COSMOPOLITAN-COMMUNITARIAN DICHOTOMY: TOWARDS A THIRD WAY?¹
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ABSTRACT
One of the current challenging study areas in International Relations discipline is normative theory which involves variety of approaches. There are two main groups: cosmopolitan and communitarian based on the philosophical concerns of the 1980s. A third group began to question this dichotomy since the 1990s. The aim of this article is to present a critical review of the theoretical literature about cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy over the past three decades. It is argued that though it is difficult there can be a middle ground. By particularly focusing on two of the dominant articulations of cosmopolitanism, that are moral and political cosmopolitan approaches, this article attempts to analyze the possibilities and limitations inherent in the search for ethical universalism through a third way.

Keywords: Normative Theory, Cosmopolitanism, Communitarianism, Moral Cosmopolitanism, Political Cosmopolitanism

KOZMOPOLİTAN-TOPLULUKÇU AYRIMI: ÜÇÜNCÜ BİR YAKLAŞIM OLÂBLÎR Mİ?

ÖZ

Anahtar Sözcükler: Normatif Kuram, Kozmopolitanizm, Toplulukçuluk, Ahlaksal Kozmopolitanizm, Siyasal Kozmopolitanizm

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INTRODUCTION

According to Hurrel (2002: 184), there can be several ways to study norms and ethics in IR:

First considers the role that normative ideas play in the practice of politics ("How have ideas about what should be done influenced political behaviour?"); the second seeks to engage in rational moral debate as to the nature of ethical conduct ("What ought we to do?"); and the third examines the extent to which moral behaviour is heavily constrained by the dynamics of political life ("Given the realities of political life, what can be done?").

This article proceeds with the second one, which involves engagement of IR discipline in closer link with the mainstream Western political theory. It attempts to analyse the methodological discussion among cosmopolitans and communitarians about the reference point of ethical conduct, and the discussion about the possibility of having ethical universalism.

What brought us to be interested in these normative discussions is not the theoretical consideration itself. It is the belief that an ethical foreign policy should be more demanding than that of ethical implications involved in every state action; and thus inevitably one has to pay attention to the history of normative theoretical studies in International Relations (IR). Normative theory can provide insights for ethical basis of foreign policy, though there would be complex problems both at the conceptual and practical basis. The policy makers’ emphasis over ethical dimensions already has generated a debate among academic society on ethical foreign policy, particularly over the content of the British foreign policy and US foreign policy. The interest over ethics and foreign policy was not new but it increased in time (Bulley, 2004: 165-180). In this regard by the late 1990s there had been panels at the British International Studies Association (BISA) and International Studies Association (ISA) annual conferences (Brown, 2001: 16). Furthermore, the International Section of the ISA has been founded in 1993. On the other hand, Frost has been anxious about this increasing interest about ethical foreign policy since he claims that there can never be a policy without an ethical dimension. According to Frost (2001: 34-38), "Ethical conduct is not an ‘add-on’ to normal non-ethical or amoral conduct." Yet, we consider that sometimes foreign policy makers might not be sure of how they ‘ought to act’ and what the appropriate behaviour is.
Furthermore, ethical theorizing in the realm of foreign policy can be improved, through re-evaluation of cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy in IR.

Generally it is claimed that the role of ethics in international relations is limited, because:

- the realm of international affairs is governed by power relations;
- there are many different ethical systems; that many of these are in conflict with one another; that there is no agreed-upon overarching ethic that may be used to sort out the differences between them; and that ethical choices are a personal matter (Frost, 2009b: 14).

On the other hand, in this article it is argued that it is not possible to study international relations without getting engaged in normative issues.

In the academic literature of IR one could observe a debate over normative theory, about how it involves the relationship between political science, political theory and international relations theory. Thus, in the twenty first century normative theory is a challenging study area in IR which involves variety of theories and approaches. Also, there are other questions. For example, as questioned by Erskine (2001, 2008), where can moral responsibility reasonably be located in the world politics? Should we consider with ethics of individual or ethics of state? Furthermore, as stated by Reus-Smith (2009), one of the critical challenges for IR theory is to systematically engage the two forms of theoretical reflections, that is normative-theoretic or empirical-theoretic perspectives.

A brief literature review shows that ethical studies have been marginalized by the Western mainstream thinking and there was lack of studies on normative theory in the discipline until the 1990s because of two main reasons. Firstly, the mainstream theories were mainly positivist, and there was epistemological and methodological bias towards objective explanations (Frost, 1996: 12). Traditionally, ethics meant a moral code or a set of principles for ethical action. But realism separated ethics and politics. In this regard, realism created a dangerous ontology, in which responsibility for survival is regarded as the reason for lack of ethical concern (Odysseos, 2002). Secondly, there was moral scepticism, and normative explanations were seen as not worthy for serious intellectual consideration (Frost, 1996: 13). Meanwhile, ethical arguments regarding the international realm were mostly carried out by scholars from the disciplines of moral and political philosophy, political theory and
sociology. Frost (1998: 132) in fact criticized IR scholars for falling behind the discipline’s own subject area. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a challenge to the positivist approach. Particularly, the interpretative approach in social science has called for a deeper understanding. The origin of this approach is to be found in the work of two independent social theorists, Max Weber and Wilhelm Dilthey, as well as in the work of Peter Winch which combined the insights of the two theorists (Hollis and Smith, 2003). The critical theoretical approaches have emphasized on emancipation, international distributive justice, on extending the boundaries of political communities to include outsiders (Linklater, 1981), on universalizing norms, and on realizing a cosmopolitan ethic (Linklater, 1995). In short, international relations scholars started to pay attention to normative theory after the 1990s. In this regard, Hayden (2009b: 6-7) states that though normative theorizing in IR was neglected earlier it is no longer the case (Smith, 1992).

On the other hand, although the number of studies extended after the Cold War, Frost (1998) stated that IR theorists had not engaged seriously enough with normative theory and kept only marginal interest over these issues, particularly due to focusing on power and self-interest. Similarly, Hurrell (2002: 183) stated that though for conventional constructivists the concept of norms became one of the buzzwords, the position of normative theory is vague. Furthermore, though since the 1990s there is a growing literature including diverse approaches in normative theory as “consequentialist (Singer), Kantian constructivist (O’Neill), Rawlsian (Rawls, Pogge, Teson), pluralist or communitarian (David Miller, Michael Walzer), Habermasian (Habermas, Linklater); constitutive (Frost, Brown); pragmatic (Cochran)” (Hurrell 2002: 187), there is scarcity in ethics-centred approach to international relations (Frost, 2009a, 2009b).

The first aim of this article is to find out through a critical analysis of the theoretical literature over the past three decades regarding the main referent point of ethics, how cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy affected normative theory which addresses ethical questions in IR. As scholars argue, this dichotomy can either lead to two separate research areas or they can work together. Nevertheless, there is a pessimistic discourse such as stated by Brown (2010b) as “the middle ground is less easy to find now than it was then”. Furthermore, Brown

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2 The constructivist engagement with norms and ethics is not included in this article. For a recent discussion of ethical dimension of constructivism see Erskine, 2012: 449-468.
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(2010a) states: “I have become increasingly sceptical of the value of referring to a cosmopolitan–communitarian debate, rejecting the crude binary involved in that debate and promoting an understanding of ethics that draws on both traditions”.

This article argues that though it is difficult there can be a middle ground, such as pragmatism that is stated by Cochran (1999), thus having a ‘hopeful optimism’ about adopting an ethical foreign policy. Cochran (1999) has shown contribution of a specific philosophical tradition namely American pragmatism for IR theory. Secondly, through focusing on two of the dominant articulations of cosmopolitanism, that are moral and political cosmopolitan approaches, this article attempts to analyze the possibilities and limitations inherent in the search for ethical universalism through a third way.

This article proceeds in three sections. Firstly, it reviews the content of normative IR theory. Secondly, it examines the dichotomy between communitarians and cosmopolitans, demonstrating questions and arguments in both views. Finally, we argue that we need to re-conceptualize a third way which involves moral cosmopolitanism in foreign policy based on philosophical tradition of pragmatism.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

General Overview on The Content of Normative Theory

During the Cold War there were discussions in IR on normative issues such as the morality of nuclear weapons, just war and nuclear deterrence. These issues constituted normative agendas of the explanatory theories. Ending of the Cold War opened up more space for normative thinking in IR. In addition to the previous ones, normative discussions included topics such as military interventions, democracy promotion, global justice related with the problems such as global poverty, nuclear proliferation, ecological degradation, illegal migrants and protection of human rights. As Janna Thompson (2002: 1) suggested, with the end of the Cold War, the time has come to “make establishment of a just international world order into a political priority”.

In the meantime, with increasing awareness about the role of ethical, normative and philosophical considerations, relevance of the Western political theory for IR was reconsidered in the late 1980s. In this regard, international political theory (IPT) approach is formed and defined as (Brown, 2010b): “a theoretical approach to IR which combines insights from political theory and IR theory, and is normative and
interpretive as opposed to explanatory in ambition”. In other words, the IPT has focused on the normative aspects of world politics, labelled as normative theory or as ‘international ethics’. Overall, there is no consensus about the label of the field. According to Nardin (2008: 595), “Were we to acknowledge a distinction between the ethical and the political, we might call the subfield “international political theory,” not “international ethics”- and that, in fact, is a common alternative name for it”. According to Brown (2010a: 5), using different titles leads to marginalization of the subfield by the mainstream, thus he also prefers using the label IPT: “Back in the late 1980s I described what I was writing about as 'international ethics' or 'normative international relations theory' – now, my preferred description is 'international political theory'.”

International ethics in the field of IR is related with the moral philosophy, in which notion of normative theory refers to at least three different approaches to ethics: virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics, and deontological or duty-based ethics. Firstly, virtue ethics is related with personal morality and individual conduct of ethics, and it is associated with the Aristotelian ethics. It questions what virtues a person would like to have in acting. It does not focus on the outcomes of his/her actions. According to Aristotle, virtues are “qualities of mind, habits of thought which need to be developed and exercised in practical life”, such as courage, moderation, generosity and practical intelligence. Behaving with virtues is the ability to be developed, but virtues considered to come naturally (Brown, 2010b: 80). On the other hand, consequential ethics is associated with utilitarianism.

In general, utilitarianism considers that pursuing interests is ethical when those interests are everyone's interests. In other words, it questions the consequences of one’s behaviour for the world. Utilitarianism is generally associated with the nineteenth century British tradition and the famous thinker David Hume. According to Hume, moral judgments are not related with reason but rather with utility. Also, Jeremy Bentham is at the centre of the nineteenth century utilitarianism. There are also others such as J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick. According to these utilitarian thinkers, search for ‘general happiness’ is in the interest of all. The government and law would punish those that damage ‘general happiness’ (Ellis, 2002: 159-160). But how to reach to general happiness is not clear. Utilitarians were generally cosmopolitan (Ellis, 2002: 164), because it was considered that individuals and not communities can be happy or unhappy. States are considered having two duties, towards its
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citizens and towards the world. But, according to utilitarianism, these two duties shall not contradict (Ellis, 2002: 173).

Lastly, ‘duty ethics’ is generally associated with Kant’s moral theory. It emphasizes the agent’s actions rather than the actions’ consequences. “When reason guides action, the behaviour is said to be motivated by duty” (Donaldson, 2002: 137). Duty action does not mean following international law or obedience to state. Rather it is associated with rationality. This idea of Kant challenges the Aristotelian natural law tradition (Donaldson, 2002: 138). In other words, people act morally due to demand of reason. While rational being is important, other kinds of specification such as with wealth or nationality is irrelevant in giving moral decisions (Donaldson, 2002: 140). Kant denied moral relations is associated with human nature, thus separated the realm of nature from the realm of morality. For Kant, unlike Hobbes and Rawls, cooperation is not necessary for international morality. “The basis for international morality must remain for Kant what is for domestic morality: the moral demand for reason” (Donaldson, 2002: 142). In other words, people want international cooperation due to demand of reason. It should be noted that these three approaches are not used alone most of the time.

Another main issue in regard to ethical dimension of international relations is whether the mainstream theories have totally rejected ethical questions. Though Martin Wight argued that political theory is “the theory of good life” whereas international theory is “the theory of survival”, there are arguments stating that normative or ethical thinking inhere also in the traditional IR scholarship such as in realism (Forde, 2002) and liberalism (Smith, 2002). Yet, according to Cochran (1999: 2), normative theory involves actions ruled with moral principles beyond self-interest, thus these traditional works in IR should not be addressed within ethical theorizing. Particularly, the English School has a strong normative dimension that aims to construct ‘middle ground ethics’. The scholars associated with the British Committee had carried out normative studies, while positivism was dominant in the Western mainstream international relations thought during the Cold War years. In the 1990s, normative interest was extended by constructivist and critical theorists. It is beyond the scope of this article to review normative implications of constructive and critical studies. Having covered this brief overview of the content of normative theory, the article will focus on the discussion about the referent point of ethics.
Cosmopolitanism versus Communitarianism

Political theorists, Charles R. Beitz (1975, 1979) with a liberal cosmopolitan view and Michael Walzer (1977) with a pluralist communitarian view to political and moral life, have played important role in the development of normative political theory. Thus, normative theorizing is separated into two different intellectual branches as cosmopolitan (or universalistic) and communitarian (or particularistic). Dichotomy among communitarians and cosmopolitans has been a philosophical debate between the two positions. There has been no consensus among these two groups about the ethical commitments as while the former has emphasized the primacy of individual rights, and the latter has prioritized the rights of political communities, primarily of the nation-states. Overall, responsibilities as human beings contrast with responsibilities as citizens (or communal responsibilities). In other words, for cosmopolitans starting point for moral considerations are individuals, while for communitarians it is communities (or states). Thus, cosmopolitans adopt an inclusive moral standing; whereas communitarians adopt an exclusive moral standing because they don't envisage an ethical system with global implications. Furthermore, most cosmopolitans were also liberals in the 1990s since liberalism was considered to side with the individual against the community (Shorten, 2007: 228).

Communitarianism: Ethics within Borders

Communitarians are inspired by Hegel’s thought since Hegel made a distinction between universal rules of morality and ethical principles specific to community. For Hegel and for communitarians the latter one is a higher form of morality. They argue that in stressing abstract individuals and their rights as the building blocks for political theory, liberalism missed the importance of community. They claim that morality is to be found in the traditions, beliefs and practices of communities, thus all values are local not universal. Thus, we have to look to our own community’s moral traditions to discover our values and practices- such as language, custom, tradition. In this regard, communitarianism advocates participation in small communities such as clubs and firms. They consider individuals as well as institutions as parts of a community. According to communitarian perspective, human identity is shaped by constitutive norms and practices as well as traditions of communities. Yet, communitarians are also aware that constitutive norms may change within a community. Communitarianism encourages collaboration among
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members of society rather than individualism. They believe in the idea of collective well-being (Griffiths and O’Callaghan, 2002: 47-48).

As a dedicated communitarian, Michael Walzer (1990: 11-12) criticizes liberalism for endorsing and justifying four kinds of mobilities including geographic, social, marital and political mobility, whose effects are intensified by the advance of knowledge and technological progress. According to Walzer (1990: 13-15), in every society, people are born into groups and they are born with distinct identities and these underlying communal identities survive the ‘Four Mobilities’ to a remarkable extent. Thus, Walzer (1990: 10) questions:

How can any group of people be strangers to one another when each member of the group is born with parents, and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbours, comrades at work, coreligionists and fellow citizens connections, in fact, which are not so much chosen as passed on and inherited?

Walzer (1990: 20) also criticizes liberalism for depicting a solitary heroic individual, who is fed on the idea of a pre-social self and whose mere achievements are instability and dissociation. Pointing out “there really cannot be individuals of this sort”, Walzer (1990: 20-21) claims that liberalism is in need of periodic communitarian correction.

In addition, Janna Thompson (2002: 188) emphasizes the value of community, insisting that individual well-being and integrity are inseparable from the integrity and well-being of the community. According to Thompson (2002: 188), a just world order would be realized through four important moral objectives including promoting individual liberty, respecting the communities, distributing the resources which would ensure that all individuals are able to exercise their liberty and maintain their community life, and establishing peaceful relations among communities based upon principles or procedures which all can agree are fair.

Cosmopolitanism: Ethics beyond Borders

Cosmopolitans argue that universal standards of justice should hold across the globe. They believe in the existence of cross-cultural moral truth. Consequently, cosmopolitan thinkers have mostly focused on how to promote global justice. ‘Universalism’ is the key word in this approach, considering values of the European Enlightenment as universal values. The word ‘cosmopolitan’ derives from the Greek word ‘kosmopolites’ that means ‘citizen of the world’ or citizen of a single community. Thus, it challenges attachment to a local culture or a state
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(Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). It treats all humans as citizens of a single moral order, often discussing about the global civil society.

According to Fine (2007), in the field of international law, cosmopolitanism has advanced studies beyond state sovereignty towards the rights and responsibilities of world citizens or individuals. In the field of international relations, cosmopolitan normative studies developed as a reaction to evaluating domestic politics separate from international politics, and in this regard as a reaction to considering international field as value free. In the field of political philosophy, cosmopolitan ideas are related to political theory of Kant (Fine, 2007: 3-4).

Shared rationality rather than cooperative considerations is important for Kant’s cosmopolitanism. In other words, rational agents are supposed to act with the demand of reason. There is no need for moral consensus or global cooperation for defending global obligations such as human rights. Kant’s cosmopolitan international order which supposed to bring perpetual peace was based on three things: international law, cosmopolitan rights and a respected international authority. Kant defined a doctrine of peace, in which people should act with the idea of lasting or perpetual peace, even if it is unlikely to be realized. People have duty to pursue perpetual peace. According to Kant, the state is a moral person, thus subject to moral obligations. If states accept republican principles internally and form a voluntary league or international confederation externally, and respect human rights of not only their citizens but of all humans, then there can be a lasting world peace. Kant, rather than a ‘world state’, envisaged a ‘Federation of Nations’, “based on mutual cooperation and voluntary consent among a plurality of independent states” (Fine, 2007: 24).

Cosmopolitan writing overtime became more sophisticated. Philosophically, there are wide groups of views that can be included within cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, in the field of international relations, cosmopolitans are mainly separated as moral (MC) and political, legal or institutional (PC). The former (MC) supports universal and general norms particularly about justice, global moral community and democratization of international or global institutions which would provide normative basis for dealing with global problems. The latter (PC) denotes that moral aspirations can be realized through global political institutions with legitimate coercive power or a ‘global state’. Today PC accepts the existence of cosmopolitan law, though some intellectuals like Pogge questions possibility of legal cosmopolitanism in the absence of a world state (Chen, 2012). MC rejects a single world government,
emphasizing on the moral unity of the world and plurality of institutions (Pierik and Werner, 2010: 5). In this regard, Simon Caney (2005: 5) rightfully suggests that the distinction between MC and PC is important because while all cosmopolitans are committed to the moral claims, not all of them are necessarily committed to the institutional ones.

The general characteristics of cosmopolitan approaches are normative individualism, equal treatment of individuals, and obligations to all (Pierik and Werner, 2010: 2-3). Similarly, Hayden (2009a: 43-44) states: “(1) individualism, in that individual human beings are the ultimate units of concern; (2) universality, in that all human beings possess equal moral status; and (3) generality, in that persons are subjects of concern for everyone, that is, human status (or dignity) has global scope”. In addition, cosmopolitans share a commitment to equality, “the survival and flourishing of all human beings matters equally, regardless of their native language, religion, skin colour, gender, endowments, ethnicity or lifestyle” (Pogge, 2012: 14). Raising questions on national sovereignty and cultural rights, cosmopolitanism puts emphasis on the concepts of global justice, universal human rights and global humanity.

As a final point it is worth noting that Held (2005) stated principles of cosmopolitan political order. According to Held (2005), first, all individuals should be active in shaping the community. Second, there can be different choices of individuals in cultural, social or economic projects yet they will be personally responsible about their choices. Third, Held (2005) underlines importance of consent which means there should be non-coercive collective agreement in political process. Fourth, there should be collective decision making about public matters. Fifth is the principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity, which means inclusiveness of all that are affected by public decisions and issues. The last one is the principle of avoidance of serious harm on people (Held, 2005: 10-16). In short, these principles show that if one prefers to follow cosmopolitan path, than he or she moves away from consideration of communitarian foreign policy towards universalism.

**Cosmopolitanism and International Distributive Justice**

Cosmopolitan political theory partly re-emerged due to changes in classical political theory with the arguments of Rawls. Rawls made remarkable contributions to the debate, first through a law for nations, set forth in ‘A Theory of Justice’ (1971) and then through a liberal theory of foreign policy, set forth in ‘The Law of Peoples’ (1993). Rawls’s theory
of justice has become very central in political theory, yet here only the main points of his argument will be briefly pointed out.

Firstly, inspired by the social contract tradition previously developed by 17th and 18th century political philosophers including Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, in his book ‘A Theory of Justice’, Rawls put forward the main principles of a theory of justice. Though Rawls (1971: 5) was concerned that the existing societies are not well-ordered, he admitted that there has been disagreement about what is just and unjust. Therefore he (1971: 4) suggested a public conception of justice” in which “everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice and the basic social institutions generally known to satisfy these principles”. To decide on the principles to be chosen, an initial situation of fairness has to be determined. According to Rawls at this initial position parties would reason behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ to ensure fairness. ‘Veil of ignorance’ refers to a condition, in which no one has knowledge of their class status, social position, material wealth, distribution of assets and resources, and personal attributes (intelligence, strength, etc.) (Rawls, 1971: 11). In other words, he is talking about universal justice abstract from any social position. Rawls (1971: 56) argued that parties at the original position have to agree on the two principles of justice. The first principle is that everyone should have equal basic rights and liberties (Rawls, 1971: 56). The second principle anticipates that there can be inequalities with the condition that the disadvantages are not overshadowed by the greater advantages of those in another (Rawls, 1971: 56), so that inequalities would benefit everyone.

In ‘The Law of Peoples’, Rawls outlines how a law might develop out of liberal ideas of justice and can be universal. In this regard, Rawls extends his theory of justice beyond the individual state, modifying the contract so that the parties taking place now are peoples not individuals any more (Buchanan, 2000: 697). According to Rawls (1993: 65), there are three conditions in order for any political regime to be acceptable as “a member in good standing into a just political society of peoples”. These necessary conditions for a well-ordered regime include respect for the principles of peace without being expansionist, a system of law “meeting the essentials of legitimacy in the eyes of its people”, and respect for human rights (Rawls, 1993: 66). In conducting foreign policy, if a violation of any of these conditions occurs in a society then external pressure “may be justified depending on the severity and the circumstances of the case” (Rawls, 1993: 67). Rawls (1993: 67) argues
that while tyrannical and dictatorial regimes cannot be accepted as members in a society of peoples, non-liberal societies can be tolerated if their political and social institutions meet above-mentioned conditions. In short, though it should be admitted that it is a very complex debate than we can review here, Rawls seems to apply cosmopolitan principles to international relations within states following liberal principles.

In the 1970’s, Communitarians including Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre criticized liberal ideas of Rawls. Sandel coined the term ‘communitarian’ to describe his position, and the individualist- or liberal–communitarian debate became a common way of describing the issues under consideration here (Brown, 2010a: 8).

Yet, Rawls’ works are criticised not only by the communitarian front but also by the cosmopolitan front. Though under the influence of Rawls, moral philosophers have become increasingly interested in issues of global distributive justice, “the ‘cosmopolitan’ position in the debate over global distributive justice is especially critical of what they see as Rawls' privileging interests of states over those of individuals (Kleingeld and Brown, 2013). In other words, though cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz have accepted egalitarian position of Rawls about equal rights and equal treatment, they have criticized his position favouring Westphalian world (Pierik and Werner, 2010: 9).

Beitz points out that Rawls’ ideas outlined particularly in the Law of Peoples constitute a powerful challenge to cosmopolitan theories of international relations. Beitz (2000) calls Rawls’s theory set forth in the Law of Peoples as ‘social liberalism’ and argues that unlike cosmopolitan liberalism which accords moral privilege to individuals, social liberalism conceives the world as composed of collectivities like societies or peoples, rather than persons. To put it differently, Beitz (2000: 695) suggests that the ultimate concern of the Law of Peoples is a just and stable society, whereas the ultimate concern of cosmopolitan view is the “well-being of individuals”. Despite praising Rawls’ theory as highly progressive, Beitz criticizes Rawls’ limited range of human rights listed in the Law of Peoples. Particularly, Beitz (2000: 684) argues that absence of rights for freedom of expression and association, and the rights of democratic political participation is dangerous as he thinks these rights are the ones to distinguish liberal democratic societies from others. Rawls was also criticized of not being truly cosmopolitan as stated below:

Rawls did not argue for the universal application of his principles of justice across state boundaries, but for a respectful relationship between states (as representatives of peoples). He
argued that liberal democratic regimes have an obligation to deal with illiberal decent hierarchical regimes as equals and not to endeavor to impose their values; and also that national boundaries place limits on redistributive obligations (Brock and Brighouse, 2005: 2).

Allen Buchanan (2000: 720-721) who is a pluralist also criticizes Rawls’s work on the law of peoples, as he argues that a moral theory of international law must address two critical issues including global distributive justice and intrastate conflict, while Rawls's theory cannot make meaningful contributions to these issues. Thus, according to Buchanan (2000: 721), the reasons behind Rawls’s failure to set forth a moral theory of international law are the denial of a global basic structure and his insistence to view populations of states as ‘peoples’ rather than “collections of different groups, often with different and conflicting views concerning justice and the good, as well as conflicting positions on the legitimacy of the state itself”.

Furthermore, Anglo-American communitarianism also criticized Rawls’ liberal assumptions, particularly Rawls’ universal justice ideas. They argued that justice should be found in particular societies, thus it can vary (not universal). They also talked about time and place specific justice rather than Rawls’ argument about justice abstract from particular social context. Yet, in the 1980's critics of liberal theory did not offer a grand communitarian theory as an alternative (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Nevertheless, because of critics to his book written in 1971, Rawls tried to eliminate universal claims in time. In the 1990s, since it was difficult to implement liberal democratic practices outside the Western world, his liberal vision changed. In 1999, his liberal vision included justice in community, nonaggressive attitude towards other communities and securing basic human rights.

Apart from Rawls’ influences, Beitz (1979) argued that existing theoretical views on international relations were inadequate, as they offer flawed normative principles of international practice. In order to have a more satisfactory normative theory of international politics, a notion of state autonomy should be developed to openly address “considerations of domestic social justice, and principles of international distributive justice that establish a fair division of natural resources, income, and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies” (Beitz 1979: 179).

In addition, Beitz (2005) mentions about some dilemmas about how the idea of the cosmopolitan is reflected in two different dimensions
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of global justice as economic and political. With respect to economic dimension of global justice, he focuses on the relief of global poverty and suggests that international-level political order has its own, distinctive form of distributive justice, which differs from that of the domestic-level political order (Beitz, 2005: 21-22). In addition, on the practical front, Beitz (2005: 24) argues that rather than focusing mainly on sponsoring large increases in inter-country transfer payments, we need to focus on “the economic, political and legal institutions and practice that influence the global distribution of advantages” including “private capital flows, the rules of the trade regime, and the system of international property rights”. On the other hand, regarding political dimension of global justice, Beitz (2005: 24) points out the difficulty of maintaining justice, due to the fact that unlike domestic level, global level lacks a structure consisting of sovereign executive power, legislature and effective police capacity.

Though communitarians such as R. J. B. Walker, Michael Walzer, and Chris Brown criticized different points of cosmopolitanism, there are also arguments articulating that cosmopolitanism and communitarianism should not be interpreted as opposite concepts. According to Molly Cochran (1999: 107-117), use of Hegelian dialectical method demonstrates “at least some level of accommodation within the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate”. The middle ground approach will be further elaborated in the following part of the article.

PC: ‘Global Institutions’

Is it possible to translate moral ideals to global institutions or into positive law such as in the field of protection of global environment, international security, economic regulation, human rights and migration? In an attempt to answer this question, PC envisions a “political ideal of a global order under which all people have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic” (Pogge, 1992: 49). PC has examined institutional frameworks to realize moral ideals.

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3 According to Beitz, the most remarkable difference is the extent of coerciveness as the global order is not as coercive as domestic-level political orders.
4 Debates on global distributive justice were mostly focused on international transfers such as foreign aid programmes.
5 Beitz underlines the general belief that ‘a state-like structure encompassing all existing states in unachievable in the foreseeable future’, but avoiding to be misled by this belief, he mentions about the existence of global and regional regimes which are well developed and may develop further under favourable circumstances.
Yet, cosmopolitan values are not integrated by all international legal institutions. Belonging to this group, Dufek (2013) questions ‘global governance without government’, expanding the position expressed by Thomas Nagel (2005), which considered that ‘a world-state’ is necessary for having global justice, that is coercive enforcement of egalitarian justice.

Nagel (2005: 121) defines justice as “something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stance in a strong political relation” underlining the need for a legitimate path forward in the governance of the world. Nagel (2005: 144) thinks that greater international authority would be desirable for the sake of global public goods such as accumulation of resources for development aid and emergency relief, atmospheric protection and free trade. Nagel (2005: 138) points out that the traditional international organizations including the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank with the exception of the UN Security Council are not empowered to exercise coercive enforcement against states or individuals. Thus, Nagel (2005: 121, 133) argues that requirements of justice themselves do not apply to the world as a whole, until the world comes to be governed by a ‘unified sovereign power’, ‘a strong and coercively imposed political community’, where everyone is granted equal status. Under such a global political framework, both people and states have to accept the authority even if they disagree with the substance of its decisions (Nagel, 2005: 140). At this point, Nagel (2005: 136) attracts attention to the dilemma that while “prosperous nations have reasons to want more governance on a world scale, they do not want the increased obligations and demands for legitimacy that may follow in its wake” as the example of US refusal to join the Kyoto Treaty on atmospheric emissions has clearly demonstrated. For this reason, Nagel (2005: 146) believes that the most realistic way to materialize global justice would be through initially establishing unjust and illegitimate but effective global structures of power that are “tolerable to the interests of the most powerful current nation-states”. Only after that a demand for legitimacy occurs there would be a transformation of illegitimate institutions. In Nagel’s (2005: 147) words, “the path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice”.

Like Dufek and Nagel, Simon Caney (2005) focuses on the question, ‘what principles, if any, should govern the global realm’. Caney (2005) defends two universal principles of justice including a liberal package of civil and political human rights and an egalitarian distributive
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Drawing on these universal principles of civil, political, and distributive justice, he then criticizes a statist world order and defends a system of global political authorities. According to Caney (2005: 264), a system of global political authorities could be realized through “a reformed United Nations incorporating a democratically elected second assembly” and “democratic procedures to be put in place which enable people to hold powerful international institutions (such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank) to account”.

As a defender of human rights, Pogge has also advocated PC. Pogge (1992: 73) has supported normative individualism through “a pluralist global institutional scheme” rather than Kant’s republicanism. Criticizing Rawls’s work on ‘The Law of Peoples’ for not proposing an egalitarian distributive component, Pogge (1994) extends Rawls’s framework to achieve global justice that is sensitive to international social and economic inequalities. Alternative to Rawls, who prioritizes justice of domestic institutions, Pogge (1994: 208) emphasizes that well-being of members in addition to the justice of domestic institutions are in the interest of people. For instance, in order to control international inequality, he puts forward a specific institutional proposal that is the Global Resources Tax (GRT). The underlying idea behind the GRT is to introduce a tax to be paid by each people for any resources it extracts within its national territory and the extent of tax is to be determined “in proportion to how much value each takes from our planet” (Pogge, 1994: 200). Pogge (1994: 201) proposes that gains from the GRT are to be used for the emancipation of poor people through assurance of a number of offerings in the service of poor including “access to education, health care, means of production (land) and /or jobs to a sufficient extent to be able to meet their own basic needs with dignity”. Pogge (1994: 20) argues that this way, there may be a shift from the status quo to a more democratic world order, where greater role would be attributed to the central organizations.

In addition, Pogge (1992) proposes a gradual institutional reform to disperse political authority over nested territorial units with the aim of decreasing “the intensity of the struggle for power and wealth within and among states, thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty, and

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6 Egalitarian distributive programme defends subsistence rights, a principle of global equality of opportunity, rules of fair pay, and a commitment to prioritizing the least advantaged. For more details view Caney, 2005: 264.  
7 For instance, Pogge suggests that the Saudi people would be required to pay a proportional tax on any crude extracted, whether it be for their own use or for sale abroad.
oppression”. To put it differently, Pogge (1992: 69) puts forward the idea of vertical dispersal of governmental authority/sovereignty which necessitates “moderate centralizing and decentralizing moves involving the strengthening of political units above and below the level of the state”. According to Pogge (1992: 61-63), main reasons for a vertical dispersal of sovereignty include maintaining peace/security, reducing oppression, ensuring global economic justice and overcoming ecological distortion. Pogge (1992: 75) argues that through a global order, in which sovereignty is widely distributed vertically and geographical shape of political units is determined by the autonomous preferences of situated individuals, above-mentioned concerns would be addressed.

Furthermore, other participants in the debate argue that though traditionally cosmopolitanism is criticized as utopian, it is not anymore, because as the world becomes more interdependent and interconnected cosmopolitan scholars started to talk about the emergence of ‘global polity’ (Held, 1995) and ‘global governance’. They are talking about the change in global norms and responsibilities for the sake of global public interest (Hayden, 2009a: 44).

**THE THIRD WAY: PRAGMATIC MC IN FOREIGN POLICY**

Unlike PC, MC is not concerned with a theory of just institutions that is creating or reforming international institutions, rather concerned with ethics in which responsibilities belong to people. MC provides a third way for conceptualizing ethics and foreign policy. A classical example is the studies of Molly Cochran.

American pragmatists particularly John Dewey⁸ contributed to ethical studies in IR through analysis of US foreign policy agenda in the first decades of the 20th century. In the late 1990s, Cochran suggested a new normative IR approach to international ethics derived from this specific philosophical tradition, namely American pragmatism. Cochran (2001) rejects that foreign policy should either be ethical or unethical. According to her, pragmatism provides a middle ground. For pragmatists, in each case ethical decisions should be made on consensual and inclusive bases, involving all the voices of NGOs and other social movements. Governments should directly be engaged in a dialogue with those most affected (for example, affected from decision to use force or

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⁸ John Dewey is sometimes referred as a ‘pragmatic liberal’ and sometimes as a ‘democratic communitarian’. He is considered as defending both liberalism and communitarianism.
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conflict management). Yet, pragmatism cannot resolve all conflicts. For example, pragmatism cannot answer when to intervene. In deciding whether to intervene, state leaders have to judge about brutality of leaders abroad; adopting a rationalist, utilitarian or consequentialist approach as they have to protect their citizens, respect state sovereignty and international agreements. The leaders also have to focus on the community they live in. Thus, a pragmatist has to consider all of these issues. It is hoped that a good leader will choose moral principles (Weber, 2013).

According to American pragmatists, both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism fail to construct a convenient principle for future international conflicts. They have insufficient guidance for resolving future conflicts like US constitution. But, they consider that US constitution can be revised and updated. Similarly, pragmatists want to allow human intelligence to develop and adopt their approach to new problems as they arise and focus on particular conflicts. Cochran accepts partly each approach: values of community not to be ignored, values of individuals also. So dilemma between cosmopolitans and communitarians cannot be resolved by valuing one in exclusion of another.

Let us more elaborate on this third way. Cochran (1999: 9) examined cosmopolitan and communitarian positions through different authors attached to these positions such as Rawls, Beitz, Pogge and Walzer; yet she considered that the positions of these authors shifted in time making it difficult to attach them within these positions. She discussess three issues: (1) a concept of the person; (2) the moral standing of states; and (3) the universal versus the particular. Regarding the first aspect, a person is born with moral personality, while according to the communitarians moral personality is developed within a community. Regarding the second aspect, for cosmopolitans the autonomy of states has no normative significance for the individuals, while for communitarians it is in the sovereign state that ethical duties of individuals are made possible because of having freedom. Regarding the third aspect, with respect to whether there can be a standard judgment, cosmopolitans seek for morally equal individuals, whereas communitarians seek for morally equal communities; that is while cosmopolitans search for universalism communitarians search for particularism (Cochran, 1999: 10-12). She argues that both cosmopolitans and communitarians have moral commitments, but there is a distinction among the two positions.
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Cochran’s (1999: 15) second point is normative theory should shift attention to a different set of problems than those upon which cosmopolitans and communitarians focus in this debate, that is towards epistemological approaches or more precisely the anti-foundational approaches rather than existing strong foundational approaches. In other words, by focusing on ontological issues in this debate based often on the foundational epistemology, one fails to see the epistemological issues. As stated by Cochran (1999: 17):

I argue that the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is not the only, nor is it even the best, terrain upon which to construct a normative theory of IR. By this I mean that the kind of conclusions or non-conclusions generated by this debate is not the only ones possible for normative IR theory.

Cochran’s third point is to construct a new normative approach. She analyzes John Dewey’s pragmatic approach in American philosophy and states that there are three aspects of his work which she finds problematic. First, she suggests that Dewey overemphasizes intelligence. According to Dewey, intelligence begins with experience, but then it continuous to develop constantly and gains ethical significance. Second, she points out that Dewey has a clear idea of the individual as an ethical agent. Third, Cochran (1999: 183-184) raises doubts about the success of Dewey’s offer on new epistemology that is whether Dewey’s pragmatist approach alone is satisfactory in looking at the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.

Thus, she compares Dewey’s pragmatism with Rorty. According to Dewey "philosophy has a role in assisting social reconstruction, Rorty, on the other hand, does not see any special role for philosophy in examining social problems" (Cochran, 1999: 185). Dewey regards philosophy as having a special method to apply. He accepts that philosophical ideas permeated American common science not to exist without common sense of community. On the other hand, Rorty regards Dewey as foundational. Rorty tried to make pragmatism more interpretive and linguistic (Cochran, 1999: 192). Cochran states that both Dewey and Rorty accept that philosophical thinking starts with community, thus theorize about social norms of community yet also criticize it. How to balance the claims of individuals and communities? Cochran believes that universal moral principles can be constructed by critical intelligence, not by epistemologically centred philosophy. She attempts to find anti-foundational ethics within synthesis of the works of Dewey and Rorty.
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Similarly, Bray argues that cosmopolitanism provides ethical guidelines for human interactions, which seeks to improve the world, while contemporary global political institutions are still weak. Bray’s (2009, 2013) method of ethical theorizing proceeds Molly Cochran’s (1999) and American philosopher John Dewey’s ideas (Bray, 2009: 686-694). According to Bray, the first step in the argument for pragmatic cosmopolitanism entails identifying the empirical realities or lived experiences about morally problematic situations. The second step is to evaluate whether today’s conceptual and normative vocabularies of cosmopolitanism are adequate for addressing new circumstances. It has three ideals. First is “moral equality” which means people affected by a problem should be included solving social problems on the basis of their moral status. Second is “critical intelligence” which means practical judgments are made about what course of action is desirable. Third is “intercultural dialogue” which means inclusive dialogue aimed at achieving practical cooperation (Bray, 2013).

When applying pragmatist MC in foreign policy, firstly a holist approach over international relations should be adopted, assuming that “we, the people of the world, are already participants in two major global social practices: global civil society (GCS) and the society of sovereign states (SOSS)” (Frost, 2009b: IX). In the GCS, we are civilians having fundamental rights while in the SOSS we are citizens in sovereign states. But one does not have to choose between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, because he or she is participating in both realms. Thus, GCS and SOSS are understood as complementary social institutions, rather than two distinct realms.

The system of sovereign states within which we enjoy citizenship rights builds on the ethical identities made possible within global civil society within which actors are established as civilians – as individual rights holders (Frost, 2009b: 110).

Secondly, a foreign policy does not need to be unselfish to be moral. As Brown (2010a: 15) argues:

There is nothing inherently immoral in being self-interested so long as the interests of others are also taken into account – an ethical foreign policy will be one that creatively marries these two motivations, not one that suppresses the former in the interests of the latter.

Thirdly, as argued in the constitutive theory developed by Frost (2009b: 20), international actors are constituted within global social practices thus have ethical commitments. These commitments constrain
what the actors may do. However, there can be foreign policy alternatives with different ethical considerations. Thus, there might not be one ethically appropriate option. Looking from the insider perspectives we have to indicate the criteria used by the actor to justify its action. Yet still intersubjective ethical approval might be required.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article is not about a new subject area. Yet, it attempts to contribute to the literature on ethics and foreign policy, a relatively less-studied field within the discipline. As mentioned throughout the article, rich traditions of thought exist over ethical issues linking political theory and political science. Notwithstanding a relative delay, IR studies have had their share within ethical theorizing as well. It can be suggested that normative IR theory has developed in the last three decades, particularly inspired by the political theory. In this regard, cosmopolitan-communitarian debate has had its mark on IR theory. Yet, it can also be maintained that rather than abstract debate over communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism, IR scholars have mostly prioritized empirical research on a number of prominent ethical issues such as human rights, international interventions or just war. Through a critical analysis of the existing theoretical literature in this interconnected subfield, this article tried to find out how cosmopolitan-communitarian dichotomy affected the development of normative research in IR. Secondly, by focusing on moral and political cosmopolitan approaches, this article has tried to analyze the possibilities and limitations inherent in the search for ethical universalism through a third way. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, since we accept that we have to understand ethical dimension of international problems rather than only considering from an approach of ‘struggle for power’ or structural factors, part of the argument offered in this article is that foreign policy choices are open to ethical evaluation.

It is the main contention of this article that cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses, which in return necessitates moving beyond this dichotomy towards a middle ground. In other words, combination of these two approaches offers IR discipline a useful theoretical framework to address complexities of the twenty first century world. The strength of cosmopolitanism comes from the fact that erosion of communal ties through forces of globalization has triggered a tendency to develop universal or cross-
Cultural norms and values. At the heart of cosmopolitan thinking is a determined search for universal standards of justice, which are to be realized with or without the leading impetus of global political institutions. However, whereas cosmopolitan thinking seems to offer a reasonable ethical basis for the individuals of the twenty-first-century world, it has ignored strong patterns of communal ties across the globe. Unlike cosmopolitans, who claim to envisage ethics for pre-social individuals, communitarians claim to envisage ethics for post-social groups of people. In this regard, strength of the communitarian thinking comes from its ability to address incidences of ‘glocalization’, attracting attention to particularization of social values as a reaction to global pressures. Despite various challenges to communal ties, it would be misleading to deny significance of ethical values specific to communities. Yet, this does not remove the need for adopting universal ethical principles. Thus, the remedy for addressing culture-specific and cross-cultural ethical standards is to adopt a middle position. The search for a middle position was voiced mainly by the American pragmatists and adherents of English School within the IR discipline. According to pragmatists a middle ground position can be adopted to address moral considerations. They try to generate a moral equality among people in solving social problems, critical intelligence in choosing desirable action and intercultural dialogue aimed at achieving practical cooperation.

It can also be suggested that the debate between individual and communitarian obligations seems to be a debate not only between liberalism and its critics but also a debate within liberalism. In fact, the dichotomy has not only arisen between communitarians and cosmopolitans, but also between different types of cosmopolitanism, namely, MC and PC, despite a number of common commitments such as normative individualism, equal treatment of individuals and obligations to all. Particularly, it is observed that Rawls has initiated and stimulated a lot of debate in the political philosophy on the issue of global distributive justice. In the redistributive justice theory, it is important who is involved in political community. In other words, if with liberal principles there is going to be a redistribution, it is important whether this will be universal or among specific community. As argued by Rawls should this be within a liberal state? Communitarianism rejected universal arguments of liberal theory and rejected possibility of universal justice, but remained short of putting forward an attractive argument.

Cosmopolitans have offered different suggestions on how to reach at ethical universalism. For instance, MC supports universal norms about
justice without any commitment to global political institutions. Unlike MC, PC has attracted attention to significance of institutional frameworks to realize moral ideals. For instance, Nagel points out that the most realistic way to materialize global justice would be through initially establishing unjust and illegitimate but effective global structures of power. Likewise, Pogge suggested institutional proposals such as the GRT and the idea of vertical dispersal of governmental authority/sovereignty. On the other hand, American pragmatists such as Cochran believe that universal moral principles can be constructed by critical intelligence. Dewey, whose ideas have inspired Cochran, has expected that intelligence of critical thinkers would improve the society, and in turn these critical thinkers would be supported in a democratic society. In short, pragmatists want to allow human intelligence to develop and adapt their approach to new problems as they arise and focus on particular conflicts.

Overall, a great deal of critical issues with strong ethical dimensions including contagious diseases like the Ebola virus, poverty, civil wars, R2P, migratory flows and refugees have shown that there is a high need for IR scholarship to develop in the field of foreign policy and ethics in order to better explain and discuss ethical dimensions of empirical issues. Prioritization of either a communitarian or cosmopolitan approach has not provided a comprehensive theoretical framework, whereas there has been growing awareness of moral responsibilities to others, as well as a world without political communities is not likely to be materialized in the foreseeable future. This duality necessitates a parallel functioning of two distinct mechanisms of morality at the same time: one addressing the needs of particular societies, where people are viewed as citizens and another one addressing the needs of a single global state where there is no differentiation between men/women and citizens. In other words, the dichotomy between moral obligations to all and moral obligations to fellows should be eliminated in favour of combining both obligations to explain and offer solutions to empirical problems.

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