

Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The Evolution of NATO's Security Agenda

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Abstract: *With the end of the Cold War, NATO's function has become a significant puzzle for world politics and the International Relations (IR) discipline. Numerous studies have been developed on this puzzle, which approach the issue from different theoretical and descriptive angles. This article fits in this literature via focusing on the security conception of the organization. Hence, the purpose is to analyze NATO's post-Cold War endurance, while linking the 'theory' with the 'practice' of security. Empirically, the article focuses on three post-Cold War Strategic Concepts of NATO in a comparative manner. Theoretically, it utilizes the three questions that are generated by critical approaches to security: What is security (security agenda) according to NATO? Whose security (referent object) does NATO act for? What are the means to be employed to secure the referent object for NATO? While comparatively analyzing NATO's post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (in November 1991; April 1999; November 2010) with these questions, the article presents detailed empirical data on NATO's changing post-Cold War security conception; hence, its endurance. The article concludes with insights on the changing and remaining parts of NATO's security agenda.*

Keywords: *NATO, Strategic Concepts, Critical Security Studies, Security Conceptions, post-Cold War*

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Introduction

Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has been the major institution to provide security for the Euro-Atlantic area. During the Cold War, NATO's major function was defined in terms of defense against the Soviet threat. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO faced a broader question: "Whether NATO was necessary at all, and if it was, then for what?"¹. As argued in this paper, it was not a coincidence that NATO has turned towards its security conception. NATO has found a new necessity for itself through redefining and broadening its security conception. Hence, the paper seeks to establish a correspondence between the redefinition of "what security is" for NATO and the post-Cold War academic debates that criticized the Cold War security conceptions' "marriage to the superpower rivalry"².

This article, utilizing the questions that are generated by critical approaches to security, asks three questions to understand NATO's post-Cold War security agenda: What is security according to NATO (security agenda)? Whose security does NATO act for (referent object)? And what are the means to be employed to secure the referent object for NATO (policies)? Comparatively analyzing NATO's three post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (in November 1991; April 1999; November 2010) with these questions, the article presents detailed empirical data on the NATO's changing post-Cold War security conception; hence, its endurance. In order to bridge the 'theory' and 'practice' of security, the article is divided into two main parts: one theoretical, and one empirical. The former provides a brief overview of the evolution of security studies, while the latter presents an empirical analysis of the three post-Cold War Strategic Concepts to clarify the evolution of the security conception of NATO. The study concludes with an overall discussion in the light of its key findings.

From Traditional to Critical: An Overview of the Security Studies Literature

A vast number of studies provide reviews on the emergence and evolution of the security studies as a discipline, and the immediate post-Cold War debates within the literature³. In their comprehensive review of the emergence and development of Critical Security Studies (CSS), Bilgin et al.⁴ explained that Security Studies (SS), as a distinct field of study, has its roots in the Cold War era. Security studies during the Cold War mainly focused on the security of the 'state' and on prescriptions to overcome external-military threats to its security⁵. It was not until the late 1970s that alternative ways of security studies emerged. Those alternative views⁶ were critical of the statist and military-oriented security conception of the Cold War. They emphasized the need for change in the then-mainstream understanding of and thinking about security and peace⁷.

In particular, the 'Alternative Defence School' and 'Academic Peace Researchers' have emphasized "the increasing inappropriateness of established ways of thinking about security given the security concerns of individuals and social groups in the West"⁸. Similar concerns were also shared by the proponents of the Third World security approach who emphasized that the Cold War security conceptions of the developed world (the West) were not appropriate to analyze the security needs of the developing world (Third World). They have further emphasized the need to get beyond militarized definitions towards a broader conceptualization of security that would allow researchers to analyze the inequalities and security problems that result from the international economic structure. They criticized the Western security conception for being inappropriate because of its emphasis on external military threats whereas the major threats that are faced by the regimes of the developing world were those coming from internal sources⁹.

Although these alternative views remained in the margins of the field throughout the Cold War era, the challenges provided by them have been of particular influence to the emergent CSS

literature in the post-Cold War era. By the end of the Cold War, scholars had already started to question the then-conventional conceptualization of security. Scholars that have a critical approach to security seized the “opportunity presented by the disappearance of the Soviet threat to broaden the security agenda and to point to threats faced by individuals and social groups”¹⁰. Such studies had constructed the bases of post-Cold War security studies that have questioned the dominant security conceptions.

The alternative voices have generated a number of debates “over such issues as the definition of security, the appropriate referent for security, the methodology by which security should be studied, and the agenda for security in the 1990s and beyond”¹¹. In a general sense, the emergent post-Cold War theoretical debates were on: the need to ‘broaden’ the security conception; the securitization theories of the so-called Copenhagen and Paris Schools; the debates on the proper referent object of security and the Aberystwyth School Critical Security Theory; and the agents that act for security¹².

With regard to broadening the security agenda, Buzan and the other members of the so-called Copenhagen School introduced the theory of ‘Sectors,’ ‘Regional Security Complexes,’ and ‘Securitization’¹³. They have argued that the security conception should get beyond the military sector and include new sectors (economic, societal, environmental, and political) in its definition. The post-Cold War era encompass complex and serious “threats such as environmental degradation, overpopulation and intra-state ethnic conflicts”; hence, the military focus of strategic studies of the Cold War period had become inadequate to analyze such post-Cold War developments that require a definition which should encompass the interdependence of all five sectors¹⁴. The Copenhagen School, beside their arguments on a broader security agenda, started to analyze the power of the ‘national security’ concept. Buzan pointed out that national security is a powerful concept that can be utilized as an instrument to mobilize extraordinary social and political activities¹⁵. Accordingly, in their theory of securitization, they have asked questions regarding how the concept of security is used politically¹⁶. Through ‘speech act’, both military and non-military issues can be put in the security agenda and presented as threats to the national security; hence generate situations of urgency and mobilize ‘extraordinary measures’¹⁷. Thus, they have questioned the definition of security by emphasizing the need to a broader approach that “includes threats such as human rights violations, social injustice, environmental degradation and economic deprivation” -threats that had not generally been addressed by statist (defined below) analysis¹⁸. In general, the proponents of the Copenhagen School have questioned ‘what security is’.

It was argued that “broadening the research agenda alone is not satisfactory so long as our conception of security continues to privilege the state, regarding it as the sole legitimate focus for decision-making and loyalty (that is, statism)”¹⁹. In ‘statism’, that is a security conception which claims that security is for the state (taking it as both the referent object and the agent of security), the state is assumed to provide security to its citizens²⁰. The ‘deepening’ debate challenged statism through proposing new ‘non-state’ referents of security including the individuals, and/or social groups²¹. The question of “Whose security?” gained importance in this period²². In addition to the broader approach to security that questioned “What security is”, this group of studies have questioned “Who/what the agent of security is” and “Whose security does that agent act for?”

As Bilgin et al.²³ have explained, security is a ‘derivative’ concept. That is, “our conceptions of security depend on the particular philosophical world-view we adopt. It is these philosophies that tell us (...) whose security we should be concerned with, and how their security may be achieved”²⁴. Cold War studies were derived from a Realist world view that put state at the center of its analysis. Alternative views emerged during the Cold War but they remained in the margins. It is the end of the Cold War that these alternative philosophies increased their voice. “When conceptions of security are derived from these alternative philosophical perspectives, very different understandings -of referents,

agendas and policies for example- emerge²⁵. Building on the questions that are posed by the above-mentioned critical approaches to security, the following part of the paper analyzes the changing post-Cold War security conception of NATO.

NATO's post-Cold War Endurance: What has been said so far?

Many studies during the immediate post-Cold War era have focused on the future of NATO and made predictions about its endurance. However, the Cold War ended and NATO not only endured but also expanded towards the Central and Eastern European countries. The endurance of NATO created new questions such as: "How was NATO adopting itself for the post-Cold War era? How did the organization justify its endurance?" Such questions have been answered by several perspectives, including (Neo)Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.

The Realist perspective, building on the 'Balance of Power', emphasized that NATO was founded under hegemonic rivalry between two great powers, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has lost its *raison d'être*²⁶. However the continued endurance of NATO presented a critical challenge for such argument, showing, in Risse's words, "the indeterminacy of Realism"²⁷. Challenging the conventional realist understanding, Risse²⁸ presents a number of empirical examples to show that NATO is alive and adopting to the post-Cold War era. He emphasizes that with the end of the Cold War, NATO has built-up "rapid reaction corps for out-of area purposes"; established close ties with the Eastern European countries; and entered into peace-keeping activities in the former-Yugoslavia. Through utilizing what he terms "Liberal-Constructivism", Risse²⁹ argues that NATO "represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community and a collective identity of liberal democracies". He further argues that due to this collective identity based on common liberal values; NATO will continue its existence.

As Williams and Neumann³⁰ summarize the Social Constructivist perspective points out that "NATO did not fragment as Neorealists had predicted because the shared democratic norms and identities of the members meant that they did not perceive each other as threats with the end of the Cold War". Other social constructivist accounts have focused on the "symbolic power" of NATO, its identity re-construction and self-representation³¹. Williams and Neumann³² argued that NATO has reconstructed its identity "as an organization whose essential identity and cohesion was based upon common cultural and civilizational bonds, not primarily upon a shared military threat posed by the Soviet Union". Klein³³ argues that threats do not independently exist 'out there' but are constructed by the way actors construct and present their own identities. Thus the disappearance of the Soviet threat did not necessarily mean that NATO will lose its justification to endure.

Existing explanations of NATO's post-Cold War endurance have either focused on the impact of the international structure on NATO or the norm-based identity of NATO while they have not dealt with the organization's security conception in detail. However, given the fact that NATO is a security organization, an emphasis on the changing security definitions are key in explaining its *raison d'être*. It is the attempt of the next section, to deal with the reformulation of NATO's post-Cold War security conception.

Through a Critical Security Lens: Changing Security Conception of NATO in the Post-Cold War

Security is a contested concept. It neither has a single meaning nor a static one. Instead the concept is being constructed through the meanings that actors attribute to it -meanings that are always open to

change. This meaning attribution process establishes a specific context, upon which agendas, referent objects, and policies of security are built. That specific context, as argued by this paper, can be clarified by answering the following questions: What is security in NATO's Strategic Concepts (agenda)? Whose security does NATO act for (referent)? And what are the means to be employed to secure the referent object for NATO (policies)?

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NATO defines three key periods in the evolution of its Strategic Concepts³⁴. The first is the 'Cold War period' in which the primary focus was military measures against state-centric threats and policies characterized defense and deterrence. In the second, 'the immediate post-Cold War period', a broader approach was brought in that emphasized further cooperation as a means to promote peace and stability and NATO engaged in crisis management operations. The third period, post-9/11, brought new issues such as 'fight against terrorism', 'energy security', and 'cyber-attacks' into the agenda. In the post-Cold War era, three Strategic Concepts were announced (in November 1991, April 1999, and November 2010).

In the Strategic Concept of November 1991, NATO explains that "all the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West"³⁵. Thus, the Cold War sources of political hostilities and "military confrontations" have been overcome. With regard to the changing strategic environment NATO makes a case for a reconsideration of its role both in terms of its "security identity" and "defensive purposes" in order to see the "positive changes mentioned above have come to fruition"³⁶. NATO also states that the new Strategic Concept will be reconsidered and reformulated in a progressive manner according to the "security challenges and risks" that may arise in the future³⁷. When NATO's existence is understood in terms of the security needs of its allies, this phrase shows that it will continue to exist through (re)defining "new security challenges and risks" as imminent. Understood in this way, NATO makes a case for its existence through defining new threats, security challenges and risks³⁸.

The challenges defined in the second part of the 1991 Strategic Concept³⁹ also answer the first question (What is security according to NATO?). NATO clarifies that the risk of a "full-scale military attack" that would come from the former Eastern Bloc has been minimized. However, Europe faced "multi-faceted" and "multi-directional" risks. These risks include "the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe"⁴⁰. NATO obtains a duty to prevent those instabilities because of the potential risk they carry for its European members. NATO states that "alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage"⁴¹. Alliance members are urged to cooperate with each other and coordinate their activities to deal with such threats⁴². It is argued that the nature of the new strategic environment necessitates "a broad approach to security"⁴³. It is pointed out that although the fundamental tasks of NATO presented in the 1949 Washington Treaty remains⁴⁴, the security conception has been broadened. As NATO states, "it is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defense dimension"⁴⁵.

The Strategic Concept is also clear with regard to the referent object of security. In the broadest sense, NATO refers to the security of the 'alliance' constituted of North America and Europe (NATO 1991, Article 16). However, throughout the whole Strategic Concept NATO makes clear that its security conception refers to the member states of the alliance. In particular NATO refers "to security amongst the members of the alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other"⁴⁶. NATO refers to 'collective security' as a broad framework that is constituted of member states. In terms of both agency and referent object the security conception of NATO remains both statist and state-centric. With regard to the policy to

secure the member states, while respecting each member state's sovereignty, NATO urges its member states to act in "collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives"⁴⁷. The means to realize this collective effort are presented as follows: "the maintenance of a military capability (...); an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations"⁴⁸. Thus, the 1991 Strategic Concept broadened the security concept of NATO to include other sectors of security while the referent object still remained the same. The broadened definition of security has been followed by a change in the means that are to be employed. NATO emphasized the need to enter into dialogue with former members of the Communist bloc, increased cooperation with other European security initiatives⁴⁹, and develop high-mobility forces to prevent (and if necessary, intervene) risks that might emerge out of the political and ethnic crisis in Central and Eastern European countries⁵⁰.

After appreciating the post-Cold War adaptation of NATO, the 1999 Strategic Concept mentions that there have been "further profound political and security developments" since 1991⁵¹. The alliance still remained committed to ensure the freedom of the member-states, to "prevent war", to its role in arms control, and "to deal with immense human suffering created by conflicts in Balkans"⁵². New issues were incorporated to the security agenda in line with the developments in the passing decade "including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction"⁵³ which present risks to the overall stability and peace of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The concept re-affirms the essential purpose of NATO, as defined by the Washington Treaty, "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means"⁵⁴. Different from its 1991 Concept, the alliance presents that the stability and security of its members also benefits the partners that the organization entered into dialogue with. The Concept also makes a clear-cut definition of security as referring to a stable Euro-Atlantic environment "based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force"⁵⁵. The fundamental security task of NATO is "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state". Crisis management (in terms of conflict prevention including response operations when necessary) and partnership (in terms of the promotion of "wide ranging dialogue with other states in the Euro-Atlantic area")⁵⁶ are presented as means to ensure stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area⁵⁷. The broader security understanding of the 1999 Concept in general reaffirms the 1991 Concept. However some new threats such as "sabotage and organized crime", "acts of terrorism", "uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people" as a consequence of armed conflict, are included in the security agenda⁵⁸. There is more emphasis on the spread of technology and on nuclear non-proliferation⁵⁹.

The referent object of security still remains to be the Euro-Atlantic area in general and member-state security in particular⁶⁰. However it is possible to observe a slight change in terms of means to achieve security. There is more emphasis on the openness of NATO for enlargement (Article 26 and 39), and the need for cooperation and dialogue with other states and institutions (Articles between 33 and 38). The Concept also mentions the possibility of force deployment in crisis areas and that the military forces "must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations"⁶¹. In general, it is possible to argue that if the 1991 Strategic Concept represented a broadening of what secure is (security agenda), the 1999 Concept represents an increase in the means to achieve security (policy). However, although it is possible to observe some reference to the security of non-NATO countries, the referent object of security still remains to be the state (being the alliance member-states).

NATO experienced important developments in the following decade, including the incorporation of new members to the alliance⁶², the 9/11 attacks, international terrorism and nuclear proliferation; and the deployment of UN led ISAF force in Afghanistan⁶³. The recent Strategic Concept⁶⁴ incorporates NATO's evolution in this decade, and mentions that NATO is well equipped to deal with the threats posed by the global era. "These threats include for instance the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber-attacks and fundamental environmental problems"⁶⁵. The emphasis on new issues such as cyber-attacks⁶⁶ and fundamental environmental problems⁶⁷ are novel. Thus, NATO continues to incorporate new issues to its agenda in line with the evolving security environment. The core tasks of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security have also been restated in the Strategic Concept. NATO also mentions that it will continue to redefine its security conception in the future⁶⁸. Enlargement still continues to be among the means to promote security. The organization restates its commitment to "open-door policy" in line with the goal of "a Europe whole, free, at peace"⁶⁹.

NATO also assumes a responsibility for "international peace and security"⁷⁰. The threat perceptions have been redefined in a global scale that incorporates not only Central and Eastern Europe but other regions⁷¹ as well⁷². While emphasizing the risk of terrorism, NATO makes significant emphasis on "nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons" and non-proliferation⁷³. Promoting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is presented in terms of NATO's attempts to promote international security⁷⁴. One might observe that both the security agenda (incorporation of new threats such as cyber-attacks⁷⁵, climate change and international terrorism) and policies (further cooperation with Russia and other regions, the need for further enlargement) of NATO keep expanding in the latest Strategic Concept (See Table 1).

Table 1: NATO's Evolving Security Conception			
	1991 Strategic Concept	1999 Strategic Concept	2010 Strategic Concept
What is security in NATO's Strategic Concepts (agenda)?	<p><i>The Cold War ideological sources of political hostilities have been overcome. "New security challenges and risks" emerged and a broader approach to security is needed:</i></p> <p>Security has political, economic, social, and environmental elements. Threats like economic social and political instabilities in the Balkans, ethnic rivalries and political disputes, and weapons of mass destruction are included in the definition.</p>	<p><i>Further profound political and security developments have emerged in the last decade. New issues were incorporated to the security agenda. A more detailed broader security agenda:</i></p> <p>Human suffering in the Balkans, oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sabotage and organized crime, illegal migration, spread of technology to the terrorist organizations</p>	<p><i>Important developments have emerged in the 2000s such as incorporation of new members to the alliance, the 9/11 attacks and the deployment of UN led ISAF force in Afghanistan. NATO Assumes Responsibility for International peace and Security. Threats are not only regional but Global:</i></p> <p>Nuclear proliferation, global terrorism, cyber-attacks, global environmental problems (climate change, health risks, water scarcity, global warming), energy security</p>
Whose security does NATO act for (referent)?	<p><i>In general:</i> The security of the alliance(Euro-Atlantic Region)</p> <p><i>In particular:</i> The security of the member-states</p>	<p><i>In general:</i> The security of the alliance(Euro-Atlantic Region)</p> <p><i>In particular:</i> The security of the member-states</p>	<p><i>In general:</i> International security</p> <p><i>In particular:</i> The security of the member-states</p>
What are the means to be employed to secure the referent object for NATO (policies)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increased cooperation among and collective effort of the member states -High mobility military forces to prevent political instabilities in the Balkan region -Dialogue with former Soviet Republics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -A shift from dialogue with former soviet republics to openness of NATO for enlargement -Increased cooperation with other European security initiatives such as CSCE, European Community, Western European Union and the United Nations -NATO operations might also include partners and other non-NATO nations -Force deployment in crisis regions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Open-door policy in order to reach "a Europe whole, free, at peace." -Further enlargement -Further cooperation with Russia -Promoting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation -Increased international cooperation

The previous pattern of broadening threats to security, increasing and intensifying the means to deal with them has continued. However, it is not possible to claim that the referent object of security has changed. Although the concept continuously refers to “international security” it seems to be presented as the end result of its members’ security. In other words, NATO argues that if the existing threats are dealt with it would not only increase its member states’ security but also serve the international security. In the end of the Strategic Concept, NATO presents its core values⁷⁶ as “universal and perpetual” and its major aim “to safeguard the freedom and security of its members”⁷⁷. Member states security is still the primary referent object of security.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War security studies have clarified the contested nature of the concept of security and called for alternative definitions. In line with those studies, this article is built upon the argument that these definitions are constructed and always open to change. Thus, it argues that any study analyzing the security definitions of an actor, should focus on the answer of three questions: What is security? Whose security? What are the means to achieve security?

Asking these questions, the study analyzed NATO’s post-Cold War Strategic Concepts to clarify the changing security definitions of NATO and the direction of that change. The security conception of NATO is evolving in a horizontal manner (broadening) but not necessarily in a vertical one (deepening). It has incorporated new issues to its security agenda and accordingly defined new means to deal with such issues whereas the referent object of NATO’s security understanding remains unchanging- that is the security of its member states.

In conclusion, this study argued that NATO is primarily a security institution and its *raison d’être* cannot be fully accounted for without understanding the evolution of its security conception. Hence, a focus on NATO’s Strategic Concepts through main questions of critical security approaches might be a fruitful starting point not only for understanding NATO’s post-Cold War endurance, but also bridging the theory-practice gap in security studies.

Notes

¹Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution Of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 100.

²Buzan and Hansen, *Evolution*, 101.

³ See Buzan and Hansen, *Evolution*; Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth, and Richard Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” *Nacao e Defesa* 84, 2, (1998): 131-57; Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present and Future of Security Studies,” in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 383-403; Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, 2, (1991): 211-39; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the agenda of security studies: Politics and Methods,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40, 2, (1996): 229-54; Colin Gray, “New Directions for Strategic Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice?,” *Security Studies* 1, 4, (1992): 610-35.

⁴Bilgin et al., “Security,” 134.

⁵Bilgin et al., “Security,” 134.

⁶Including “the Commission on Global Governance and its conception of ‘common security’, academic peace research and their proposal regarding ‘stable peace’, and Third World security approaches”. Pinar Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” *International Studies Review* 5, (2003): 203-22.

⁷ See Bilgin et al., “Security,” 139-141; Bilgin, “Individual,” 204-206.

⁸Bilgin, “Individual,” 205.

⁹Bilgin et al., “Security,” 139-140.

¹⁰Bilgin, “Individual,” 207.

¹¹Bilgin et al., “Security,” 141.

¹² See Bilgin et al., “Security,” 131-57; Bilgin, “Individual,” 203-22.

¹³See Buzan et al., “Security”; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Barry Buzan, “Environment as a Security Issue,” in *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security*, ed. Paul Painchaud (Quebec: The Studies and Research Center on Environmental Policies, Universite Laval, 1992), 1-28; Ole Wæver, “Securitisation and Desecuritisation,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press 1995), 46-86; Ole Waever, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery,” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2004).

¹⁴ See Bilgin et al., “Security,” 144.

¹⁵Buzan, “Environment,” quoted in Ole Wæver, “Securitisation” 46-86.

¹⁶ Ole Waever, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2004, 6-7).

¹⁷Bilgin et al., “Security,” 147.

For further information on the studies of this school, see Bilgin et al. “Security,” 147; Waever, “Aberystwyth”, 13-14; Buzan et al., “Security,” 23-30; Buzan and Hansen, *Evolution*, 214.

¹⁸Bilgin et al., “Security,” 149.

The political-sociology inspired Paris school scholars have also entered into the ‘securitization’ debate. While taking individuals as the referent object they have focused on ‘(in)securitization’ through state practices. They have generally studied issues like migration, border control, and human rights issues.

¹⁹Bilgin et al., “Security,” 149.

²⁰ See the discussion of statism vs state-centricism in Pinar Bilgin, “Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East,” *The Review of International Affairs* 2, 1, (2002): 101-102.

²¹ Pinar Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” *International Studies Review*, 5, (2003): 203-22.

²² Some scholars have focused on individuals as the referent object of security.

See Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” *Review of International Studies* 17, 4, (1991): 313–26; Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martin Shaw, “There Is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies*, 19, 2, (1993): 159–75.

Others additionally proposed normative agendas that seek for a security definition in terms of ‘emancipation’. For emancipatory approaches please see the studies of the Aberystwyth School or some might call it the Welsh School. Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones are two key figures of the school.

See Wæver, “Securitisation,” 1995.

²³Bilgin et al., “Security,” 151.

²⁴Bilgin et al., “Security,” 151.

²⁵Bilgin et al., “Security,” 151.

²⁶See John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, 15, 1, (1990): 5-56.

²⁷Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in *The Culture of National Security*, ed Peter J. Katzenstein (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 377.

²⁸Risse-Kappen, “Collective,” 395.

²⁹Risse-Kappen, “Collective,” 395.

³⁰Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 29, 2, (2000): 158.

³¹See Bradley S. Klein, “How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies, 34, 3, (1990): 311-25; Williams and Neumann, “Alliance,” 357-87.

³² Williams and Neumann, “Alliance,” 361.

³³See Klein, “Representational,” 311-25.

³⁴“Strategic Concepts,” 2012, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accessed May 12th, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm.

Since its foundation, NATO has been adopting itself with the evolving international environment. Since October 1949, there have been more than fifteen official documents that represent the Strategic Concepts of NATO.

³⁵“The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Article 1, 1991, accessed May 12th, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.

³⁶“NATO 1991,” Articles 2-6.

³⁷“NATO 1991,” Article 6.

³⁸In a sense, NATO presents answers and justifications to those who question whether NATO is necessary.

³⁹“NATO 1991,” Articles 7-14.

⁴⁰“NATO 1991,” Article 9.

⁴¹“NATO 1991,” Article 12.

⁴²“NATO 1991,” Article 13.

⁴³“NATO 1991,” Part III.

⁴⁴“Safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means”.

See “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949, accessed May 12th, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁴⁵“NATO 1991,” Article 24.

⁴⁶“NATO 1991,” Article 18.

⁴⁷“NATO 1991,” Article 17.

⁴⁸“NATO 1991,” Article 19.

⁴⁹CSCE, European Community, Western European Union and the United Nations. See “NATO 1991,” Article 33.

⁵⁰These forces should “have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances. See “NATO 1991,” Article 42-46.

⁵¹“The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1999, accessed May 12th, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.

⁵²“NATO 1999,” Article 2-3.

⁵³“NATO 1999,” Article 3.

⁵⁴“NATO 1999,” Article 6.

⁵⁵“NATO 1999,” Article 10.

⁵⁶Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. See “NATO 1999,” Articles 10-12.

⁵⁷“NATO 1999,” Article 10.

⁵⁸“NATO 1999,” Article 25.

⁵⁹“NATO 1999,” Article 23.

⁶⁰“NATO 1999,” Part III.

⁶¹“NATO 1999,” Article 53.

Even Russia is counted among those states that may contribute to NATO operations. This in fact justifies the constructivist explanations based on “identity NATO from a defence institution against Soviet Union towards a liberal norm based identity”.

⁶²The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland acceded in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia acceded in 2004; Albania and Croatia acceded in 2009.

⁶³UN led force in Afghanistan. NATO assumed the leadership of the ISAF in 2003.

⁶⁴“NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2010, accessed May 12th, 2012, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>.

⁶⁵“Strategic Concepts,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2012, accessed May 12th, 2012 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm.

⁶⁶In terms of “bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection”, see “NATO 2012”, Article 16.

⁶⁷“Including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs”. See “NATO 2012”, Article 15.

⁶⁸“NATO 2010,” Article 6.

⁶⁹“NATO 2010,” Preface.

Another significantly important change is that NATO refers to the “taxpayers” and “citizens of allied countries” in the preface of the Strategic Concept which has not been a usual reference in the previous Strategic Concepts. Indeed, it may be analyzed as a way to further emphasize domestic accountability of the member states’ policy-makers and increase the legitimacy of NATO through democracy.

⁷⁰“NATO 2010,” Article 2; “NATO 2012”.

⁷¹Mediterranean and Gulf. See “NATO 2010,” Article 35.

⁷²“NATO 2010,” Articles 9-10.

⁷³“NATO 2010,” Article 10.

⁷⁴“NATO 2010,” Article 26.

⁷⁵In terms of “bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection”, see “NATO 2010,” Article 16.

⁷⁶“Individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. See “NATO 2010”, Article 38, Article 2; NATO 2012.

⁷⁷“NATO 2010,” Article 38, Article 2; “NATO 2012”.