy principle. Our government follows the United Nations' principles fairly and resolutely, while seeking for establishment and preservation of good relations with all our neighbors and all independent nations to the best of her ability.”<sup>2</sup>*

First of all, Menderes underlined the importance of establishing alliances, involving in common security systems such as NATO and mentioning his commitment to the United Nations. This is why he made a reference to the alliance between Turkey, France and Britain, while qualifying USA as a great friend. By the 3<sup>rd</sup> Government Program, it is announced that Turkey will operate together with NATO and in accordance with the goals of United Nations on 17 May 1954. Similarly, Turkey signed Balkan Pact and proceeded in her relations with Pakistan. Also, this program remade an emphasis on Turkey-USA relations as well as Turkey's cooperation with France and Britain. Moreover, it mentioned the improvement of relations with Italy and Germany.<sup>3</sup>

By the 4<sup>th</sup> Menderes Government Program on 9 December 1955, the goal of foreign policy was repeated as the preservation of peace and security. Besides commitment to UN, significance of the maintenance of Balkan Pact and Baghdad Pact was highlighted. On the other hand, this program attached importance to the Cyprus Issue. He explained his foreign policy targets and expanded his framework by the following statement: “Our foreign policy plays a mediator role among Europe, Asia and America while serving for world peace. Especially, our relations with US and Britain will be further developed.”<sup>4</sup>

The prominent part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Government Program of Menderes on 25 November 1957 was the resignation of Fuat Köprülü, who held office as the foreign affairs minister for four terms, and inauguration of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as the new foreign affairs minister. In this program, Menderes stated that “Our relations with NATO allies, especially Germany, France and Italy, as well as Baghdad Pact allies such as Iraq, Iran and Pakistan will be consolidated.”<sup>5</sup> As it is also understood from these statements, the government policy gave equal importance to the relations with western and eastern states.

This study is organized to address activities in foreign policy of five consecutive Menderes governments between 1950 and 1960. The paper consists of five sections and it is structured in the following manner. Section one provides overview of Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II under the title of “Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II.” Section two focuses on the Soviet Union – Turkey relations and United States – Turkey relations in the light of some developments such as the acceptance of Turkey to NATO and sending Turkish troops to Korea. Section three discusses Turkish foreign policy toward Balkans under the title of “Turkey’s Admission to the Balkan Pact.” Section four addresses Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East under the title of “Admission of Turkey into the Baghdad Pact.” Section five provides an overview of Turkish – Greek relations and Cyprus Issue under the title of “Turkey’s Relations with Greece (Cyprus Problem)”. Consequently, section six concludes by evaluating overall issues of the 1950s to 1960s period of Menderes.

## **I. The Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II 1945-1950**

During World War II, Turkey remained neutral and followed balance of power strategy despite pressures coming from the allied powers<sup>6</sup> and axis powers<sup>7</sup>. The ultimate aim of Turkey was to protect her territorial integrity and independence. However, both Germany’s desire to involve Turkey into war and the Soviet threat left Turkey in a difficult situation.

Germany proposed Turkey the Dodecanese Islands, Aleppo, Mosul, Azerbaijan, and Batumi in exchange for entering war and taking side with Germany. In the beginning of war, Turkey signed an alliance agreement with France and Britain, and took part in the allied power block.<sup>8</sup> In response, Germany stopped sending munitions to Turkey which were ordered by Turkey during pre-war period.<sup>9</sup> Thus the German policy toward Turkey was intensified and relations between these two states began to normalize by 1940. Some achievements of Germany during 1940 can be considered as one of the main reasons for this situation. On 25 July 1940, Turkey signed Turkish – German Commercial Treaty. Moreover, Turkey and Germany signed treaty of amity which moved their relations beyond the economic field.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, Turkey reassured Germany that Turkey will not attack on Germany. But, Turkish policy toward Germany left Turkey in a difficult situation in relation to the allied powers. For instance, USA cut the financial aid for a while and then she started again by 30 November 1941.<sup>11</sup> Despite of the pressures coming from the allied powers, Turkey sustained her relations with Germany until 1944.

During World War II, Yalta conference was held by the allied powers in 1945. This conference let another meeting in San Francisco in 25 April 1945 and this meeting provided a base for the establishment of United Nations.<sup>12</sup> However, they set the condition of being a founding member of United Nations just in case of waging a war against the axis power. Thus, Turkey waged a war against Germany and Japan in 23 February 1945 in order to fulfill this requirement.

Since World War II, Soviet Union – Turkey relations began to deteriorate. Some of the main reasons of this deterioration were Soviet Union’s desire to control Turkish straits and get naval and army bases in Turkey, their attempts for changing Montreux Convention regarding regime of straits and their demand for annexation of Kars and Ardahan.<sup>13</sup> Also, abolishment of ‘Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality’ by Soviet Union was another significant reason for explaining those unfavorable relations. Therefore, entering war with the West block under the leadership of United States appeared as the only way for Turkey to avoid these pressures. The period starting from the end of the World War II until the late 1980s, which was sustained with economic, political, military, ideological and cultural tensions between Western Block and Eastern Block, is called as the Cold War Period.<sup>14</sup>

Turkey had to deal with a bipolar international system while seeking to determine her foreign policy after World War II. In this bipolar system, there were two main factors which influenced Turkey’s preferences: on the one hand the demands of Soviet Union and on the other hand Turkey’s need for foreign aid to sustain her postwar economic development.

The military aid of Britain for Turkey and Greece was an effective starting point after World War II. However, Britain announced to US that she will no longer provide aid for those countries. Besides this, Britain also underlined the importance of providing military and financial aid for these two countries in order to secure Western block from the communist threat of Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup> Following these developments, President Truman requested an authority from American Congress on 12 March 1947 in order to supply \$400 million military aid for Turkey and Greece. On that occasion, American Congress met on 22 May 1947 and decided to provide \$100 million for Turkey and \$300 million for Greece as military aid.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, Truman Doctrine can be understood as a means of action to prevent the spread of communism by promoting American understanding of politics and economics.<sup>17</sup> In this respect, these aids entered into force by 22 May 1947, but failed to provide an economic development for Turkey since they based upon military means.

After Truman Doctrine, many economic aids from USA felt into place. One of the most important aids was Marshall Plan that was named due to the foreign affairs minister George Marshall. These aids were also called as ‘the European Recovery Program’ since they aimed at assisting the recovery of European economies after the end of World War II. In order to fairly allocate the funds of this four-year plan (1947-1951) among European states, Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) was established in 16 April 1948.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the inclusion of Turkey to both Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan concluded with a shift in the Turkish foreign policy towards the West.

All these financial aids which started with CHP period continued during the period of DP. Thanks to this situation, the foreign policy formulation of DP was in harmony with CHP’s in the early 1950s. Turkey’s Soviet policy, which was in cooperation with USA, let Turkey to develop closer relations with the West. Then, Turkey was invited to European Council as a member state on 8 August 1949 and also became the first Muslim country recognizing Israel. This initiative resulted in different manners. While Turkey and USA became closer allies, Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern states worsened.

Attempts of Turkey in foreign policy went beyond this. Right after the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, Soviet Union felt insecure and regarded Mediterranean as a power vacuum. For this reason, Turkey offered ‘Eastern Mediterranean Defensive Alliance’ treaty. According to this treaty, USA, Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece would cooperate with each other. As a first step, Turkey and Italy signed ‘Turkish-Italian Friendship, Peace and Judicial Settlement Treaty’ on 24 March 1950.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, Turkey set her primary target which is to join all kinds of economic and military organizations established by Western states as much as possible.

## **II. Admission of Turkey into NATO and Foreign Policy of Democratic Party**

In order to prevent Soviet threat, Western European states and Northern American states came together and signed a treaty to form NATO on April 1949 in Washington.<sup>20</sup> Security has always been at the forefront in Turkish foreign policy and this explains Turkey’s attempts to join NATO for preventing Soviet threat.

As soon as Menderes government came to power, leaders of the government met in Yalova on 18 July 1950 and decided to send troops to Korea for demonstrating their desire to be on the Western side. The opposition supported this decision but criticized the government about not informing them during the decision making process.<sup>21</sup> Thus, Turkey sent her troops of 4.500 soldiers under UN to support South Korea in her struggle with North Korea.<sup>22</sup> With this action, Turkey became one of the largest and active belligerents in the war. This force was under the command of Colonel Tahsin Yazıcı and belonged to the American division. Number of Turkish soldiers increased over 6.000. Until ceasefire was signed on 27 July 1953, 721 Turkish soldiers became martyr and 672 of them were wounded and came back to Turkey. Also, 1475 of wounded Turkish soldiers were treated in Korea, 234 soldiers were captured and 175 soldiers were designated as lost.<sup>23</sup>

Since the end of World War II, Turkey's primary target in her foreign policy was to join NATO to overcome the threats coming from Soviet Union. This desire of Turkey was valid both for the CHP and the DP terms. Turkey made her first application for NATO membership during the time of CHP government on 11 May 1950 while she made the second one on 1 August 1950 during DP period. Second Turkish application was in the same time with Greek application. NATO council of ministers refused this request on 13 September 1950 whereas there were some figures within US such as American senator Cain.<sup>24</sup> According to Cain, Turkey had to be empowered since she had a great geopolitical importance.<sup>25</sup> American ambassador Mc Ghee also went along with Cain.<sup>26</sup>

After all, NATO council of ministers decided to accept Turkey and Greece as the NATO members by unanimous vote within their meeting on 16-21 September in Ottawa. On 17 October 1951, the protocol text for Turkish and Greek involvement in NATO was published and Turkey became an official member on 18 February 1952.<sup>27</sup>

Main motivations of western states to accept Turkey as a member of NATO can be found in the following reasons:

- The strategic location of Turkey,
- The heroic characteristic of Turkish army displayed in Korea,
- To secure American and British interests in the Middle East by the support of Turkish army,
- Intimidate Soviet Union and support Turkey against expansionist policies of Soviet Union.<sup>28</sup>

Thanks to the support of American statesmen, Turkey achieved Menderes government's prior target in foreign policy. After Turkey entered in NATO and all through the period of Menderes government, Turkey followed Western oriented policies.

Soviet Union always regarded the Turkey's NATO membership as a big threat. On 3 November 1951, Soviet ambassador sent a diplomatic note to Soviet foreign affairs ministry.<sup>29</sup> In that respect, Stalin made serious accusations against Turkey. But, after Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev came to power and changed the aggressive policy of Soviet Union toward Turkey. He stated that Soviet Union gave up her demands which threaten territorial integrity of Turkey and control of Turkish straits.<sup>30</sup>

### **III. Admission of Turkey into Balkan Pact**

There are some similarities between Balkan Pact and Balkan Agreement; however the environment in which they were written are quite different. Balkan agreement was formed within a multipolar system in 1934 and aimed a closer cooperation among contracting states against revisionist states. On the other hand, 1954 Balkan Pact was a product of a bipolar system of Cold War years.<sup>31</sup> In this sense, while seeking for establishing a security cordon, intention of Menderes was to turn Turkey into the leader of the South Mediterranean.<sup>32</sup>

While US played an important role during the formation of Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia took a significant role in its signature procedures. Until 1948, Yugoslavia was a part of Soviet bloc. However, when relations of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union deteriorated, Yugoslavia came closer to US and obtained some funds from UPP. Yugoslavia incorporated with Turkey and Greece in terms of the establishment of Balkan Pact as well. Right after the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into NATO, a power vacuum emerged between the two blocks while most of the Balkan states were in Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Yugoslavia was one of these states and her cooperation with Balkan Pact filled this power vacuum.<sup>33</sup> Following negotiations among Fuat Köprülü, Stefanopoulos and Koca Popovic as foreign affairs ministers of these three countries, 'Friendship and Cooperation Treaty' was

signed on 28 February 1953 in Ankara.<sup>34</sup> The official name of this pact was ‘Friendship and Cooperation Treaty of the Republic of Turkey, Hellenic Republic and Yugoslavia Federal Republic.

Balkan Pact turned into an agreement when Republic of Turkey, Hellenic Republic and Yugoslavia Federal Republic signed ‘Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement’ on 9 August 1954 in Bled.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, by this agreement some decisions were taken such as the foreign affairs ministers of these countries would meet twice a year, there would be a permanent council, and when permanent council could not meet, their task would be carried out by the Permanent Secretariat of Ankara Agreement. Common ground of these countries was to block Soviet threat as well as ensuring financial aid from UPP.<sup>36</sup>

Just like the Balkan Entente that was established by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania against the expansionism of Italia during Atatürk period, Balkan Pact was established against USSR which sought to take Balkan states under Soviet control. In that period if Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had an opportunity to make their decision freely, they could have been admitted to this pact, as well.

Balkan Alliance Permanent Council made its first meeting in Ankara and at the end of the meeting the agreement establishing the Permanent Assembly was signed on 2 March 1955. The task of Permanent Assembly, consisting of 20 members selected from national assemblies by each member state, was to search on the possibilities of cooperation in all possible fields.<sup>37</sup>

Balkan Pact was not able to realize the expected goals. Death of Stalin caused the change in the foreign policy of USSR. Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and USSR got better when Moscow removed the economic sanctions on Yugoslavia in the aftermath of Stalin’s death. This new situation affected attitude of Yugoslavia towards the Pact. Also, Cyprus Crisis, deteriorating relations with Greece, almost broke down the activities of Balkan Pact. Consequently, Greece prevented the meeting of Permanent Secretary to be held in Athens in 1955. Since both Greece and Yugoslavia took negative attitudes against the Pact, it became dysfunctional even though relations relatively warmed up by 1958. Eventually the Pact lost its importance.

#### **IV. Admission of Turkey into Baghdad Pact**

Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen who gained independence after World War II came together and signed the Pact of Arab Union.<sup>38</sup> For Turkey, who successfully took part in the struggle of independence, establishing good relations with those states was very important. In that term, the first state which Turkey established official relations was Iraq. On 29 March 1946, agreement of Friendship and Good Neighborhood was signed between Iraq and Turkey.<sup>39</sup> Turkey’s neighborliness with Iraq affected other Arab states. Turkey recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon on 6 March 1946. The agreement of Friendship and Good Neighborhood agreement was signed with the King Abdullah of Jordan on 8 January 1947.<sup>40</sup>

After 1948, relations between Turkey and the Arab states started to be deteriorated. Following events can be regarded as the reasons for this deterioration: the aids given by US to Turkey under the scope of Truman Doctrine; the opposition of the Arab states to decision of UN General Assembly on establishing the Palestine Conciliation Commission on 12 December 1948 and Turkey’s supportive vote with Western states as well as Turkey’s recognition of Israel as the first Muslim state in 1949.<sup>41</sup>

As soon as he came to power, Menderes planned to maintain the relations of Turkey with the Middle East within the framework of a cooperation with the West. After 1950, DP government continued the relations in both military and political fields.<sup>42</sup> Since 21 December 1950, the permanent attaché of the Israel remained to stay in Turkey. In that term Israel had attaches in only four states. Other three states were USA, Britain and France. Close relations of Turkey with Israel made her alienated within the Arab World.

After Turkey was accepted to NATO, she took initiative and began preparations for establishing a military Pact involving USA, Britain and France. The reason why Turkey assumed leadership role in establishment such a Pact was that Turkey tried to prevent Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. With this goal, the Foreign Affairs Minister John Foster Dulles visited Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan, Greece, Turkey and Libya between 11-28 May 1953. The aim of these visits was to prevent influence of Soviet Union upon the region. Turkey would play an important role in the Pact.<sup>43</sup> Among the middle eastern states, Egypt opposed to this idea. One of the reasons why Egypt opposed to this Pact was that CHP, governing party before DP, was the first Muslim government that recognized the State of Israel.<sup>44</sup> And the other reason was that Egypt sought to become a leader of the Arab World. The first tension of Turkey with Egypt occurred in January 1954. Then, Fuat Hulusi Tugay, Cairo Ambassador of Turkey, was deported.<sup>45</sup> This situation deteriorated Turkey-Egypt relations. Turkey initially started negotiations with Pakistan to establish the Pact. On 2 April 1954, agreement was signed with Pakistan in Karachi. This was qualified as a military agreement that was mainly based on defense issues.<sup>46</sup> Menderes visited USA right after this agreement.

In 1955, Menderes made an official visit to Iraq, Lebanon and Syria in order to establish a defense pact in the Middle East. The main goal of these visits was to “assume a leading role in the Middle East.”<sup>47</sup> After the visit of Menderes to Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri Es Sait, they made a joint declaration. In this declaration, it was stated that “Turkey and Iraq decided to make a cooperation as soon as possible to provide trust and stability in the Middle East.” Governments of Turkey and Iraq assumed that such an agreement would help to provide security in the Middle East in harmony with the United Nations Charter.<sup>48</sup>

Under the Nuri Es Sait Pasha administration, Iraq tried to establish a leadership among Arab states by attempting to get closer with the West. Then, in his following statements, Nuri Es Sait Pasha declared that they wanted to establish a pact with Turkey aiming at the security of the Middle East. Egypt reacted against this statement. The underlying reason for this reaction was that Egypt sought to establish an Arab unity under her leadership. Eventually, Turkey and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955.<sup>49</sup> After that Britain (4 April 1955,) Pakistan (23 September 1955) and Iran (3 November 1955) joined the Pact. However, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were aside this Pact. Those states under the leadership of Egypt started political, economic and military agreements aiming at competing with and eventually replacing this Pact.<sup>50</sup> USA did not join the Pact in order to prevent negative reactions from the non-member states of the Pact; however she continued to provide military and technical assistance. Egypt and Syria showed great reaction to the Pact by claiming that it divides the Arab World. Involvement of Britain to the Pact through Iraq can be interpreted as Britain was looking after her own interests in the Middle East. However, this situation made harder to win the confidence of Arab states for Turkey. On the other hand since Turkey brought Britain in a kind of agreement providing security of the Middle East, it is understood that Turkey developed a different understanding of foreign policy making compared to other Middle Eastern states.

After the Baghdad Pact was signed, Egypt, who was seeking the leadership of the Arab World, declared that she would make an agreement with Syria and Iraq. Lebanon and Jordan was out of this bilateral alignment. All in all, Baghdad Pact did not make Turkey to get closer to the Middle East; it rather deteriorated her relations with the middle eastern states.

Another development occurred in this period was the new movement called as Non-Alignment, which was consisted of new group of states being out of the Eastern and Western blocks. Starting point of this movement was Bandung Conference. Bandung Conference was held on 18-24 April 1955, in Bandung, Indonesia. 29 states attended to this conference. The goal of the conference was to protect existence of those newly established African and Asian states against the two great nuclear powers of USA and USSR and to provide solidarity among these young states.<sup>51</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu represented Turkey in this conference. In the conference, the attitude of India towards Turkey created a tension. The reason why India assumed such an attitude to Turkey was the bilateral agreement between Turkey and Pakistan. Because, India was seeking to unify Pakistan with her territories who had border problems with India.

Yet another important event in terms of understanding the Middle Eastern policy during Adnan Menderes period was that Turkey took side with Western states opposing the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. Turkey joined the London Conference with 21 states using the Canal most frequently on 18 August 1956. Besides that she supported the so called "Dulles' Plan" in that period. Turkey also supported the attempt of getting the Suez Canal under an international control with eighteen other states at the end of the conference. Eventually, Dulles, the foreign minister of US, initiated the "Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA)." Turkey became a member of this association with Pakistan by October 1st. President Gamal Abdel Nasser criticized this decision of Turkey by saying that "Turkey is the Police of Western Imperialism not only in the Arab world, but also in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)".<sup>52</sup>

This attitude of Turkey did not only damage her Middle Eastern policy. In that period, Middle Eastern states not participating to London Conference supported Greece on the Cyprus problem. Turkey curtailed her relations with Israel to the level of charge d'affaires when Britain, France and Israel started to occupy Egypt, particularly the Canal region. However, since Turkey was in cooperation with USA, this attitude of Turkey did not solve any problems and had no positive impact at all. Consequently, Turkey continued to be perceived as a state supporting the solutions of West and cooperate with them and she could not get rid of being described as the gendarme of the West.<sup>53</sup> One of the most important reasons that made Turkey not to end her affairs with USA was the Jews lobby having a strong voice in US Congress.<sup>54</sup>

In that period, the close relations of USSR with the Middle Eastern states worried Turkey. Turkey wanted to establish the connection between NATO and the Baghdad Pact to resolve this issue. US administration supported Turkey in this case. Eventually, there would be a connection between NATO and the Baghdad Pact as Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan practically undertook a protection role of this pact. In this way, USA would have to play a major role in all political and military developments in the region. This role would start in the early 1957 with the initiation of Eisenhower Doctrine.

The reason of USA for initiating the Eisenhower Doctrine dates back to the time that US regarded the increased prestige of USSR, which happened when Britain frayed around the edges in the Middle East due to the Suez Crisis, as a part of the international communism.<sup>55</sup> The aim of the Doctrine was to fill the power gap that was left by Britain, to secure the petroleum reserves that were important for Western states, and to prevent the region from the influence of the communism.<sup>56</sup> So that USA would fill the power gap left by Britain in the Middle East. For Adnan Menderes administration this doctrine meant to involve also the Middle East in the scope of military and economic aid started by the Truman Doctrine. Menderes Government not only supported this doctrine, but also wanted to be involved in this doctrine. After these developments, the Turkey-US relations got much closer.

Since 1957 Syria's relations with USSR further improved. After this development, the relations between Turkey and Syria were deteriorated since Turkey perceived militarization of Syria as a danger against her security.<sup>57</sup> Beyond any doubt, Soviet Union played a big role in this situation. The relations between Turkey and USSR were already deteriorated due to the involvement of Turkey in NATO. As a result of the intimacy of Turkey to NATO, USSR gave \$570 million aid to Syria. In return, Syria let USSR to deploy Russian missiles in her territories. Not surprisingly, Turkey regarded this situation as a threat.<sup>58</sup>

In 1958 an important development occurred. On 14 July 1958, a military coup was staged in Iraq. This coup was against the active Middle Eastern policy of Menderes. After a bit later from the coup, Iraq withdrew from the Pact.<sup>59</sup> Thereupon, other members of the Pact and US Secretary met for a situation assessment in London on 28-29 July 1958. Turkey criticized this coup; however she officially recognized the military regime in Baghdad on 31 July 1958. After this development in Iraq, it was decided to move the center of this organization to Ankara and change its name as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). This organization was established with the mission of defense and it was more of an organization for economic, cultural and technical cooperation.

The biggest mistake of USA and founding members of this organization was not to invite Afghanistan to Baghdad Pact and CENTO.<sup>60</sup> Thus, Soviet Union easily controlled Afghanistan in the following years.<sup>61</sup>

The impact of Baghdad Pact on the middle eastern states remained very limited. The idea of establishing a pact in the Middle East was completely an idea of UPP. The aim of USA was to construct a defense power against USSR. In fact the main goal of the middle eastern states was to meet their economic needs by getting aid from USA in this pact. On the other hand Turkey not only could not realize this aim but also faced with deteriorated relations with both USSR and the Arab states.

CENTO members held a meeting in Tehran in April 1960. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu attended to this meeting on behalf of Menderes. However, this was the last attendance of DP. Because the DP administration was stepped down with the 27 May 1960 coup and so DP's Middle East policy was terminated.

## V. Turkey's Relations with Greece (Cyprus Issue)

Cyprus Issue started to take shape after World War II. The biggest factor producing this problem was the attitude of Britain having tendency to leave the Island to Greece. The main source of this problem was that Rums desired to put the idea of *enosis* (Uniting the Island with the Greece by Rums) into practice after World War II.

Cyprus Issue emerged in CHP period during early 1950s, and it continued when DP was in power. However, CHP's foreign affairs minister Necmettin Sadak did not accept presence of any problem in Cyprus by saying that

*“There is no such kind of problem as Cyprus. Because, today Cyprus is under the authority and rule of Britain.”*<sup>62</sup>

After DP came to power, the Foreign Affairs Minister Fuat Köprülü said that

*“At the present moment, issue like a Cyprus problem is out of our concern. Because, the Greek Government is not occupied with concerning Cyprus problem as well. Consequently our Foreign Affairs Ministry is not officially informed about the existence of such kind of a problem.”*<sup>63</sup>

As it can be understood from this dialogue, CHP and DP had a similar view of the Cyprus Issue. After 1954 elections, Cyprus Issue came into the agenda of DP. Due to this problem, the relations between Turkey and Greece started to be deteriorated. The aim of both states was to provide and preserve their financial security by keeping good relations with the West. Thus, both states continued to conduct US supported foreign policies.

The most important factor made DP to change its policy about Cyprus was the assignment of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as the State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister on the issues of external economy and Cyprus Issue. As soon as Zorlu came to power, he was assigned with this duty and he established the Cyprus Commission under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>64</sup> Responsibility of this commission was to develop an official stance and opinion of Turkey on the Cyprus Issue. The aim of Zorlu was to prove and declare to the world public that Cyprus belongs to Turks by presenting official documents. Until that year, Turkey had remained silent against this situation in the Island that used to be in the hands of Britain. However this situation, which was not cared about previously, came into prominence when Greece officially applied to UN<sup>65</sup> to be given the right of *self-determination* to the people of Island. However this demand of Greece was rejected. This development internationalized the Cyprus issue. Britain indicated that Turks in Island also had a *self-determination* right. Consequently the “thesis of partition” came to the forefront. Meanwhile, Rums, who sought to realize the *enosis*, founded the terrorist organization of EOKA (Greek for National Organization of Cypriot Struggle.)

With the foundation of this terrorist organization, shipment of military equipment to the Island started. In the presence of violence of Rums against Turks in Island, opposing resistance movements of Turks started by April, 1955. Then, governments of Britain, Turkey and Greece held a trilateral summit in London on 29 August – 7 September 1955.

In this meeting Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, supported the preservation of status quo in the island, and otherwise return of the Island to Turkey and on a forward basis proposed “self-governance.”<sup>66</sup> During this meeting, the *April 6-7 Events* occurred. The reason for these developments was the news that Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki was bombed. Due to this negative atmosphere, which was affected also by *April 6-7 Events*, meeting achieved no result. Right after the meeting, conflicts in the Island were intensified. After these developments Menderes made a statement declaring that during *April 6-7 Events* in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara police did only its duty and he also promised that people being exposed to physical and moral damage would be pleased.<sup>67</sup>

Britain assigned Lord Radcliffe to prepare a constitution for Cyprus in July, 1956. Lord Radcliffe, in his report, which was prepared in November 12, 1956 after field-survey conducted in Cyprus, indicated that “British Government should accept the presence of two different communities and separately recognize self-determination right of the two communities,” which meant that the partition of Island can be approached as a solution.<sup>68</sup> Adnan Menderes evaluated the decisions taken by the British during the opening speech of DP group meeting on July 5 1956: “British say that firstly terminate terrorizing acts. After terminating terrorizing acts 10 years-term will be accepted. At the end of the 10 years-term the decision of self-determination principle would be taken to the approval of the 2/3 majority of NATO member states. It is the essential argument of the British proposal...”<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, due to the *April 6-7 Events*, relations between Menderes and Foreign Affairs Minister Fuat Köprülü were worsened. After this event, Fuat Köprülü declared that he resigned in the press conference by saying that “There is a difference of ideas between Menderes and him.”<sup>70</sup> After this moment Turkey started to defend the thesis of “partition of Cyprus.”

After Turkey continued to support the partition thesis the terrorist incidents increased in the Island. In these circumstances, while the Cyprus issue was going on, Greece referred the case to UN. Greece demanded “self-determination” again. Greece emphasized that if the problem was not resolved in accordance with the Greek side, they would leave NATO.<sup>71</sup> Demand of Greece was put on the agenda again in December 9, 1957. Syria, Egypt, Yugoslavia, USSR and Eastern Bloc states supported Greece. After voting, the self-determination thesis of the Greece was not supported.<sup>72</sup> In the late 1957 NATO General Secretary Paul Spak met with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Greek Prime Minister Kostantin Karamanlis in order to discuss the Cyprus Issue. However, meeting did not give any positive outcome. After the meeting Menderes came back to Turkey and he declared that in case of delivery of soldiers or arms to the Island by the Greece, Turkey would take all kinds of measures on December 26 at the DP Assembly.<sup>73</sup> The Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece was much more intensified on June 1958. The most important reason for this was the conflicts between Turks and Rums and demonstrations of people in Turkey as a reaction to those conflicts.

In December 3, 1957 plan of Sir Hugh Foot, who was appointed as the governor to Cyprus, came to agenda. However, since this plan was based on cohabitation of the two communities it was rejected by Turkey.<sup>74</sup> According to this plan a) Before reaching a certain resolution, there would be 5-7 years transitional period, b) It would be guaranteed that any resolution that would not be accepted by Turks and Rums would be ineffective, c) The state of emergency in the Island would be terminated and Makarios would be permitted to come to Island, d) The negotiation for self-determination system with leaders of two sides would be started.<sup>75</sup> After that another British Prime Minister Macmillan brought another plan forward on 19 June 1958. According to this plan, establishment of a new constitution would begin by conferring on the proposals of the two communities, Turkey and Greece. In the new constitution the following principles would be taken into account: a) Two communities would have two separate House of Representatives and these legislative organs would have the final decision about the issues related to their communities, b) The council, which would be consisted of Turkish and Greek governmental representatives, 4 Rum and 2 Turkish members and governed by British Governor, would be established, c) Governor would be authorized for foreign affairs, defense

and internal security, however he would consult with the representatives of Turkey and Greece, d) Representatives of Turkey and Greece could apply for the neutral referee in case of evaluating the legislation as discriminative.<sup>76</sup> According to Macmillan Plan, the status of Island would not change for seven years, which meant there would be continuation of British sovereignty. Plan was rejected by both sides.<sup>77</sup>

TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) declared a proclamation on 16 June 1958. In this proclamation the argument of “the latest resolution that Turkey accepted is the partition” was emphasized again. On the same day TBMM held a secret session about this issue and during discussions of this session, position of the Government was firstly supported by the opposition party leader İsmet İnönü and all other members of opposition and it was accepted unanimously.<sup>78</sup>

The leader of Cyprus Rum Community Makarios made the proposal of “independent Cyprus under the protectorate of UN” on September 1958. As the proposal began to be recognized in international arena, the second Macmillan Plan was accepted.<sup>79</sup> In the second Macmillan Plan two things appeared on the first Macmillan Plan were changed. These changes were to remove the regulations that representatives of Turkey and Greece would attend the council headed by the Governor and dual nationality. The first change was attributed to give more flexible working conditions for representatives. Second change was made to remove legal strains.<sup>80</sup>

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Prime Minister Konstantin Karamanlis met at Zurich to start negotiations between 5-11 February 1959. At the end of the meeting two states declared the Zurich Agreement in which they accepted the establishment of an independent republic in Cyprus. Representatives of Turkey, Greece and Britain and also the representatives of Turkish and Rum Communities signed London Agreement based on Zurich Agreement on 19 February 1959.<sup>81</sup>

With Zurich and London Agreements between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece other agreements were also signed. These agreements were: a) Establishment, b) Guarantee, c) Military Cooperation, d) Constitution of Republic of Cyprus.<sup>82</sup>

Among these agreements, in the Agreement of Guarantee, parties guaranteed to protect the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus with all its details.<sup>83</sup> What it meant was that if the constitutional order of Republic of Cyprus was attempted to be broken, Turkey, Britain and Greece would consult each other. On the other hand with the allowance of the Agreement of Guarantee, Turkey would unilaterally intervene to the Island when it is necessary to bring order. Also, according to the Alliance Agreement, Greece would have a right to keep 950 soldiers on the Island, while Turkey would have a right to harbor 650 soldiers.<sup>84</sup>

Along with the positive sides, this agreement had also negative impacts on Turkey. For instance, Turkey conclusively gave up from the most favorable choice which was the formal and legal annexation of the Island to territories of Turkey. Since after this agreement Cyprus became an independent state, it would not be possible for Turkey to directly affect developments in Cyprus. Nonetheless, in the context of the right to guarantee, Turkey had right to intervene to the Island when necessary. Menderes evaluated the final situation about the Island as follows:

*“We could not get Cyprus, however we neither gave it. We did not violate the interest of anyone. However, we did not make any concession on interests of our nation at all. Even though we did not realize the principle of partition, in the presence of you, I am very confident that we will provide the peace and stability in the Island as the reading of articles indicates the same principle.”<sup>85</sup>*

The Federal Republic was formally established as the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus entered into force. With this constitution, the Ministries of Health, Defense and Agriculture were left to Turks. President of the Republic Makarios was from the side of Rums, and Deputy President of the Republic Fazıl Küçük was from the side of Turks.<sup>86</sup> As it can be observed in this task sharing, mostly Rums had a voice in the administration. However, this order was not a long standing one. Since the foundation of

the Republic, Makarios tried to change the constitutional order. In addition to this, instead of preventing these attempts of Makarios, Britain supported him by proposing amendment in the 13<sup>th</sup> article of the Constitution. In the following years Britain always regarded Rums as the only representatives of Cyprus and supported them.<sup>87</sup> This attitude of Britain meant to ignore the agreements made in the 1959. Consequently the constitutional amendments made in 1963 removed the acquirements of Turks procured with Zurich and London Agreements. From this date on the conflicts between Turks and Rums were intensified, resistance of Turks against some Rums seeking independence of Island and President of Republic continued as the bloody terrorizing attacks of Rums went on until 1974.<sup>88</sup>

## Conclusion and Assessment

Consequently, Adnan Menderes period provided the most important incentives for the making of Turkish foreign policy, which are the security problem and the development of country by procuring the external aid.

Security was one of the foremost issues of the foreign policy for Menderes. The threat of Soviet Union made Turkey to develop closer relations with the West. Therefore, Turkey not only joined NATO, but also provided her security in the west and the east by involving in Balkan and Baghdad Pacts. The attempts for joining NATO, which were started by CHP government were realized after the heavy price of Korean War during DP government. Besides, joining NATO further increased the importance of Turkey on international stage. The security cordon of Turkey was not connected with only NATO. The sphere of this circle was widened by Balkan and Baghdad Pacts. In that period aids provided by USA also had an impact on Turkish foreign policy. For instance, while the Truman and Marshall aid was going on, Turkish foreign policy was obviously western oriented. In the last periods of Menderes government, when it became obvious that it was no more possible to get credits from the West, USSR was necessarily considered as an alternative. Thus Menderes planned an official visit to Moscow.<sup>89</sup> Nonetheless due to military coup happened in 1960 this could not be realized.

Close relations of Turkey with USA during the Menderes term affected relations with Britain, as well. According to Britain the geopolitical importance, military power, social structure and determined regime of Turkey were significant. Turkey was in the position of a bridge between the West and the East.<sup>90</sup> During DP government especially as it can be understood from the Suez Canal Crisis the Western oriented foreign policy of Turkey in the Middle East deteriorated foreign policies of Arab states towards Turkey. Turkey was called as “Gendarme of the Middle East” by the opposition in the Middle East.

The rapprochement with Greece established after Balkan Pact was increasingly deteriorated because of the growing Cyprus Issue. After 1955, the Cyprus Issue started to become one of the most problematic issues of Turkish foreign policy. Cyprus Problem affected not only the foreign policy but also the internal dynamics of Turkey. Even though this problem started during CHP period, it was crystalized in DP period. In this term despite the concessions made in terms of applying partition thesis of Turkey, after all Turkey adopted a successful policy. Consequently Adnan Menderes followed an active but a very risky foreign policy.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For further explanation: Cem Erođul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, Imge Kitabevi, 2.ed., Ankara, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Period,9, B.59, 02.04.1951, O:1, V.6, pp.66–76.

<sup>3</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term 10, I.3, 26.05.1954, V.1, pp.21–35.

<sup>4</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term 10, I.14, 14.12.1955, V.8, pp.251–253.

<sup>5</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term:11, I.10, 04.12.1957, V.1, pp.57–65.

- <sup>6</sup> Allied Powers: The block was formed by US, Britain and Soviet Union during WWII
- <sup>7</sup> Axis Power: The block formed by Germany, Italy and Japan during WWII
- <sup>8</sup> Süleyman Seydi, “1939-1945 Dönemi İç ve Dış Politika”, Osmanlı’dan İki binli Yıllara Türkiye’nin Politik Tarih: İç ve Dış politika, ed. Adem Çaylak, Mehmet Dikkaya, 2. Vol., Savaş Yayınevi, Ankara, 2010, pp.269–270.
- <sup>9</sup> Rıfat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih:1789-1994, 4.ed., Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1995, pp.630.
- <sup>10</sup> Uçarol, ibid., pp.637-638.
- <sup>11</sup> Uçarol, ibid., pp.645-650
- <sup>12</sup> Uçarol, ibid., pp.621–622
- <sup>13</sup> For further information: Kamuran Gürün, Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1929–1953), Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1991
- <sup>14</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, Soğuk Savaş, (trans. Dilek Cenkçiler), İstanbul, 2005, pp.281.
- <sup>15</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1990, pp.9.
- <sup>16</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi: 1914–1980, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 1983, pp.441–442.
- <sup>17</sup> Bağcı, ibid., pp.9-10.
- <sup>18</sup> Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih: 1918–1990, 2.ed., İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1991, pp. 204; Turkey became member of OEEC on 2 August 1961. For further information: <http://www.oecd.org>
- <sup>19</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.45.
- <sup>20</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm> 23.03.2011
- <sup>21</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Period 9, B. 17, 11. 12,1950, V.3, pp. 137–
- <sup>22</sup> Sönmezoğlu, ibid. pp.45.
- <sup>23</sup> Sedef Bulut, “Sovyet Tehdidine Karşı Güvenlik Arayışları: I. ve II. Menderes Hükümetlerinin (1950–1954) NATO Üyeliği ve Balkan Politikası”, Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, Number:41, May 2008, pp. 42.
- <sup>24</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Türk Dış Politikası, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, pp.45.
- <sup>25</sup> Bağcı, ibid., pp.27.
- <sup>26</sup> Bağcı, ibid., pp.33-38.
- <sup>27</sup> Sönmezoğlu, ibid., pp.47.
- <sup>28</sup> Mehmet Saray, Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye’nin NATO’ya Girişi;III. Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar’ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2.ed., Ankara, 2000, pp.143.
- <sup>29</sup> Gürün, ibid., Ankara, 1991, pp. 308–309.
- <sup>30</sup> Armaoğlu, ibid., 1983, pp. 521.
- <sup>31</sup> Oran, Baskın Oran, Türk Dış Politikası:Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, V.I:1919-1980, 11.ed., İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, pp.588.
- <sup>32</sup> Bağcı, ibid., pp.54.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid
- <sup>34</sup> For further information about this agreement: İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağlılıkları, V.II (1945-1990, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1991, pp.475-485; Mehmet Gönlübol, A.Haluk Ülman, “İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası:1945–1965”, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası:1919–1995, Siyasal Kitabevi, 9.ed.,Ankara,1996, pp.238.
- <sup>35</sup> For the articles of this agreement: Oran, ibid., pp.590.
- <sup>36</sup> Bulut, ibid., pp.47.
- <sup>37</sup> Oran, ibid., pp.591.
- <sup>38</sup> Oran, ibid., pp.616.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid
- <sup>40</sup> Oran, ibid., pp.616-617.
- <sup>41</sup> Oran, ibid., pp.617.
- <sup>42</sup> For detailed information in this case: Süleyman Özmen, Ortadoğu’da Etnik, Dini Çatışma ve İsrail, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık yy. 2001, pp.280–282.
- <sup>43</sup> Oran, ibid., pp.620-621.
- <sup>44</sup> On 28 March 1949, Turkey declared that she de facto regonizes Israel. For detailed informnation: Özmen, ibid., pp.261–268.
- <sup>45</sup> Cairo Ambassador Fuat Hulusi Tugay was relative of Egypt royal famil due to his wife. After the revolution, when the properties of royal family was nationalized, he criticized Nasser and in one reception they had a polemiV. After that Tugay was declared as persona non grata and he was departed. For detailed information: Oran, ibid., pp.621.
- <sup>46</sup> Özmen, ibid.,pp.288-289.

- <sup>47</sup> Bağcı, *ibid.*, pp.64.
- <sup>48</sup> Bağcı, *ibid.*, pp.64-65.
- <sup>49</sup> For the details of the Pact: Soysal, *ibid.*, pp.489-521.
- <sup>50</sup> For further information: Yaşar Canatan, *Türk Irak Münasebetleri*, Ankara 1996, pp.120.
- <sup>51</sup> Armaoğlu, *ibid.*, pp.624.
- <sup>52</sup> About the Dulles plan: Bağcı, *ibid.*, pp.80.
- <sup>53</sup> Tayyar Arı, , *Liderler Kanaat Önderleri ve Kamuoyunun Gözünde Yükselen Güç: Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu*, Bursa 2010, pp.28.
- <sup>54</sup> Bağcı, *ibid.*, pp.81.
- <sup>55</sup> Sander, *ibid.*, pp.241.
- <sup>56</sup> Sander, *ibid.*, pp.242-243.
- <sup>57</sup> Arı, *ibid.*, pp.29.
- <sup>58</sup> For further information: Saray *ibid.*, pp. 148.
- <sup>59</sup> Oran, *ibid.*, pp.632.
- <sup>60</sup> Uçaraol, *ibid.*, pp.737.
- <sup>61</sup> Saray, *ibid.*, s. 149.
- <sup>62</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1945'den Günümüze)", *Türk Dış Politikası: Cumhuriyet Dönemi*, ed. Mustafa Bıyıklı, V.2, Gökkuşbu Blimevi, İstanbul, 2008, pp.263.
- <sup>63</sup> Reports of the DP secret sessions Dönem IX, Volume 3, (20 May 1950), pp.34.
- <sup>64</sup> Bağcı, *ibid.*, pp.106.
- <sup>65</sup> Greece brought it into agenda of UN meeting on 24 September 1954. There were 30 positive votes against the 19 negative and 11 abstaining votes. Mustafa Albayrak, "Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları:1950-1960, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, sayı 46, V.XVI, March 2000, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2000, pp.252.
- <sup>66</sup> Sönmezoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 264.
- <sup>67</sup> TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 10, I.80, 12.09.1955, V.2, pp.623-629.
- <sup>68</sup> Armaoğlu, *ibid.*, pp.532.
- <sup>69</sup> Albayrak, *ibid.*, pp. 256.
- <sup>70</sup> Cumhuriyet, 20.Haziran 1956.
- <sup>71</sup> Zafer, 22 February 1957.
- <sup>72</sup> Albayrak, *ibid.*, pp.263.
- <sup>73</sup> Ayın Tarihi, sayı: 277. (Aralık 1957) pp.325.
- <sup>74</sup> Söylemezoğlu, *ibid.*, 266.
- <sup>75</sup> Oran, *ibid.*, pp.606; ayr.bkz. Sir Hugh Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, Hodder & Stanphoton, Harper and Row, London, 1964.
- <sup>76</sup> Oran, *ibid.*, pp.606.
- <sup>77</sup> A. Suat Bilge, "Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye- Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri", *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919-1995, Siyasal Kitabevi*, 9.bpp., Ankara 1996, pp.359.
- <sup>78</sup> Albayrak, *ibid.* pp.266.
- <sup>79</sup> Söylemezoğlu, *ibid.*, pp.267.
- <sup>80</sup> Bilge, a.g.m, pp.362.
- <sup>81</sup> Fikret Alaysa, "Türk Dünyasındaki Gelişmeler Işığında Tarihi Perspektiften Kıbrıs", *Kıbrıs'ın Dünü Bugünü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Ankara 1993, pp.63-77.
- <sup>82</sup> Bilge, *ibid.*, pp.368.
- <sup>83</sup> Armaoğlu, *ibid.*, pp.533.
- <sup>84</sup> Armaoğlu *ibid.*, pp.534.
- <sup>85</sup> Demokrat Parti Meclis Grubu Gizli Müzakere Zabıtları, Dönem; XI, V.258, (12 February 1959), pp.39-41.
- <sup>86</sup> Albayrak, *ibid.*, pp.271
- <sup>87</sup> Nasuh Uslu, "Türk Tarafı Açısından Kıbrıs Sorununun Boyutları", *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, Derl. Şaban H.Çalış, İhsan D.Dağı, Ramazan Gözen, Liberte Yayınları, Ankara 2001, pp.215.
- <sup>88</sup> Daha geniş bilgi için bkz. Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası, derl. Cüneyt Yenigün, Ertan Efeğil, "Kıbrıs Sorunu" Bölümü, pp.557-641, Nobel Yayınları, Ankara, 2010.
- <sup>89</sup> For further information: Oran, *ibid.* pp.519-521.
- <sup>90</sup> Yasemin Doğaner, *İngiliz Büyükelçiliği Yıllık Raporlarında Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'sinde Dış İlişkiler, Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi, Yıl 2, Sayı 4, Güz 2006*, pp.227-246.