When Aid Fails: The Unsuccessful U.S. Attempt to Coerce Turkey through Aid Prior to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

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Abstract: Amidst the multitude of analyses on the question of aid effectiveness, there remains a dearth of studies focused primarily on the aid-for-policy bargaining process itself. This is especially unfortunate due to the conclusions which could be drawn by analyzing specific instances of aid-for-policy failure. In this case study analysis, I will approach the question of aid effectiveness by examining U.S.-Turkish bilateral interactions leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite numerous attempts by the U.S. to gain access to Turkish military bases through coercive aid, Turkish acquiescence eluded U.S. diplomats, thus impacting the entire character of the war effort. Assessing effectiveness and the superiority of aid as a diplomatic tool requires an examination of both donor and recipient interests. In this case U.S. strategic and military interests remained myopic to such a degree that Turkish economic concerns and trepidation over potential losses of sovereignty were all but ignored in the U.S. diplomatic effort. This case demonstrates that a donor can invest less through foreign aid and achieve a similar or better end state compared to using other diplomatic tools or not seeking the goal at all.

Keywords: Foreign Aid, Coercion, Coalition of the Willing, United States, Turkey, Iraq

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Introduction

International relations scholars and policymakers alike have been critical of U.S. foreign aid policy since the earliest days of the Cold War. The steadily decreasing allotment of money and resources for foreign aid as a portion of the overall foreign policy budget over the past half century demonstrates the mainstream perception of aid’s usefulness as a tool of influence. The fiscally conservative Congress of the mid-1990s attempted to dismantle USAID completely, an effort which has seen new life in recent years despite USAID’s role as the very tip of the spear in U.S. foreign affairs efforts. In order to fully understand the role that aid plays in contemporary international relations, a cursory knowledge of the basic theory of aid as a political tool as described by the seminal works of the field like Morgenthau (1962), McKinlay and Little (1977) and Lebovic (1988) is required as well as a baseline definition of what constitutes policy effectiveness. Analyzing aid effectiveness is no different from analyzing any other international interaction. As money and resources are spent in order to achieve a political end, properly assessing effectiveness consists of examining costs versus benefits and the ultimate results of aid provision interactions.

An assumed component of analyzing aid effectiveness should naturally be the process associated with gaining policy compliance. Too often in the scholarly field and in policymaking circles, a myopic focus on end results has dominated analysis, rather than emphasizing the process by which the end result was arrived at. In order to properly draw conclusions about aid’s effectiveness as a tool of diplomacy, a deeper examination of individual cases to include instances of both success and failure is fundamental. Despite the contributions of scholars such as Richardson (1978) and Moon (1983) to an understanding of aid-for-policy interactions, a noticeable deficiency of contemporary analyses on instances of coercive aid failures continues to plague the field.

An examination of a more recent aid-for-policy failure such as the ill-fated U.S. attempt to gain compliance from Turkey prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq allows one to gain insight into the fragile nature of aid-for-policy bargaining and draw lessons about how to better employ aid for political and strategic purposes. The importance of these lessons cannot be overestimated. Given the history of the post-invasion stabilization efforts in Iraq, the coalition effort would have undoubtedly benefited from Turkish compliance with U.S. demands. This would have resulted in a more rapid stabilization of Iraq through tighter border control and thus preventing the influence of foreign elements in the subsequent insurgency.

But the theoretical significance of the failed U.S. effort to coerce Turkey through aid lies in its implications for the bargaining conception of aid provision as described by Moon (1983). The bargaining conception assumes that there are two autonomous states; each with their own policy preferences. In the absence of any coercive attempts on the part of the more powerful state, the weaker state will follow its own ‘baseline’ preferences, which may run counter to the interests of the powerful. The U.S. was attempting to coerce Turkey through aid to gain policy compliance but ultimately failed to alter the Turkish payoff structure. Thus Turkey followed its ‘baseline’ preferences and refused to concede to U.S. demands. The human costs from this breakdown in negotiations were immense. But this case serves as a real life demonstration of the bargaining conception of aid and provides valuable lessons for policymakers.

This paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the applicable questions and literature. Section II articulates the current theory. Section III presents a case study of the U.S.-led coalition of the willing in 2003, with special emphasis on U.S.-Turkish aid bargaining. Section IV examines the pertinent evidence and draws applicable conclusions.
Section I. Questioning Aid Effectiveness

When a nation has achieved either hegemonic or superpower status, the norms of foreign policy behavior change dramatically. The primary foreign policy objective when a state has reached the pinnacle of global power is the maintenance of its status. More important than any other aspect of this behavior is the practice of influencing weaker states. Influencing or coercing behavior from weaker states allows the first world nation to protect its interests at a minimum of resource expenditure while providing for long-term maintenance of the status quo. Quite often in the modern era of increased power projection, coercing aid recipients into supporting donor-led foreign policy initiatives comes at a price. The 2003 coalition established by the United States for the invasion of Iraq represents this type of foreign policy behavior.

In the world of power politics it is to be assumed that aid provision creates a system by which the preferences of weaker states will begin to mirror those of the dominant state over time. The descriptive names applied for this type of behavior throughout the literature include: political aid, coercive aid, bargaining aid, dependency aid, leverage, etc. Whatever title is applied, the same general principle is applied. By establishing an aid relationship in any form, the donor nation will naturally expect to gain long-term foreign policy advantages.

The practice of utilizing aid as a tool of coercion or influence of weaker states has a long history. In fact, what some have more blatantly referred to as political bribery was commonplace among major powers up to the early nineteenth century. However, as a younger nation, aid as a tool of foreign policy influence in the U.S. arsenal is a relatively modern development. While U.S. assistance in various forms existed previously, the post-World War II era provided the perfect storm of circumstances conducive for the use of aid. The ruins of Europe became the new battleground for the ideological Cold War and an enormous split between east and west quickly developed. In order to maintain the policy influence necessary to keep the Soviet onslaught in check, the U.S. devoted a vast amount of resources to the reconstruction of Europe. However, the United States’ history of providing assistance to recipients in order to gain foreign policy leverage is mixed.

It is because of these mixed historical results that the literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid remains divided. A great number of analyses of U.S. aid policy, such as Poe (1992), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2004), Lai and Morey (2006) remain limited in their approach, typically focusing on key aspects of the recipient such as regime type. The nagging problem of limited scope has also plagued researchers like Klare and Arnson (1981), Cignarelli and Pasquarello (1985) and Carleton and Stohl (1987) when examining the persistent issue of recipient human rights records. Studies that have explicitly proposed to analyze the effectiveness of aid as a political tool like Wittkopf (1973), Rai (1980), Kegley and Hook (1991), and Wang (1999), are likewise limited in scope, relying on United Nations voting records as evidence of successful U.S. coercion, or instead focusing on individual forms of aid rather than all forms of assistance like Sislin(1994). Previous analyses of aid effectiveness have suffered from the same limitations of scope that have kept the overall study of foreign aid effectiveness divided for a number of years. It is in this area that the value of employing case studies becomes quite apparent. Studies which are limited in scope also work under the premise of one-size-fits-all aid provision, which is a relative oversimplification of international interactions that inadvertently divides the field.

Beyond the methodological limitations of trying to seek an empirical picture of the aid-for-policy game, there has been a limited focus on the lessons which can be drawn from analyzing the manner in which the game is played. In other words, studying the repeated interactions between donor and recipient resulting in success or failure has not been a priority. Bruce Moon’s 1983 piece on the foreign policy of the dependent state is invaluable in this area, but applying a basic understanding of the bargaining process between donor and recipient to a more recent case can reveal a lot about aid effectiveness.

By maintaining a strong devotion to empirical approaches when analyzing aid effectiveness, the field has strayed away from the most fundamental approach, which involves basic questions of cost versus
benefit in order to determine aid’s utility as a foreign policy tool. For example, what is the value of a recipient conceding to donor demands? Is this concession less than or more than what the donor nation is willing to provide? What are the long-term effects of such an interaction? Can the donor nation count on compliance in the future without a similar provision of aid? Or has a new working friendship been established? This hypothetical set of considerations is naturally very simple, but through the use of case studies, it is possible to account for the largest number of contingencies in order to create an analysis of aid effectiveness that is appropriately broad enough in scale to draw genuine conclusions. The U.S. experienced various successes and failures while assembling the 2003 Coalition of the Willing for the invasion of Iraq. By focusing on an instance of failure (Turkey), we can reach tangible conclusions which would otherwise remain elusive if viewed strictly through an empirical lens.

Section II. A Theory of Effectiveness

Despite the divisions within the field over aid’s definitive utility in eliciting policy compliance, quantitative approaches in the literature have yielded excellent progress. Aid, as an incentive for recipients, has been successful in prompting compliance with donor demands. However, the quantitative work does have limitations because it has often been too narrow in focus to allow for a proper assessment of the bargaining process between donor and recipient. Establishing one-size-fits-all solutions for international interactions is a difficult prospect, and assessing the ramifications for the bargaining conception of aid provided to us by analysis of U.S.-Turkish interaction in 2003 necessitates the use of a case study. Case studies allow for a greater range of cost-benefit analyses over multiple instances on an extended timeline and provide leeway for alternative explanations. Most pertinent to this study, case studies allow us to compare aid’s effectiveness in achieving a policy outcome compared to the costs and benefits of relenting and not seeking the desired policy outcome at all.

While most scholars have correctly approached questions of aid effectiveness through the strictly political lens of as presented by Morgenthau, many have not addressed the relatively low costs associated with aid provision. In order to properly assess the value of aid, it is necessary to account for all possible investments of money and resources. Assessing effectiveness and the superiority of aid as a diplomatic tool requires an examination of both political and economic factors for both the donor and the recipient. I theorize that a donor can invest less through foreign aid and achieve a similar or better end state compared to using other diplomatic tools and such an end state is preferable to not seeking the end state at all.

U.S. efforts towards coercing Turkish participation building up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrate all of this. The graphic below represents the bargaining process between the U.S. (donor) and Turkey (recipient). When the baseline preferences of the weaker state run counter to the preferences of the more powerful state, an offer of aid may be used to elicit policy compliance.

Coercion Through Aid Provision

Donor offers aid

Target Accepts

Target Declines

Donor uses Force

Donor Sanctions

Donor Gives Up

This very simplified picture of how the bargaining through aid process works allows for an initial offer of aid, which can be accepted or declined by the potential recipient, followed by the choice of using other
means of coercion or admitting defeat. This portrayal of coercive aid represents only an initial stage in the overall bargaining process that policymakers must go through when seeking to influence targeted states. It does not account for repeated interactions which, taken altogether, create a more realistic portrait of how the game of aid provision works. It is here that case studies provide an advantage. One of the major assumptions of this study’s theory is that aid alters the payoff structure in an individual international interaction subsequently requiring a new cost-benefit analysis. These individual points in the bargaining process are more easily observable using case study methodology. Economic and political interests can be accounted for. Various alternative explanations can be used. And a feeling of how the two parties in the bargaining process truly perceived the policy disconnect can be attained.

The process of conducting a cost-benefit analysis after each repeated interaction mirrors the bargaining game scenario discussed by Richardson and Moon. Assuming that the aid-for-policy game can potentially encompass multiple interactions similar to the one graphically portrayed above, a true picture of how assistance can influence recipient behavior which previously did not exist begins to emerge. Analysis of multiple iterations of this game more closely resembles reality, and therefore represents an advanced approach to evaluation of the aid-for-policy bargaining process. U.S. interactions with the prospective members of the 2003 coalition were based around this idea of repeated cost-benefit analyses. Repeated offers of aid subsequently followed by acceptance or rejection on the part of the recipient will reveal aid’s power in altering the payoff matrix of bilateral interactions. An instance of failure, such as the attempted coercion of Turkey, can reveal a number of hypothetical scenarios where aid might have succeeded if attention to the basic premise of a bargaining game were paid.

Section III: The Coalition of the Willing

In stark contrast to the relative successes of aid-for-policy efforts throughout the globe from the end of World War II, throughout the Cold War, and in various regional interests in recent decades, the U.S. experienced mixed results throughout 2002 and early 2003 with regard to establishing a coalition for the invasion of Iraq. This is a result of the haste with which the U.S. pursued its policy objectives rather than a reflection of aid’s capacity for eliciting policy compliance. Turkey stands out among the recipients of U.S. assistance during this period because of: (A) its unwillingness to comply with U.S. demands (B) its geographic and therefore strategic significance to the war effort and (C) the mutually beneficial gains that would have been achieved if both sides had followed prudent strategies. At various points throughout the negotiation process, policy success was achievable, only to be derailed by failures on the part of both donor and recipient to perform a proper cost-benefit analysis with regard to long-term outcome expectations. The result of this breakdown in the aid-for-policy game, indicated in the model as the U.S. choosing to “give up”, was mutual losses for Turkey, the U.S., the war coalition, and the Iraqi people.

Coalition Types and Aid-for-Policy

Cooper (2005) identifies the 2003 Coalition of the Willing as a top-down coalition. That is, it was a coalition created by the leader of the policy initiative, which also happened to be the world’s lone superpower. The coalition can be characterized as one in which the leading nation (The United States) has primacy and autonomy. This is different from what Cooper (2005) calls bottom-up coalitions where international players come together as equals seeking to pursue a common policy initiative. A typical bottom-up coalition would be one concerned with issues such as third world hunger relief, anti-landmine initiatives, or environmental concerns.
Properly categorizing the 2003 coalition is important because it is pertinent to establishing exactly why it was created. Naturally, answers seem to vary throughout the literature with some claiming that the U.S. needed others to share a portion of the burden while others claim that the coalition was merely political appeasement in order to prevent international reputational losses. What is important and relevant to the current study is that the type of coalition that was formed is indicative of the extent to which the U.S. was willing to use aid as a tool for gaining support. While some nations were on board with the invasion of Iraq by their own volition (Great Britain), others required a significant amount of enticement. Ultimately, by whatever means the U.S. gained international support, all of the coalition members were subject to U.S. leadership, which epitomizes Cooper’s model of a top-down coalition. In order to properly understand the successes and failures of U.S. aid policy in the creation of the coalition of the willing, understanding the significance of the coalition type is vital.

Coalition type is also important in the case of the 2003 Coalition of the Willing because it is very telling about how the war effort played out. It is safe to assume that without widespread global support for an invasion of Iraq, the U.S. was forced to assemble an ad hoc coalition of its own and the countries that chose to join the coalition did so for their own differing reasons. One country may choose to join because it believes in the cause, while another may join simply to curry U.S. favor. For example, NATO candidate countries were far more likely to send troops to join the U.S.-led effort. The self-serving interests of these countries are obvious. Other nations were willing to join the effort strictly for the purpose of gaining greater access to U.S. economic and military assistance, a reflection of how aid alters the payoff structure for recipients and brings about policy compliance.

Gaining Tangible Support? Or Gaining Legitimacy?

In a number of instances, governments which expressed their support for the U.S. invasion did so at extreme domestic political peril. This includes such allies as the UK, Australia, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Japan. Nations that were already dependent upon U.S. aid as a significant portion of their GNP were the most easily influenced and quickly joined the coalition of the willing despite any political misgivings they might have had. This included a number of nations in the Middle East and Central Asia whose baseline policy preferences were in complete opposition to that of the United States. A number of African nations such as Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda also joined the U.S.-led coalition while receiving a significant amount of U.S. development assistance. The harshest critics of the Bush administration and this type of diplomacy made claims such as, “This ‘coalition of the coerced’ stands in direct conflict with democracy”. However, within the context of the basic theory of political aid as laid out by the seminal works of the field, this characterization of the U.S.-led aid effort simply is likely too harsh. The theory of political aid identifies aid as a diplomatic tool, a natural fact of power politics, and an assumed part of superpower behavior. Anderson, Bennis and Cavanagh (2003) successfully identify the complicated nature of the coalition of the willing at a very early stage. Because the coalition was a top-down coalition characterized by U.S. supremacy, questions about U.S. motivations invariably lead to questions about U.S. foreign aid provision techniques. Was it an attempt by the U.S. to shift the burden to others? Or was the U.S. simply saving face?

Cooper (2005) states that, “The U.S. maintained a hard security agenda and created a sense of urgency”. This harkens back to the aforementioned point that the U.S. was likely dead set on carrying out the invasion at all costs. Faced with significant levels of international condemnation for its proposed actions against Iraq, the U.S. was left on its own to establish an invasion coalition. The U.S. accomplished this by employing all diplomatic means available, to include economic, military, and political coercion. The result was a coalition comprised of 49 countries (which became 48 after Costa Rica dropped out) whose contributions to the U.S.-led cause ranged from verbal support, to non-combatant logistical support, to providing troops. Sharing the burden of work associated with an invasion, regime change, and
subsequent democratization of Iraq was really an afterthought relative to the potential international reputational losses the U.S. might have experienced had it carried out the invasion unilaterally. This is an important point because U.S. intentions would naturally be linked to the price the U.S. was willing to pay in order to gain international support for its Iraq initiative. Gaining international legitimacy at the lowest possible price however, was something that would come back to haunt the U.S. in its interactions with Turkey, an invaluable and strategically well-positioned country that U.S. diplomats underestimated.

Bringing Turkey on Board

International interactions of all types typically feature a limited role for the legislature and an even smaller level of impact for the general public of a participating state. This is a feature of power politics which has been in existence for a long time, and even democracies can usually be characterized this way. In 2001, Turkey had experienced its worst recession in 50 years. Never quite up to the European level of development, Turkey arguably had the most to gain or lose from the invasion of Iraq, depending on the course of events. Couple this with Turkey’s membership in NATO and strategic importance as a bordering nation, and it is easy to see why the U.S. assumed it would be an ally that could be easily bought through various means. However, the memories of Turkish lawmakers and the Turkish people ran long. The economic impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the resultant humanitarian/refugee crisis it created left a lasting impression in Turkey about the treacherous nature of the region. The vast majority of the Turkish people were opposed to the war in Iraq, and the threat of regional instability, as well as other international concerns, loomed large in their minds.

U.S. diplomats understood the severity of the matter, to a certain extent, and did not approach Turkey expecting it to be a readily willing ally. The diplomatic efforts of the United States were in fact underway for nearly a year before the invasion. U.S. military planners understood the hesitancy of Turkey with regard to participating in an invasion of Iraq after the dramatic aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. As early as September of 2001, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, Turkish Prime Minister- Bülent Ecevit was expressing concerns about including Iraq in the war against terrorism. In the minds of Turkish policymakers, an attack against Iraq would only destabilize the region and foster an environment conducive to the spread of terror. In July, 2002, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense had visited Turkey to discuss matters of regional stability and the U.S.-Turkish partnership in the GWOT. Although nothing was officially said at the time, it is presumed that the U.S. invasion plan was already in the works. In December of that year, Wolfowitz visited again in order to lay out the U.S. plan and left under the assumption that Turkish participation was “assured”. Given the long memories of the Turks with regard to the previous war in Iraq, it was naturally assumed from the beginning that Turkey would be on the receiving end of some sort of economic compensation package in the event of an invasion. Just how large such a package would be, would be the product of extensive negotiations over the months preceding the attack.

The actions of the Turkish parliament with regard to participation in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq stand out as something of an international relations anomaly. Most of the scholarly community in international relations accepts that foreign policy decisions made by any state are contemplated primarily within the office of that state’s executive, leaving little room for legislative input. This notion generally holds up for all theories of international relations, even those who attribute a high level of value to the sentiments of the general public in foreign policy decision making. Even when taking public opinion into account, decisions at the international level are made by unitary state actors, meaning that an executive, dictator, or monarch makes the final call. Therefore, despite Turkey’s obvious misgivings about military participation, it was not unreasonable that the U.S. was expecting Turkish involvement in the invasion following a January 31st, 2003, agreement by the Turkish National Security Council to present parliament with a resolution allowing for necessary military measures for protecting Turkish interests. While the
Turkish Security Council as well as the Turkish parliament were hopeful for a peaceful resolution, or at least international legitimacy for an invasion, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. reflected an assumption that Turkey would be an ally, willing or not.

The actions of the Turkish parliament during the buildup to the invasion and concurrent negotiations with the U.S. reflected a number of political complications present at that time. It is somewhat difficult from an American perspective to understand the difficulties associated with coercing Turkey into joining the coalition of the willing. The U.S. did not have to live through the resulting regional instability caused by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the concept of serious separatist movements is completely alien in the American experience. Despite the fact that Operation Desert Storm could be carried out under the guise of protecting a sovereign land from a foreign invader, economic issues were certainly at stake in 1991. Assuring regional stability in order to keep the energy pipeline moving was vital to American interests, and at the same time, the U.S. did not have to suffer any serious negative side effects from the destruction left behind. This was not the case for Iraq’s neighbor to the north.

Although the estimates put forth by Turkish officials are somewhat dubious, it is estimated that Turkey experienced an economic loss of somewhere between 30 and 100 billion dollars by closing its border during the 1991 Gulf War. While the U.S. was primarily concerned with protecting regional stability for the sake of keeping the energy flowing, Turkish concerns were similar, but even more severe. Migdalovitz (2003) points out the fears of Turkish officials with regard to not only the loss of energy, but also threats to foreign investment and even tourism, elements the United States did not have to concern itself with. The possibility of regional stability caused by an invasion, occupation, and regime change in Iraq would only naturally seem threatening to a country which was already living in fear of economic loss, as well as its own internal separatist movements. In the grand scheme of the long-term challenges associated with the invasion of Iraq, it turned out that regional stability and the significance of border security were even greater than what either country had expected. This will be discussed further below.

The Kurdish Problem

While the economic concerns of the Turkish government were important, perhaps no other issue stood out as much during the buildup to the invasion as the Kurdish problem. Following Operation Desert Storm, a Kurdish uprising against the Hussein government in Iraq led to a significant refugee crisis and the bolstering of Turkish fears of an independent Kurdish state. The geo-cultural region inhabited by the Kurdish people covers a land area which touches on both Turkey and Iraq. Fear of Kurdish separatism was immediately threatening to the Turkish government. Prior to 2003, the international community had already been sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, further exacerbating Turkey’s worries. If the 1991 Persian Gulf War was to serve as any indication of things to come, then the government in Ankara had good reason to worry about a potential loss of sovereignty caused by a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Indeed, as Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service, speaking before the House Subcommittee on International Organization, Human Rights, and Oversight in 2007, said:

“Turkey’s primary concern, however, is the disposition of the Kurdish region, particularly the possibility that the Kurdish region might try to become an independent state. Such an action, Turkey fears, could serve as further inspiration for separatism among Turkey’s Kurds, and would further jeopardize Turkey’s efforts to insist that the Iraqi Kurds expel guerrilla fighters from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that are present in some refugee camps in Northern Iraq. The three Kurdish inhabited provinces of Iraq – Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah – form a legal “region” in post-Saddam Iraq with its own administration, parliament, and security forces.”
At the end of Operation Desert Storm, the George H. W. Bush administration, as well as the international community, felt confident that expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, imposing harsh sanctions on Iraq, and creating a no-fly zone over northern Iraq would create a new regional order where incursions such as the one made by Hussein would no longer be tolerated or even possible. However, the intervening years between U.S. operations only exacerbated the plight of the Iraqi people while fanning the flames of Kurdish separatism in both Iraq and Turkey. The no-fly zone, which was meant to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq from possible Hussein reprisals, had served to bolster the confidence of Kurdish nationalists. The PKK, under the protective cloak of the no-fly zone, was able to establish its own autonomy to such an extent that Ankara began to perceive a threat to Turkish unity.30

Fears of a refugee crisis similar to 1991, fears of Kurdish separatism, and fears of regional instability would cause the Turkish government to be hesitant about assisting a country that they would normally have no problem standing behind. In fact, Turkey expressed specific problems it had with an invasion of Iraq prior to September 11th during the Clinton Administration when Iraqi regime change was suggested.31 More than any economic, political, or strategic issue pertinent to Turkey’s refusal to join the coalition of the willing, the threat of regional instability and a subsequent loss of sovereignty stood out as the most frightening.

Another fear which loomed large in the minds of Turkish government officials was that of a loss of sovereignty or some level of territorial control brought on by the presence of a foreign military. Whether a country is the target of a liberation effort (Iraq), or the potential takeoff point for an international coalition (Turkey), the fear of allowing foreign troops onto one’s soil is always palpable.

But perhaps even greater than the tangible political and strategic concerns a foreign presence might generate is the cultural impact of allowing such an invasive presence. Cagaptay (2003) noted in January of 2003 that, “Most Turks harbor suspicions toward any foreign military presence, taking pride in the fact that they have never been subjugated to outsiders”.32 Cagaptay does clarify the fact that the Turks would likely be more trusting of an American presence rather than a European presence given the history of U.S.-Turkish relations, as well as Turkey’s NATO membership. However, the military presence on Turkish soil would likely have been unprecedented in its overall size. This is a rather vague and indefinable concern on the part of the Turkish government and does not easily lend itself to an open and shut political analysis. It is perhaps because of this fact that the U.S. diplomatic effort was unable to reach the ultimately desired end state. Fortunately, the issue becomes easier to grasp when viewed through the lens of Turkish public opinion, which was staunchly opposed to the invasion of Iraq, and even more opposed to Turkish participation.

Negotiating with Turkey

Turkish public opposition to the war most likely came from somewhere in the often murky and abstract area of the political culture at the time. Divisions between the Turkish parties in power stymied the forward progress towards a mutually beneficial resolution of the issue between Turkey and the United States.33 This fact, coupled with a strong division between the executive and his cabinet and the parliament and the military created a perfect storm of resentment towards support of the U.S.-led effort. As noted earlier, it is very rare for a legislative body to be so heavily influenced by public opinion as to override the foreign policy preferences of an executive, but Turkey in 2003 is just such an instance. The vast majority of Turks at that time did not feel that Saddam Hussein was a menace to their own national interests, and thought that an invasion could only result in regional instability and Turkish losses economically and potentially in terms of sovereignty.34 By the time of the March 1st resolution, Turkish public opinion stood at 95% opposed to the invasion.35 And while such an example of public opinion overriding executive
foreign policy decision making is rare, it is likely a reflection of a number of facets of the civic culture of Turkey at the time. Where the Ecevit Government had been lukewarm about the prospects of an invasion of Iraq and the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which took over in November of 2002, appeared to have a very pro-American stance.\(^{36}\)

Unfortunately for U.S. military and strategic planners, the relative inexperience of this new government was not taken into account. Fragmentation throughout the Turkish government, the higher echelons of the Turkish military, the parliament, and the general public created an unusual storm whereby gaining a full commitment was going to be difficult. Widespread fears of the creation of a more dangerous situation in the region also played a role as did the intangible economic fears of the general public. But perhaps greatest of all was the public distrust and fear of the United States. A perception of a coming worst-case-scenario, combined with the view that the U.S. was seeking to transform the region in its own image through a “with-us or against-us” attitude built a public opposition which was too powerful for the Turkish government to ignore. The downside to this perception, for both the Turkish people and for the U.S. war effort, was that a deal might have been reached had the Turkish government conceded to U.S. demands or had the U.S. been willing to offer a larger assistance package.

The U.S. requirements of Turkey in the coalition, to be sure, would have been heavy. The U.S. would have needed Turkish forces to alter their own strategic posture with regard to northern border operations in order to gain Iraqi Kurdish cooperation for coalition efforts. This inherently bred mistrust of U.S. intentions within the Turkish military.\(^{37}\) Throughout late 2002 it became increasingly obvious that the U.S. was determined to carry out the invasion while the Turkish government felt the timeline for invasion was moving too quickly. Throughout all of this, the Turkish government indicated that it desired UN approval before supporting any invasion coalition.

The numbers associated with U.S. aid offers and desired troop deployments through Turkish soil vary greatly, even to the present day. Within the Turkish media, the wildly different reports about U.S. demands fueled an already burning dislike of U.S. war plans and did little to change public opinion. Early reports from December of 2002 varied from 15,000 to 40,000 troops on Turkish soil in exchange for 4 to 30 billion dollars in U.S. compensation. In January of 2003, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers visited Ankara and received a lukewarm response to his diplomatic efforts. The AKP-led Turkish government was indicating readiness, but on nowhere near the scale desired by the U.S. military. A U.S. promise of $2 billion in grants and $2 billion in loans was deemed insufficient by AKP leadership while a Turkish allowance of only 15,000 U.S. troops on Turkish soil was seen as unsatisfactory by U.S. military leadership.\(^{38}\)

In mid-February, 2003, a Turkish delegation visited Washington, D.C. in order to ask Secretary Powell for as much as $92 billion in aid as compensation for estimated losses over five years of war and occupation in Iraq.\(^{39}\) From the U.S. perspective, this was seen as hardball negotiating or even the Turks exploiting their strategic advantage to the detriment of U.S. war aims. However, from the perspective of the Turkish ruling party, an enormous aid package was seen as a prerequisite for gaining parliamentary support for a vote allowing U.S. troops on the ground. By the time of the March 1\(^{st}\), 2003, vote in the Turkish parliament, the Turkish National Security Council had not offered a firm recommendation concerning the strategic and military value of allowing American incursion into Turkish territory, and the results were disappointing for U.S. military planners and ultimately for the entire coalition.

By a vote of 264 in favor and 250 opposed with 19 abstentions, the measure to allow U.S. troops into Turkey in exchange for U.S. aid failed in the Turkish parliament by 14 votes.\(^{40}\) Reporting after the fact, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that an aid package in the range of $6 billion was offered with $4 billion in the form of economic aid which could then be leveraged to obtain $24 billion in loan guarantees.\(^{41}\) However, by this time the U.S. had already altered its invasion strategy. Eventually U.S. overflight rights were granted, but the major U.S. aid commitments had already disappeared. The resulting

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changes to the U.S. invasion plan had repercussions which lasted the duration of the war, occupation, and rebuilding effort. These will be discussed in greater detail below.

What Might Have Been

In the 2007 House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq, a number of questions were brought up concerning the inability of the U.S. to foresee the future. In particular, Representative Ron Paul of Texas took a different approach to the question of what might have been by bringing up analyses conducted by both the UN as well as the CIA indicating that an invasion of Iraq would be a much more costly endeavor than the Bush administration was anticipating. This type of after-the-fact critique however, is a moot point if the administration was already dead set on proceeding with the invasion. The more pertinent question with regard to the current study is what greater levels of participation on the part of U.S. allies might have meant for the success of the long term war effort. The anticipated Turkish participation in the invasion of Iraq would have led to some 62,000 troops, 255 warplanes, and 65 helicopters having access to Turkish bases. Military analysts believed that this level of strength would have allowed for an assault across Iraq’s northern border, subsequently leading to a significantly shorter invasion, thereby securing the country in a far more timely fashion. Given the subsequent fiasco associated with securing Iraq post-Saddam that U.S. lawmakers elaborated upon during the 2007 House Subcommittee hearing, reaching an agreement with the Turkish government would have proven invaluable in saving both money and lives.

Unfortunately the post-combat phase of U.S.-led operations in Iraq was not optimally planned for, perhaps as a result of U.S. overconfidence or perhaps attributable to ignorance of pertinent regional variables such as stability and anti-western sentiment. Even for a brief period following the success of combat operations in Iraq, a number of analysts had not yet fully grasped the imminent obstacles to securing peace. In his analysis of the breakdown of U.S.-Turkish negotiations leading up to the invasion, Salmoni (2003) was hampered by a lack of historical perspective when he optimistically concluded that:

“"A strong a priori assessment of the strategic map is also essential. Two operational fronts were not essential to OIF victory. One may conjecture that two fronts could have doubled combat casualties, fatal accidents, etc. The rapid success of American troops—slowed more by sandstorms and prudent field commanders than Iraqi forces—raises the question whether U.S. negotiators pushed Turkey too hard on a matter ultimately not mission critical, but guaranteed to spark acrimony."

Writing in 2003, Salmoni was focused entirely on the breakdown of negotiations rather than the possibility of a prolonged fight against insurgents throughout Iraq. From the perspective of quickly toppling the ruling regime, U.S. success in Iraq was immediate bordering on easy. The subsequent occupation and rebuilding of Iraq were a different story, one that might have taken a different course with Turkish participation.

Palka, Galgano and Corson (2005), writing from the perspective of political and military geography, emphasize that the subsequent difficulties after the official end of the Hussein regime might have been avoided through certain force multiplying measures undertaken by the U.S.-led coalition. After regime change in Iraq had occurred, the country became a popular destination among violent Jihadists and rapid stabilization became a desperate need. A larger sized force, or more pertinent to the current argument, an open northern front would have made the critical tasks of securing borders, stabilizing the country, and restoring order after the completion of combat operations significantly easier. Palka et al.
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(2005) also acknowledge that U.S. military planners were not ignorant of this fact. U.S. intelligence at the time indicated that the area of greatest need would not be in the realm of combat operations, but in securing Iraq afterwards to prevent the kind of insurgency that subsequently became a reality. This is a pivotal point when analyzing the significance of the breakdown in U.S.-Turkish relations.

Given the overall costs of the U.S. effort in Iraq, which according to the Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and Economic Outlook of 2010 totaled around $709 billion, the inability of U.S. forces to enter Iraq through a northern front may have been devastating. This possibility is further backed up by examining the cost timeline from 2003 through 2010 where an obvious difference exists between the costs of combat operations versus the costs of the occupation and stabilization effort. Border security became the most glaring difficulty during the occupation years, and the only way this could have rectified was through an appropriate change of strategy, i.e. additional troops (which was likely impossible given the U.S. strategic posture at the time) or a northern front into Iraq through Turkey allowing for quicker stabilization. Therefore, 50, 60, or even 70 billion dollars in grant compensation to Turkey would have been a drop in the bucket in the grand scheme of the operation, and yielded undeniable military and strategic benefits while saving countless lives during the recovery process.

Aid-for-Policy in Turkey in the Context of the Current Theory

As noted at the beginning of this case study, U.S. negotiations in establishing the invasion coalition of 2003 indicate the significance of the how aid alters payoff structures leading to new cost-benefit analyses. This theoretical point stands out compared to the other elements of the current theory, but the rest of the theory should not be ignored. Although bilateral interactions with Turkey were ultimately unsuccessful in attaining what the U.S. truly wanted and needed, hindsight does demonstrate aid’s relatively low cost, especially if the U.S. had considered other coercive means. Because of the healthy history of relations with Turkey, the U.S. could never consider any other option outside of aid for gaining Turkish support. While the negotiation process certainly strained bilateral relations between donor and recipient, employing other means for gaining policy leverage was never considered a viable option.

Therefore the major lesson to be taken from the failure in dealing with Turkey is the breakdown of the process itself and the implications of a lack of foresight when undertaking a major invasion of a country that was already accepted as a regional and even global hotspot. Putting aside moral judgments concerning the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, there are a few things that can be established as fact. Stability did not come easy, and foreign influence on the stabilization problem was a constant thorn in the side of U.S. policymakers in subsequent years. The difficulties associated with an inability to account for foreign influence (insurgents, Jihadists, terrorists, freedom fighters, whatever name one chooses to apply) are directly connected to the inability to control borders, the inability to quickly install an interim government which would be responsible for managing the continuing affairs of Iraq, and the inability to quickly reconstruct and consolidate Iraq as a democracy. The presence of a subversive foreign element in Iraq can be tied to the U.S. failure to negotiate equitable terms with Turkey. The 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrates aid’s power in averting catastrophe at a high level.

From a purely economic viewpoint, the failure to conclude negotiations with Turkey leading up to the invasion of Iraq was detrimental to the U.S. war effort as a whole. Changing payoff structures and cost-benefit analyses should have directed the U.S. to continue offering more aid to the Turks in exchange for their support. While alternative means such as sanctions or force were off limits when dealing with Turkey, this case demonstrates that the “give-up” option also carries significant costs. Although these costs are obviously the most difficult to quantify, choosing the option of giving up in any international interaction will clearly have ramifications later when coping with the extreme uncertainties of the future. The uncertainty of the future was not completely ignored by U.S. and Turkish policymakers. While the
scale of the insurgency effort and the influence of foreign elements may not have been completely understood, it was widely known, even within the upper echelons of the U.S. military that a continuing struggle against insurgents was a possibility. The subsequent U.S. fighting against insurgents in places like Najaf, Karbala, Sadr City, and Fallujah all serve as examples of how the U.S. military underestimated the scale of the insurgent war and the threat of foreign elements. The cost of this fighting in both resources, lives, and the intangible battle to win hearts and minds cannot be concretely estimated. But in the context of this theory, it is not difficult to see how the breakdown of negotiations with Turkey had a ripple effect in succeeding years.

The conclusion to be drawn from the U.S. assemblage of the invasion coalition in Iraq is that haste and improper cost-benefit analysis are killers. The losses suffered by the U.S. in material and manpower were significantly higher than the costs of an aid package to secure Turkish support. Then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki was hesitant about the war plan because he believed a greater force was necessary. Unfortunately U.S. political leaders did not share his cautious outlook. This point is understandable given the relative ease of toppling Hussein’s military forces, but the insurgent war triggered by the instability of Iraq and porous nature of its borders clarified the true nature of what an invasion of Iraq entailed. This represents a hard learned lesson for U.S. diplomats about what aid means not just in bilateral negotiations, but potentially to the entire U.S. strategic posture towards a region.

In U.S. policymakers’ defense, the blame does not lie entirely with them. The tenet of a new cost-benefit analysis associated with international interactions and offers of assistance clearly points to a failure for Turkish policymakers as well. Much like D.C., Ankara was overly confident in its bargaining power and complete indispensability for the U.S. effort to the point that they believed they could demand any price for compliance with U.S. demands. In economic terms, this cost Turkey dearly. Perhaps their motivations were compounded by U.S. arrogance, or perhaps the unusual impact of public opinion on parliamentary decision making led to Turkish refusal to comply. Whatever the exact cause of the breakdown of negotiations was, neither side won.

The coalition created for the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrates the importance of aid in creating international support for otherwise unpopular policy initiatives, avoiding international reputational losses, and potentially gaining military advantages which can have long term positive impacts. While it is a negative instance (The Turkish government refused the aid, refused to comply with U.S. demands, and the U.S. refused to increase the size of the aid package being offered), hindsight provides support for the theory of the current study. Quantifying the military value of having full Turkish support is difficult, but given the overall costs associated with what became a long and expensive military effort on the part of the U.S., the ramifications of Turkish non-compliance were likely severe. Amid the hundreds of billions that were spent in carrying out the long term war effort in Iraq, an increase in the size of the aid package being offered to Turkey would likely have been marginal. The myopic failure of the U.S. to offer an adequate aid package to Turkey could be chalked up to hubris, or perhaps a misunderstanding of the Turkish political climate at the time as well as an incorrect appraisal of what lay ahead in Iraq. Whatever the reason, this case exemplifies the idea that diplomatic aid provision can alter the payoff structure for recipients to such a degree that their compliance with donor demands becomes guaranteed, resulting in high yield payoffs for the donor in the long run.

The U.S.-Turkish negotiations prior to the invasion best illustrate the theoretical tenet of the current study that individual international interactions require subsequent cost-benefit analyses. For the entire second half of 2002, Turkey sought to engage the US. In hardcore bargaining to maximize its own strategic and geographic leverage, playing off of what it considered to be its own indispensability to U.S. intentions. U.S. policymakers looked upon Turkish obstinate resistance as pure exploitation of the coalition war strategy without devoting enough energy to understanding: (A) Turkish fears and hesitations regarding the consequences of the invasion; (B) the long-term ramifications of failing to open a two-front war and (C) the costs versus the benefits of continuing the aid-for-policy game. U.S. policymakers, beginning with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz truly took Turkish support for granted in a policy
game where doing so with a potential recipient already holding a great deal of policy leverage is a dangerous and shortsighted mistake.

Section IV. Lessons

Reflecting on what went right, what went wrong, and the things that might have been during America’s involvement in Vietnam, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara bemoaned the lack of support from key allies in the war saying, “If we can’t persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we better reexamine our reasoning.” This is a telling statement from a man who was pivotal in the development of U.S. strategic policy for several years during the Cold War. Essentially, coercive foreign policy is often more than a statistical tally of numbers on development, or compliance within international organizations, or trade levels or any other go-to indicator of successful influence. Winning hearts and minds matters. In the context of this article McNamara’s assertion that a failure to bring like-minded nations on board with a foreign policy initiative is grounds for rethinking the initiative itself should not automatically be taken as an indictment of the invasion of Iraq. Rather, the lesson to be gained from McNamara’s experience in this study is on the difficulties of bargaining and influencing when diplomacy is approached with a closed mind and an inflexible resolve to carry out the mission only on one’s own rigid terms.

By failing to fully comprehend the Turkish stance on another war in Iraq, the U.S. effort suffered when it didn’t have to. And the posture of the recipient state in this particular case was reflective of more than just the will of the government. Turkey’s position on the invasion was the result of political, economic, and social factors involving the Security Council, the Parliament, the military, and the people. To say that U.S. diplomats drastically underestimated how obstinately Turkey would resist U.S. efforts at compulsion is an understatement. By failing to satisfy recipient demands and stubbornly moving forward with such hubris, the U.S. created problems that were otherwise avoidable. Conversely, Turkey suffered for its own resistance when it could have profited.

U.S.-Turkish interactions in 2003 provide us with a natural experiment in aid-for-policy bargaining. Compliant behavior, according to Richardson (1978), is the function of an external rather than internal process. In the case of the U.S. and Turkey, the internal position (Turkey’s) was quite strong and the external forces (from the U.S.) could not overcome it. Therefore, this case exemplifies the process and opens the doors for further research. In particular, additional case study evidence on instances of success and failure should provide the groundwork for follow-on empirical analysis of aid successes and failures. Formal modeling of the shifting payoff structures involved in the aid bargaining process will further elaborate how and when failures in this type of diplomacy occur. The ramifications of this type of research can potentially transform U.S. aid policy into a better refined weapon of diplomacy and prevent future bargaining failures.

Notes


Ibid., p.315.


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34Cagaptay, Soner. “Why Are the Turks Hesitating on Iraq?” 1.
37Ibid., p.2.
38Ibid., p.3.
39Hale, William M. Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. 95.
41Migdalovitz, Carol. “Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues,” II.
44Salmoni, Barack. “Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 4.
47Ibid., p.15.
49Park, Bill. “Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq,” 12.