

Turkey's Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?

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The end of the Cold War and Turkey

The end of the Cold War has almost changed the picture of international system. Not only new actors have entered into the international game but the hierarchy of the system has also been influenced deeply. The end of the Cold War is therefore a systemic change that altered the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and the rights embodied in the system.¹ Though it has made system-wide effects, for several countries the end of the Cold War has especially given path to the extraordinary developments for their foreign policies. Many small and medium-sized countries have faced important difficulties in adapting their foreign policies to the new developments in world politics. No doubt Turkey as a medium-size regional state is in this camp. Since late 80s, the Turkish foreign policy can be said to be in flux, or a transition, as some might prefer. The emergence of new independent Turkic states in Central Asia, the rise of Americanism in the Middle East, important developments in Caucasia and Balkans, the ongoing EU membership process have captured the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has faced several problems vis-à-vis such a huge agenda.

First, the set of Turkish foreign policy's means is very limited. Turkey has failed in many areas in attaining her goals. The poor conditions of the Turkish economy have from the very beginning impeded the success of Turkish foreign policy. Second, the identity-oriented problems have shaken, if not traumatized, the Turkish political life during the 90s. Several

titles can be listed as follows: the rise of Islamism, the Kurdish problem, and the rise of Turkish army's role in political life. Such important domestic problems and developments have also weakened the ability of Turkey in adapting herself to the new realities of post-Cold war international system.² In a wider context, the social contract of the republic in Turkey has come under important societal and political attacks.³ Turkey facing these internal and external problems has tried to construct a new foreign policy agenda.

In some cases, foreign policy became battleground of different domestic political preferences. A well-known case is the Turkish-Israeli relations. The Turkish-Israeli relations for a time became a symbolic instrument of competition between the Islamists and the secularists in Turkey. In the eyes of ordinary Turkish citizens the alliance with Israel was a purely military, rather than civil choice, which was used by the military against the pro-Islamic government at that time.⁴ Many experts also share this approach. For example Meliha Altunisik wrote "Turkey's ties with Israel factored into this conflict since they were used by the military as an example to show the Welfare Party [the pro-Islamic party led by Necmettin Erbakan] its limitations in power."⁵ Third, Turkey has faced important challenges from other competing countries such as Russia, Iran.

However the more important is the systemic dilemma Turkey now faces. Historically speaking the Turkish foreign policy since the early years of the republic has depended on two important principles⁶: First, the Turkish foreign policy has been always *status quo* oriented. Turkey has never challenged the physical configuration of international system. In other words Turkey has never tried to change any international border in the system. Besides, Turkey has never tried to challenge the balance of power in international system. The reason of this status quo-oriented foreign policy approach originated from the early years of the republican regime in which state formation and nation building aims had been formative. The second principle of the Turkish foreign policy can be labeled as Westernism/ being pro-

Western. Turkey has always wanted to see herself in the western camp. The Kemalist modernization/ westernization programme deeply affected this pro-Western foreign policy understanding. The history of Turkish foreign policy with some exceptions can be summarized with all Western-centered developments and keywords such as NATO membership, the Turkish-American strategic partnership, and Turkey's historic aim of becoming part of Europe. The Turkish decision-making elite has always been criticized by conservative circles because of being extreme pro-Western.

For Turkey remembering the conditions of the Cold War, it was easy to adapt such a foreign policy approach during the Cold War. Turkey became member of NATO in 1952. Among the reasons of this preference, the Soviet threat should be numbered first. Since the early years of the Turkish Republic the Soviet factor has always been in the agenda of the Turkish foreign policy. Apart from this negative reason, it should be noted that NATO membership at that time had been considered as a guarantee of the institutionalization of democracy in the country.⁷ In the course of time Turkey internalized its pro-American and anti-Communist stance within the context of pro-Western foreign policy. Even though the Turkish-American relations had been damaged by several important developments such as “the Johnson letter” case, the strategic partnership endured during the Cold War. In sum, the pro-Western stance of the Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War had been successful in adapting itself to the crisis and problems.

As mentioned above the systematic dilemma has come to the front by the end of the Cold War. As the end of the Cold War has finished the monolithic understanding of the West, Turkey fell into a dilemma of making choice between America and Europe. The Cold War bipolar system had two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to world politics. But, important developments during the recent decade have clarified that it is now at stake that whether the end of the Cold War and the threat of Soviet aggression dissolved the

glue that bound the two sides together for a half-century or not.⁸ The nascent conflicts between Europe and U.S. have created important problems for many countries like Turkey. Following Walt one can remember why there had been a U.S.-Europe coalition during the Cold War: the Soviet threat, the American stake in the European economy and the generation of political elites that had developed the habit of working together in a common endeavor.⁹ However, the U.S.-Europe cooperation is to crackle down due to the important issues such as economy, security and identity. Apart from such theoretical approaches, we see clear clashes between U.S. and European powers on important issues such as how to deal with Iraq or Iran. Thus many American experts have warned that how the U.S.-European relations is managed must be Washington's highest priority.¹⁰ The European countries--now get bored of the arbiter role of U.S. in their region--want to develop independent foreign policies in specific areas. The crux of the question lies with the differing perspectives of a global superpower and individual EU member states.¹¹ In other words, though other reasons such as trade are important, the formal cause of the rift is the structural conditions of the post-Cold war international system. Put briefly this is a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers.¹² As Huntington writes "the settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combination of other states".¹³ Along with the U.S. as superpower of the international system, there are now other regional powers such as the German-French condominium in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia.¹⁴

The rift between U.S. and Europe is symbolized very often by the tension between American and the German-French condominium, among others, is the most important case for the Turkish foreign policy. On one hand, Turkey emphasizes the importance of the traditional strategic cooperation with America. On the other hand the EU membership has become the

ultimate aim of the Turkish foreign policy. The U.S. as a traditional strategic partner has contributed to Turkey's endeavors in international arena in different ways.

Turkey and U.S.

Theoretically speaking the Turkish-American strategic relationship has depended on several items:¹⁵ First, the U.S. has contributed to the Turkish national defense system both by providing military equipment and helping to keep political will. For example the U.S. supported Turkey against the Soviet threats during the late 40s. Turkey was given 100 million \$ U.S. by the U.S. in the context of the American President Truman's doctrine. Along with the financial support, a strong American support counterbalanced the Soviet political threat to Turkey.

Second, the American financial support to Turkish economy has played important role in the course of history. The U.S. since 1947 has kept supporting the Turkish economy. Third, both U.S. and Turkey strategically need each other against the Soviet Russia. Turkey needed a powerful country to counterweight the presence of a superpower in the north. However, for the U.S. Turkey was an important strategic territory. How the President Truman depicted Turkey in his address before a joint session of Congress clearly shows how the American policy of Turkey was shaped:

“....Turkey also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.”¹⁶

Fourth, ideological reasons played important role. Turkey from the very beginning of the republican regime has defined its national route as modernization/ Westernization. The founding fathers and after the leading elites of the Turkish Republic has always been pro-Western minded elites. As one Turkish author mentions an establishment of a modern bourgeoisie state, for Turkey, like the Western model was a matter of life and death.¹⁷ In the same context, the role of the U.S. has been of great importance in the course of history. The close relationship between America and Turkey did not only change the security perception of Turkey but also made important changes in domestic politics. After the introduction of American support within the context of Truman doctrine several important developments happened in Turkish politics.¹⁸ The Turkish President had resigned from party membership and accepted being independent. In 1949, the Turkish Parliament made the Chief of Staff accountable to the Defense Ministry. Along with such developments a quasi-official antagonism had its inception against socialist movements. A list of very well known Turkish academics was removed from their university positions. Many journalists were blamed as

propagandizing communism lost their positions, if not their newspapers. Another very important outcome of the American effect was the emergence of the first truly big Turkish merchants and businessmen. Several entrepreneurs such as Vehbi Koc made important deals with the American trade firms. They not only became the first big holdings of Turkey, they opened the country to the American products.

The proximity between Turkey and America endured during long years. Even after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was presented as a model country in Central Asia by the U.S. administrations. The predominantly Turkish-speaking population in these republics has increased Turkey's importance in their eyes. Turkey's strategy towards this region has been trying to mobilize its cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties to the Turkic republics. The main U.S. goals are to increase stability, speed up democratization, introduce a free market economy and make sure that it operates smoothly, increase commercial activity, control nuclear weapons and encourage human rights standards. The principal priority can be defined as blocking the spread of influence of existing radical regimes and preventing the creation of new ones.¹⁹ Having seen itself as the presented model country by America, the Turkish foreign policy has not hesitated to follow the same narrative. The White Paper published by the National Defense Ministry of Turkey portrays "Turkey's geopolitical, geo-strategic and eco-strategic importance" as follows:²⁰

"Turkey has a special place within the Atlantic-European and Eurasian zones. She is in the position of aiming at integration with the western society, in addition to being a democratic, secular and contemporary country of the Islamic world. Turkey is also at the center of a population of 200 million people who speak Turkish in the Balkans, Caucasia and Central Asia. She forms a model which is taken as an example by the new independent states, led by the societies that speak the Turkish languages. Turkey, with her existence and successes, is concrete evidence that the

Islamic religion and democracy are compatible with each other and that social and cultural development can also be realized in a democratic environment. The reconciliations sought in the world are existing in the structure of Turkey. Turkey is determined to continue the effectiveness of her foreign policy with her function of bringing together reconciliation, peace and cooperation obtained from this structure.”

This narrative finds itself a position in Turkish foreign policy.²¹ As a very recent case Turkey once again has presented itself as a model in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 atmosphere. Turkey has sought to promote itself as a model for secular Islamic development.²² Turkey’s eagerness to present herself as a model country in Eurasia has created counter reaction from especially Iran. The Western narrative that puts Turkey as a model for newly independent Eurasian states also depends on the binary opposition of Turkey and Iran. Accordingly, Turkey is the model and Iran is worst possibility to happen. Both Turkish and Iranian circles have adopted this narrative though being Western. This narrative has even for a time created an illusion as if Iran and Turkey are alone to shape the region’s future. As an apt case Vahid Isabeigi’s article “Turkish model not for Iran” might be analyzed here to represent the Iranian reaction to the issue.²³ Accordingly

After September 11, the United States and U.S. media including Time Magazine and even some in Iran are extolling Turkey as an exemplary model for all the Muslim Countries to achieve democracy and economical prosperity.

However;

The reality is that the Turks are trying hard to conceal the imperfections in their government. Turkey is, in fact, on the brink of a large-scale convulsion.

The article after reminding that “Turkey suffers trying to look European with a population largely uneducated and poor and that Turks were supposedly granted democracy in 1923, but the government has been castigated for notorious human rights violations of its own citizens”, goes so far as to claim that “if the revolution had not occurred in Iran, the Turkish economy would be even worse as the West would not have shifted from Iran with Turkey benefiting from European and American investments. That indicates that without aid, Turkey would be in a much worse plight than it is in now.”

The cited subject also shows how the U.S. plays a significant role in the making of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. To sum up so far, the Turkish-American relations have been continuing on ad-hoc basis in several areas related to, among others, economic and military cooperation. Especially for the security elite in Turkey, the U.S. is a kind of option, which is difficult to ignore. Moreover, the American influence over Turkey, in the context of the Turco-Iranian competition in Eurasia, has shaped the Turkish perception of many other countries such as Iran and Iraq. Thus, a structural change in Turkish-American relationship will definitely create enormous outcomes not only for the Turkish foreign policy but also for the domestic configurations of the country. As “the U.S. has been the most closest ally of Turkey since the Second World War”²⁴, any small change shall re-shape the Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey and Europe

The Turkish-European relations should first be named as unique in terms of its historical and cultural terms. In this respect there is no other country or region that can challenge the meaning of Europe for Turkey and Turks. It is a historical fact that the

Ottomans had very sophisticated relations with the European states from the time of the 13th century. No evidence has emerged to show that the leading European forces ever neglected the Ottoman factor. It should be mentioned that the Ottomans played a major part in the European states system throughout its existence, from early sixteenth century to its merger into the present global system.²⁵ In other words, the Turks have been in a systemic relationship with Europe. Even though the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim populated state and it included large sectors of Muslim territories such as Hicaz, Egypt and Palestine, its systemic oscillation had always been occurred with Europe in international system. If needed, becoming a part of European society should first be mentioned as the ultimate project of the Turkish Republic. Not only foreign policy but also the domestic political life was re-organized according to the Westernization project.

The demographic factor in Turco-European relations deserves attention. “Approximately 4 percent of Turkish citizens live within the borders of the EU. The number of Turkish citizens living in the EU comes to half of the population of Denmark, six times than Luxembourg, two-thirds that of Ireland, ore one-fourth of the population of Portugal or Greece.”²⁶ In the same context, the German factor should be reminded. The presence of approximately 2.4 million Turks in Germany is an important factor of bilateral relations working both ways. The influence of these Turkish people in Germany has always been a point of concern for Turkey and Turkish people. Moreover, Over 1,000 firms with German participation (more than 50% investment share) operate in Turkey today.²⁷ “The volume of Turkish workers in Germany has resulted in entrepreneurial activities. Turkish investment in Germany is 7.2 billion DM, while German investment in Turkey is only 1 billion DM. Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany own 42,000 businesses in 54 different industries employing 186,000 workers, 15% of which are Germans. 1200 Turkish entrepreneurs start new businesses in Germany each year.”²⁸ Germany is the largest recipient of the Turkish

export with 23%. It is again the largest trading partner from which Turkey imports with 16%. These figures clearly show the idea of Europe is a living issue in daily life. That is to say the Turco-European relations depend on important social pillars that embraces society, culture, identity and daily life.

Another very important issue is Turkey's candidacy of European Union. Historically speaking, no other issue has ever been this much significant for Turkey. From security issues to economic programs, any issue quickly is contextualised within the Turkey-EU relations. In an unusual way, the idea of EU membership has created its unique social divisions in Turkish politics. The domestic line, which had been dividing Turkish left from right, has been disappeared. An international line that is EU-originated now divides the Turkish society. There is a new globalist group in which one can find socialist, religious and liberal people supporting EU membership. In the same way there is now a nationalist group in which one can find again communist, anti-Semitic extreme Islamic fundamentalists, and ultra-nationalists supporting anti-EU thesis.

It is no longer the traditional nationalist line that used to specify the difference between right and left. This division extended to almost every other issue. As an apt example, the pro-EU groups including liberal, socialist and moderate Islamists have started criticizing strongly the traditional Cyprus policies namely represented by Rauf Denktas. Each political group or movement used to be united during the Cold War era. In other words socialists as a united group used to support same ideas. In the same way, Islamists used to support their thesis. However thanks to the EU membership process, we see Islamists or socialists conflicting with each other. While some Islamists are cursing EU as an evil project, very large sectors of Islamist at the same time perceive EU as the most important opportunity for the country.²⁹ In the same way, it is now possible to see Islamists and leftists supporting same thesis on very important issues such as Cyprus or the Kurdish problem. Large sectors of

society perceive EU membership as a very important opportunity. The recent general elections held on 3 November 2002 very clearly show the social support behind the idea of EU membership. EU membership was one of the most important issues that the parties had debated during the election campaign. Considering the results of the election, anti-EU parties were left outside the parliament.

The EU membership as a political project has become a kind of social idea. Today, the religious-oriented groups, the Kurdish groups and a big group of Turkish elites including liberals and socialists support EU membership. EU membership, considering several public opinion surveys and the results of the recent general elections, has now a very strong social basis which has become a very determining actor in making of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's important decisions from Cyprus issue to the status of military forces in domestic politics will be designated according to the Turco-European Union relations in the long run.

Turkey between EU and U.S.: the NATO Crisis

France, Germany and Belgium blocked the automatic start of NATO procedures for the military planning to protect Turkey, arguing it would force the crisis into a "logic of war" while some peaceful diplomatic alternatives still stood a chance of success in the Iraqi crisis. It was believed to be the first time in 53-year history of the alliance that a nation –Turkey– formally invoked article 4 of the founding mutual defense treaty, and it was another indication of deepening divisions in the alliance over the Iraq crisis.³⁰ The crisis began after a U.S. request to the alliance for defending Turkey, the only NATO member that borders Iraq. The three countries argued that the conditions for sending NATO military equipment to Turkey is then premature while diplomatic efforts continue to try to avert war. What drew attention was the invocation by Turkey of Article IV of the NATO treaty.³¹ France, Germany and Belgium led an opposition group against the Turkish invocation of the cited article. NATO's manner was not that much surprising since they had followed the same attitude, although in different

context, in 1991 Kuwait crisis. This time, however, the objection of these countries was rather considered as anti-U.S. rather than specifically targeting Turkey.

The U.S. side quickly protested the group. Rumsfeld commented on the group strategy as “Shameful, for me it’s truly shameful.”³² The NATO crisis can be taken as a fresh reflection of the competition between EU and U.S. in a different context. Several different other reflections can be seen in other fields. For example Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted that “some of the European countries, especially France and Germany, are actually organizing the United Nations against the United States.”³³ The debate concerning the Turkey’s defense quickly became a battlefield between Franco-German condominium and the U.S. in NATO. Rather than debating over Turkey’s defense, the competition between the U.S. and the Franco-German condominium is the real essence of the crisis. Though the American side quickly blamed the European opposing countries for not carrying out their organizational responsibilities, the three European opposing states replied that their action was not against the defense of Turkey. It was clear for all sides, including Turkey; the present crisis had a double appearance. Though it seemed like a crisis over Turkey, the real reason was the tension between the Franco-German condominium and the U.S.. However the crux of the question lies here. Even though the “real” reason of the conflict among NATO allies was not directly related to Turkey, it was again Turkey that was to face the outcomes of such an important tension. Thus, the recent NATO crisis has clearly demonstrated that no matter Turkey is directly involved or not, the tension between Europe and America is essentially important for Turkish foreign policy.

The *Tezkere*/ (Motion) Crisis and Conflicting Agendas in a Postmodern Neighborhood

Despite five decades long alliance between Turkey and the U.S., this relationship could not gain a historical, cultural and economic depth. It is a sort of alliance based on specific interests. There is also no geographical proximity that may pave way for

improvement of the relations in any of the realms given above. The relations with the U.S. did not have a cultural stamp in Turkey other than prevalent impact of the American values distributed through the forces of globalization. On the other side of coin, there is no influential Turkish demographic existence in the U.S.. Turkey is culturally more influenced from Europe and is undertaking a long process of European style of modernization. Turkish-American relations, by nature, do not dictate an integration or deepening of relations other than ad-hoc temporary coalitions for specific purposes. The U.S. administration has a superficial interest to Turkey and does not want to involve in, for example, democratization and human rights issues. The recent developments led to emergence of a postmodern neighborhood between Turkey and the U.S.. The road to this neighborhood has full of indications about future of relations between these two countries.

Ankara was quick enough to satisfy the U.S. demands considering their use of Turkish territory in the attack against Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Incirlik base in Mediterranean part of Turkey played a crucial role in the U.S operations in their attacks to Afghanistan. The new aggressive U.S. stance against Taliban regime found receptive audience at both state and societal levels in Turkey and Ankara immediately extended its full scale support to the U.S. It is very informative to analyze Turkish-American relations in the aftermath of September 11 to see the relationship between a world hegemon and its depended ally in the Third World. This also exemplifies the structural problems that the Third World countries face in international system. The crucial problem is that how a dependent ally will respond to the demands of hegemonic power when these demands are in conflict with their own interests and also are in conflict with the international law and perceptions of international institutions. Legitimacy matters in this relationship since Ankara had no problem with supporting the U.S. in the aftermath of September 11 attacks where there was a widespread approval of the U.S. war against Al-Qaide connected terror. In Iraqi crisis, the situation changed. The Bush

administration lost their legitimate ground in the United Nations and Ankara has serious concerns over this projected war against Iraq.

Bush administration welcomed Tayyip Erdogan, leader of Turkey's new leading moderate Islamic AK (Justice and Development) party in White House and the U.S. President himself discussed the potential Turkish support in Iraqi war. Then Turkey's prime minister Abdullah Gul put an enormous effort to persuade Turkish parliament to pass a motion that will allow the U.S. forces to open a northern front against Iraq. This issue caused a considerable public debate in Turkey. What is witnessed is the alliance of leftist, Islamist and nationalist segments of Turkish society against opening a northern front and also about sending Turkish troops to Iraq. There are a number of reasons for this alliance that should be taken into consideration.

- 1) According to news reports, the chief advisors to prime minister Abdullah Gul overestimated the "value" of Turkish support to the U.S.. Even there was a considerable belief that the U.S. would not attack to Iraq without opening a northern front.³⁴
- 2) There are a number of influential economic, cultural and historical factors that ranges from historical memory to potential damage of Iraqi war to Turkish economy.
- 3) There is an untold mistrust to future American designs in Iraq.
- 4) The U.S. promises during the negotiation phase did not satisfy Turkish security elite's concerns. These concerns are mainly about establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and territorial unity of Iraq.
- 5) A large segment of pro-European bloc believes in that Turkey's involvement in Iraqi war will bring the security first apparatus of state to fore and this will blockade the internal reforms for the EU membership.³⁵

The first months of 2003 witnessed an immense negotiation between Turkish and American diplomats. These discussions did not go anywhere other than further polarization of the two sides. The Cold War expectation that Turkish security elite would fulfill the U.S. demands was not met. Turkey's military dominated National Security Council did not express any idea and left the decision to Turkish parliament. At the end, Turkish government backed out of admitting the U.S. troops to open a northern front to Iraq. This negative vote is the result of democratic decision making process and it is allegedly the U.S. target to improve democracy in its allies. However, the U.S. administration was shocked by the military establishment's leaving this decision to the civilian rulers. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz openly expressed the expectation in his May 7 interview that the military "for whatever reason, they did not play the strong leadership role that we would have expected."³⁶ The role that the U.S. administration assigned to military in Turkey is contradictory, while attempting to build democracy in Iraq after removing a military dictator in government.

Conclusion

Turkey is, in its truest sense, at a point of making choice between Europe and the U.S.. This is also somehow valid for Europe and the U.S. considering their policies toward Turkey. Turkey's close relations with the U.S. which led to consolidation of national security state and the pseudo-westernization outlook of security elite in Turkey during Cold War years seems to be a part of history. It is an important question to pose that why there is no anti-Europeanism in the Middle East while the major European countries had imperial controls in this region. And also why there happened such an intense anti-Americanism in this region while the American involvement goes only five decades back in the Middle East. The rise of anti-Americanism and especially the changing positive perception of the European Union among Turkish masses is a clear indication of this trend in the Middle East.

Turkey's European horizon means reconfiguration of politics and restructuring of economy which would directly serve to further democratization and development at home. There may be a benign scenario that European rejection of Turkey may leave the country in the middle of nowhere. However, the current dynamism of Turkish people (forced old guards of politics outside the parliament on 3 November 2002) which takes its strength from a mixture of modernized institutions and cultural-civilizational elements found its way to build a "new Turkey." This societal construction is in association with the developments in international system. The forerunners of this new project and its social base choose the "paradise" not the "power" using Robert Kagan's analogy.³⁷

NOTES

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¹ Here we use Gilpin's systemic change formula to explain the end of the Cold War. See: Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 42.

² For identity problem in Turkish foreign policy see: Hakan Yavuz, "Degisen Turk Kimligi ve Dis Politika: Neo-Osmanliligin Yukselisi," *Liberal Dusunce*, Vol.4, No.13, (Winter 1999), pp. 22-38.

³ Saban Calis, "Ulus, Devlet ve Kimlik Labirentinde Turk Dıs Politikası," *Liberal Dusunce*, Vol.4, No.13, (Winter 1999), pp. 5-21.

⁴ Gokhan Bacik, "The Limits of An Alliance: The Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Summer, 2001), p. 53.

⁵ Meliha B. Altunisik, "The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (April, 2000), p. 183.

⁶ Baskin Oran, "1945-60: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Turkiye," in Baskin Oran (ed.), *Turk Dis Politikasi, Vol.1: 1919-1980* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2001), pp.496-498.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, "The U.S. and Europe: Continental Drift?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1, (2000), p. 51.

⁹ Stephen Walt, "The Ties that Fray," *National Interest*, (Winter 1998), p. 9.

¹⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living With a New Europe," *National Interest*, (Summer 2000), p. 17.

¹¹ See: An Address by Under Secretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat, Issues in U.S.-European Relations, Nixon Center Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 6, 16 October 1998.

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, (March-April, 1999), p. 36.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See: Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000), pp. 17-21.

¹⁶ President Harry S. Truman's Address Before A Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947. Available at: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>

¹⁷ Ali Kazancigil, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm", in Ersin Kalaycıoğlu-A. Yasar Sarıbay (eds.), *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme* (İstanbul: Alfa, 2000), p. 151

¹⁸ Cagri Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in Baskin Oran (ed.), *Türk Dis Politikasi, Vol.1: 1919-1980* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 537.

¹⁹ Bulent Aras, "U.S.-Central Asian Relations: A View from Turkey", *Middle East Review of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January, 1997), available at: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a4.html>

²⁰ Turkish National Defense Ministry, The White Paper, <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/birimler.htm>

²¹ For a good analysis of the narrative of the Turkish model see: Idris Bal, "The Turkish Model and The Turkic Republics," *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (September-November 1998). This article is also available at the official homepage of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/III-3/bal.htm> . Also see: Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, (2000), pp.36-58 . In this context, in order to clarify the official policy on this issue, it is useful to cite what the Deputy Director General for Central Asian, Caucasian and Slavic Countries of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Halil Akinci) said on the topic: "Our second principle was to achieve their integration with the world. Why? Because their integration with the world, the development of economic interests, particularly of the European countries, Japan and the United States, would be another guarantee for their independence." Halil Akinci, "Turkey's Relations With the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics," in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), *Turkey At the Threshold of the 21st Century Global Encounters and / vs Regional Alternatives* (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998), p. 103.

²² See: Ali Erginsoy, "Turkey Aims to Establish Itself As a Model in Afghanistan, Central Asia", *Eurasian Insight*, 28 December 2001.

²³ Vahid Isabeigi, "Turkish Model Not for Iran," *Iran Today*, 1 July 2002.

²⁴ Cengiz Candar, "Türklerin Amerika'ya Bakisından Örnekler ve Amerika'nın Türkiye Politikası", in Morton Abramowitz (ed.), *Türkiye'nin Donusumu ve Amerikan Politikasi* (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), p. 169.

²⁵ Adam Watson, "Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies," *Review of International Studies*, No.13, (1987), p. 147.

²⁶ Faruk Sen, "Turkish Communities in Western Europe," in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p. 233.

²⁷ Bianca Kaiser-Pehlivanoglu, "Germany's European Policy: Some Implications for Turkey," *Private View*, (Spring 2002), p. 50.

²⁸ Lourdene Hurh, "The Turkish Economy and Turkish Economic Development", <http://socialscience.tyler.cc.tx.us/mkho/fulbright/1998/turkey/hurh.htm>

²⁹ On this issue see: Hasan Kosebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, (June 2002), pp. 130-146 and Gokhan Bacik and Alper Dede, "The end of Turkish Modernization?" *Revista de Humanidades*, No. 7, (October 1999), pp. 33-56.

³⁰ Paul Ames, "NATO crisis over Turkey", http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,5964378%255E2,00.html

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- ³⁶ *Radikal*, 8 May 2003.
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