THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME:
Inconsistency and Illegitimacy Creates Its Weaknesses

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Abstract

Considering the dangers of proliferation and its possible destabilizing effects to world peace and international cooperation environment, it is very important to determine the roots of this failure and ineffectiveness. Therefore, this paper aims to find answers to the following questions: Is the current regime implementation legitimate and should it be kept in the same functioning structure? Alternatively, is the major problem in the existing nuclear non-proliferation order due to its selective focus and its ethnocentric double standard that creates an illegitimacy problem? If it failed to be effective to prevent proliferation, what kind of possible destabilizing factors are waiting us in the present and future decades? By answering these questions it has been concluded that the prestige value of nuclear deterrence is eroding and the “rogue states” can be effectively destroyed by using conventional weaponry. It has been also concluded that the failure of the existing nuclear order is due to its selective and somewhat myopic and hype focus on proliferation and its ethnocentric double standard.

Key words: Nuclear non-Proliferation Regime, “Rouge States”, Great Powers.

NÜKLEER SİLAHSIZLANMA REJİMİNİN ETKİSİZLİĞİNİN ARKASINDAKİ İKİ NEDEN: Gayrimeşruluk ve Tutarsızlık

Öz


Anahtar kelimeler: Nükleer silahlanma rejimi, “başarısız devletler”, Büyük Devletler

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1. Introduction

Recent changes in political, economic and technological conditions in post-cold war era have made problems of nuclear proliferation more challenging than ever. Parallel to this challenging environment, there has been a consensus in policy-making circles of many countries, especially the great major powers, that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry is the top international priority of the post-cold war world. “Halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction has become, in the minds of many state officials and analysts, the dominant post-cold war international interest.”

Even if we focus on the settings of U.S.-Russian relations, it can easily be realized that the most important part of the arms control issue has been articulated as “preventing the nuclear anarchy”. Unless this nuclear anarchy is prevented, it is very clear that it will be very difficult to talk about the long-term world peace based on international stability. However, despite all these dangerous threats, whether direct or indirect, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which was created by Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the end of 1960s and by several supporting treaties and arrangements such as Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), START-I and START-II Programs, has failed to deter or detect the nuclear weapons programs both in the five great major powers and other countries. This failure and ineffectiveness has made the issue more important than ever with reference to its possible dangers.

Considering the dangers of proliferation and its possible destabilizing effects to world peace and international cooperation environment, it is very important to determine the roots of this failure and ineffectiveness. As some analysts argue is this current regime implementation legitimate and should it be kept in the same functioning structure? Alternatively, is the major problem in the existing nuclear non-proliferation order due to its selective focus and its ethnocentric double standard that creates an illegitimacy problem? If it failed to be effective to prevent proliferation, what kind of possible destabilizing factors are waiting us in the present and future decades? This paper will try to

2 See US-Russia Joint Declaration, Moscow, 24 May 2002. Released by the White House, Office of Press Secretary, US Department of State. Available at website: www.state.gov
3 Basic provisions of the NPT regime are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, prohibit the transfer of weapons directly or indirectly from states in possession of nuclear weapons, safeguard nuclear materials and facilities and their transfer, make benefits of peaceful nuclear energy available and promote disarmament. For the details of NPT regime and its provisions in detail, please see Burns H. Weston and Anthony D’amato (eds), Documents on International Law and World Order (St Paul, Minnesota: West, 1980), pp. 204-206.
4 ‘Nuclear proliferation’, in basic terms, is the spread of nuclear weapons. ‘Non-Proliferation, on the other hand, is the limitation of the production or spread of nuclear weapons. Fort the casues of nuclear proliferation see, Tany Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation: An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate”, The Nonproliferation Review, (1996), pp.43-48.
5 For the discussions and analyses that argue the current regime is legitimate and even it should be supported with small changes in its own existing structural and functional conditions, see Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993) pp. 17-27.
find answers to these questions and determine the real roots of nuclear proliferation, which is one of the biggest dangers of the century we are living in.

My hypothesis in this research paper, related with the questions asked above, is that major problem and the failure of the existing order is due to its selective and somewhat myopic and hyped focus on proliferation and its ethnocentric double standard. Regardless of motives and background, the external focus of proliferation concern, despite its articulation in general world order terms, is clearly where it has always been, on the acquisition of these weapons by Third World countries, but especially by that subset of countries defined as “rogue states”? (Iran, N. Korea, Syria, Algeria etc.) which are currently perceived as hostile to the sort of international stability being promoted by the United States. On the other hand, virtually no notice has been accorded to major powers and even some other Third World countries’ acquisition of the technical capabilities and nuclear weapons program. This double standard and inconsistent implementation of the alleged general concern is destroying the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime, triggering the nuclearization of other states and creating the potentials for many destabilizing factors (which will be mentioned in detail later) to the international order and peace, because it is very difficult to talk about the legitimacy of any regime, unless it is based on equality and law which are applied to all parties in the same conditions without any exceptions or double standards. It is one of the minimum requirements of international morality. The most interesting and, perhaps, dramatic side of the picture is that, while the policy makers of the great major powers are focusing on the possible threats of so-called “rogue states”, and legitimizing their nuclear programs against that assumed threat, they are undermining two very important facts: One of them is that the prestige value of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is eroding and the other one is that such “rogue states” could be effectively destroyed without reliance on nuclear weaponry, given the superiority of the U.S. and its closest allies in conventional weaponry.

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To support my hypothesis in this paper, first I will analyze the meaninglessness of the pragmatic attempts of great major powers to retain their established status in nuclear arms and even develop new nuclear programs against the assumed threat of “rogue states” by undermining the facts that the “prestige value of nuclear deterrence” is eroding and the such “rogue states” can be effectively destroyed by using their superiority in conventional weaponry. Second, I will focus on the double standards and ethnocentrism in the implementation of nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how it creates illegitimacy, which will possibly trigger the nuclearization of other states, and destabilize the world order. Third, I will analyze the possible destabilizing effects and dangers of an illegitimate non-proliferation regime and try to find possible solution options.

2. The Unnecessity of Nuclear Weapons for Great Powers

The non-proliferation focus is premised on the monumental misconception that the greatest danger of nuclear weapons arise from those that do not currently posses the weapons, or that possess a minuscule arsenal, as distinct from the nuclear weapons states that have arsenals containing hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of nuclear warheads, as well as sophisticated means to ensure their delivery over long distances. In contrast, the rogue states, even with a handful of nuclear weapons, would be inviting their own annihilation if they ever launched or even seriously threatened to use a single nuclear warhead. As was evident in the Gulf War, such states could be effectively destroyed without reliance on nuclear weaponry, given revolution in military affairs and the superiority of the U.S. and its closest allies in conventional weaponry, an international condition that is being projected well into the next century.

In the background of historical reality that atomic weapons were used to close out a victorious war, an occasion justified by the argument of saving lives on the battlefield and shortening the ordeal of World War II. Such a justification for the use of this weaponry has been generally accepted by public opinion in the U.S. and suggests in the present global setting the danger of some “Hiroshima Temptation” - that is, a set of circumstances in which battlefield conditions suggest a considerable military advantage deriving from the threat or use of nuclear weaponry in circumstances where no prospect of retaliation exists. Throughout the cold-war era, “nuclear deterrence” was mutual, and rational to some extent especially in terms of creating international stability against the possibility of a general war, even if not entirely symmetrical. Bipolarity was stable in part, because deterrence is

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8 There is a strong belief in the international community that nuclear deterrence works and is still necessary. Therefore the development of nuclear weapons has long been associated with prestige and status. Prestige value of nuclear weapons is also closely linked to the correlation between the five permanent (P5) members of the UN Security Council and the five states defined as Nuclear Weapon States (N5) in the NPT. Mutimer labels this as a ‘potent symbolic value in the interstate games of prestige’. See David Mutimer, “Confidence-Building and the Delegitimization of Nuclear Weapons: Canadian Contributions to Advancing Disarmament”, International Security Research and Outreach Programme, International Security Bureau, March 2000, p. 5.

most effective in bilateral contexts, between two states or two blocs. More generally, bipolarity made policy management easier, because the system’s clear divisions simplified the calculations. As a result, the inhibition on use was reinforced by a strong survival motive. Even in the cold war’s own logic, despite this, on a number of occasions, nuclear threats were delivered to Third World adversaries so as to influence negotiations, the declared nuclear weapons states were very unlikely to use nuclear weapons to threaten states and it was very difficult whether they were really effective in terms of deterrence or not, if their use was clearly impossible. Although they faced many examples of crises and problems like Vietnam War, and terrorist attacks to many Americans in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, nuclear weapon possession was of no help. Over time less developed states had learned that the declared five nuclear weapons states pose little or no nuclear threat to them. Likewise, the former Soviet Union was faced with military defeat in Afghanistan, and did not resort to nuclear threats or use. Still, despite the Gulf War in 1990s and September 11 events, Washington’s nuclear weapon status has been of no practical use. Over time, the prestige value of nuclear weapons has diminished, in part, because of the realization that these weapons cannot be used for many functions other than deterrence; the social, political and environmental repercussions are so great that their use by any responsible nation lacks the credibility in almost any imaginable scenario.

If it is really difficult to argue that having nuclear weapons had a really effective deterrence power even in the cold war era and were of practical use, can we talk about their stabilizing effect and rational base in the post-cold war period? While, on the one hand, the prestige value of nuclear weapons and their stabilizing effect is eroding and, on the other hand, there are recently emerging expectations that future wars can be successfully fought with minimum casualties on the American or allies’ side, is it possible to talk about a rational base for the great powers to insist on sustaining their nuclear status against an assumed threat of “rogue states”? The answer, logically, will not be “yes” to an assumption that they do need to acquire nuclear weapons, or maintain their nuclear status against “rogue states” given their position of being extremely powerful militarily, politically and technologically against their adversaries.

3. Double Standards Creating an Illegitimate Regime

It is difficult to explain the priority accorded to non-proliferation policy in government policies of great powers, especially U.S. government policy, partly because it is doubtful that the official rationale expresses the whole story. The external focus of proliferation concern, despite its articulation in general world order terms, is totally “ethnocentric” and clearly on the acquisition of these weapons by Third World countries, but especially by that subset of countries currently perceived as hostile to the sort of international stability being promoted by the United States. For instance,

virtually no notice has been accorded to Japanese or German acquisition of the technical capabilities to support a possible future mid-scale nuclear weapons program, despite their record of past militarism and the possibility of serious political tensions arising from their economic rivalry with the United States.

Michael Klare has persuasively argued that U.S. non-proliferation efforts in recent years have been mainly directed against the so-called “rogue states”, a shifting classification currently consisting of Iran, North Korea, Syria and Algeria. Klare also emphasizes the extent to which non-proliferation policy is underpinned by domestic considerations. He contends that the recent emphasis on this “rogue doctrine” as he calls it, represents the best effort of Pentagon to play a meaningful international security role, thereby justifying a high defense budget, in a global setting that now lacks any credible strategic threat. Regardless of motive, the result of such a preoccupation is to associate danger to world order more than ever with the possibility that a specific group of Third World countries will acquire nuclear weapons (and/or other weapons of mass destruction).

Based on these propositions, there has been no serious attempt to prevent the nuclearization of Israel, Pakistan and India on an assumption that these countries are democratic and alliances, and they would not create a possible threat to international stability and peace. Especially the approach to Israel’s nuclearization reflects a clear ethnocentric discrimination. At one end of the scale is Israel, a country that achieved a nuclear weapons capability without evoking any expression of opposition by nuclear weapons states, particularly the U.S., and is generally supposed to have received various forms of external governmental assistance. At the other end of the scale is North Korea and Iran, whose sovereign rights have been challenged in fundamental respects, partly as a result of suspicions that a nuclear weapons program was under way. Such a discriminatory pattern of geopolitical enforcement could, in theory, be rationalized by reference to perceived threats of use or aggressiveness. But such a justification is not convincing with respect to non-proliferation. After all, it is Israel that has been involved in a series of wars with its Arab neighbors, has expanded its territorial claims considerably since its founding in 1948, and was widely reported to be seriously contemplating reliance on nuclear weapons if the adversity of the first days of the 1973 war had persisted.

Nor can this ethnocentric discrimination be satisfactorily explained by the intensity of a perceived security threat. As has often been noted, international society remains primarily a self-help system in relation to security; the United Nations promise of providing effective forms of collective

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12 See Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) pp.6-7. The list of rogue states is varied from time to time, but Klare’s list seems accurate in relation to current nuclear weapons concerns: see discussion at pp. 130-168 and the list of “prospective rogues” on p. 134 that includes such countries as China, Pakistan and Taiwan. When the idea of rogue or outlaw states is invoked in relation to terrorism, Syria is sometimes left off, and Sudan and Cuba are added.


14 For discussion of Israel’s nuclear weapons program, see Seymour Hersh, *The Sampson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991)
security on behalf of victims of aggression has, with rare exceptions (for example, Kuwait, 1990; South Korea, 1950), been unfulfilled. In this regard, Israel’s perceived vulnerability to hostile neighbors makes it reasonable for it to acquire the most destructive conceivable deterrent; but the same justifying conditions apply, with even greater persuasiveness, to the situation of North Korea. Israel has the benefit of having the United States as a powerful and committed ally and enjoys positive relations with a number of other countries, whereas North Korea has been confronted by a hostile United States and was on the receiving end of nuclear threats in the latter stages of Korean War. Indeed, especially since the end of the cold war, North Korea seems to have been confronted by a much more menacing security environment than that facing Israel, being isolated and seemingly on the brink of internal economic collapse, as well as faced with South Korea’s oft-proclaimed ambition to achieve reunification under its aegis.

Another important discriminatory approach is the “silence” against China’s nuclearization with an assumption not to gain its anger and hatred and integrate it to the international system. Especially it is very clear in U.S. Grand Strategy in the post-9/11 era. China is a cause of, and a contributor to, nuclear proliferation especially in South Asia. China also holds some keys to limiting the extent and scope of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Its policy towards South Asia is driven by real politic considerations. Chinese policies in South Asia have helped to undermine the effectiveness of NPT and have decreased the possibilities of India and Pakistan joining the regime as non-nuclear weapon states. None of the other great powers have left their silence against China’s nuclear transfer to Pakistan violated Beijing’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although the NPT explicitly prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons materials by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. Yet, the international community generally condones this policy as acceptable behavior by a great power. This has weakened the legitimacy of the NPT and has made the adherence of India to the treaty virtually impossible. The contradictions in Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policy seem to have hurt the regime in the short and long run.

The biggest discriminatory aspect of the current implementation of NPT regime is the approach towards the position of Russia, the U.S. and Britain. No serious attention is given to Russia’s possession and decisiveness not to reduce and destruct its nuclear stockpiles and its pragmatic attempts in retaining Russia’s established status in nuclear arms with an assumption that it is not an enemy anymore. The U.S. and Britain are not only sustaining their nuclear stockpiles or their programs, but also they are actively working on “neo-deterrence policies” with special references to new “layered defenses” coupled with “layered deterrence” which gives a special importance on new programs to develop nuclear-tipped, earth penetrating weapons capable of destroying hardened underground targets, and creating “advanced warhead concept teams” working on new warheads and warhead

modifications in order to develop 21st century’s nuclear weapons. Supporting the same double standard, the Bush administration, however, will not ask for a second time Senate’s consent to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)’s ratification, although the CTBT has been a consistent demand of global public opinion.18

Bush Administration’s nuclear weapons policy is more likely to disrupt moves towards global nuclear disarmament and creates real questions about the legitimacy of current NPT regime. Bush and Putin declared in Moscow to bolster the NPT, but they themselves are working to retain their own nuclear arsenals at least for half a century ahead without fulfilling their own nuclear disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT.19 President Putin seems to be more pragmatic in retaining Russia’s established status in nuclear arms. Besides that, the U.K. has committed more to its nuclear partnership with the U.S., as exemplified by Blair government’s participation in U.S. sub-

18 Instead of doing that, President Bush, in his first comprehensive statement on U.S. nuclear weapons, made on 1 May 2001, attempted to bring in “new concepts of deterrence”. The concepts of his neo-deterrence are based on the view that Russia is no longer an enemy of the U.S., but new threats are emerging from countries that are developing weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. Bush’s new deterrence includes: a strategy to counter proliferation of WMD; a framework to build ballistic missile defenses (BMD); and a plan to seek reductions in nuclear warheads within the new BMD framework. He viewed mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy of Cold War as “grim premise” that aimed at avoiding mutual annihilation through nuclear strikes. This recognition led the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to seek the 1972 ABM Treaty. Today’s Russia, Bush believes, is in transition moving towards democracy seeking peace within itself and with its neighbors. But it is still “a dangerous world” declares Bush, with more nations having or aspiring for nuclear weapons. Among them are some of the “world’s least-responsible states” Bush noted, some of “today’s tyrants. For the complete text of the original speech, see “US NPR Briefing”, 9 January 2002, op.cit and George Bush’s remarks at the National Defense University, 1 May 2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 37, no. 18 (Washington D.C.: US National Archives and Records Administration, 7 May 2001) pp. 686-687.

As a result of this “neo-deterrence policy”, the U.S. needs to retain, as part of stockpile stewardship, an ability to carry out a test for determining, implementing, and sustaining the “optimum test readiness time”. The need to maintain readiness to “resume underground nuclear testing” if required, is emphasized. To support this policy, especially on the development of smaller nuclear weapons, retired general John Gordon, head of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 February 2002 that the Nuclear Weapons Council had ordered a three-year study into developing and testing a nuclear-tipped, earth penetrating weapon capable of destroying hardened underground targets, and that the three nuclear weapons laboratories now had “advanced warhead concept teams” working on new warheads and warhead modifications. And also, a group of politicians, military officials, and the leaders of US nuclear weapon laboratories have argued for the development of a new generation of precision nuclear weapons that could be used in conventional conflicts with Third World Countries. For details, see Walter Pincus, “US Studies Developing New Nuclear Weapons”, International Herald Tribune, 20 February 2002, p.3.

19 See US-Russia Joint Declaration, Moscow, 24 May 2002. Released by the White House, Office of Press Secretary, US Department of State. Available at website: www.state.gov
critical test in Nevada in February 2002 and reportedly planned construction of a plant in Western Berkshire for manufacturing a new generation of nuclear arms.20

While the great powers are trying to sustain their nuclear status and even trying to develop new nuclear programs, any attempt of Third World countries to reach any small nuclear capability is condemned and regarded as a huge threat to world peace and international stability despite the fact that new nuclear weapons states even cannot match the arsenals of the declared nuclear weapons states. Even if a proliferant country is to devote all of its resources to nuclear weapon acquisition, it would be unable to match the arsenals of any of the five declared nuclear weapons states – either in quantitative or qualitative terms. Sweden is an example of a nation that actually began a nuclear weapons program for the purpose of deterring a nuclear weapons state (former Soviet Union) and then abandoned it. Although financial considerations played a significant role, the crucial argument by the military against the idea of acquiring weapons was that they would not be effective against the overwhelming arsenals of the most likely nuclear foe. As being even weaker than Swedish case in terms of having less financial, technological and military capacity, none of the so-called “rogue states” can match arsenals of the great powers.21 This ethnocentric approach to nuclear proliferation is generally originated from an assumption that Third World does not play the “nuclear game” in the same “rational rules” with the advanced industrial states. The source of nuclear alarm stems from the proposition that leaders outside the boundaries of the advanced industrial states are more prone to irrational behavior.22 These leaders are said to be more likely to become prisoners of their rhetoric and to be guided more often by religious, ideological, or sectarian imperatives, making them less subject to rational considerations. It is sometimes asserted that even the knowledge that their adversaries might retaliate in kind would not deter such leaders from using nuclear weapons. Not much evidence was ever produced to support these propositions, and as recently as the First and the Second World Wars, the leaders of today’s advanced industrial states were willing to sacrifice millions of their soldiers and civilians in the service of various causes. Thus, the argument that new nuclear states may be led by “new Hitlers” seems to ignore the fact that Hitler himself ruled a nation that before and after was a symbol of rationality and progress.23

When applied to Third World nuclear states, the “Third World irrationality” theme seems to derive its deductions about leaders’ rationality from the extreme rhetoric they frequently employ. Such deductions reveal a tendency to apply criteria based on Cold War Western political culture to

other regions of the world, as well as a failure to understand the role of rhetoric in some non-Western societies. Consequently, the vast gap between the language utilized by leaders in the Third World and their actual behavior is often overlooked. Their purposeful if not cynical use of extreme rhetoric, primarily as a tool for mobilizing domestic support, is largely ignored by Western observers. This has led to a failure to realize that behavior of seemingly crazy leaders, such as the Iranian leaders, has been much more cautious than their rhetoric would imply. On the other hand, it is difficult to sustain the proposition that Third World leaders enjoy a monopoly on folly, while the past leaders of today’s advanced industrial states have made as many gross miscalculations as have Third World leaders.

Another fear as a source of ethnocentric bias is that nuclear weapons in Third World countries would be under insufficient civilian control is coupled with the concern that the professional and organizational biases of the top military command would lead it to ascribe war-fighting roles to nuclear weapons and that the military would argue for the use of nuclear weapons in a preventive war. By contrast, civilian leaders are viewed as more likely to regard nuclear weapons primarily as

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24 The “Third World irrationality” theme has a tendency to gradually disappear from the discourse on proliferation, largely because liberal nuclear alarmists have increasingly recognized its ethnocentric basis. It has been replaced by a less offensive proposition that leaders like Saddam Hussein are more likely to miscalculate than their advanced industrial counterparts. Yet past leaders of today’s advanced industrial states have made as many gross miscalculations as have Third World leaders. And also, based on Barbara Tuchman’s work, it is difficult to sustain the proposition that Third World leaders enjoy a monopoly on folly. It is true that Saddam Hussein made two enormous errors within last twenty years: In 1980, he calculated that Iran could be defeated easily following the purges of its military command by Ayatollah Khomeini’s clerics, and that its leadership would capitulate following the conquest of Kuwait. While there can be little dispute about the magnitude of the first of these mistakes - it is comparable to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and to Hitler’s invasion of Russia - the second can be regarded as irrational only in retrospect. At the time, a number of prominent observers in the United States and elsewhere believed that a war in the Gulf would involve far higher U.S. casualties than were ultimately sustained. In addition, Hussein’s original estimate of U.S. willingness to absorb such costs was not baseless. Indeed, president George Bush needed the U.N.’s approval in order to gain the U.S. Senate’s support for the campaign, and even then the Senate voted to authorize the use of U.S. forces against Iraq by only a narrow margin (52-47) Thus, while the premises leading Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait turned out to be mistaken and resulted in war and defeat, his plans to manipulate the U.S. sensitivity to costs were not irrational. Moreover, Saddam’s political survival demonstrats that he did not assume intolerable risks. In general, all states are prone to miscalculation and there is not much evidence that Third World regimes are more likely than more advanced industrial states to make such mistakes. See Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1984)


26 Scott Sagan argues, “Preventive war is more likely to be chosen, however, if military leaders have a significant degree of influence over the final decision. While there have not been, obviously, any preventive nuclear wars among the new proliferators, the probability of such attacks will increase since
instruments of deterrence. Whereas civilians focus on war avoidance, it is feared that the military’s “nuclear war-fighting” approach would increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons would actually be used. Some of these preceding arguments are based on questionable premises and reveal a measure of cultural paternalism among members of the U.S. arms control community. For example, outcomes are deduced from the premise that military organizations in Third World countries might be left on their own to deal with nuclear weapons, whereas in fact, Third World leaders rarely permit their military organizations much latitude on any matter. Granting their militaries such freedom would present Third World leaders with a permanent threat of coups, especially if we focus on their political background.

Another and widely shared concern about new nuclear states is that they are more likely to experience greater domestic instability, and that nuclear weapons might be used in factional wars or a crisis of succession. Indeed, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens - the civilian control over the military is more problematic in many of these cases.” Sagan argues that Pakistan is a good example, but all of his confirmed examples of Pakistani military’s advocacy of preventive war are from before India detonated a nuclear device. Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, in International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107.


28 The major arguments related with that fear is mentioned by Scott pagan in a related theme suggests that problematic civil-military relations in many new nuclear states will allow the military to assume control over nuclear programs and weapons. The dangers involved this possibility were elaborated by Scott Pagan: “Professional military organizations - because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests - display strong proclivities toward organizational behaviors that lead to deterrence failures. This organizational critique argues that professional military organizations, if left on their own, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirements for rational nuclear deterrence. Second, such organizational behavior can be effectively countered only by tight and sustained civilian control of the military. There are some strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack such positive mechanisms of civilian control”

Sagan adds: “Two widespread themes in the organization theory literature focus attention on the major impediments to pure rationality in organizational behavior. First, large organizations function within a severely ‘bounded’ form of rationality: they have inherent limits on calculation and use simplifying mechanisms to understand and respond to uncertainty in the external environment… Organizations are often myopic: instead of surveying the entire environment for information, organization members undertake biased searches, focusing only on specific areas stemming from their past experience, recent training, and current responsibility…Second, complex organizations commonly have multiple conflicting goals and the process by which objectives are chosen is intensely political. Such a political perspective envisions apparently irrational behaviors as serving the narrow interests of some units within the organization, even if the actions appear ‘systematically stupid’ from the leadership’s overall perspective” See Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, in International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107.
Kurdish population in Halabja – and in 1994, ballistic missiles were employed in Yemen’s civil war. However, it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons could be used in an internal struggle without inflicting unacceptable costs on the initiating party.

Without basing on strong cases and with an inconsistent, one-sided implementation, this kind of selective - and somewhat myopic and hyped - focus on non-proliferation has several detrimental effects on world order and opportunities for peace and security that are especially unfortunate within the current historical setting. Such lines of criticisms are not meant to imply that proliferation of weaponry is desirable or of only trivial significance, even on a highly selective basis, although there are ultra-realists who have made such an argument. The spotlighting of non-proliferation, together with the inconsistent implementation of the alleged general concern, has the following serious adverse consequences: it deflects attention from the dangers of nuclear weaponry; it overlooks opportunities for, and beneficial contributions of, nuclear disarmament, particularly if directed at achieving an overall demilitarization of international security; it diminishes the legitimacy of world order; and it reflects a posture that contradicts the mandates of international law, international morality, the political consensus of states, and the dictates of world public opinion.

Structures of authority work best when their reliance on coercion is minimized and it is based on equality principle for all parties without any exception. This means that their norms of behavior are accepted voluntarily and thus with a sense of their inherent reasonableness and fairness, which adds up to an acknowledgement of legitimacy. The role of legitimacy in achieving policy objectives is of particular importance in international society, given the absence of centralized and impartial third-party procedures of interpretation and enforcement. When the legitimacy of a legal regime is weak, compliance depends on a mixture of self-interest and geopolitical enforcement by dominant state actors. When geopolitical means are relied upon, the tendency is to implement norms against adversaries and to overlook violations by friends, which accentuates an impression of illegitimacy by its unequal treatment of equals. Such generalizations are particularly applicable, as with non-proliferation, in relation to peace and security issues.

Thomas Franck has usefully identified legitimacy with “a pull towards compliance with those addressed normatively”. The approach taken by the United States and the other great major powers to nuclear weaponry undermines in fundamental respects the very possibility of legitimacy associated with the structure and practices of world order and encourages perceptions of hypocrisy with respect to alleged concerns over non-proliferation, terrorism, and weaponry of mass destruction. This criticism can be reinforced by reference, first of all, to the selectivity of concern exhibited in relation to countries suspected of having developed or obtained nuclear weapons.

29 See “Southern Scud attack on San’a reportedly kills more than 23 civilians”, BBC/ME/1995/1, May 12, 1994.
31 The U.N. system, including the ICJ, provides a capability for third-party roles, but their operations are dependent on voluntary submission and funding and are not consistently available.
In this respect, from a legitimacy perspective, non-proliferation is better understood as the subordinate goal for world order, while renunciation of a nuclear option and rejection of the weaponry by all states is the primary goal. The illegitimacy of the present world is highlighted by the fact that since the end of the cold war and the removal of the main deterrence rationale for the weaponry, there has not been evident any disposition by the nuclear weapons states to initiate negotiations dedicated to the elimination of nuclear weaponry, or even to accept firm limitations on their own options to use nuclear weapons on a discretionary basis and this breach is further aggravated by the dynamics of geopolitical manipulation of the treaty regime, oscillating between the extremes of over- and under-implementation. (As mentioned, Israel and, to some extent, India and Pakistan were allowed to proceed with their nuclear weapons programs on a covert basis, while North Korea was warned that any effort on its part to exercise its legal option to withdraw from the NPT would be treated as provocative and impermissible.)33 This failure is particularly notable in the 1990s, with the erosion of the rationale for mutual deterrence at a strategic level, and given the absence of any fundamental geopolitical cleavage in relations among major states. Its depth is further evidenced by the refusal to accord even lip service to Article 6 obligations in mainstream literature on non-proliferation, which interprets the regime as being one-sidedly directed at preventing the spread of the weaponry rather than, as negotiated, based on the reciprocal obligation to roll back reliance on, and possession of, nuclear weaponry by the nuclear weapons states.

4. Destabilizing Effects of Current NPT Regime

The double standard and inconsistent implementation of the non-proliferation regime is destroying the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime, triggering the nuclearization of other states and creating the potentials for many destabilizing factors to the international order and peace in many aspects. Here, I will focus on all these destabilizing effects of current inconsistent and illegitimate and implementation.

First, by the inconsistent implementation, the current non-proliferation regime excludes any serious inquiry into the prospects for disarmament and other forms of demilitarization as a policy option. The preoccupation with non-proliferation is coupled with a strong tendency to hold constant the rest of the military landscape, save a partial receptivity to cost-saving and risk-managing measures of arms control. In this respect, it sustains the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to weaponry of mass destruction by keeping the issue entirely outside the realm of serious political discourse. In recent reviews of security policy by mainstream specialists, the possibility of disarmament is not even mentioned, much less evaluated.34

33 So-called security assurances have been given to non-nuclear states facing nuclear adversaries. For discussion, see Tuiloma Neroni Slade, “1995 Review and Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 5 (1996), pp. 246-252.

From many viewpoints such neglect is deeply unfortunate. To begin with, the altered international political context would seem to favor a phased disarmament process, especially as associated with nuclear weapons. It is true that secondary and undisclosed nuclear weapons states might turn out to have the greatest dependence on these weapons as they often lack non-nuclear alternatives to achieve their principle security goals. In this respect, leaders in France, the UK, Russia, China and Israel may at this point sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are needed for purposes of national security. Such considerations would undoubtedly complicate any move toward a world free of nuclear weaponry, but it would not preclude it.

Second, there is a concern that the greater the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that these weapons will be used. The focus of this concern is not the total number of nuclear weapons in the various states’ arsenals, but rather the number of ‘fingers on the button’: how many different leaders can decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons and this danger will grow as additional states acquire nuclear arms. Especially if we focus on the possibility that another use of nuclear weapons would legitimize their further use. A related fear is that the next use of nuclear weapons may lead to uncontrolled escalation. Thus, the damage caused by nuclear weapons in 1945 is said to have been limited only by the fact that the U.S. had exhausted its nuclear stockpile of two 14-23 kiloton bombs. In contrast, future nuclear states are expected to possess more weapons of higher yield.35

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional new nuclear weapons states, as a result of a response to the regime’s double standard and illegitimacy, may be considered to be far more dangerous than the possession of these weapons by the original five nuclear powers (US, Russia, France, Britain and China) in Cold War period, because the dangerous consequences of these major states possessing nuclear weapons were mitigated by the stabilizing effect of the Cold War and its bipolarity and simplified calculations. But like most regions (especially Middle East) are multi-polar, and the spread of nuclear weapons would likely result in much greater problems of policy control.36 States are expected to be more likely to use nuclear weapons, especially if they share a border with enemy. For example, in the Middle East, the stakes involved are who is going to live on this one little strip of land next to the Mediterranean. Ultimately, national survival is at stake. By contrast, it is asserted that the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance was stable largely because the political stakes for the two superpowers were limited. This argument displays a measure of historical amnesia; a much stronger argument is that the dangers of US-Soviet nuclear relations were somewhat mitigated because the two countries were not contiguous. Europe and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provided an effective physical and psychological barrier between the top superpowers. Another mitigating factor may have been that the US and the Soviet Union had never engaged each other in major wars.37 By comparison, new nuclear states like India and Pakistan have common borders and a record of past warfare, as do Iran and also Israel is in the same region, which is geographically very close to these two states. Thus it is feared that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in those regions could have particularly dire consequences. The problem of territorial contiguity also has negative implications for crisis stability.

35 Ibid.
Common borders may result in short warning times; this could heighten fears of a preemptive strike and could lead neighboring nuclear states to adopt dangerous “launch on warning” postures.

Third, inconsistent implementation of non-proliferation regime is diminishing the legitimacy of world order and international peace environment and creating an inconsistency with prevailing views of international law, morality, political consensus of states and world public opinion. As it is mentioned before, when the legitimacy of a legal regime is weak, compliance depends on a mixture of self-interest and geopolitical enforcement by dominant state actors. When geopolitical means are relied upon, the tendency is to implement norms against adversaries and to overlook violations by friends, which accentuates an impression of illegitimacy by its unequal treatment of equals. This kind of implementation will create bigger instabilities for the world peace in the long term. Based upon this reality, the retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states, without the explicit adoption of a kind of minimalist use posture and in the absence of credible efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament, seems clearly to violate prevailing norms and currents of opinion.\(^\text{38}\)

Similarly, with respect to international morality, it is virtually taken for granted that any form of reliance on nuclear weaponry is immoral. In this regard, the continuous testing and development of new generations of nuclear weapons systems and doctrine are interpreted as an immoral embrace of this weaponry. Scholarly observers over the years have also linked reliance on nuclear weapons with a genocidal mentality, which is to consider such forms of security as tantamount to ultimate depravity.\(^\text{39}\) International morality has always exhibited a strong anti-nuclear bias and it always emphasized the obligation to seek nuclear disarmament in some feasible form as an urgent priority and gave an exceedingly reluctant and conditional approval to a posture of limited, second-strike deterrence given the realities of the cold war. Clearly, the international morality emphasis the inability to reconcile nuclear weaponry with the just war tradition. In one of the influential assessments of this same set of issues reaches similar argument on support for existing approaches to nuclear weaponry, thereby reconciling morality with prevailing strategic and policy perspectives; but it fails to achieve moral resonance outside the framework of nuclearist assumptions about the world.\(^\text{40}\)

Fourth, the current nuclear non-proliferation regime and its inconsistent, one-sided implementation bases itself on stigmatization of the assumed opponent sides, that is the so-called “rogue states”, generally to justify the wars against them like the case of war against Iraq, but these assumptions, as clearly used in political journals and the outlines of security policy-makers, creates an unwanted consequence and through stigmatizing and/or demonizing the assumed enemies, as Michael Foucault argues, it marginalizes the other and thereby produces the types of understandings necessary to legitimate state coercion without any legitimate base. Demonizing enemies can prevent a negotiated peace, offering a treaty that can be accepted or pursuing nonviolent solutions for conflicts. Fears become self-fulfilling because they dictate the kind of behavior that produces the results that

\(^{38}\) See William M. Evan and Ved P. Nanda (eds), *Nuclear Proliferation and Legality of Nuclear Weapons* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995).


were dreaded. It also prevents them to participate in the “normal” political options and excludes from the international cooperation environment. As clearly explained in social theories like “Labeling Theory” an indicated criminal no longer deserves the prestige accorded to heads of states. They (leaders) cannot travel outside of their country and sometimes are forbidden to even meet with the representatives from the other countries. The stigma of a criminal affects how the peace negotiations take place, making the mere presence of some leaders itself undesirable. It also prevents them to participate in the “normal” peace negotiations, and it separates them from “normal” political processes by making them as “faces of evil”. The theory concentrates on the stigmatization of deviants and its counterproductive effects to consider. It attempts to explain how individuals can become what they are named. Its focus is not the primary cause of deviancy, but on how characterizing individuals as “deviant” alters the nature and extent of deviant behavior. For Foucault “abnormal” labels can be counterproductive in the following way: Stigmatized criminals become perverts and intolerable monsters since the crime as such is recognized and constituted, and now strengthened by the whole psychoanalytical and sociological arsenal. What we are doing is constructing an entirely new type of criminal, a criminal so inconceivably horrible that this crime goes beyond any explanation, any victim. When we focus on the international status and position of the so-called “rogue states” like N.Korea, Iran, Syria and Algeria, we can easily see the described situation that most of them are excluded from the international community or at least they do no want to be part of normal political processes and become polarized with the help of counterproductive consequences of stigmatization and this is as much a big threat to international stability and peace as their nuclearization.

5. Conclusion

The current effort to implement the non-proliferation regime on a selective basis against certain so-called “rogue states” is subject to a series of objections. The existing non-proliferation approach is harmful generally to the quality of the world order and, in addition, distorts priorities with respect to non-proliferation itself, but, more significantly, in relation to its indirect acquiescence in the persistence of nuclear weaponry as a continuing feature of international life. The above analysis argues, in effect, that the existing non-proliferation regime - that is, the combination of the treaty and its geopolitical implementation - is currently seriously flawed. So what? There is only one solution recommended: To implement the NPT as negotiated, thereby giving serious effect to the mandate to pursue nuclear disarmament. To go on ignoring these fundamental flaws of the nuclear status quo is to contribute to the wider conviction throughout the Third World of an illegitimate


world order. To create a strong tendency for the implementation of the NPT as negotiated, we have to focus on some supporting short and long-term alternative options:

First, giving the U.S., as the leading nuclearizing power, the global role of being the major proponent of nuclear disarmament and alternative security might rekindle creative energies on behalf of a truly beneficial “new world order” that would reestablish American credentials to play a leadership role on the global stage. It would be a healing and legitimating posture with respect to most countries in the world and would remove the stigma of nuclearism from American policy. It would also liberate financial resources and the energies of the scientific and engineering communities in a manner that might facilitate a societal recommitment to such currently under-supported public goods as education, health, environment, urban renewal and welfare, rather than investing on militarization instead of investing on “peace”. Here, there is a lot of work that should be done by the civil society and/or social movements, academic staff and security advisors who have a real influence over national security policies of the U.S. in terms of fighting against strong war lobbyists.

Second, an emphasis to the prospects of international law, international morality and political consensus of the world states is required to give serious effect to the mandate to pursue nuclear disarmament on a mutual basis with a regard to possible destabilizing consequences of nuclear proliferation and possible threats to long term world peace. To prevent the counter-productive consequences, this mutual consensus also requires the attempts to integrate the so-called “rogue states” to the international peace system through negotiations and reciprocal political processes, rather than stigmatizing and demonizing them and legitimizing the wars against them without any legitimate and moral basis. This is only possible through strengthening the international institutions and organizations and acting with references to international law especially in terms of improving the safeguards regime, developing detection and verification technologies, providing security assurances when feasible and educating publics and governments on the costs and problems associated with nuclear weapons possession. Here, as one of the most effective long-term solutions, giving a more emphasis on the education option through international institutions will play one of the major roles. To remove a nation’s motivation to acquire or maintain such weapons, the nation must be convinced that its interests are better served by not having nuclear weapons. To support this option, the economic costs of nuclear programs in terms of its direct costs and indirect cost like physical security for all the facilities, equipment, nuclear materials, device designs and other items needing protection, the possibility of becoming targets when they acquire such weapons, the possibility of fueling regional arms races, environmental damages, and the importance of investing on “peace” instead of investing “war” should be more emphasized.
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