HEGEMONIC INTERVENTION: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS IN LIGHT OF AN
ANALYSIS OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS

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Abstract
This article aims to develop a conceptual framework for the management of
intrastate conflicts by relying on hegemonic stability theory and its basic
concept: public good. In the light of the failure of the international
community to develop a unified response to most cases of intrastate
conflicts, the study investigates the role of leadership in international
attempts to manage such conflicts. Briefly stated, in the absence of a direct
threat to the interests of each individual member, there will be a need for a
leader that is capable of providing the public goods associated with efforts to
bring a solution to the conflict. Findings from several phases of Kosovo crisis
which support this proposition are used to illustrate and evaluate the
accuracy of this assumption.

Key words: Intervention, collective action, leadership, NATO, Kosovo

ÖZ
Bu çalışma hegemonik denge teorisine ve bu teorinin en önemli kavramı olan
kamu yarıarı termine dayanarak ülke içi çatışmaların kontrol almaına yardımcı olacak kavramsal ülke içi çatışmaların çözümüne amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, uluslararası toplumun ülke içi çatışmaların söz konusu olduğu bir çok olayda ortak bir tutum sergilemedeki başarısızlığı dikkate alarak, bu tür çatışmaların kontrol alta alınmasını için gerekli olan çabalar içinde liderlik rolünü incelemektedir. Kısa ifade etmek gerekirse, herhangi bir ülkenin çıkarlarını doğrudan tehdit etmediğçe, bu tür çatışmaların çözümüne kavuşulması için sarfedilen çabalar için gerekli olan kamu araçlarını sağlayabilecek gücü sahip bir liderle ihtiyaç duyulacağını savunmaktayım. Bu savun doğruluşunu ırdelemek ve göstermek için, bu öngörüyü destekleyen Kosova krizinin bir çok aşamasındaki bulgulardan faydalanılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müdahale, kolektif Eylem, liderlik, NATO, Kosova

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Introduction

International action in response to intrastate conflicts characterized by violence is nothing new, nor is debate regarding these international actions. However, the proliferation in the number of such conflicts since the end of the Cold War has turned them into one of the major problems of the international community. There has been a growing tendency among states to view such conflicts as being more than internal matters of a state suffering from internal strife. This has contributed to efforts to search for appropriate means and methods to respond to and prevent such conflicts. The tendency in the international community has been acting collectively under an international organization or an ad hoc coalition in the management of violent internal conflicts by means of coercive intervention.

Nevertheless, while not all internal conflicts have attracted the same degree of attention, the intensity or the amount of violence has not been always sufficient to induce international involvement. Although the absence of established norms, rules and procedures can be blamed as the primary obstacle in front of swift and effective international response, it does not explain the selectivity of involvement. The absence of vital interests or divergent interests of potential interveners, therefore, stands out as the most common and potentially the most credible explanation for the failure of the international community in dealing with internal conflicts.

This article, in the light of the failure of international community to develop a unified response to the most cases of violent internal conflicts, investigates the role of leadership in international attempts to manage such conflicts. Approaching the issue from the hegemonic stability theory perspective, I argue that in the absence of a direct threat to the interests of individual members, there will be a need for a leader who is capable of providing the public good.
associated with the efforts to bring a solution to a conflict.

In its most general form, the theory of hegemonic stability is used to imply that “the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in international system” (Snidal, 1985: 579). Drawing from this assumption, I claim that prevention and resolution of internal conflicts require the presence of a hegemon or, to put it more appropriately, a leader. The leader not only mobilizes international organizations to take an active role in efforts for the prevention, management and resolution of such conflicts but also encourages or compels other states to either participate into the solution finding process and/or contribute the production of public goods associated with the resolution of the conflict. Public goods associated with efforts to ethnic conflicts include diplomatic operations, economic sanctions, use or threat of the use of force and several other actions that requires coordination.

I study the case of Kosovo intervention undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the spring of 1999 to provide an empirical demonstration of the arguments constructed here. The process of international engagement in ethnic conflict in Kosovo, which culminated in NATO intervention, gives us clues about how collective action towards resolution of such conflicts require a leading state that is ready to either provide or induce contribution for the production of public goods associated with such involvement.

Consequently, my analysis proceeds in four steps. The next section briefly explores relevant studies conducted on the topic. The third section examines hegemonic stability theory and extends its basic assumption of leadership requirement for the management of international trade to the management and resolution of intrastate conflicts. In the final part of the paper, I study Kosovo crisis both before
and after it became violent to demonstrate the relevancy of the argument put forward.

**Literature review**

The question of intervention and its practice has been somewhat mixed for the major states of international community. Along with the sense of moral obligation to act in the face of gross humanitarian crisis (Blechman, 1995; Finnemore, 1996; Smith, 2000), it has been argued that refugee flows, and potential spillover effects of such conflicts, which are inherently a serious threat to international peace and security, create a demand for external involvement by major powers (Brown, 1996; Mitchell, 1970; Dowty and Loescher, 1996; Carment et.al., 1997).

However, the intensity and scope of human suffering has not always been enough to attract involvement. Despite recognizing the need for new tools and methods to deal with internal conflicts, evidence suggests that in the absence of a direct threat to their interests, major powers tend not to involve in such conflicts. In general, the lack of public support due to high costs and military casualties associated with such operations makes western capitals back away from taking an active role in intrastate conflicts (Blechman, 1995; Regan, 1998).

Thus, as Lake and Rothschild (1996) have observed, states in the absence of strong interests at stake, tend to lack any incentive to carry the burden and seek to free ride on the efforts of others for finding a solution.

What is it that makes it possible to act collectively in certain conflicts, while the absence of which hinders cooperation and prevents taking a firm stance even in worse humanitarian catastrophes? A quick response to this question might be the so called CNN effect, which implies that the intensity of media coverage creates a sense of obligation in Western governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crisis against their will (Jacobson, 2000). However, to what extent media commands that power on its own is questionable. As Michael Desch (2001) observes, one should not complicate the power of media on the
public and its effect on policy makers, whose influence over the latter is overstated. Another explanation, but a relatively old one, would involve paradigmatic response. Realist theories, for instance, would argue that states would intervene only when their direct and indirect geo-strategic and economic interests are at stake (Bull 1984; Morgenthau, 1967). However, Martha Finnemore (1996), argues that most interventions, especially after the end of the Cold War, were carried out in states where geo-strategic or economic interests of interveners were negligible. For instance, analyzing international intervention in Somalia, David Gibbs (2000) argues that the operation was conducted on purely humanitarian purposes without concern for any national interests. According to Finnemore, the answer lays with the shift in normative understanding, which accords all human beings the same degree of protection regardless of their identities. However, Finnemore fails to explain why certain people receive intervention on their behalf while others barely receive attention.

Writing on the topic under the Cold War circumstances, Mitchell (1970) proposes transactional and affective motivations as driving forces behind third party involvement in civil strifes. While transactional motivations encapsulate military, political, and economic linkages, affective motivations involve the role of ideological, religious, or ethnic ties between the intervening party and the victim of strife within the target state. A similar type of explanation has been provided by Carment (1993) and Carment, James, and Rowlands (1997) as the primary motivation mobilizing the intervening state. Elsewhere, elaborating on third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts using game-theoretic model, Carment and Rowlands (1998) addresse practical issues that interveners usually take into consideration before they embark upon and during an intervention. These issues are the mission’s intensity, the salience of the conflict to the intervener,
the capabilities of the belligerent, and the belligerents expected gains from continued fighting.

**Intervention as “Public Good”: Theoretical Assumptions of Collective Action and Hegemonic Stability Theory**

Against this background, no attention has been paid to the collective action and leadership aspect of the international involvement in internal conflicts. Recognizing this gap in literature, this study aims at developing a conceptual framework for advancing basic research on the management of internal violence by relying on hegemonic stability theory and its primary concept: public good. Hegemonic stability theory can be considered as a reaction to the assumptions of realism skeptical to cooperation among nations from within the realist school. The approach tries to answer why states cooperate to realize their common goals despite the anarchic nature of the international system defined in terms of the absence of a central authority.

From the realist perspective, states are motivated by relative gains rather than absolute gains - how well they do relative to each other rather than how well they do themselves. Leading realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), Joseph Grieco (1993), and Robert Gilpin (1987) contend that in a self help system no one can rely on any other. Therefore, to ensure their survival and independence in the long run, countries have a predominant interest even in the short run in avoiding a loss in their relative capabilities.

However, not everybody shares the realist skepticism towards cooperation (Snidal, 1991; Oye, 1985; Young, 1989). Neo-liberal institutionalists, for instance, highlight institutions as a solution to the problem of anarchy. Robert Keohane (1984), for instance, argues that the need for coordination, created by complex interdependence in world affairs, facilitates emergence of international institutions, and thereby encourages more cooperation among states.
Yet, as Martin (1993) demonstrates, institutions are not always the best solution for cooperation. The difficulty in establishing consensus among members with diverse interests, and the temptation to free ride are two of the most prominent problems. The unanimity rule of decision making, according to Young (1991), either dooms cooperation to failure or leads to incorporation of broad formulas with little content utility to the issue underhand. Thus, even if multilateral organizations provide the context for cooperation, this does not necessarily imply that cooperation will be secured.

Hegemonic stability theory is another explanation for the success or failure of cooperation among states. The theory's basic tenet is that emergence of cooperation among states depends on the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor capable of mitigating cooperation problems arising from collective action. The absence of such power is associated with undesirable outcomes and disorder (Snidal, 1985).

The theory builds much of its assumptions on the theory of collective action developed by Mancur Olson. Writing in The Logic of Collective Action, Olson (1965) argues that when interests are shared, open to free participation in terms of their provision and free consumption, rational actors are inclined to free ride, that is, to let others pay the cost of goods benefiting everybody. In the absence of any assurance to honor one's promise, defection becomes the dominant strategy, and no one contributes to supply and production of public goods (Hardin 1982).

Two distinguishing properties of public goods create incentives for free-riding: non-excludable and non-rival (or indivisible between users). Any individual's consumption of these goods does not preclude consumption by others; and once

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they are produced, regardless of their contribution or not, no one can be excluded from their consumption.

Under these circumstances, according to Olson (1965), in the absence of selective incentives, public goods are unlikely to exist unless the group is “privileged”. In such groups, either all members or at least one of them places a higher absolute valuation to a particular good that they will provide that non-excludable good irrespective of free riding, because they still generate a net relative benefit despite unilaterally baring the full cost of the burden.

Building on the assumptions of collective action theory, Charles Kindleberger (1986) argues that in order to overcome cooperation dilemma a hegemon must exist. Because of its relative size in international system a hegemon “has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, even if it has to bear the full burden of providing it himself.”

Relative to the interests and benefits that states extract from cooperation in issue areas such as international trade, collective security, or environmental regimes, the consideration of intrastate conflicts as public goods might in the first place seem quiet hard to conceive. Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate how intrastate conflicts square with the notion of international public goods, before demonstrating how effective resolution of such conflicts requires provision of leadership.

The public good-ness of intrastate conflicts is conceivable when considered in terms of byproducts of private goods whose costs or benefits are borne collectively. As individuals pursue their private activities or interests, they frequently create externalities for other actors. These externalities can be good or bad. A negative externality arises when private activities impose undesirable costs or outcomes on the rest of society. Consider the example of the broadcasting of a loud music in a public.
place. Although one cannot reject or be excluded from the negative impact of this action, the impossibility of rejection is not really what makes the loud music an issue. Rather, costliness of rejecting a bad is sufficient to provoke collective action and problems associated with it. “If the broadcasts are a bad, their absence is a good, and what people would do to prevent the bad is surely equivalent to what they would do to provide the obverse good” (Hardin, 1982: 62).

Intrastate conflicts in many respects can be considered as public bads produced as byproducts of private activities of parties involved in internal conflict to promote their respective interests. The spillover effect they carry makes these conflicts potential threat to international peace and security. Such conflicts always pose the risk of attracting external parties, for instance, when either one or both sides to conflict attempt to seek external assistance. Alternatively, external involvement might occur when one of the regional states act preemptively to prevent the involvement of any other external party (Mitchell, 1970).

Neighboring countries can be involved in the conflict even without having to intervene or undertake any substantial activity that will exacerbate the situation. The territory of the neighboring countries will most of the time be used for the supply of arms which might create potential frictions between the neighboring country and one of the parties (Brown 1996). Refugee flows that such conflicts create equally pose a threat to international stability. Refugees, along with the tremendous suffering that they bear, not only impose a heavy burden on the host state but have disruptive effects within that country.

In this context, although produced outside a group, when the negative externality that the action of parties to conflict disturbs the welfare of the group, as in the example of loud music, and its rejection or elimination requires a cost for the group then we can claim that a condition that involves a
collective action has been created. Efforts to prevent contain or stop a war result in conditions that convey broad benefits both for the parties to the conflict and for wider international community (Hamburg and Holl, 1993). Thus provision of stability at the international level like the provision of defense at national level is a public good that everyone can enjoy (Mendez 1993).

**Leadership and Intervention**

Now that I have demonstrated the connection between collective action, public goods and intervention, the remaining task is to establish the link between leadership and intervention. Two questions need to be answered at this juncture. The first question is whether a small group of states is capable of producing public goods to deal with public bads in absence of a leading state. The second question is what leadership is and how it applies to coercive interventions.

According to Snidal (1985) if a hegemon is needed because somebody has to provide the international public goods, such goods can be produced regardless of a hegemon. Using Thomas Schillings n-person binary choice model Snidal demonstrates that it is possible for two or more states, through strategic interaction, to obtain sufficient net benefits for them to produce international collective goods.

However, Brenner (1995) insists that a leader fulfils a number of crucial technical functions in multilateral cooperation. These are problem identification, problem definition, option identification, deliberation and decision, and finally implementation. Therefore, he insists that voluntarism will not suffice to ensure the provision of public good.

If leadership is a necessary condition for the achievement of successful outcomes, what does it entail? The concept of leadership employed here takes its meaning from the combination of three forms of leadership identified by Young (1991). These are structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. Structural leadership involves translation of
the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage over the issues at stake. The entrepreneurial leadership entails the use of ideas and negotiating skills to influence the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional bargaining. It suggests construction of mutually acceptable deals that yields benefits for all. Intellectual leadership, on the other hand, relies on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake. The leader attempts to reorient thinking of the participants about available alternatives to induce them to come to terms with these issues in question.

Kosovo Crisis as a Case of Hegemonic Intervention

In this part of the article, using the conflict in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbian administration and the subsequent air campaign, “Operation Allied Force,” by NATO against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from March 24 through June 10, 1999, I demonstrate the validity of the argument raised above. The case is a good example of illustrating not only how intrastate conflicts can be considered as negative externalities, having repercussion for the wider international community, but also how the presence or absence of leadership might affect the prospect of international engagement. However, before focusing on these points, a brief summary of the background of the crisis is essential.

Background of the Conflict

NATO was not the first external power whose attack on Yugoslavia had been welcomed by Yugoslav Albanians. Approximately six decades earlier to NATO’s operation, the occupation of the Albanian inhibited areas of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy had aroused the same kind of sympathy out of their resentment to two decades of repressive and colonizing Serbian rule. After the end of the war, the Yugoslav communist leader Joseph Tito
designated Kosovo as a province of the Republic of Serbia.

In 1980s, the Albanian political and cultural dominance in Kosovo became a major source of Serbian nationalism, fueled and exploited by a communist bureaucrat, Slobodan Milosevic, who rose to power by pledging to restore Serbian control over Kosovo. Following his accession to power, Milosevic orchestrated a nationalist campaign, put down Albanian resistance with force, and finally stripped Kosovo of its autonomous status between 1989 and 1990. A state of emergency was imposed and the army was called in. These measures were accompanied by the expulsion of Albanians from almost all major public and economic spheres in Kosovo.

**International Prevention as a Symptom of Collective Action Problems**

Viewed in this context, the violent conflict sparked in late 1997 can be seen as a perpetuation of a contentious relation in the history of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. Initially unifying around the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, Albanians launched a Gandhi style non-violent resistance against Serbia after declaring their independence along with other Yugoslav republics. Rugova and his circle relied too heavily on passive resistance, which they thought would bring automatic Western support for the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and its eventual annexation to Albania (Schmitt, 1995). However, despite sympathy for passive resistance, which was mistaken for support for the Albanian cause (Judah, 2000; Vickers, 1998; Bashiri, 1996), the agenda of international community was largely shaped by the consideration to prevent Kosovo from turning into another international issue. Therefore, Rugova, despite his request to be treated as the representative of Albanians, was allowed to attend the international conferences on

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4 For a very detailed historical coverage of the Kosovo conflict see Judah (2000); Malcolm (1999); Mertus (1999); Vickers (1998).

5 For a detailed account of the passive resistance see Clark (2000).
the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) as an observer (Judah, 2000).

When the West granted recognition to the new Republic of Yugoslavia in turn for the Dayton Agreement, prospect for an independent Kosovo was almost lost (Judah 2000). The agreement, excluding Kosovo from the process, tacitly endorsed Serbian claims to the province. Exclusion of Albanians from the peace process discredited Rugova and his passive resistance and led to the emergence of “Kosovo Liberation Army” (KLA, or — in Albanian — Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: UÇK) to achieve freedom through violence (Hedges 1999: 29). Beginning in 1997 the KLA with arms it obtained from Albania after the financial and governmental collapse of that country began to launch attacks on the Serbian forces (Lani, 1999).

**Pseudo-Engagement**

As a result, the international community seriously begun to take interest in Kosovo, this was not out of concern for the plight of Albanians. In 1996, alarmed by the increase in the number of Albanians seeking asylum in the Western Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1996) drew attention to the systematic human rights violations.

Yet, demand for independence, whether passive or active was an idea that found no support in the international quarters. According to Richard Caplan (1998), the United States and the west European states—the chief architects of the Dayton agreement—were concerned that the establishment of an independent Kosovo would make it easier for the forces of separation to triumph over those of integration in Bosnia and that the fragile peace they had constructed there would be shattered. It was also feared that an independent Kosovo would destabilize neighboring Macedonia with a considerable Albanian minority. Finally, there was the concern, more generally, that an
independent Kosovo would serve as a precedent for the numerous self-determination movements bent on separation elsewhere in Europe.

Thus, once it became evident that the eruption of violence was inevitable, the international community concentrated on efforts to achieve a viable solution short of independence. The statement issued in September 1997 by the Contact Group – an ad hoc coalition composed of the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, previously established to bring a solution to the Bosnian crisis – meeting, which ruled out independence and objected status quo was exemplary of the balanced approach adopted by different international organizations throughout 1996 and 1997 (Weller, 1999b: 234).

The contact group statement was important in another sense. It signaled direct involvement of major powers through the Contact Group. Nevertheless, the Contact Group initially served as a forum for the accommodation of member states’ interests. While Russia considered the crisis as an opportunity to counter the US as a way of fixing its image by emphasizing pan-Slavic ties with Serbia, individual European countries of the group were concerned with their trade relations with Serbia. Italy’s attitude regarding the solution of the conflict “within the limits of diplomacy” was illustrative of the stance of the European capitals. Although the US with Britain insisted on a firmer action against Serbia, they did not show any sign of being enthusiastic about direct involvement (Bellamy 2002). These differences among the major powers severely constrained the ability of the coalition to act collectively and thereby undermined several diplomatic attempts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The most significant international initiative taken at this stage of the conflict was opening of an information office by the US administration in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo province, on June 5, 1996 (Troebst, 1998). This initiative was important in
demonstrating US support for Rugova’s peaceful strategy even if Washington disagreed with his objectives.

The intensification of the conflict and escalation of violence in the province marked a turning point in international attention. The activities of KLA with claims to liberated areas in the province and Yugoslav/Serbian repression during 1998 intensified outside involvement (Bellamy, 2002; ICC, 1998a). When the U.S. special envoy Richard Gelbhard during his visit to Pristina on February 23, 1998, called the KLA a “terrorist group,” a view echoed by the Contact Group meeting in Moscow two days later, Milosevic was given a pretext to crack down on the rebels. The use of disproportionate force by the Army of Yugoslavia and Special Police Units (MUP) in the Drenica region on February 28 and March 5 left more than 80 Albanians dead, among them many women and children.

The symptomatic character of violence, evoking the Bosnian syndrome, the refugee syndrome and Balkan wars syndrome as outlined by Bellamy (2002) urged the international community to the attend the issue seriously. This realization on the part of the international community, however, did not translate into concrete actions that would bring definitive solutions (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000). Disagreements over the right course of action between the Contact Group members, which by that time had evolved into leading international mechanism working for the resolution of the conflict, remained as wide as before.

In response to Drenica events, Albright together with her British colleague Robin Cook favored a firm approach, and insisted on immediate action. Albright insisted that “the only way to stop violence in that region is to act with firmness, unity and speed” (cited in Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000: 26).

Other Contact Group countries did not share Albright’s position. The dominant tendency among other members of the Contact Group was to rely on non-coercive measures and positive to avoid any direct involvement. For instance, while Lombardo
Dini, Italian Foreign Minister, considered that they “must make every effort to redirect the situation within the limits of diplomacy,” his German colleague insisted on a UN Security Council authorization before any action against Yugoslavia can be taken (cited in Bellamy, 2002: 73).

On the other hand, the EU members and Russia heavily relied on positive incentives to convince Milosevic to modify its position on the issue. For instance, during a visit to Belgrade, French and German Foreign Ministers, Hubert Vederine and Klaus Kinkel respectively, convinced Milosevic to allow for the opening of EU office in Pristine in return for readmission of Yugoslavia to OSCE and some easing of the economic embargo, which had been implemented during the Bosnian crisis (ICG, 1998a).

To summarize, international engagement until the end of the first half of 1998 was characterized by what can be called diplomacy of persuasion. Without showing a radical departure from the past, international initiatives were designed to persuade the Kosovar Albanian leadership, with the exclusion of the KLA from much of the process, to abandon their claim for an independent Kosovo, and Milosevic to end the violent crackdown in Kosovo and accept negotiations with the Kosovar Albanian leadership.

The United Nations Security Council’s (1998a) first resolution, 1160, on the conflict adopted on March 23, 1998 was representative of international position. The resolution was condemning Serbia and the KLA for engaging in atrocities. The authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community were called upon “urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues,” and accept “the participation of an outside representative or representatives.”

Yet no diplomatic attempt was successful enough to persuade Milosevic to retrieve from insisting that Kosovo was an internal matter of Serbia and to refuse international mediation. After all Kosovo was the place...
on which Milosevic had built his entire political career by exploiting Serbian nationalism to which Kosovo was the Promised Land. Furthermore, once the requests of international community were accepted, this would legitimize Rugova’s claims and thereby lead to another Dayton. It would be Richard Holbrook, the leading diplomat articulating the Dayton Peace Agreement, who assumed the charge to conduct diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Contact Group, to break Milosevic’s resistance. His initiatives in early May succeeded in persuading both sides to engage in talks to end the conflict. Furthermore, Holbrook managed to convince Milosevic to accept US mediation in facilitating dialogue for a political settlement. Also he managed to secure an agreement, which would form the basis of Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), and would allow diplomatic observers to travel from Belgrade to Kosovo (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000).

In securing these concessions, however, Holbrook did not solely rely on his personal skills. The US President Bill Clinton in a press conference signaled the readiness of the US to increase the pressure on Belgrade unless the Serbian administration sat on the table (Daadler and O’Hanlon 2000). In addition, the Contact Group at its London meeting on May 9 issued new economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and threatened to adopt additional ones (Weller, 1999a). Eventually, Milosevic managed to soften the hardening tone by accepting the deployment of an observation mission in Kosovo. Furthermore, he pledged to end repression against the civilian population and continue negotiations with Rugova. Yet these concessions hardly had any impact over the fight between the KLA and Serbian security forces, let alone deteriorating conditions of civilians. As the Serbian Security forces were restrained under the watchful eyes of the west, the initiative was taken by the KLA. During late June and July, KLA offensives to size and hold places in
Western Kosovo resulted in the intensification of the conflict throughout the summer. As a result of counteroffensive operations launched by Serbian security forces, not only was the KLA almost defeated but also Kosovo was nearly evacuated (Troebst, 1998). According to UN Commissioner for High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) estimates, the number of the displaced Albanians had reached to 241,700 by mid September (ICG, 1998b).

At that point, international diplomacy led by Holbrooke, now the US ambassador to the UN and Christopher Hill, the US ambassador to Macedonia, and a senior member of Holbrooke’s negotiating team at Dayton, run along two tracks (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000; Judah, 2000; Bellamy, 2002). What Holbrooke was trying to do on the ground was spearheaded on the paper through plans produced by Hill for a settlement. Unlike previous efforts, however, American diplomats had recognized that relying on Rugova alone would not be enough to resolve the conflict. Therefore, instead of labeling the KLA a terrorist group and excluding it from the process, they realized that it would be necessary to include the KLA into the process to reach a viable solution (see Weller, 1999a: 348 for the content of the draft agreement). Thus, Hill not only shuttled between Belgrade and Pristina but also between the LDK and the KLA. However, an informal understanding in late summer between Rugova and Milosevic on an interim plan that postponed the final decision on Kosovo’s political status was rejected by KLA representatives. Consequently, what diplomacy of persuasion succeeded in the end was no more than persuading the international community that it was not working.

Leading Diplomacy under the Threat of the Use of Force

The summer long Yugoslav military offensive had resulted in enormous civilian causalities and the displacement of over 230,000 Albanians from their homes. These operations turned out to be a disaster for
the Serbian administration in galvanizing the Western opinion (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000; Judah, 2000). International community had come to the conclusion that new tools of engagement were needed to push the parties for a settlement. Apart from the fear that events may get out of control and spread fighting to Albania and Macedonia, the potential humanitarian catastrophe waiting at the door with the coming winter conditions and displaced people hiding in Kosovo hills urged the US and other major actors to introduce threat of the use of force to support diplomatic activity.

On September 23, 1998, the United Nations Security Council (1998b) adapted Resolution 1199, which determined the situation as a threat to peace and security in the region. The resolution signaled a shift in international attitude. Yet the resolution at the same time once again revealed persisting division among major powers. Despite the fact that the resolution determined the crisis as a Chapter VII situation of UN Charter, no reference was made to military intervention. To satisfy Russian demands, which raised a strong protest against the threat of air strikes against Yugoslavia, any reference, which may justify the use of force was omitted from the final text of the resolution.

Threat of the use of force was not a policy approach that the international community in the context of Kosovo adopted for the first time. However, unlike earlier threats that were issued in isolation, the threats that were made in the second half the 1998 were given legal cover under the UN resolutions and institutionalized under NATO’s collective security umbrella.

Due to its impact on the stability of NATO’s southeastern flank, the alliance had developed an interest in Kosovo as early as

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6 Chapter VII Article 39 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority to determine whether a situation poses a threat to international peace and security. A Security Council resolution adopted under Article VII allows Security Council to take all necessary measures, which potentially includes the use of force, to maintain or restore peace and security.
March. In its several meetings, the Alliance had begun to discuss the possibility of threatening Serbia with air strikes to end the conflict. However, most NATO members, French, Germany and Italy, in particular, insisted that any NATO action in or over Kosovo be authorized by the UN Security Council. The Italian prime minister, for instance, even after the decision of the activation of order was taken, still insisted that “his government did not see grounds for military action which would have to be legitimized by the United Nations” (Zenko, 1998: 3).

According to Zenko (1998), American action would be necessary to compel its European allies to confront the crisis in Kosovo. The US insisted that an outside settlement on the parties was necessary for the resolution of the conflict, and argued that NATO retained the right to act independently of the UN. Yet the alliance waited for a UN resolution. After the issue was defined by the Security Council as a threat to peace and security, The Northern Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s parliamentary body, voted on September 24, 1998 for Activation Warning (ACTWARN), which allowed NATO forces a limited air operation and authorized its supreme commander to commence air strikes to press Serbia’s compliance with Resolution 1199. To support Holbrook’s efforts on the ground, NATO unilaterally issued another “activation warning” known as “October Ultimatum” for air strikes in 96 hours if Belgrade did not comply with UNSCR 1199 on October 13, 1998 (Judah, 186).

Diplomacy under guns seemed to be producing positive results when Holbrook succeeded cutting a deal with Milosevic in October (Strategic Comments 1998c). The agreement envisioned a cease fire, as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 1199, and the establishment of a Kosovo verification mission (KVM) by the OSCE to observe the compliance to the ceasefire on the ground and of an air-verification mission by NATO. The agreement was endorsed by the UN
Security Council (1998c) Resolution 1203 on October 24.

The Holbrook initiative under the mediation of the Contact Group, however, could not put an end to atrocities in Kosovo (Gow, 1998). Taking advantage of the new situation, KLA forces moved into positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces (United Nations 1998). In retaliation, the Serbian forces once again initiated a disproportionate crack down. The execution of, according to OSCE-KVM investigation, 45 unarmed ethnic Albanians by the Yugoslav forces in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, galvanized international reaction. According to Steven L. Burg (2003) the “Racak massacre provided the emotional impetus for policy makers to abandon what appears to have been a White House strategy of negotiating with Milosevic.”

Following Racak, Albright was quick to engage in diplomatic consultations “to build consensus for her idea that future diplomacy had to be backed by the threat of force” (Judah, 2000: 194). Renewed international efforts made by the Contact Group were shaped under this dictum. Albright’s plan involved using credible threats of force to coerce parties into accepting a comprehensive peace plan. The new plan would be based on blueprints developed by Hill, yet involving a robust NATO-led peacekeeping force to enforce compliance (Bellamy, 2002: 172). Therefore, in February and March 1999, the international community exerted intense diplomatic pressure accompanied by threats of military action on the FRY authorities.

On January 29 meeting, the Contact Group summoned Serbians and Kosovar Albanians to engage in proximity talks. The consensus within the Contact Group, according to Weller (1999a), echoed aggressively within the Alliance. NATO on 30 January issued a statement that enunciated the organization’s resolve and readiness to take any necessary measures to ensure compliance with international demands.
The initial reaction of FRY was to refuse a conference, which they thought would internationalize an internal matter of the Serb Republic. Russian diplomatic efforts were successful to persuade the Serbian regime (Weller 1999b). When Serbian representatives and the Kosovar Albanian delegation (including both the KLA and the LDK), met at Rambouillet, a castle near Paris on February 6, 1999 for a settlement, Contact Group members concluded that both sides would be held accountable if they failed to comply with what was offered to them at the end of 21 day negotiation period. The following day, NATO reiterated its readiness to take any measures necessary to enforce compliance with international demands. That included possible air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory and measures against the KLA to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo (See Judah, 2000).

The plan offered by the Contact Group was an “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government in Kosovo” with political and military provisions. Two weeks of intensive negotiations could produce no substantive results. Under the pressure of Albright, the Kosovar Albanian delegation agreed to sign the agreement, yet-reserving the right to consult with people of Kosovo. The response from the Serbian delegation, on the other hand, was at best equivocal and ambiguous. The delegation indicated that Serbia would be prepared to grant autonomy and it was ready to discuss the scope and character of an international presence in Kosovo to implement the agreement but not on Contact Group terms.

The draft agreement, proposed to the Serb delegation at Rambouillet, contained terms that were considered by Belgrade as open violation of the sovereignty of the FRY. The agreement required Serbia to accept a Kosovo force (KFOR) established by NATO with the authority of unrestricted passage throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters to oversee the implementation process. KFOR also retained the authority to use force if
necessary against any parties violating the agreement. The Serbian delegation simply viewed this provision as an attempt to occupy the whole Serbia (Weller, 1999b; Bellamy, 2002).

In addition, the agreement allowed for a referendum among the people of Kosovo to decide on the final settlement and status for the province three years after the agreement was in force. Thus, Milosevic did not hesitate rejecting the agreement, despite the fact that this provision was balanced by strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of the FRY (Weller, 1999b).

Giving up controls over the Kosovo region under a peaceful agreement would be political suicide for Milosevic who had built his entire political career on Serbian nationalism and its symbol, Kosovo. Thus, when the Contact Group convened a second round of talks on 15 March 1999 at the Kleber Centre in Paris, to bring negotiations to a conclusion, the FRY delegation presented their version of the agreement, which simply led to the collapse of negotiations.

**Leading a “Sub-Optima” Intervention**

When NATO launched Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999 to end Serbian violence and repression against ethnic Albanians, and to establish a political framework for an agreement on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, it did not expect the operation to last 74 days. The dominant view in the alliance was that a relatively short bombing campaign would persuade Milosevic to come back to sign the Rambouillet agreement (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). It took four weeks of air campaigns for the alliance leaders to realize that the Yugoslav leadership would not respond to negotiation proposals. As a result, at the NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, member states decided to further intensify the air campaign by expanding the target set to include military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other targets in Serbia itself (See Judah, 2000 and Bellamy, 2002).
Although in April, planning for a ground invasion began at NATO headquarters, there was, however, strong political resistance against ground deployment in several of the NATO countries, including the US itself. The reluctance over the deployment of ground troops was another vivid illustration of how intervening states viewed the crisis in terms of public goods, which they prefer to sub-optimally produce. However, a final round of negotiations completed in early June averted the need for a ground invasion.

At the G8 meeting in Cologne, Russia and the G7 countries developed a seven-point peace plan that was originally introduced by Germany in April. These principles called for an immediate and verifiable end to the repression and violence in Kosovo; the withdrawal of FRY military, police, and paramilitary forces; the deployment of effective international civil and security presences; and the return of all refugees. While the plan stated that “the people of Kosovo will enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” no timeline or mechanism for resolving Kosovo’s long-term status was included in the agreement.

On June 1, 1999, the Serbian government advised the government of Germany that it would accept the G8 principles. Later on June 3, the Serb Parliament formally approved a peace plan based on the G8 principles. The agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established the framework for UN civil administration of the province and the establishment of an international security presence.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I have analyzed the role of leadership in the success of collective coercive attempts in intrastate conflicts. Throughout the paper two themes have been strongly emphasized: the treatment of intrastate conflicts as public goods or public bads, and the need for a leader in collective international attempts for the achievement of successful outcomes in...
these conflicts. I began my analysis by drawing attention to the growing international awareness to the linkage between human rights abuses, forceful displacement of populations and regional and international security. This considerations turn intra state conflicts into public bads. However, given the poor record of international community in dealing with intrastate conflicts, I argued that in the absence of a direct threat to the interests of individual states, there is a need for a leader that is capable to provide or induce contribution for public goods associated with efforts to bring a solution to the conflict.

As illustrated in the case of Kosovo crisis, conflicts do not exist in separate from the rest of the international system. They have externalities or costs to the broader community, which must find ways to deal with such conflicts and share costs associated with efforts for their solution. As outlined above the public bad associated with the conflict was the potential threat it posed to international peace and security. Refugee flows caused by the conflict was not only upsetting stability of the neighboring states but at the same time becoming an evident problem for the European countries outside the region. Indeed, when the international community seriously begun to take interest in Kosovo, this was not necessarily out of concern for the plight of Albanians but because the increase in the number of Albanians seeking asylum in the Western Europe, alarmed Western capitals to consider the issue seriously.

The threat that Kosovo posed, however, was not limited to merely to the flow of refugees to the Western countries. It was feared that once exploded, the damage it would cause would not be limited to Kosovo. While those closest were the most to be effected from failure to prevent the diffusion of the conflict, other states were at the risk of exposure in varying degrees. Not to mention the fragile situation the conflict had created for Albania, Macedonia
and other neighboring states, for the European Union countries, for instance, the conflict was another deadly incident on its periphery in less than a decade. For NATO it implied possible splits within the organization among the member states, i.e. Turkey and Greece which were likely to become parties to the conflict.

Intervention to solve a conflict similarly has consequences with different magnitudes for different segments of the international community. The benefit can be securing the stability of a region, security of an ally or enhance legitimacy among other members of the international community. In the case of Kosovo, the articulated benefits varied. They included maintaining peace and stability in Southern Europe, strengthening the institutions that keep the peace, preserving Bosnia’s progress towards peace and strengthening democratic principles and practices in the region. Preventing the flood of refugees and the creation of safe havens for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals, preventing the spread of conflict to Albania and Macedonia and preventing the unilateral involvement of Greece and Turkey on opposite sides, and preserving NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe, and finally overcoming the sense of shame that the West had failed in the Bosnian catastrophe can be considered among other articulated interests.

Reasonably, I argued that an internal conflict becomes the subject of collective action to restore status quo when the actions of the parties to conflict create a negative externality or a cost for the group. Nevertheless, the awareness that a problem exists does not automatically imply the obligation to do something about it (Brenner, 1995). Several reasons prevent leading members of the international community to acknowledge the problem. As indicated earlier the first reaction of potential interveners is to evaluate the degree of threat posed by the conflict to some of their strategic, political and...
economic interests. For instance, the more the conflict is away from one’s border the least one will be ready to undertake the costs.

Above all obstacles, however, one should recognize the fact that interventions are risky and costly engagements. They require diplomatic, economic and military resources, which no state, including the potential leader, is likely to undertake in absence of well defined interests. Even the probability that cost sharing will occur does not guarantee that an interventive behavior will emerge. In the absence of strong interests at stake, states seek to free ride on efforts of others. Disagreements over the right course of action are likely to be deep and defections are likely to be high. In the absence of a leading state, potential interveners demonstrate a pseudo-engagement, which allows them retain their distance rather than solving the conflict. It is quite common to observe different states pursuing different strategies. Therefore, discrepancy between rhetoric and actions is the norm rather than exception. These inconsistencies naturally strain several non-coercive and coercive attempts designed to enforce a solution.

The process of international involvement in the Kosovo crisis, in this regard, is no exception. As observed in Kosovo, the initial approach of the international community in general and the Contact Group in particular demonstrated how states were less enthusiastic to undertake any commitment. Despite the fact that Kosovo was a bomb waiting to explode, the international community exhibited a strong tendency to underplay the situation. Efforts of the Contact Group, which mainly served as a forum to accommodate the interests of member states, were hampered by equivocal signals. Not all the coalition members, displayed by the attitude of Italy and Russia, had the same degree of political will to see Serbia being coerced or agree on the type of strategy to coerce.

A good indicator of how intervening states viewed the crisis in terms of public good,
which they prefer to sub-optimally produce was the discussion among NATO states over the deployment of ground troops. The lack of public support due to high costs and military casualties associated with deployment of ground troops made the intervening states back away from realizing this option. The discussion on ground troop deployment among member states demonstrated that the members of the group were not willing to provide as much of the good as it would be in their common interest to provide.

Against these setbacks, Kosovo Crisis has been a good example of illustrating how the presence or absence of leadership might affect the prospect of international engagement. I suggested that the leader not only mobilizes international organizations to take an active role in efforts for the prevention, management and resolution of such conflicts, but also induces other states to either participate into the solution finding process or contribute to costs associated with the production of collective goods.

The task of leadership as provided in the case of Kosovo by the US was not only crucial in minimizing the intra-coalition differences over the right course of action but also in shaping perceptions of the credibility attributed to non-coercive and coercive measures undertaken by the coalition. In this context, the US played a crucial role throughout the process in the identification of the problem, option identification, deliberation and decision, and finally implementation. It actively involved in mediation in facilitating dialogue for a political settlement, activating Contact Group, the UN and NATO to take a more robust approach. Indeed, American action shaped under the position of Secretary of State Madeline Albright came out to be necessary to compel Europeans to confront the crisis in Kosovo. From the early stages of international engagement Albright insisted that an outside settlement on the parties was necessary for the resolution of
the conflict. However, for the most part the US initiatives required cooperation and consent from the other members of the Contact Group. Only after taking the support of other NATO members and taking a tacit consent from Russia could the US actively led international efforts. This fits well into the assumption that leadership depends on consent from the followers.

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