Abstract
We identify new religious orthodoxies as a type of religious movement. Neither liberal adaptation nor fundamentalist rejection, they embrace much of modern life even as they attempt to submit that life to a sacred, moral order. Their prevalence calls into question social science theories that view religious movements as reactions to crises associated with contacts with modernity or the West, or with failed states. These theories especially characterize International Relations scholarship of Islamic movements: state-centered and assuming binaries of modern versus traditional, secular versus religious, political versus cultural, they cannot adequately interpret new religious orthodoxies. We report on the first author’s study of Islamic revival in Turkey, termed Muslimism. In Turkey since the 1980s, the lines between the state and the bourgeoisie, and secular and religious have been challenged. An emerging Muslim middle class uses capitalist markets, civic associations, and political parties as “sites of cultural hybridity” to redraw these boundaries by formulating a “modernity without guilt” and an “Islam without apology.” New religious orthodoxies while often nationalistic tend toward global orientations and action. We identify mechanisms of contemporary Turkish Muslimism for influencing international institutions, and we draw implications for rethinking IR assumptions about religion, global processes, and the international.

Keywords: Hybridity, Muslimism, Political-Islam, Turkish Islamic movements, Religion and International Relations, Moderate Islam, Religious Movements.

Türkiye’de ‘Müslümancılık’ ve Yeni Dini Ortodoksiler

Özet
Yeni Ortodoksleri (New Religious Orthodoxies) bir çeşit din hareketi olarak tanımlıyoruz. Bu hareketler hem moderniteyi reddeden fundamentalist din hareketlerinden, hem de moderniteye asimile olmuş liberal din gruplarından ayrılr. Yeni ortodoksler modernitenin zespołlu yöneri kucaklarken aynı zamanda modern hayatı İslami öğretiler ve yaşam gelenekleri ile harmanlar. Bu yeni formun yaygınlığı, dini hareketler modernitenin yol açtığı sosyo-ekonomik krizlerin ifadesi olarak gören,

Anahtar Kelimeler: Melez Kimlikler, Müslümancılık, Politik-Islam, Türkiye’de İslami Hareket, Din ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, İlimli İslam, Din Hareketleri.

الاسلام في تركيا والارثودوكسيون الجدد

تسليهان جويك وجورج م. توماس

خلاصة:

نعرف الأرثودوكيسية الجديدة على أنه نوع من الحركات الدينية. إن هذه الحركات تختلف عن الحركات الدينية الأصولية التي ترفض الحداثة، مثلما هي تختلف عن المجامع الدينية الليبرالية التي تنصهرت في بوتقة الحداثة. وبينما يحتضن الأرثودكسيون الجدد مختلف جوانب الحداثة، فإنهم يبدون الوقت بخوض الحياة العصرية مع المذاهب الإسلامية والأعراف الحياتية. إن ذيوق هذا الشكل الجديد يؤدي إلى رؤية الحركات الدينية كتعبير عن الأزمات السوسيو-اقتصادية التي فصحت الحداثة المجال لها، كما أنها تتنازل بالترجمة مصداقية النظريات الكلاسيكية التي تعرّف على الاختلافات في ميدان الحداثة والتقليدية والعلمانية والدين والسياسة والثقافة. والجدير بالذكر أن الأرثودكسيون الجدد، فإننا نطبق من الدراسات التجريبية التي أجراها كاتب المقال الأول حول الحركات الإسلامية الحالية. ويُعرف الكاتب هذه الحركات "Muslimism" باستعمال تصريحات الحركة الإسلامية للثقافة المخصصة للطريقة الدينية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني والتحرير السياسى التي بدأ تطورها على أنتونيان من القرن الماضي باعتبارها "مجامع ثقافية هجينة". وب بصورة عامة فإن الأرثودكسيون الجدد لهم حساسيات وطنية، ويشمل ذلك المسلمين أيضاً. غير أنهم وفي نفس الوقت يجهلون نحو أهداف وفعالية عولمية. ونجد هنا أن حركة الإسلامية ترتبط مع طريق دعوة الإسلام ومنكفة النظرة الثقافية لإدماج العلاقات الدولية أي الدين والمسلمات الدولية والتوقفات العالمية والقبول المسبق.

الكلمات الدالة: الهويات الهجينة، النزعة الإسلامية، الإسلام السياسي، الحركات الإسلامية في تركيا، الدين والعلاقات الدولية، الإسلام المعتدل، الحركات الدينية.
The quest for a “moderate Islam” and the problematic of religion in international relations

The conservative Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia and the Islamist regimes and political forces in Iran and Afghanistan, in the aftermath of September 11, present a global image of Islam as a fundamentalist if not radically aggressive religion. This image fits nicely within International Relations (IR) theory that views deeply felt religious commitments within world politics as a serious problem and deeply felt Islam especially, given arguments that it is as an intrinsically “clashing civilization.” IR reinforces the popular question of why there has not developed a moderate Islam. This question takes on urgency in the face of democratic movements throughout Islam-majority countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

What might be meant by moderate, however, is vague and alluded to primarily in the negative: moderate Islam (or moderate religion generally) is not violent, not repressive, not fundamentalist, and not theocratic. Candidates for the label of moderate Islam are not uncommon and the most prominent one is the Islamic revival in Turkey. Yet, the ability to recognize a negatively defined case is difficult especially given normative concerns. If something is defined by the absence of an action, one can never categorize a case because it is always possible that the action will be committed sometime in the future. Islam in Turkey might sometime in the future become fundamentalist. This categorical blinder is reinforced by entrenched views that strongly held religions must be repressive: Islam in Turkey only seems moderate but it really is a front for a more aggressive Islamism.

We argue that we need to rethink our understanding of religion, religion in modern democratic polities, and religion in the international. We follow the lead of many scholars1 and draw on sociological approaches2

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2 Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman, Religion, Globalization, and Culture, (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Mark
and here develop a line of analysis based on empirical studies of religious movements and revival. In this paper we report on a study of Islam in Turkey and then draw out implications for international relations. We first describe Muslimism, its conditions and content. We then describe the general characteristics of new religious orthodoxies and using Muslimism in Turkey as an example, draw out implications for IR theory.

**Muslimism in Turkey**

Since the 1980s, Islam has penetrated into the urban life in secular Turkey. This on the one hand is now not surprising since scholars have drawn attention to religious growth in late-modernity, to religion’s influence in IR and to its acknowledgement by intergovernmental organizations. Islamic revival in Turkey on the other hand is disruptive to most theories in political sociology and IR. Islamic resurgence took on unique, hybrid content and was manifested through unconventional channels; it is no longer the mosques or cemaats that embody the current state of Islam in Turkey. Instead, pious Turks opened up 5-star hotels that observe Islamic teachings on alcohol and gender, character-education schools, and manufactured Islam-proper fitness outfits. They also formed civil formations where they use both the Medina cer-

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**Notes**

3 The conceptualization of Muslimism and the empirical work reported here is part of a larger project carried out by the first author. An earlier formulation of “new religious orthodoxies” is George M. Thomas, “Religions engaging globalization: new religious orthodoxies,” paper presented at the Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Center, Emory University, November 17, 2009.


tificate and UN conventions to fight against Human Rights violations, moralize principles of free-market with Islamic teachings creating a hybrid business model, retrieve progressive Islamic concepts (e.g. *ijtihad* and *masalih*, both referring to adaptation and reinterpretation) to combat against religious bases of gender-discrimination. Moreover, they established political formations attempting to push the national polity towards liberalization (from ethnic minority rights to privatization and civil rule) while ascribing Turkey a bridging role in international relations, between Islam and the West.

**Defining Muslimism: Muslimism and Hybridity**

We argue that the new Muslimist orthodoxy does not conform to conventional prescriptions. Neither liberal adaptation nor fundamentalist/Islamist rejection, it embraces many aspects of modern life while submitting that life to a sacred, moral order. Muslimism is a hybrid identity frame empowering engagements between Islam and secular modernity. More complex than cultural imports of fundamentalist religious movements and than what Roy has called ‘Sharia plus electricity’\(^6\), Muslimists reinterpret theology (from sources such as *hadith* to symbols such as the veil) and restructure their everyday life by formulating new lifestyles, practices and institutions as they engage modernity.

Within the frame of Muslimism, the main aim is not capturing the state to Islamize the society nor is it Islamizing the community to eventually bring on an Islamic state. The main concern is to contrive a lifestyle in which the ‘individual-believer’ can be incorporated into modernity without being marginalized and while preserving an Islam-proper living. Thus, Muslimism is neither state nor community-centered but individual-oriented.

The Muslimist individual orientation is layered in between theology, social relations and politics. It is grounded on a theological shift depicting the self as the main locus of religious accounts (orthoexy) and conduct (orthopraxy). For the Muslimist, a true religiosity does not emanate from a policing state or a gazing community but from *iman* (inner belief) and *kalb* (heart). Such an approach empowers the individual over ex-

ternal sources of control. This creates neither a vacuum of authority nor a subjectivist religious form. Differing from liberal theologies, Muslimism acknowledges an objective separation between helal and haram that must be upheld (e.g. by veiling, praying, fasting or abstaining from alcohol). Moreover, iman acts as a constant and ever-present guide directing the Muslim-self towards hayır and away from haram regardless of whether law (the state) or the gaze of other Muslims (the community) is present or not. Within this framework, faith is a matter of individual choice and ‘faith as choice’ is more meaningful and valuable than ‘faith as forced’ by external authorities.

This theological individual-orientation has sociological consequences. It increases individual autonomy at the expense of community and hence allows self-expression and personalism at the expense of homogeneity that are reflected in Muslimist lifestyles, institutions, and practices. Self-fashioning the veil, forming (and joining) professional and voluntary associations instead of following religious orders (ce- maat), or consulting theology professors or intellectuals instead of submitting to prophetic figures (hojas or imams) for religious learning make strong statements about individuality, self-expression, and individual autonomy.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that Muslimism is a mere cultural expression; it has profound political implications. Even though it is the individual who is responsible to choose between helal and haram, the state is responsible to guarantee an atmosphere of freedom that would allow the individual to make that choice. For Muslimists both an Islamic state and a strictly secularist state are repressive, they both violate individual autonomy and eliminate choice (e.g. by imposing or banning the veil). Muslimists engage the political space to bring about

7 In contrast, for Islamism, an Islamized state and community are essential to attain and maintain a truly Islamic life; the state grants Allah’s will by enforcing religion and religious conduct (e.g. compulsory veiling or banning of alcohol) and the community reinforces the state’s role in everyday life by conforming to prescribed conduct (e.g. veiling) and accepted interpretations of such conduct (e.g. veiling in particular formats such as using particular colors and styles) as external indexes to measure one’s faithfulness.

8 For a paralleling argument see Şennur Özdemir, MUSIAD: Anadolu Sermayesinin Dönüşümü ve Türk Modernleşmesinin Derinleşmesi, (Ankara: Vadi, 2006).

9 In contrast, Islamism strengthens the authority of the community at the expense of the individual by marginalizing self-expression or modification and depicting them as degenerate and inauthentic.
a state model in which faith can be practiced as choice. For that aim, they attempt to realign the state along more liberal and pluralist lines, making it more receptive to religious demands on the one hand and individual liberties on the other. This political push includes, for example, the Muslimist electoral support to the Justice and Development Party (JDP), exerting civic pressure on national polity, or allying with IR institutions (e.g. the EU or the UN) to influence foreign and domestic affairs.

Our choice of conceptualizing this new phenomenon as Muslim[ism] aims to reflect this layered repositioning of the Muslim-individual vis-à-vis faith, community and the state. The term Muslimism, methodologically, suggests that we focus on the Muslim subject and its actions rather than assuming the religious text (or Islam more broadly) to produce religious establishments with homogenous aims, actors and discourses across societies and various historical contexts\(^{10}\).

**Historicizing Muslimism**

What conditions have led to the emergence and success of Muslimism? Who are the agents that formulate and exercise it? Where can we locate Muslimism in the social landscape?

The existing meta-theories dealing with religious mobilization tend to answer these questions by focusing either solely on political mechanisms (thus political Islamism) or on cultural mechanisms and expression (thus cultural Islam). This divide between politics and cultural is especially defining for Turkish scholarship due to the historical route modernization has taken in Turkey which politicized both modernity and religion. The interpretations mostly draw on these politically overcharged categories. In contrast, we suggest a historical-analytical perspective that takes into account the shifting boundaries between religion and the secular-state and the intertwining of politics and culture.

\(^{10}\) The term Islamism cannot be definitive of this new form. Islamism linguistically describes a set of actions and ideas oriented towards Islam itself. Paralleling this, the academic use of Islamism refers to an ideology aiming to retrieve an Islamic order, either through the Umma (community) or the State. This results in a methodological approach that takes Islam as its unit of analysis. This is problematic as Islam is not independent of Muslims and the contexts that channel Muslims towards various forms of Islamic expressions, from fundamentalist to anti-colonialist nationalist movements to mystical forms.
We identify the roots of Muslimism in 1980s liberalizing policies. More than deregulating the market, liberalizing policies dramatically undermined statism (which promoted a total exclusion of religion from the public space) and opened up new political, cultural and economic spaces for religious mobilization. The retreat of statism also weakened Islamist establishments/expressions (developed as a reaction to statist policies) enabling religious actors to contest existing religious discourse and re-articulate religious identity.

Moreover, liberalizing policies generated a new group of pragmatic Muslim entrepreneurs who wanted to take advantage of the new opportunities and be incorporated into modernity. Freed both from statist and Islamist prescriptions, these Muslim entrepreneurs became the prime agents of Muslimism. How do Muslim entrepreneurs actually produce Muslimism? And where can we locate it?

Muslimism finds its expression in ‘cultural sites of hybridity’ initially formed by the new Muslim entrepreneurs in the service sector (e.g. pro-Islamic hotels) but eventually moving into other realms including civil and political formations. It is in these sites where Muslims experiment with Islam and modernity amalgamations and contest both Islamist definitions of ‘how to be a good Muslim’ and secularist prescriptions of ‘how to be modern.’ Instead, sites of hybridity redefine Islam to be ‘unapologetic,’ and modernity to be ‘guilt-free.’

Conditions undermining statism and traditional Islamic establishments existed prior to the neo-liberal transition in Turkey, yet in each case conditions for Muslimism were limited. Opportunity spaces were repressed by secularist backlashes and (or) mobilizing actors were confined to traditional religious sectors unable to articulate an alternative religious discourse. Moreover, the necessary conditions for the rise of Muslimism were hindered further by the external conditions enforcing both the statist and Islamist frames (e.g. the Cold War or 1979 Iranian revolution). In contrast, the necessary domestic conditions for Muslimism were coupled with a favoring IR context following the neo-liberal transition, giving Muslimism further support. The end of the Cold War, Turkey’s relations with the IMF, the US and NATO, lack of any serious external military threat, but in particular the increasing prospect of entering the EU further strengthened Muslimist positions undermining statist and Islamist ones.
In order to move beyond flawed categorizations, we need an analytical-historical analysis, which can detect the particular historical conditions that generated Muslimism, identify the agents that mobilized it and locate the social sites in which Muslimism resides. Such an inquiry starts with situating Muslimism in the broader domestic and international institutional contexts.

In Turkey, two cultural orders have emerged, each with differing forms/limits of 'opportunity structures' (receptivity/vulnerability of the political system to organized protest by a given challenging group)\(^1\), and thus channeling Islamic mobilization and expression in different directions\(^2\). The first order, bureaucratic republicanism (1918-1980), emerged as a result of a cultural revolution that replaced the Ottoman structure with a modern nation-state while the latter, liberal republicanism, emerged from Turkey’s transition to a free-market economy.

We argue that throughout the bureaucratic order Islamic mobilization was channeled into Islamism, while the Muslimist impulses emerged along 1980s liberalizing policies maturing into a new Islamic orthodoxy in later periods of the liberal order. The following sections will illustrate how each order shaped Islamic expression into certain forms and how the liberal order produced a distinct Islamic orthodoxy by generating new conditions (opportunity spaces) and mobilizing new agents (the Muslim entrepreneurs) who built new social sites for religious expression and living (sites of hybridity).

**Bureaucratic Republican Order, 1923-1980**

Overall, bureaucratic order is characterized by statism under which the state monopolizes economic and cultural production hindering open-

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\(^2\) The larger project identifies find various periods within each cultural order, with differing form of opportunity structures shaping Islamic movements in distinct ways. However, each period is mainly shaped by the overarching cultural order determining what opportunities may arise or not (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The periods that emerged within the bureaucratic republicanism are: nation-building (1923-40), multi-party politics (1950-70), and partisanship (1970-80). Current liberal republicanism, beginning in the 1980s, covers the emergence of liberalism (1980-1990) and its institutionalization (1990 to present).
ing of opportunity structures for civil participation, and the emergence of a democratic polity. Turkish modernization and secularization took shape within the frame of this ‘bureaucracy-dominated polity’ and were submitted to the state. As such, they came to be defined as nationalistic, political projects engineered by the state, protected by the army, and operating in a top-down manner through oppressive measures.

We argue that mirroring the image of statism, throughout the bureaucratic republican order, Islamic mobilization took an Islamist form becoming equally state-centered, political, and authoritarian. It articulated a reactionary discourse against the state and against state-imposed secularism. The main actors of Islamic mobilization were rooted in traditional segments and religious establishments, most notably Naksibendi and Sufi orders. Even though, within the bureaucratic order, there were temporal extensions of opportunity spaces that could have created Muslimist impulses, these were cut off by statist backlashes and the religious agents remained rooted in traditional sectors unable to articulate an alternative religious discourse.

**Temporal Extensions**

In 1950s, the multi-party system and the progressive attempts of the Democrat Party (DP) opened up the bureaucratic order relatively, but this was cut off by the 1960 coup (in conjunction with the Cold War economy), which restored the bureaucratic order and hindered the emergence of Muslimist impulses.

From 1970s and 1980, we again find semi-liberal openings sponsored by the state itself aiming to use Islam as a shield against ethnic and denominational conflict. This (along with rapid modernization and mass education) allowed Islamic groups’ political and economic upward mobility, resulting in the emergence of the NOM (National Outlook Movement) frame and its first political party, the National Order Party (NOP)\(^\text{13}\). The openings, however, were temporal and weak. The statist frame and power structures remained in place repressing Islamic mobility by two military-interventions in 1971 and again in 1980.

\(^{13}\) The NOP was closed by the 1971 coup, but was replaced by the National Salvation Party founded in 1973 by the same NOM leaders. The NOM established and provided a general vision also for the succeeding Islamic parties; namely Welfare Party (1983), Virtue Party (1997), and Felicity Party (2001).
On the other hand, Islamic actors (both the political parties, electorate and grassroots) mainly remained rooted in rural sectors and traditional establishments keeping the Islamist frame. The external conditions—the Arab-Israeli conflict, Soviet-Afghanistan war, and Khomeini revolution in Iran— in addition to translations of Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb into Turkish further redounded Islamism. Hence, throughout the bureaucratic order, statism and Islamism remained intact and hindered the emergence of Muslimist impulses in conjunction with external conditions.

The bureaucratic order ended by a military coup in 1980. The coup on the one hand aimed to restore the civic order and on the other it implemented radical economic reforms proposed by the World Bank and the IMF, which replaced protectionist economic policies with a free-market economy, also encouraged by the US and NATO. The military rule ended by 1983 national elections, which carried the new Mother Land Party (MP) and its leader Turgut Özal to victory, marking the beginning of a new order.

The Liberal Republican order, 1980—

The effects of liberalization were dramatic; it undermined statism allowing peripheral groups (in particular Kurds, Alevites and Islam) to participate in the center (from the finance sector to education, charity, and associational life), and it increased the autonomy of civil society thus stimulating democratization. The MP government also extended religious liberties. Turkey’s intensifying relations with supra-national institutions, in particular the EU, reinforced the pluralist and civic atmosphere. Turkish citizens were given the right of petition to the European Commission of Human Rights, and international instruments against torture were signed.14

The political openings went hand in hand with an economic restructuring. The Özal government privatized public enterprises, liberalized domestic pricing, brought in foreign investment, and removed trade barriers and agricultural and state subsidies while deepening Turkey’s

relations with IMF and the World Bank. The export economy expanded the domestic market towards Anatolian cities generating new economic centers and a new group of Muslim petty-entrepreneurs, thus incorporating Anatolian businesses into global production and market.

These internal developments were reinforced by the external conditions. The end of the Cold War, Turkey's relations with the IMF, the US and NATO, lack of serious external military threat, and most notably the prospects for entering the EU favored liberalization.

The economic and political openings, in conjunction with external conditions, effectively undermined state-secularism and shifted the axis of modernization away from the statist and nationalistic prescriptions (both in economic and cultural terms) towards civil society, free-market, and globalist objectives. Thus, within the liberal order, the struggle between state and a growing Islamic mobilization became part a broader struggle between traditionalism and change, authoritarianism and democracy, and state and civil society.

The undermining of statism by the neo-liberal condition also weakened political Islamist establishments and expressions. Against declining state-control and expanding opportunity spaces, the state-centered, reactionary, and radical form of Islam gradually lost its appeal creating a vacuum for the emergence of alternative Islamic expressions.

Utilizing the new economic opportunities, political openings and the vacuum created by undermining of Islamist power structures, the new Muslim bourgeoisie articulated free-market and civic associational life with Islamic sentiments. This curious engagement resulted in a hybrid, individual-oriented, and reformist Islamic expression, more in line with the liberal institutional context, maturing into the Muslimist orthodoxy as Islamism prevailed in the society at large from civil formations to theology faculties. More recently in the early 2000s, Islamism also found its expression in the political sphere by the formation of the JDP.

**Temporal Backlashes**

We find significant challenges to the extended political opportunity structure within the liberal order; nonetheless, Islamism continued to thrive, became institutionalized, and strengthened its position.
One such challenge was a reassertion of the NOM frame at polls in mid 1990s under the Welfare Party (WP), which gained electoral support from Islamic grassroots mainly due to weakening of the center right parties, its successful advertisement for a ‘just’ economic order and a ‘moral’ government, and its ability to mobilize at the grassroots level. The party, which maintained secularism versus Islamism stance, however, also got support from the Muslimist civil society, contributing to its political victory.

How was it that Islamist WP received support from early Muslimists who challenge the reactionary and state-centered Islamic expressions? The WP was the only party at the time open to Islamic sensitivities, which made the WP relatively attractive for the early Muslims. Equally puzzling, however, how was is that the WP did not engulf the Muslimist demands into its own discourse and channel them back into Islamism, given that it was the only political outlet for Islamic groups at the time?

Two factors seem to explain that: The WP and its Islamist discourse could not express Muslimist demands and could not fulfill Muslimist expectations in the long term. Thus, the alliance between Muslimist grassroots and the political leaders of the NOM was marked by tension and was only temporary. This temporary alliance was broken by another backlash, yet this time coming from the army.

In 1997, the army intervened and passed the 28-February-decisions which, more than halting Islamist political mobilization, reasserted statism and the statist version of secularism for the intervention not only targeted the WP but also sought a total exclusion of religion from the public sphere by severely threatening pious businesses owners, academics, public employees, and veiled university students.

15 The WP was founded in 1983 and was closed following the 1997 military intervention.
16 Within that frame, the WP depicted capitalism, Westernization, and secularism as 'microbes' causing corruption, moral decay, inequality, interest and high-prices, and advocated moral improvement by eliminating Western influences. It disfavored EU membership and promoted intra-Umma alliances, was state-oriented, and assigned religious leaders and Islamic morality an explicit place in the political sphere (from the banking system to moral order).
17 The fact that in the 2002 elections the Felicity Party (a late NOM party) received only 2.5% while the JDP, a party consistent with Muslimist demands, became the leading party makes a case in point.
The effects of the intervention were complex; the army unintentionally did much more than dismantling the NOM. On the one hand, it undermined the legitimacy of the statist power structures further in the eyes of the public. Second, by outlawing the current Islamist party, the military unintentionally freed Muslimism from NOM and prevented Islamists from engulfing Muslimist impulses. Freed from NOM and its leaders, Muslimism pushed its distinct Islamic politics into the political sphere under the JDP founded by a group of reformist Islamic politicians who broke off from the NOM in 2001.

Along this track that Muslimism has taken from the economic sector to the political sphere, Turkey’s intensifying relations with and the prospects for entering the EU catalyzed Muslimist growth. The EU acted as a broad institutional frame legitimizing liberalization and the market-oriented, reformist, pluralistic Muslimist politics while weakening the coherency of state-centered approaches and reactionary Islamic expression.

The Agents and Sites of Muslimism

The previous section situated Muslimism in the broader historical context and demonstrated that Muslimism is rooted in the emergence of a new order that undermined statism and Islamism creating new opportunities and a vacuum for articulation of an alternative religious form. Who were the agents that used the liberal condition to articulate a new Islamic content? What are actual processes involved in formulating Muslimism? Finally, where can we locate Muslimism in everyday life?

It was the new Muslim pretty bourgeoisie that was generated by the export-economy who became the prime agents of Muslimism. This new group emerged in the newly growing centers of Anatolia and among second or third generation Anatolian migrants living in the metropolitan cities who kept strong ties with their place of origin. They are mainly composed of small to medium sized ventures that are family-owned or trust-based. They used urbanization, migration and expansion of education as avenues to build competitive skills and realize social and economic upward mobility. Islam is a salient cultural reference for these entrepreneurs. As their Islamic identity historically distanced
the Muslim bourgeoisie from the secularist state and its bureaucratic favors, they depend on the market, globalization of production, and the ability to establish dense export activities, and are thus self-reliant.

Driven both by a commercial fervor and Islamic values, the Muslim bourgeoisie articulated free-market and Islam in specific ways creating an Islamic sub-market (or ‘Islamic sub-economies’) in which an innovative spirit reproduces modern tastes and practices in an explicitly Islamic manner. From 5-star Islamic hotels to tesettür fashion to hashemas (Islam-proper swimming suits), the hybrid products and services of the Muslim bourgeoisie demonstrated to pious Turks the possibility of an Islam-proper lifestyle that is also commensurate with modernity, its institutions and values. Therefore, more than being an economic market, we identify the Islamic sub-economies as ‘cultural sites of hybridity’ where Muslims directly experiment with Islam and modernity amalgamations producing new compatibilities between the two.

Even though the sites of hybridity were first crystallized in the form of the Islamic submarket, they are now found in society at large in intellectual groups and civic formations. For example, Muslimist women’s associations promote a new Islamic gender politics by criticizing gender discrimination produced by secular-modernity (such as exploitation of female sexuality and labor by capitalist markets) and also by religion (e.g. polygamy and laws of inheritance), using progressive Islamic concepts such as masalih and ijtihad (both referring to adaptation to the social currents).

More recently, we find that the sites of hybridity and Muslimism have also entered into the political sphere in the form of a political formation, the JDP. Formed by pious politicians, since its formation, the

20 Many associate the emergence of moderate Islamic politics in Turkey with the emergence of the JDP, seeing the party as the ultimate actor producing a new Islamic expression, thus, erroneously reduce Muslimism to a political party. These interpretations fail to acknowledge that the JDP and its moderate Islamic politics are reflections of a new Islamic orthodoxy (and theological reformism) under way since the late 1980s and rooted in the new Islamic bourgeoisie and active in civic society.
party has promoted a liberal national polity particularly on issues that relate to terror law, capital punishment, censoring, ethnic minority and religious minority rights and liberties, torture and prisons, institutional gender-discrimination, and military and civilian relations. The JDP policies on such issues were also the harmonization steps for the EU and affirmed JDP’s commitment to the EU process. The party aggressively promoted Turkey’s membership in the EU, accorded precedence to international treaties over Turkish law21 while developing Turkey into a major regional power in the Middle East and thus deepening relations also with the Muslim world.

The JDP, by producing advanced hybrid formulas combining Islamic values and globalist objectives, and by promoting a conciliatory politics between Islam, the state, and the West, prevailed over both the pro-secularist and Islamist parties and gained a strong Muslimist electoral support carrying its leaders to prime ministry and later to presidency. In contrast, neither state secularism, firmly linked to the old bureaucratic order, nor Islamism, firmly linked to reactionary and state-centered religious establishments, could effectively absorb such notions.

In summary, whether it is based in the economic terrain or in other realms, the sites of hybridity challenge the hegemony of Islamism over defining ‘how to be a good Muslim’ and the monopoly of state-secularism over defining ‘how to be modern’. In the sites of hybridity modernity is reformulated to be ‘guilt-free’, where modernity is no longer reduced to a sum of evil effects destroying religious sensitivities: from individuality to free-market, to fashion, to human rights and democracy, modernity no longer offends Islamic priorities and identity. Similarly, within these sites, Islam is cleared from its prevalent stigmas and redefined to be ‘unapologetic’: being an Islam-inspired party does no longer prevent promotion of a democratic, liberal national polity or being pro-EU. Likewise, being a veiled woman does no longer prevent advocating gender equality or entertaining modern bodily practices from fashion, to yoga, to swimming (with the Islam observant swimsuits). In sum, the cultural sites of hybridity bear Muslimism on all

aspects of life, reshaping religious aspirations, practice and theology, political thoughts and worldviews, lifestyles and habits. It is in these sites where we can locate Muslimism in everyday life.

Empirical Documentation of Muslimism

Given these mechanisms (conditions, agents and sites), we expect Muslimism to have a certain content that will significantly differ from other religious establishments, in particular from Islamism. Organized the anticipated Muslimist content around the 3Ds (dīn-religion, devlet-state, dūnya-world) to structurally define it and differentiate it from Islamism. By examining Muslimist attitudes toward each D in terms of ontology (meta-views of a given D), agency (agents responsible to attain the meta-views) and action (type of action taken to attain the meta-views), the empirical work produced an ideal-type Muslimist cognitive schema giving us nine core elements that are constitutive of Muslimism. These include for example innovation, civicness, conciliation, hybridity, heterogeneity, social action, liberal state and individualization.

To examine whether Muslimism displays the anticipated elements and thus differs from Islamism, the first author employed a qualitative study and conducted in-depth interviews (in 2007) with four pro-Islamic civil organizations; each identified as ‘cultural sites of hybridity’ based on pilot field research (in 2006): Capital Women’s Platform (CWP), MAZLUMDER (a human rights association), the Justice and Development Party, and MUSIAD (a businessmen’s association). The interviews were conducted only with high-level members (e.g. congressmen, founders, and chairs) of these organizations. The participants were asked standardized but open-ended questions that got at general issues such as secularism, modernity, practical and symbolic values of religion, political values, the Western religions and civilizations, lifestyles and everyday life, children and education, belonging and identity, wealth and competition, state and civil society, projections about future.

The data overall supported the theoretical expectations; Muslimism is present in the sites of hybridity and the study has correctly identified its

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22 The empirical work was designed and carried out by the first author.
core elements. In this paper, we will only introduce empirical findings showing how the Muslimist participants design the macro realm Devlet (state) at the ontological (the meta-view) level, which we termed ‘liberal state’. We will also briefly discuss how Islamism perceives the West and the IR institutions basing this on various questions of the survey.

**The Liberal State**

In the macro realm Devlet (state), we anticipated Muslimists to promote a state model that is designed around liberal principles, and termed this as ‘liberal state.’ The data support this expectation and reveal this state model is built on contestations both of secularist (instead of secular) and Islamist designs of state. Integral to this contestation is definition of ‘true-secularism’, in particular by differentiating it from state-secularism. The following presents Muslimist criticisms of secularist and Islamist state models, their definition of ‘true-secularism’ and the features ascribed to the Muslimist state.

**Contesting State-Secularism**

Given Islamism is a religious orthodoxy; it is not surprising that consistent among the participants we find explicit criticisms of the secularist nature of the Turkish state. However, the target of criticisms is not secularism itself where secularism is negated on religious grounds. Participants, instead, contest the authoritarian/ oppressive character that secularism has acquired in Turkey and use a liberal political discourse that emphasizes individual rights and liberties, religious rights being only a part of that. Whenever participants criticize state repression of religion, they also talk about repression of other ‘outcast’ groups from non-Islamic religion to ethnic/ national minorities:

Aslı (CWP): “I think Turkey is a country that is built on paranoia... When the founding elite formed the nation-state everything from what Albanians said to what Arab, Greek or Bulgarian did or religion...all...became so problematic... It still is. Few years back they declared that Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s adopted daughter (manevi evlat) was of Armenian origin. What is wrong with that?...I think it is great because it
shows Turkey’s integrating structure. But the army interpreted that as an insult against Atatürk…This delays us from progress…”

Yücel (JDP) : “…A Muslim does not have the right to provide education to his kids in the way he wants or to send his kids to whichever school he wants…A Christian does not have the right to school his own priest. A Jew does not have the right to school and train his own rabbi…We made big mistakes between 1923 and 1928 by sending out our Christians…”

As these quotes exemplify, Muslimists contestation of state secularism is part of a broader protest against authoritarianism that is based on individual liberties and multicultural references.

Reformulating Secularism

Integral to participants’ contestation of state secularism is their attempt to reformulate secularism based on the Muslimist state design. The first term of this reformulation is the separation of state-secularism from ‘true-secularism’. Nur (MAZLUMDER), who considers the US-model secularism to be closer to her perception of secularism, for example says:

“…in Turkey religion has always been exploited by the laic wing... Secularism in Turkey is not objective; it continuously seeks to regulate the life-space of the religious and it harasses religion... If we look at the secularism in Turkey, I can never be a secular...but if what you mean is separation of religious and state affairs.... Secularism... is objectivity. If this is so, if it is objectivity, of course I am a secular. Now how should a state handle religion? I want the state to be neutral and objective before its nation and people...I think the US has been realizing that more or less.”

As this quote shows, for the Muslimists secularism is acceptable and even desirable as long as it is defined as disengagement of state and religious affairs not as state control and subjugation of religion.
Other terms of this negotiation/reformulation are most explicitly unveiled when the participants talk about the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri), a state institution that regulates religious affairs. Following the Muslimist claims for separating state from religious affairs, we would normally expect the participants to demand the termination of the directorate. However, the data suggest the opposite, an overwhelming majority of the participants favor preserving the directorate. This first seems puzzling, but a deeper examination illustrates that this actually is a Muslimist position.

The participants believe that a center, such as the Directorate, that would regulate religious affairs is a necessity.

Ersin (JDP): “The Directorate is necessary. It certainly should be preserved. Because then based on what are you going to determine your proceedings? Now think about this, today you have a mosque in your neighborhood and what does happen if everyone who has a little of bit of Islamic knowledge want to be an Imam?…what are you going to do? This needs regulation...”

As the congressman exemplifies, the participants are concerned that in the absence of a regulatory center various religious communities would claim their own version of ‘true Islam’ creating disarray and also vulgarize Islamic knowledge in the hands of groups/leaders that are unqualified to teach/produce Islamic knowledge.

However, while Muslimists embrace the Directorate, they also attempt to shape the Directorate (and more broadly state’s position vis-à-vis Islamic civil society) along new lines. Most commonly, they suggest that the Directorate (1) should have a more pluralist/neutral nature (serving not only Sunnis but Alevites and even non-Islamic religions), (2) should have more autonomy, and (3) should cooperate with the religious civil society. These terms also inform us about the Muslimist definition of ‘true secularism’: a state is neutral toward each faith group, respects religious sensitivities, and sees religious groups as legitimate actors, as put by a congressman.

Yücel (JDP) “The directorate should be expanded and should cover every faith group in Turkey…it should be transformed to include Jews
and Christians... I think the state should also pay salaries to the priests. I mean the non-Muslim citizens pay taxes to this state too, so what about their religious services? Why does the state pay only for Imams?"

So far, we reported the Muslimist contestation of state-secularism and its definition of true secularism. The following will document how participants criticize and contest the Islamist design of the state.

Contesting Islamic Sharia

None of the participants identified as Muslimist either support the idea of an Islamic state or think an Islamic state is necessary to establish a truly Islamic life. The data show that this is not simply a political, strategic choice but it is embedded in broader liberal attitudes regarding governance and state, and more interestingly in Muslimist theological perception of God, individual, the state (this is the theological layer of the Muslimist individual orientation discussed earlier in the paper).

The participants are equally critical of Sharia as they are of the secularist state for violating individual liberties, and these criticisms intersect at a liberal political discourse as Erol, a JDP congressman epitomizes when he talks about Iran:

“If an Islamic state is what it is in Iran this is also a regime of suppression. If you cannot make people believe in something, you cannot make them accept that something by force in anyway. I contend that we can maintain a religious life under a democratic state, a state of law”.

Similarly, Ihsan (MUSIAD) says: “That is absolutely wrong [referring to Iran’s compulsory veiling]...I have never run into in any Islamic reference like: hit on someone’s head with a wood-stick or lock them in...the choice remains with the individual because Islamically what is essential is the individual responsibilities. I contend that this regime in Iran will not last long...”

This takes us to the Muslimist theological perception of faith, state and the individual. For Islamism, a true religiosity emanates from self (‘iman’ / inner belief and ‘kalbi’/ by heart) not from a policing state or a gazing community:
Derya (CWP): “you should be at a position where you can both do good and bad… If the state prevents you from doing misdeed, this is not Islamic because in Islam you as the individual are responsible. You should have the actual opportunity to do and choose badness but you choose not to; consciously and willingly. Otherwise if you tie someone hands… Thus, an Islamic state is not necessary. What is necessary is to protect and maintain the environment of freedom.”

Ihsan (MUSIAD): “…The best governance would be one which provides an atmosphere of freedom. And I think Islam that is practiced under such governance would be more valuable. Because…it is not valuable if you practice Islam because you have to or because you are forced to. This is only related with the self; with one’s faith. It acquires value and meaning only when you practice and believe consciously and comfortably …”

These show that for the Muslimists faith is an individual/ inner, voluntary, and a rational choice. This dramatically undermines the theological centrality the state acquires in Islamism for creating an Islamic society and truly faithful Muslims. For the Muslimists, what is central is not the state but an atmosphere of freedom in which faith is an individual choice. Thus, while Islamism theologically engages state and faith, Muslimism theologically disengages the two.

Yücel (JDP): “…Islam does not talk about state institutions. Neither in hadith nor in verses can you find a precept like this. Religion was not revealed to the states. It was revealed to individuals singly. The state is not an addressee...And any ways, religions do not claim political power. It is the people who demand for that. For instance, our prophet does not tell us; go ahead and be presidents, prime ministers…”

To summarize, neither a Sharia nor a secularist state is attractive for the Muslimists due to their liberal political and multiculturalists (pluralist) commitments and theological perception of faith (and believing). Based on the contestations of both type of states, Muslimists articulate an alternative state model that is designed around liberal lines.
Articulating the Muslimist state

Three themes are spread evenly among the participants regarding the definition of a ‘good state’: democracy, justice and tolerance/clemency. The terms are utilized to point out to a state model in which rights and freedoms are granted and expanded. Epitomizing this shared discourse, Lale (CWP) sees democracy as an essential ingredient of a ‘good state’:

“…Contrarily to an Islamic state, what is necessary is a democratic state. If democracy can be consolidated everyone will have the chance to live their lives in accordance with their own faith. They will have the chance to practice their faith as much or as less as they choose. This is better than an Islamic state.”

Thus, the Muslimists promote a state model that would recognize each group and would allow them to realize their various lifestyles, preferences, commitments and tastes. How genuine is Muslimism in its demand for democracy, after all it is a religious orthodoxy that is submitted to a truth perceived to be objective? Or what are the limits of Muslimist liberalism?

The participants claim to cherish rights and freedoms on a universal landscape, which is shared equally between ‘us’ and the ‘other’. For example, when defining the most urgent human rights violations in Turkey, a large majority of participants identified non-religious issues, from torture to murders and domestic violence, to be more urgent than religious issues (such as the ban on veil or educational rights). Moreover, throughout the analysis of the 3Ds and at various elements, the participants criticized the Islamists for demanding liberties only for themselves while denying the same rights for the ‘other’ or having no tolerance for other in particular secular lifestyles (from mini skirts to alcohol). This again shows us that what participants demand is a universal democratic platform; one that is not only for the religious but for all.

Paralleling this, the ideal Muslimist state is defined to be anti-prohibitory, in particular through discussions on alcohol and missionary activities. None of the participants identified as Muslimist favor banning either of missionary activities or of alcohol. (This is a significant con-
trast with Islamism, which does not even accept alcohol to be an issue of freedom)\textsuperscript{23}.

Şeref (MUSIAD): “I don’t think prohibition/ banning is a meaningful thing to do. The environment we live in, the position we have, and the vision we put forward does not entail prohibition. We are not a closed society; we are a society with self-confidence…”

Similary Namik (MUSIAD) says: “…If we are to internalize Europe, the world… on the one side you raise mosques in Europe and you open up Quranic courses in Europe, and then you come here say we ban missionary activities. This is not acceptable. Istanbul is a good example. I have lived in Kumkapı…a church and a mosque are next to each other. It has been like that for centuries…”

To summarize, the analysis of the ontological element of macro realm Devlet (state) confirm our expectation that the Muslimists articulate a state model that is designed around liberal principles. Differing both from Islamist and secularist state models, the Muslimist ideal state extends the borders of political freedoms and withdraws from prohibitory politics and compulsion. This model is based both on political commitments to individual liberties and theological perceptions of faith, state and the individual. Within this frame, Muslimists also redefine secularism as a neutral state, and a state that respects religious rights, pushing state-secularism towards “a democratic secular imaginary”\textsuperscript{24}.

**Muslimist perception of the West**

Muslimist discourse, as expected, challenges the presumed clash and incompatibility between Islam and the West. While this discourse

\textsuperscript{23} It should be noted however participants have certain reservations about alcohol and missionary activities, such as suggestions on strictly supervising the age limit, not selling alcohol in certain areas, and preventing encouragement and prodding of alcohol. Importantly these reservations are not framed within an Islamic discourse (e.g. alcohol is haram) but within a pragmatic discourse, emphasizing the societal and personal hazards alcohol could generate (traffic accidents, alcoholism and so forth). Given that, it is not surprising the JDP has recently (2011) enacted new regulations regarding alcohol sale, such as shifting the age limit from 18 to 21, regulations that are quite parallel to that of the Western states.

comes forward in participants’ discussions on modernity (from leisure, liberty, democracy, fashion, parenting, to individuality) across the 3Ds, the survey also more directly inquires how participants position Turkey (and Islam) vis-à-vis the West. This inquiry reveals that the participants are globally oriented, have globalist objectives, and promote a conciliatory politics between Islam/ Turkey and the West.

Global Orientation

As part of their future plans, quite homogenous across organizations, participants aim to move beyond the national and regional borders and become global civil actors. They want to participate in international projects, work with international agencies, and have an influential voice on IR discussions and policy-making, from human rights violations to sustainable growth to more micro issues such as traffic-murders. Thus, the participants want to be further integrated into the global system.

This is reinforced when participants criticize Iran for being a ‘closed’ society and isolating itself from the global society. Halil (JDP) asserts that Iran will have to either integrate into the global system and if not it will tumble. Similarly, Namık (MUSIAD) argues that the world is becoming more and more global and he considers Iran’s attempt to isolate itself as political lapse.

Conciliatory Politics and the EU

Paralleling the global-oriented discourse, participants denounce Islam versus West dichotomy, in particular through ascribing Turkey a hybrid character, where Turkey is seen to be both Islamic and European (geographically, culturally and historically), suggesting that neither identity requires abandonment of the other. Epitomizing that Şeref (MUSIAD) and Ismail (JDP) say:

“We are at a central position. We are Europeans; we went to Balkans reaching to Vienna, Austria. But we are also Asian, Middle Eastern. We have borders with the Middle East and historical bounds with the Turkic Republicans. Our culture, our land; we are right in between two civilizations.”
“I think we are a bridge.... On one side, we are European, and on the other side we are Asian and we are Turks. ...being Turkish is nested and multifaceted.”

Within this frame, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of the participants are pro-EU, and they believe that Turkey would overall benefit from the EU membership – the most important benefit being democratization for more than half of the participants. The membership is expected to help Turkey for ‘normalization’, for further establishment of the rule of law, for improvement of human rights, and for extension of civil liberties. For example, Ismail (JDP) and Pınar (CWP) say:

“The EU has been our dream for so many years. We want to join the union especially so that we can improve human rights, we can improve our standards of living. We want to catch up with certain economic and social standards the EU countries were able to establish”

“Right now the EU is showing us only the carrot [referring to slowly moving negotiations]. But even within this period, we were able to benefit a lot. I believe the more we are involved the more positive outcomes will emerge.”

Participants’ discussion on the EU also reveals how Muslimists intertwinew nationalistic sentiments with globalist objectives. Ali (JDP) epitomizes this as follows:

“There are no more borders in the world. Turkey’ membership as the only Muslim country will result in new openings for Turkey and for the whole world; it will be an example to Muslim countries and to Western countries. It will be a model of congruence and conciliation among various cultures and religions. That is why Turkey’ entrance in the EU is very important.”

This quote shows that for the participants EU membership will benefit not only Turkey but the whole world. Participants argue that membership would build a new model of conciliation as an example for the rest of the world (globalist objectives) while at the same time ascribing
Turkey a significant international role in promoting global conciliation (nationalistic sentiments). This way Muslimists bridge nationalistic objectives and globalist ones. Deepening this, while participants praise Turkey, they use Iran as a negative reference, and criticize Iran for stimulating conflict, animosity and polarization, as put by Erol (JDP):

“... Iran is defying the US, the whole world and everyone. But this is not politics, this is not diplomacy! Politics require handling things with conciliation and seeking diplomacy... Iran is not doing politics, they are swaggering. It is almost like this man [referring to Ahmadi Nejad] is a provocateur...”

Finally, the Muslimist promotion of conciliatory politics is not limited to IR. Participants carry over the same discourse to inter-religious interaction, both at the level of governance and in everyday life. These include for example favoring liberalizing policies for extending the rights of religious minorities (such as easing the rules for opening worship houses) and, more interestingly, participants’ positive attitudes about developing close friendships with members of non-Islamic religions, where a majority indicate that ‘good morality’ is more important than religious affiliations.

A final note on Muslimism and West

It should be noted that while having a global-oriented discourse and promoting conciliation politics, Muslimists also harshly and openly criticize Western foreign policy in regions as diverse as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Chechnya. They also criticize UN and EU human rights courts for not being objective or for being weak. They criticize, moreover, the EU’s attitude on certain historical issues (e.g. Cyprus, Armenia) and conservative wings in the EU itself, which aim to exclude Muslim Turkey from “Christian Europe.”

These criticisms, however, are not reasons to abandon EU processes nor do they result in an anti-Western, anti-global discourse. Instead, participants separate these criticisms from their general approach to the West, its values and institutions. This more broadly reveals the unique nature of the Muslimist orthodoxy: it embraces the meanings,
values, thoughts, and forms of action within the world polity, such as modernity, democracy, and individuality\(^{25}\) while submitting them to the Islamic and vernacular order.

**Theorizing New Religious Orthodoxies and International Relations**

Muslimism is not unique in its approach to articulating rationalistic institutions and its religious tradition. We refer to Muslimism as a new religious orthodoxy that we argue is a helpful concept in understanding religion and international relations. New religious orthodoxies embrace modern institutions such as capitalist markets, nation-states, and individualism (citizenship, rights, education, subjective expression) and simultaneously submit them to the sacred, moral order of their religious traditions. They are neither liberal syncretism in which individuals pick and chose to form an idiosyncratic religiosity, nor are they fundamentalist. New religious orthodoxies select elements of their tradition they identify as fundamentals but use them to leverage innovative versions of modern practices, as seen in Muslimism in Turkey.

One research direction is to carry out comparative analyses of new religious orthodoxies in different religious traditions. For example, Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are in their different ways examples within Christianity. Sufism in some locations is practiced among the urban upper middle class and professionals in this fashion. Research designs would include cases in which new religious orthodoxies are absent to identify conditions.

In this paper we are suggesting another research direction, that of working out the implications for understanding religion in world politics and for international relations theory. IR theory shares much with sociological theory that is state-centered or more generally rational actor-centered. Common assumptions include (1) modern nation-states are rational actors, (2) they generate norms that coordinate and control interactions, and (3) they are secular in the sense of being differentiated from religious organizations and thus the interstate system is secular,

or should be. The “should be” recasts the last assumption as a normative imperative. The combined presumed description and normative imperative lead to the view that the presence of religion within international relations is a problem in a dual sense: it is a puzzle that must be explained as an exception and it will cause all types of problems.

These assumptions comprise a metatheoretical framework that leads scholars to either miss the presence of religion or to explain it away as epiphenomenal of things like economic or political interests or as irrational responses to crises, alienation, or frustration. Consider two of the more important defining moments in recent world politics and the attending scholarship. Many Western sociologists and political scientists shortly after the 1979 revolution in Iran reassured everyone that it was not about religion. Thirty-two years later scholars and the media immediately depicted the attack on 11 September 2001 as a product of irrational, essentialist religious civilization and resentment.

This framework is shared by different theoretical approaches, including realist, liberal, and critical constructivist. Because of the common framework, all such approaches with some exceptions tend to see the insertion of religion into international politics as a threat. In terms of organization and practice, giving religious organizations authority and influence disrupts the sovereignty of the state as organization and hinders rational action by confusing state interests and rational coordination. In terms of a world cultural model of the modern nation-state, it brings the external, transcendent order back into a system that was constructed precisely to exclude the transcendent, thereby calling into question the sources of nation-state sovereignty as a moral project.26 IR scholars tend to focus on organizational practices. For realists and neo-realists, all but rational considerations of state interests are and should be excluded from international relations. For liberalism and neo-liberalism, international institutions and cultural meanings are reducible to norms and organizations that coordinate complex interactions so states can optimize actions. Liberals often consider the importance of norms such as democracy that communicate values

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beyond rational coordination, but even here there is the tendency to view these as means to rational ends. Critical constructivists are the most open, of course, to cultural and institutional realities, but there is the tendency to reduce these to centers of power, either to interest-driven actors or to institutional sites. Religion is interpreted critically as means of control, irrational escape, or displaced resistance. Both liberal and constructivist theories are open to international values such as multiculturalism and provide an opening for religion, but religion appears as a manifestation of local culture that should be protected, not as a force or actor to be engaged.

Bringing sociological theories and particularly sociology of religion into IR, must be highly selective if it is to be helpful because much in sociology shares the same framework. For example, the state-centered theory of collective action identifies important conditions for any movement to mobilize and for the successful emergence of new religious orthodoxies as illustrated by the importance of opportunity spaces for Islamism in Turkey. Recent work in the approach ignores or reduces religion to issues of power interests and social movement organizations. Similarly, the prevalent approach within American sociology of religion is rational actor theory that conceptualizes religious markets and focuses on organizational competition or monopoly to explain organizational growth, ignoring religious content and more diffuse religious movements.

The framework common to sociology and IR thus tends to boil down to requiring in modern polities self-defining moderate religions. But what is moderate religion? If defined negatively as not passionate or fanatical, not literalist or fundamentalist, not violent or repressive, then no passionately held religion applied to modern life will be so defined because there is the modern fear that it also might become one of these. This seems especially true of academic and secular views of Islam. In any case, people commonly hold their religions intensely and passionately and will desire to bring them into their everyday life.


28 See also Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic political identity in Turkey*. 
We start with this latter point: people will use their religion to engage everyday life, including political life. They will use it to target political centers whether the nation state or global governance institutions and organizations. When this takes the form of engaging institutions by embracing them and working within them yet submitting them to religious categories and moral imperatives, we refer to it as a new religious orthodoxy. As shown in the study of Muslimism, these are developed in modern sites within the market, civic society, and the state resulting in a hybridity.

**Implications for the Political**

The presence of new religious orthodoxies thus calls into question social science theories that view religious movements as reactions to crises whatever their putative source: contacts with modernity or with the West, or failed states. Furthermore, new religious orthodoxies call into question binaries that are built into social science theories: modern versus traditional, secular versus religious, political versus cultural. The binary of culture versus political, that a movement must be one or the other, blinds us to the reality of new religious orthodoxies. Muslimism, for example, must in this view be either the use of a religious tradition to legitimate Westernized consumption or a façade for a political Islamism. The former focuses on the fact that Muslimism is not statist, not oriented to control of the state or the use of the state to dominate society. The presumption is that any movement not oriented to the state must not be political. New religious orthodoxies such as Muslimism are in fact political and Muslimists are involved in politics and political parties; observers that focus on this aspect insist that it must really be about control of the state. The presumption is that to be political is to have radical control of the state and thus society as one’s ultimate goal.

Muslimism and other new religious orthodoxies blur the distinction between cultural and political. They embrace many aspects of modern life while submitting that life to a sacred, moral order. As they engage modernity, they formulate a hybrid identity frame, new lifestyles and new institutions. Muslimists, for example, construct a lifestyle where the Muslim-individual can be incorporated into modernity while establishing and making salient their Islamic identity. New religious
orthodoxies thus entail the restructuring of everyday life around new institutions, empowering the religious-self over community and state pressures, and reframing the polity, state purpose, and political participation.

One implication is that we need cultural theories of the state, of the interstate system, and of international relations. Nation-states have cultural programs, one moral purposes, and are culturally constituted. The interstate system is culturally constituted and the nation-state is embedded in a moral ontology. As illustrated by Muslimists’ engagement with the Turkish state, religious movements engage the underlying ontological groundings of the state. They in particular engage the sources of authority and sovereignty. In a sense, they relativize the state, depicting it neither as a sacred ensuring progress (salvation) nor as an evil profaning sacred traditions. These aspects are seen in the several statements that interviewed Muslimists made about state and society.

New religious orthodoxies engage the moral groundings of the state with a global vision. This varies from case to case of new religious orthodoxies. In the case of Turkey, the conditions for Muslimism were very much linked internationally: global markets, relations with the European Union, and its location between West and East. Yet, the comprehensive engagement with modernity, the modern state, and modern capitalism almost ensures that new religious orthodoxies articulate a global vision. We see this in the interviewed Muslimists’ attitudes toward the West and the European Union.

While new religious orthodoxies are characterized by a political sensibility or ethos, they can and usually do become linked to party politics because it directs religious people to participate politically. In Turkey, this has taken the form of electoral participation and electoral support

for the Justice and Development Party. Many members and leaders of the Party, moreover, would qualify as Muslimists and some are included in the empirical study.

It is important to understand, though, that the JDP is not essentially Muslimist. It is a political party that is informed by Islamism, has Muslimist members and leaders, and gains broad electoral support from Muslimists. As a political party, it pursues party politics and under given conditions reflects Muslimist sensibilities.

It is out of the scope of this paper to analyze the full scope of the JDP, but we point to the degree to which it articulates with Islamism. It uses the universalistic language of human rights in supporting the rights of minorities including Alevi, Kurds, and Christians. Strategically, the expansion of rights both plays to the demands of the European Union and opens up secular public space to Muslims. The important thing here is that it does so by articulating freedoms within a liberal state, thus appealing to Muslimists. The Turkish government does draw legal boundaries relative to moral, social issues, but here there seems to be a parallel with Christian Democratic Parties in European countries. It attempts to distinguish sharply such actions from a desire to establish religious law. This again articulates with the attitudes expressed by Muslimists in balancing state, society, and individual choice.

There is nothing in our theory to suggest that this broad policy approach is unchangeable, but instead is highly conditional. Any number of scenarios might play out that would lead the JDP to move toward a more statist or Islamism approach and forsake liberal policies. External threat, regional power politics, European exclusion, economic shifts affecting the middle class, and internal military intervention could effect such changes. Forsaking liberal policies based on universal human rights, in particular regarding Kurds, Alevites, and gender, would certainly be judged harshly and likely would vindicate those who argue that it is essentially Islamism. But this falls back on negative binaries and misses the conditional nature. How this would affect Muslimists is also conditional. We would expect that if the government moved in this direction, it would lose support of Muslimists.32

32 This expectation would be qualified because there is the phenomenon of organizations becoming so identified with a movement, that people stick with it even after it has changed, and this would
Implications for the International

As noted, new religious orthodoxies generate a global vision, and we have documented the views of Muslimists toward the West and the European Union and to the embracing of universalistic human rights. The global is also played out in party politics, as evidenced in the discourse and foreign policy strategies and initiatives of the JDP government.

In terms of the general discourse, the government clearly claims a special calling to lead in a new world order and to provide a model for the future. By promoting membership in the EU and simultaneously looking eastward, it is staking a claim to have a special role in bridging civilization divides in the twenty-first century. This is played out in particular actions such as teaming with Brazil to try to broker a deal with Iran over its nuclear energy/weapons policy and becoming active in mediating international relations in Eastern Europe. The fact that it has eschewed a close relationship with Venezuela is telling, and consistent with its view that Turkey has a unique role to bridge divides and present an exemplary domestic model of the liberal state, economy, society, and religion. The model has been taken up to some extent. For example, at least one cleric returning to Tunisia claimed that he is not Bin Laden but Erdoğan. There is no strong evidence that this has congealed into a transnational ideological movement but is consistent with the cultural and ideological influences in other countries.

These strategies do not fit neo-realism (pursuing well-defined material state interests) or neo-liberalism (constructing global liberal institutions). Clearly, neither strategic interests nor liberal principles are being sacrificed but are promoted. These putatively contradictory purposes are articulated within a discourse and strategy centered on the global role and model of Turkey, deeply informed by political sensibilities associated with Muslimism. They preserve the model of the nation-state be a possibility that would have to be explored.


34 For American Foreign Policy, see Michael. H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
and an Islamic worldview of authority and drive innovative strategic action. New religious orthodoxies question the received binaries of IR theory: secular/religious, internal/external, culture/political, modern/traditional. They call for a more cultural and institutional approach to international relations and in particular to the place of religion.
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