CONSPIRACY OR SOCIAL CHANGE? A LITERATURE REVIEW ON TRANSNATIONAL NGO NETWORKS

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Abstract

In a globalizing world, foreign/international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work in satisfying various societal needs along with the domestic national NGOs. This cooperation is not welcomed by all circles in the host countries. The activities of these organizations are seen with suspicion. Furthermore, the domestic NGOs that are associating with the foreign/international NGOs are seen by the same circles as compradors and sometimes even labeled as “traitors.” In the face of such allegations, the purpose of this study is to examine a literature that has a neutral attitude towards the relationships that take place in civil society between the foreign and domestic NGOs. This, in turn, may lessen the suspicion in some circles towards foreign NGOs and domestic NGOs that are cooperating with them. Finally, this article aims at suggesting some research questions based on this literature for the researchers in Turkey.

Keywords: Civil society, nongovernmental organizations, transnational relations, transnational NGO networks, boomerang pattern of influence.

Öz

Komplo veya Toplumsal Değişim? Ulusaşan STK Ağları Üzerine Bir Literatür Taraması

Küreselleşen bir dünyada, yabancı/uluslararası sivil toplum kurumları (STK) ulusal STK’ılarla birlikte toplumsal ihtiyaçları karşılama doğrultusunda faaliyet göstermektedirler. Bu işbirliği ev sahibi ülkelerde tüm çevreler tarafından hoş karşılanmamaktadır. Bu kurumların faaliyetleri şüpheye karşılanmaktadır. Dahası, yabancı/uluslararası STK’lar ile işbirliği yapan ulusal

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**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Sivil toplum, sivil toplum kuruluşları, ulusaşırı ilişkiler, ulusaşan STK ağları, bumerang etki yapısı

**INTRODUCTION**

Civil society is a popular topic of research within the field of political science and government in recent decades. It has gained importance particularly after the collapse of Socialist regimes in Europe and elsewhere (Seligman, 1992). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are one of the constitutive components of civil society. Depending on the voluntary/professional support of individuals, civil society organizations aim at satisfying various societal needs (e.g. providing material support to the needy, defending human rights, contributing to democratization, etc).

Thanks to globalization, foreign-domestic nongovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) can take part in satisfying those needs along with the national-domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, this is not always a welcomed contribution. There may always be some people, who are suspicious of these organizations’ activities in the host countries. Indeed, in the recent past, some of the foreign/international NGOs (F/INGOs) were accused of trying to subvert the regime by the Putin Government in Russia (Volk, 2006). Similar accusations were directed towards some F/INGOs in Turkey, which were seen either directly linked to foreign governments with the purposes of espionage or believed to be the agents of imperialism in general (Yıldırım, 2004; Hablemitoğlu, 2001). Their activities were seen as an infiltration to the culture of the host country with the purpose of weakening its resistance towards exploitation. Furthermore, the domestic NGOs that are associating with the F/INGOs are seen by the same circles as compradors and sometimes even labeled as “traitors.”

Finding out whether any of the F/INGOs is involved in subversive activities cannot be the proper subject of scientific studies such as this. It is a security issue and thus, it is the business of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and/or other responsible government security agencies. However, the purpose of
this study is to examine a literature that has an objective attitude towards the relationships that take place in civil society between the foreign and domestic NGOs. This, in turn, may lessen the suspicion in some circles towards foreign NGOs and domestic NGOs that are cooperating with them. Finally, this article aims at suggesting some research questions based on this literature for the researchers in Turkey.

I. TRANSNATIONAL NGO NETWORKS

The early 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new challenge to what had come to be the dominant paradigm in the field of international relations in the post-World War II period, i.e. the classical realism. The new challenge was carrying the banner of “transnationalism”, and found its first profound expression in the work of Keohane and Nye (1970), Transnational Relations and World Politics. Keohane and Nye and the other authors who contributed to the volume were critical of the realist assumptions that the main actor in the realm of international relations was the nation-state, and that international institutions and norms were merely reflective of the decisions of sovereign states that act on the basis of their national-interests (Colas, 2002: 2-3; Tarrow, 2001: 3-4). Keohane and Nye were opening this debate with the following words:

A good deal of intersocietal intercourse with significant political importance takes place without governmental control.... This volume ...focuses on these “transnational relations”-contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments. ... We believe that the simplifications of state-centric approach divert the attention of scholars and statesmen away from many important current problems and distort the analyses of others. We have suggested a “world politics paradigm” that includes transnational, transgovernmental and interstate interactions in the hope of stimulating new types of theory, research, and approaches to policy (in Colas, 2002: 2-3, Nye and Keohane 1970: 398).

Of course, the idea that international relations are shaped not only by the states, but also by the factors such as international norms that are not determined by the states, and trade was not new and had been known to many classical thinkers such as Kant, Burke and Marx. What was new about this last take on transnationalist approach, as Colas (2002: 3) suggests, was that: first, unlike the previous analyses, this time transnational phenomena was not a “tangential consideration within a broader theoretical framework”, but established the core of the theoretical analysis. Second, despite some important
differences in their arguments, the researchers in the new transnationalist literature placed their faith in the behaviouralist approach that was prevalent in the social science methodology back then. What was most important for this approach was to gather more data, and the rapid proliferation of the transnational interactions was providing more cases to be observed in that sense.

However, this new literature had not been very influential in challenging the realist state-centric paradigm. During the 1980's, especially through the work of Kenneth Waltz, the realist school was able to hold its dominance in the international relations literature, this time under the name of neo-realism (Brown, 2002). The revival of the “transnational relations” literature came in the mid 1990’s. Thomas Risse-Kappen’s edited volume, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (1995), was heralding this revival.

According to Thomas Risse-Kappen and his colleagues, the earlier arguments had set the debate about world politics in terms of an unfruitful dichotomy: state-centric views versus society-dominated views. A more fruitful approach would be to see the interaction between the inter-state world and “society world” of transnational relations. In this view, if the specific conditions under which transnational relations can have an impact on the policy outcomes of the states could be specified, then, the claim that “the reciprocal effects between transnational relations and the interstate system” are “centrally important to the understanding of contemporary world politics” could be made more solidly (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 5).

In this direction, they identified the following question as their research question: “[U]nder what domestic and international circumstances do transnational coalitions and actors who attempt to change policy outcomes in a specific issue-area succeed or fail to achieve their goals?” (emphasis in the original) (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 5). According to the answer that they gave to this question, the differences of impact of transnational actors on state policies can be accounted for on the basis of two factors: “(1) differences in domestic structure, i.e., the normative and organizational arrangements which form the “state,” structure society, and link the two in the polity; and (2) degrees of international institutionalization, i.e., the extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations.” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6)

With regards to the first factor, i.e. the differences in domestic structure, Risse-Kappen and his colleagues (1995: 6-7) argue that as the domestic structure gets dominated by the state, the likelihood that transnational actors will have an impact on the policy outcomes diminishes. In a society where the domestic
structure is dominated by the state, it is very difficult for transnational actors to penetrate the socio-political system of that country. On the other hand, a fragmented state and a robust civil society would make it easier for transnational organizations to have influence on the policy outcomes.

With regards to the second factor, i.e. degrees of international institutionalization, the regulation of an issue-area by international norms increases the chances of transnational actors’ penetrating the boundaries of a target state (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 7). In this understanding, norms are defined by Peter Katzenstein as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 3).

A further refinement of the debate on transnational relations can be found in the work of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), *Activists Beyond Borders Advocacy Networks In International Politics*. The concept of network forms the core of this refinement process. Accordingly, both Keohane and Nye (1971) and Risse-Kappen (1995) collections bring together such various sorts of transnational actors as multinational corporations, the Catholic Church, international scientific organizations, and activist groups. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 29-30) argue that all these forms of transnational relations can be analyzed in terms of networks: “Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 91)

Thus, these transnational networks are categorized in three different groups based on their aims: (i) Transnational networks that are motivated by instrumental goals such as transnational corporations and banks, (ii) Transnational networks that are motivated by shared causal ideas, such as the groups of scientists (iii) Transnational networks that are motivated by shared principled ideas or values (transnational advocacy networks).

To the extent that the last form of transnational networks is motivated not by material gains and/or professionalism, but rather by shared ideas and values, they form a distinct category. Many times, they are not satisfied with policy change in their field of action but seek to reshape the institutional and ideational bases of international interactions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2). In Keck and Sikkink’s (1999: 91) words, “[A]dvocacy captures what is unique about these transnational networks—they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to their ‘interests’.”

International and domestic NGOs, local social movements, research and advocacy organizations; foundations; the media; churches, trade unions,
consumer organizations, intellectuals; parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments are among the major actors that form an advocacy network. (1999: 91-92)

The most valuable commodity that the NGOs in an advocacy network share is information. They not only share information related to their relevant fields of action, but they also create “frames” through which they interpret that information, and shape the perceptions that pertain to their issue areas (1999: 92). A second thing that the actors in an advocacy network share is funds. In response to the services they provide, the NGOs are funded by foundations in a network. However, services may also be provided to other NGOs in the same advocacy and sometimes other advocacy networks. Finally, personnel exchanges is not something uncommon in advocacy networks (1999: 92).

Thus, connections are important for both sides. It is important for the resource-poor Third World actors because it provides access, knowledge, leverage and many times money. For the actors from the developed world, this cooperation provides them with information, and also with the legitimacy in the society of the targeted state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 93). In this line, with regards to the Chilean case, Hawkins (2002: 55) states that

*International organizations provided financial aid and international recognition to struggling domestic groups, making it more difficult for the military regime to repress them entirely. In turn, domestic Chilean organizations offered information about the nature of human rights abuses to international actors.*

As indicated at the outset, connections between F/INGOs and domestic NGOs are not always welcomed. While F/INGOs from the developed world work in an environment that is friendly, for the most part, towards international cooperation, domestic NGOs from the developing world work in an environment that is not always F/INGO friendly (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 94). As Keck and Sikkink (1999: 94) put it, “[L]inkages with northern networks require high levels of trust, because arguments justifying intervention on ethical grounds often sound too much like the ‘civilizing’ discourse of colonial powers, and can work against the goals they espouse by producing a nationalist backlash.” F/INGOs are seen either directly linked to foreign governments with the purposes of espionage or believed to be the agents of imperialism in general (Yıldırım, 2004; Hablemitoğlu, 2001). Their activities were seen as an infiltration to the culture of the host country with the purpose of weakening its resistance towards exploitation. Furthermore, the domestic NGOs that are
associating with the F/INGOs are seen by the same circles as compradors and sometimes even labeled as “traitors.”

Transnational advocacy networks are most likely to emerge when channels between domestic groups and their governments for resolving conflicts do not exist, or where they exist, they are ineffective in doing that. Thus, such a state of affairs sets into motion what Keck and Sikkink (1999: 93) call the ‘boomerang’ pattern of influence. Despite the liberal belief that the primary purpose of the existence of the state is to protect the rights of the members of the civil society, many times, the state is the primary violator of those rights. Domestic actors and/or groups who cannot challenge the powerful state alone may first turn to each other for solidarity. Even these domestic networks of solidarity may not be strong enough to tame the power of the state. Therefore, they turn to outside world for support from the foreign and international non-governmental organizations (F/INGOs). The formation of domestic and international networks may occur simultaneously. As a result of this dual process, domestic actors including individuals, groups and NGOs derive strength not only from the solidarity that they have among themselves but also from the solidarity that they establish with F/INGOs.

In their efforts to tame the power of the state, international advocacy networks employ several tactics. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 16; 1999: 95) categorize those tactics into four groups:

(a) information politics, or the ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact;
(b) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away . . . ;
(c) leverage politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and
(d) accountability politics, or the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorsed.

As indicated above, sharing politically-relevant information is the most precious commodity of these networks. Due to their location, domestic NGOs know first-hand about the violations of rights. Getting this information quickly and spreading it credibly across the international arena occurs through the linkages that domestic NGOs establish with F/INGOs. F/INGOs may help the process of the dissemination of politically relevant information either directly or indirectly. In the case of indirect contribution, they provide opportunities for...
domestic NGOs to herald their news. One such opportunity can be found in the 
space that F/INGOs provide for domestic NGOs in international organizations 
such as the United Nations. As Martens (2004) informs us, NGOs are interested 
in gaining consultative status in the UN. As an “official way” to participate in 
the international system, the consultative system gives the opportunity to NGOs 
to obtain information and voice their opinion in the UN. However, not every 
NGO is able to obtain this status. It is especially difficult for domestic NGOs 
because of the blockage that their native state create in the UN. Luckily, there 
are many F/INGOs that have this status. They can help the domestic NGOs to 
use their status as a platform to state their complaints at the UN level. An 
example of this is the cooperation between International Federation of Human 
Rights (FIDH) and its member NGOs such as Human Rights in China. Even 
though Human Rights in China cannot have the consultative status in the UN 
due to People’s Republic of China’s strong opposition, thanks to its connection 
with FIDH it can inform the relevant organs of the UN such as Commission on 
Human Rights about the human rights abuses in China (Martens, 2004).

Domestic NGOs and F/INGOs in a network not only share politically usable information, but also frame it in a way that it will make sense to the targeted audience. The information that is presented to the international world is not presented just for the sake of letting the world know about what is going on, but also in order to initiate action to correct some injustice. Therefore, persuasion is important. One way of effective persuasion is to use symbols and stories. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 22), many times, not just a single event but juxtaposition of several important events persuade people for action. For example, the juxtaposition of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, Vietnam War and Watergate scandal was influential in creating human rights movement in the US.

Another influential strategy in boomerang pattern of influence is leverage politics. In this strategy, a weaker actor, say a domestic NGO, uses its linkages to F/INGOs, in order to make a powerful actor, e.g. the USA, EU or the UN, pressure a target state. The aim is to change the behavior of a target state. A good example is provided by what Hawkins (2002: 65) has to say about the role of the US Congress against the Pinochet dictatorship. Accordingly, thanks to the information about human rights abuses in Chile that was provided by the international human rights network, the US Congress sanctioned Chile. These sanctions usually take the form of the suspension of military and financial aid, of the sales of weapons, and of bilateral diplomatic relations. In fact, since the term of President Carter in the 1970s the US tries to restore a moral dimension to American foreign policy by emphasizing that the US military and economic aid is dependent on the human rights records of the recipient countries (Heywood, 2002: 127; Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 23).
Finally, *accountability politics* involves the endeavor on the part of the international advocacy networks to pressure the target state to keep its promises regarding the international norms such as human rights and democracy. As Keck and Sikkink (1998: 24) suggest, sometimes governments subscribe to international norms just for the sake of diverting attention. However, once they accept these standards even at the level of discourse, transnational advocacy networks can use this opportunity to show the disparity between the discourse and the practice, and embarrass the target state in the international arena.

Using these four strategies, either separately or in combination with one another, international advocacy networks try to influence the behavior of the states that do not comply with international norms in the fields such as human rights and democracy. The interactions in a transnational advocacy network can be illustrated by a diagram:

![Diagram of transnational advocacy network](source.png)

*Source:* Taken and redrawn with some revision from (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 13).

However, in order for the boomerang to give the expected results there are some conditions. These conditions can be divided into two groups: (a) issue-related conditions, and (b) actor-related conditions.

As Keck and Sikkink indicate (1999: 98-99), there are two issue areas around which transnational advocacy networks emerge most effectively. These are “(1) those involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when
there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) about who bears responsibility; (2) issues involving legal equality of opportunity” (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 98). In this sense, it is easier to form an effective advocacy network when the subject of the right abuse is torture or disappearance than some other rights abuses such as property rights violations. Furthermore, when the victim of the right abuse is perceived vulnerable and/or innocent, then, the likelihood of having a successful campaign increases. For example, it is easier to campaign around torture of a political prisoner than around torture of a common criminal. Secondly, when there are open-violations of legal equality of opportunity, then, a successful advocacy network is likely to emerge. The best example of this phenomenon is provided by the campaign that was waged against the apartheid in South Africa that was lacking the most basic aspects of equality of opportunity (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 99).

With regards to actor-related conditions, the first thing that can be said is that “…networks are more effective where they are strong and dense. Network strength and density involves the total number and size of organizations in the network, and the regularity of their exchanges” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 206). The second thing that can be said about actors is related not with actors that are in the network but with the actors who are the targets of those networks. As briefly touched upon above, in order for a network to have any impact on a target state, that state must have accepted international norms, at least at the discourse level. This provides the members of a network with a moral leverage to criticize the state. Secondly, the target state must be caring about its international image. A state that does not care about the opinion of the outside world does not have much incentive for promoting human rights when it is criticized in the international arena. Third, before an international network emerges, there must be some level of freedom in a state so that individuals can organize and communicate with others. In parallel to Risse-Kappen et. al. (1995), Keck and Sikkink imply that a very strong state which does not leave any room for flourishing of a civil society makes it very hard for an international advocacy network to emerge. Finally, if the target state itself is too powerful, or due to its geographical location, economic power, or natural resources, is very important for powerful states, then, it is hard for the boomerang pattern of influence to have the expected result (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 206-208).

A final touch on this literature was provided by Khagram et al. (2002). In this edited volume, Khagram et al. make a threefold classification among the actors that attempt to bring about social change in an area that is seen as problematic. Accordingly, it is possible to talk about (a) transnational networks, (b) transnational coalitions, (c) transnational movements. In this classification, transnational networks correspond to the most informal form of collective
action. It is basically formed around the information exchange. The actors in this sort of network do not have formally established ties. They aim to share the information and frame it in a purposeful way. Transnational coalitions, on the other hand, involve more coordinated relations among the civil society actors. It may involve not only sharing information but also resources with the aim of changing a particular state of affairs that is deemed unjust. Finally, the distinctive feature of transnational movements is that they employ protest and/or disruptive action. They may share information and/or bring together resources as well. However, they make their impact by taking it to the streets (Khagram et al. 2002: 7). Sometimes these protests may get even violent. The protests that took place against globalization and the institutions that are associated with this phenomenon such as World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in Seattle and in Washington D. C. at the beginning of this decade can be given as examples of this mode of collective action. With regards to this final mode of transnational collective action, Sidney Tarrow (2001: 1) argues that “mass-based transnational social movements are hard to construct, [and] are difficult to maintain . . . .”

Finally, transnational networks and coalitions can be defined expansively or restrictively. When they are defined expansively, they include all relevant actors that put effort to create some sort of social change in an issue area. In this sense, among the elements of transnational networks and coalitions are NGOs, social movements, parts of states, intergovernmental organizations, foundations, and epistemic communities. When they are defined restrictively, the members are limited to domestic NGOs and F/INGOs (Khagram et al., 2006: 9).

**CONCLUSION**

In this study, the aim was presenting a literature that looks at the relationships that take place in civil society between foreign/international NGOs and domestic NGOs with a social scientific eye. At the beginning, it was pointed out that this relationship is not welcomed by all circles. In countries such as Russia and Turkey, these interactions in civil society were approached by suspicion, if not total hostility. The foreign/international NGOs that are acting in such realms as human rights, democratization, and environment are seen as the new agents of old-imperialism or neo-colonialism. It is argued that external enemies attack the integrity of respective countries under the cover of human rights, democratization, etc. However, as it was shown in this article, there is a wide body of literature that takes this relationship as a subject of social scientific research and approaches it with an objective attitude.
In fact, in Turkey, there are many issue areas that can be researched through this scientific body of literature. Some potential research topics can be found in the field of human rights. First, it can be explored whether the human rights associations in Turkey have any cooperation with foreign and international NGOs. Secondly, it can be asked what is it that they are doing together? How do they establish relationships? What is the advantage of having such an interaction with F/INGOs? Is there a “boomerang effect” in the realm of human rights in Turkey? More specific examples in the realm of human rights can be found in women’s rights and/or in the rights of gays and lesbians: Is there any transnational advocacy network that is operating in these issue areas in Turkey? Are they successful? If not, what are the reasons for their failure? These issue areas can be investigated either separately or in combination with a comparative perspective.

Similar questions can be raised in the fields of democratization and environment as well. In order to get some sort of variation, the ideological difference can be included in the research to see if there is any variance in terms of establishing cooperation with F/INGOs and domestic NGOs as we move through the ideological spectrum. Another meaningful research would involve a comparison of the interaction between F/INGOs and domestic NGOs in these three realms, i.e. the realms of human rights, democratization and environment. It can be asked if there is any difference among these three fields in terms of establishing, maintaining relations and having results in Turkey?

Rather than developing conspiracy theories about the alleged secret agendas and functions of F/INGOs and their domestic partners, a scientific study can (and should) focus on their open/ overt activities, and raise the following questions: What is it that they are doing? How are they doing it? What is the nature of the relationship between a F/INGO and a domestic NGO? It is believed that the answers of these questions and the clarification of these issues will help us better understand the contribution that foreign/international NGOs -both by themselves and in cooperation with the domestic NGOs- are making to satisfying the interests of the society.

NOTES

1 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are defined as “private, voluntary, nonprofit groups whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of social change.” Nongovernmental organization is subjected to a twofold distinction: (1) domestic nongovernmental organizations, and (2) international nongovernmental organizations. Accordingly, the members of domestic nongovernmental organizations come from one country, though their efforts may be directed internationally. International
nongovernmental organizations’ (INGOs) decision-making structures are formed with voting members from at least three countries, and the scope of their efforts are cross-national and/or international (Khagram et al., 2002: 6). Another definition of INGOs is provided by Sidney Tarrow (2001: 12) in the following way: “International non governmental organizations are organizations that operate independently of governments, are composed of members from two or more countries, and are organized to advance their members’ international goals and provide services to citizens of other states through routine transactions with states, private actors, and international institutions.”

According to the above-distinction, while an organization such as Open Society Institute of USA (OSI) qualifies as a domestic NGO, Amnesty International would qualify as an INGO. However, talking about OSI within the context of a country other than USA as a domestic NGO may cause confusion. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, domestic NGOs with a foreign-origin—with respect to the host country—are denoted as foreign nongovernmental organizations (FNGOs). On the other hand, the use of “domestic nongovernmental organization” is solely reserved for national-domestic NGOs of the host country. Furthermore, for the purposes of simplicity, foreign nongovernmental organizations (FNGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) will be abbreviated as F/INGOs.

About the realist assumptions on international relations see Morgenthau, (1948: 34-38). Risse-Kappen and his colleagues (1995: 3) defined transnational relations in the following way: “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization” (emphasis in the original).

Networks do not have to be always beneficial: Raab and Milward (2003) argue that networks are mostly seen in a positive light, as a solution to complex problems, in areas where coordinated action is necessary. They contend, however, that networks can be seen in a negative light, as problems in themselves as well, especially when they are used for illegal or immoral ends. Raab and Milward’s definition of “dark networks” include networks functioning in areas such as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, diamond and weapons trade. Risse-Kapen (1995: 4) agrees that “there is no reason to assume that transnational relations regularly promote ‘good’ causes”. Transnational terrorist networks are cases in point. A similar point is made by Asal et.al. (2006).

However, it should be admitted that in the post 9/11 era, it is hard to reconcile the foreign policy of the Bush Administration with this concern for human rights standards. The existence of prisons such as the one in Guantanamo Bay where terrorist-suspects are held without due-process of law for prolonged periods of time is meaningful in this respect.
REFERENCES


