THEORETICAL DEBATES ON NEW SECURITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR*

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Abstract
This study aims at analysing the key theoretical debates on new security in International Relations (IR) in the aftermath of the Cold War. Firstly, it starts examining the major theoretical approaches on the new concept of security. It provides a critical reflection on security issues premised upon the view that the wide range of the levels, referents, and dimensions not only reflects an engagement in 'a continuing process of historical change', but also it reflects a normative element of a possible transformation within the prevailing order. Secondly, it attempts to demonstrate how the traditional conception of security has dramatically changed both in its levels and dimensions of investigation after the end of the Cold War. Particularly, the redefinition of security is examined through a Critical Security Studies (CSS) perspective combined with Social Constructivism. In sum, this study examines how the concept of security has redefined within the discipline of IR in the beginning of the post-Cold War era.

Keywords: New Security, Critical Security Studies, Social Constructivism, IR Theory.

Öz
Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Uluslararası İlişkiler’de yeni güvenlik üzerine yapılan kuramsal tartışmaları incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma ilk olarak temel kuramsal yaklaşımların yeni güvenlik kavramına bakışını incelemektedir. Güvenlik meselelerine eleştirel bir çerçevede yakalan çalışma, güvenliğin genişleyen analiz düzeyleri, referans nesneleri ve boyutlarıyla birlikte, sadece ‘devam eden tarihsel bir dönüşüm’ göstermekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda mevcut düzey de dönüştürmenin mümkün olduğunu öncüleyen normatif bir yakıstanda da gerekli olduğunu kabul etmektedir. İkinci olarak çalışma, Soğuk Savaş’ın sonucu ile birlikte geleneksel güvenlik kavramının hem analiz düzeyleri, hem de araştırma boyutlarıyla çapı bir biçimde nasıl değiştğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Güvenliğin yeniden tanımlanması özellikle Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları ve Sosyal İnşacı kuramsal yaklaşımlar açısından ele alınmaktadır. Özetle bu çalışma, güvenlik kavramının

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1. INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this study is to analyse theoretical debates on new security in International Relations (IR) in the aftermath of the Cold War. The study falls into two sections. The first section focuses on examining the current theoretical approaches on the new concept of security. It provides a critical reflection on security issues premised upon the view that the wide range of the levels, referents, and dimensions not only reflects an engagement in “a continuing process of historical change” (Cox, 1981: 135), but also it reflects a normative element of a possible transformation within the prevailing order by questioning the priority of these elements as well as their particular importance for each referent. The second section aims to demonstrate how the traditional conception of security has dramatically changed both in its levels (including individual, national, international, global) and dimensions of investigation (ranging from political/military and economic to societal and environmental) after the end of the Cold War.

In sum, this study examines how the concept of security has redefined particularly through a Critical Security Studies (CSS) perspective combined with Social Constructivism in the beginning of the post-Cold War era.

2. KEY DEBATES ON NEW SECURITY

Security has always been an important issue for individuals, societies, states and the system of states. The main problématique encountered has been how to determine the meaning of security and how to acquire it. Both before and after the Cold War, IR theory has tackled the question of security and attempted to find an appropriate explanation of security within the realm of international politics. The extensive academic attempts to produce efficient definitions and theories to demonstrate the changes that have occurred in the understanding of security during the post-Cold War era have intensified the debate within the discipline. This first part of the study focuses on this post-Cold War debate on security for a better understanding of the current formulations of security in respect to these new approaches to the concept of security.

In the Cold War period, the definition of security was predominantly confined to the national security of the state. Traditional Realist and, later, Neo-realist approaches have dominated the definition of security during the Cold War. Positivism, which has been taken for granted in these dominant approaches of IR, presupposes a sharp distinction between facts and values. The predominance of the Positivist approach to the study of IR has invalidated the recognition of beliefs, values, or opinions, which are necessarily embedded in theory. Until recent times, to keep a value-free basis while theorising has been a central concern among many IR
thorists. Nevertheless, as Neufeld notes, “the rise of interpretative approaches to the study of society have challenged positivism’s hegemony, and have created a space for the full recognition of the non-reductive power of human consciousness.” (Neufeld, 1995: 93). Thus, the positivist tenet of the value-free nature of scientific knowledge has been challenged. Moreover, it has been claimed that positivism has a ‘hidden normative content’ as well. Neufeld asserts, “the nature of positivism’s hidden normative content is now manifest... [since it contains] explicit and implicit value judgements, and controversial normative and ideological claims” (Neufeld, 1995: 105) despite its value-free and objective talk.

First of all, researchers have to choose a research field and a theory. At this very stage, they “may be influenced by their personal values in the pre-scientific choice of topic.” (Neufeld, 1995: 99). Furthermore, theories, which social scientists use to explain their research topic, already have certain normative preferences embedded within. Thus, the chosen theory would determine the facts to be taken into account within the borders of its main assumptions. In the next stage, the researcher is required to make an interpretation considering both sides’ perspectives. For a comprehensive understanding of each side’s claims, the value systems of those should be considered as well. Furthermore, the researcher’s act of interpretation itself should be interpreted in the highlighting of his or her own values and beliefs. As Frost points out “International Relations scholars have to take normative positions.” (Frost, 1994: 118).

Neufeld takes recent developments such as postmodernist, feminist and overtly normative approaches as evidence of a current shift towards a non-positivist direction in the discipline. He claims that, “if International Relations theory is to remain ‘true to its moral commitment’, the restructuring process now underway must be brought to its ‘subversive and revolutionary’ conclusion.” (Neufeld, 1995: 125). Critical theory, Critical Security Studies (CSS), and Social Constructivism should also be added to these post-positivist theories.

The traditional forms of theorising about security, which has already been challenged and dismantled by Critical theory since early 1980s, have been profoundly questioned with the demise of the Cold War. This is not only due to the dramatic changes in the political realm, but also the consequent changes that it caused within the theoretical debate in IR as normative and critical perspectives have found time and space to flourish. Owing to the very fact that the presupposed equation between security and national security was no longer adequate to explain the current political reality in the post-Cold War era, new approaches have begun to develop. Since IR theory needed to adjust its conceptions and perspectives regarding the theorisation of security, IR theorists have increasingly begun to use critical perspectives. One of these has resulted in a new study approach to security called CSS (Critical Security Studies).

A number of academics agree that security is a ‘contested concept’. ¹ There are other IR theorists, who oppose this idea firmly, arguing, “security is more appropriately described as a

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confused or inadequately explicated concept than as an essentially contested one.” (Baldwin, 1997: 12). Booth criticises Buzan’s conclusion that it is not necessary to make the ‘essentially contested concept’ of security incontestable, as he asks, “if we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?” (Booth, 1991: 317). However, Booth’s critique appears to be shaky as it presupposes a universal ‘we’. As much recent Post-positivist theory points out, by taking ‘we’ for granted it is easy to assume the possibility of a universal definition of security. Rather we may have to accept that while there may be widespread consensus over some key dimensions of ‘security’, much of it remains context-specific and identity-specific. Thus, the disagreement of IR scholars over the concept of security begins right from the concept itself, whether to take it as given or to question its prior historical definitions. On this matter, Walker notes that the difficulties faced with the concept of security and its reconstruction do not necessarily derive from “its notorious imprecisions or susceptibility to propagandistic abuse … [but] from its derivation from a prior account of who or what is to be secured.” (Walker, 1995: 9). That is exactly where CSS steps in, as it challenges “the hegemonic security discourse and the prevailing practices of global (in)security by asking a series of fundamental questions.” (Jones, 1995: 309). Thus, broadening our enquiry over the concept of security is at the heart of CSS, which can be understood as a sub-field of critical international theory. It seeks answers to the following three main questions: “first, what is security? Second, who is being secured by the prevailing order, and who or what are they being secured against? Third, … [with] whose security should we be concerning ourselves, and by which agents and through which strategies should this security be attained?” (Jones, 1995: 309). By posing these questions, the CSS challenges the traditional theories and approaches to security and employs a critical standpoint. Questioning the orthodox discourse on security, CSS employs a non-statist perspective as it sees the sovereign state as a part of the problem rather than the solution. (Jones, 1995: 310).

On the other hand, the state-centric Realist paradigm assumes that national security is the primary issue of the states in a balance of power system; and that statesmen think and act in terms of maximising national interests by gaining more power, which is often defined in military terms. According to Morgenthau, for example, international politics, like all other political activity, involves the exercise of power; in his words, it is “a struggle of power [which] is always the immediate aim” (Morgenthau, 1993: 29) for the pursuit of national security. Later, Mearsheimer has argued that the current multipolar system has more potential conflicts -such as extreme nationalism and ethnic rivalries - than the Cold War system, which was a period of peace and stability brought about the bipolar structure of power (Mearsheimer, 1990: 5-56). According to Mearsheimer, due to the power imbalances deterrence is more difficult; and due to the miscalculations that are more frequent under multipolarity, war is more likely to be seen in the post-Cold War world. Hence, the structure of the international system, which is seen as anarchic in its nature from the orthodox


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standpoint, largely determines the national security objectives of states from a neorealist position.

According to Walker, the emergence of new Neorealist analysis (such as Mearsheimer’s Neorealist Stability theory) in international politics has revived the Realist debate, since “the conceptualisation of ‘change’ ... inside and outside the sovereign state, has been crucial.” (Walker, 1993: 106). Walker claims that, although change is one of the major insights of political realism, “the classic historicist realist texts ..., the overall framework ... offers little guidance for the future.” (Walker, 1993: 124). As Walker claims that states are not the only possible subjects of modern political life and that the process of rethinking security “demands a considerable degree of scepticism towards the modern principles of autonomy and sovereign subjectivity.” (Walker, 1993: 10). According to Walker, Realism is unlikely to offer any practical political guidance on how to overcome the exclusionist features of existing forms of political identity and community due to the fact that Realism is a theory insisting on the exclusiveness of the sovereign state as the pre-eminent actor in world politics whereas state sovereignty and boundaries are increasingly constraining modern political life. Like Walker, Ashley also criticises realist perceptions of interstate relations. Ashley rejects a world dominated by ‘Western Rationalism’, the main characteristic of Realism, which regards the sovereign state as unproblematic and objectifies the reality of interstate relations. According to Ashley, the ‘rituals of power politics’ and the ‘realist international political community’ have failed and lost their power and capacity to define the ongoing changes of state sovereignty and domestic political life in the post-Cold War era.²

Although Realism has received extensive amount of criticism, there are still several Realist or Neo-realist scholars arguing for Realism as being “the most promising framework” (Buzan, 1996: 47-65) to explain the political realm. In People, States and Fear, although looking from a Neo-realist standpoint, Buzan views security in broader terms, including political, economic, societal, environmental and military aspects. Nonetheless, Buzan gives a rather state-centric definition of security depicting security as “about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity.” (Buzan, 1991: 18-19). However, this definition reflects the overwhelmingly common state-centric perception of security.

In Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Waever and Buzan have defined security as being always relative in its nature and developed a new concept called ‘societal security’, which takes collectives and their identity as the ultimate criterion (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre, 1993: 23). Before co-authoring the above mentioned book, Waever, essentially a realist deploying post-modern methodology, has developed the idea of security as a ‘self-referential practice’ and a ‘speech act’, which is done by labelling certain issues as having absolute priority and urgency and by implying or speaking of them as such.

Therefore, Waever suggests that security is about survival: for whom, by who and why all depend on the “specific way of framing an issue.” (Waever, 1996: 103-132). In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan and Waever assert that the meaning of a concept lies within its usage. Since there would be no definition that suits it ‘best’, the concept of security can be defined as “a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 24). To clarify how an issue can become a concern of security, they introduce a new concept of ‘securitization’, which means “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 23-24). Thus, the securitization process is a speech act, that is, the utterance or the labelling of an issue as security. However, “the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” which is always a political choice to do so (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 25).

There is another approach to security, which takes military security seriously, but also claims that “domestic politics, beliefs, and norms must also be included as important determinants of state behaviour.” (Baylis, 2001: 263). This radical approach to collective security claims that state behaviour is not solely a result of the structure of the international system, but also ideas and norms are important. Thus, Groom defines ‘collective security’ as a basic set of shared values among states in which the security will be defined with reference to these values and carried out by an institution capable of making peaceful changes in order to handle any difficulties (Groom, 1990: 77). Depending upon a positive commitment to the value of world peace, collective security imposes a related normative requirement: “loyalty to the world community.” (Claude, 1964: 230). Thus, collective security requires a fundamental flexibility of foreign policy and a willingness of nations to fight for a system of peaceful change. According to Claude, “collective security recognizes no traditional friendships and no inveterate enmities, and permits no alliances with or alliances against.” (Claude, 1964: 233). Attempts to establish a collective security system, like the League of Nations, have failed in the past. However, supporters of the collective security approach claim that there is still an opportunity to establish a collective security system in the post-Cold War world as it provides some essential foundations and greater opportunities for states to share similar values and interests (Baylis, 2001: 263-265).

The notion that ideas, norms and values have profound effects on world politics is also shared by constructivists. One of the main assumptions of social constructivism is that the structures of international politics are socially constructed and as Wendt puts it, “the structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas.” (Wendt, 1999: 139). The other assumption of constructivism is that the change in these social structures depends on actors’ redefinition of their identities and interests and that structural change can help to bring about greater security. Since the structures of individual states and the structure of the international system are the products of social relationships, security threats are also socially constructed. Criticising the presumption of realists and neorealists that the international system is by definition a “self-help” system, Wendt argues that “self-help
and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. *Anarchy is what states make of it.*” (Wendt, 1992: 395). Wendt defines institutions as stable structures of identities and interests, and it is through a process of interaction that the social structures, which define these identities and interests, are being created. Wendt asserts that the interstate practices determine whether a system becomes a “self-help” one or another in which states interact. By changing these practices of interstate relations, it is possible to “change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.” (Wendt, 1992: 407). Since identity and interest-building are ongoing processes, in other words, agents and structures are ongoing ‘accomplishments of practice’; relatively stable social practices can bring about transformations in the ‘agents’ and ‘structures’ of international system (Wendt, 1999: 313).

On the subject of structural transformation, Wendt asserts that state identity and interests can be transformed into transnational forms of political identity through an ‘evolution of cooperation’, which also leads to the transformation of the system itself (Wendt, 1992: 418-422). He explains the transformation of a competitive security system into a co-operative one as a four staged process: the first stage is the breakdown of consensus on identity commitments, which are the state’s own ideas about itself. The second stage constitutes a critical examination of old conceptions about self, other and the structures of interaction. This second stage of transformation is highly reflexive; it requires a critical self-reflection, which breaks the vicious circle of taken granted ideas and identities about self and other; thus, opening the way to formulate new ‘possible selves’. The third stage corresponds to constitute a new practice, which requires identity and interest changes and reformations not only within self but also within other. In the fourth stage, states should attempt to show others that they can trust each other and that their practices do not create insecurity for others. This should be done through several ‘transformative practices’ such as unilateral initiatives and self-binding commitments. By repeating these new positive practices, “this will institutionalize a positive rather than a negative identification between the security of self and other and will thereby provide a firm intersubjective basis for what were initially tentative commitments to new identities and interests.” (Wendt, 1992: 422). Wendt gives the case of the Soviet Union as an example of this transformation from a competitive to a more co-operative interaction and of a state’s capacity for critical self-reflection (Wendt, 1992: 422 & (Wendt, 1999: 375). Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ brought about a reassessment of the Soviet Union’s role identity against the US. The change of the Soviets’ ideas about themselves and about the Cold War, which led to a radical political change, was “a result of having looked at their existing desires and beliefs self-critically.” (Wendt, 1999: 129). Consequently, the redefinition of ideas and interests has changed reality.

3. REDEFINITION OF SECURITY: ACTORS, LEVELS, AND DIMENSIONS

Having overviewed the recent debates on new security thinking, this section turns to examine the redefinition of security in terms of actors, levels and dimensions, which have increased in their numbers and deepened in their scope within this new understanding of security in the post-Cold War era. How the concept of security is defined within the new security agenda? What are these different dimensions, agents, and aims of security? While trying to answer these questions, the section will provide an overview of the expanded or deepened
definitions/redefinitions of security whilst showing the differences and similarities they bring to CSS.

According to Krause and Williams’ analysis, there are three levels to the current debate over the new definition of security. One of them is simply broadening the neorealist concept of security “to include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration.” (Krause and Williams, 1996: 230). The second one is deepening the security agenda by engaging in different levels of security such as individual, international or global levels as well as regional and societal security. The last level of the debate remains a rather state-centric approach whilst widening its scope to include some diverse terms of security (such as common, co-operative, comprehensive, collective) and arguing for different types of interstate co-operation in security issues (Krause and Williams, 1996: 229-254).

From a neo-realist perspective Buzan has put forward a multidimensional definition of security as “the interplay between threats and vulnerabilities, and the attempts by a variety of actors to position themselves in this interplay to their best advantage given the circumstances in which they find themselves. In this sense, the logic of security is found in socio-political, economic and environmental relations, as well as in military ones.” (Buzan, 1996: 261). Although this definition of security appears to recognise a multiplicity of actors, it does not necessarily emphasise that they are all primary to the concept of security. On the contrary, throughout their studies Buzan and Waever offer a definition of security, which rather favours the state’s position among the other referents (Buzan, 1991: 22). Although they accept the existence of other actors, they engage in a discourse that views state as the privileged or the central actor in this competing area of security. Nevertheless, they claim that they have “a wider conceptual net within which the state-centric position is a possible but not a predetermined outcome”, (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 37), and that this is due to the very fact that they operate in a “state-dominated field.” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 37).

Among other scholars who favour a state-centric definition of security, Ayoob’s work can be given as a strong example. Ayoob argues that a state-centric approach to security is necessary whilst examining the Third World security as he sees the state possesses an overriding importance in the political realm and that it is the main provider of security. However, he only admits the importance of the other referents of security as long as they “threaten to have political outcomes – as they may in certain instances – that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or dramatically weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of politics, both domestic and international.” (Ayoob, 1997: 130). Such arguments over redefining security, which focus on the exclusiveness of the state in the political realm, generate a multidimensional definition of security as long as it operates around the state. For example, Ullman sees “national security as an attempt to protect against events that threaten to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state: … [like] basic needs, environmental deterioration and natural disasters.” (Tickner, 1995: 182).
Viewed from a CSS perspective, a multidimensional definition of security is not enough to assert that the concept has been defined adequately, but it also requires a multileveled definition in order to balance the expansionist and deepening aspects of security. Thus, individuals, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, etc. should also be studied as the referent objects of security. There are several scholars who emphasise a specific referent over others. For instance, Booth focuses on individuals as the ‘ultimate referent’ of security. He claims “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.” (Booth, 1991: 319). Therefore, security does not only mean the absence of threats but also the emancipation, which can be defined, according to Booth, as freeing people either as individuals or groups “from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do.” (Booth, 1991: 319). Therefore, in Booth’s formulation, real security can be established through emancipation (Booth, 1991: 326). But if the goals or desires of different groups of individuals clash or are incompatible, there is the possibility that the co-existence of these different groups of people would end up in a more insecure world than before. As regards how to gain emancipation, he suggests that it may be initialised by researching and teaching in that purpose, and by giving support to several civil society organisations. However, he does not convince us as how we might agree on the meaning of emancipation and thus fails to provide a consensual definition, since he views the concept of emancipation rather from a Western point of view. In a later study on security, Booth clarifies this ambiguity by admitting “it is simply not possible to say what emancipation looks like, apart from its meaning to particular people at particular times.” (Booth, 1997: 110). Thus, he labels emancipation as “a worldwide though not universal cultural norm.” (Booth, 1997: 110).

In general, security can be defined as the required values and capabilities by the referent object to achieve and protect its main purpose of existence. These purposes may range from the very basic physical and individual survival to the very complex ones like identity and sovereignty. The required degree of security differs from one referent to the other changing relatively in time. These different degrees of security should be acquired in a balanced way in order to achieve an overall condition of being secured at an optimum level. However, actors usually need more security in some dimensions than the others depending on their present circumstances and interests. This does not imply that a referent would have to provide the same degree of security for each dimension, but it rather emphasises that the kind and the degree of security needs would change in respect to the interactions of these dimensions. That is to say, an overall state of being secure for a referent may be achieved through a balanced coverage of the multidimensional security necessities.

For instance, an individual cannot feel secure and fulfil the requirements of an intellectual engagement without providing a physically and psychologically secure environment for himself. When physical security is gained at a certain degree, an individual seeks other kinds of security for freeing himself from human constraints like threat of war, war, poverty, poor education, and political oppression (Booth, 1991: 319). The emancipation process of individuals requires a holistic approach to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ affairs and ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ politics (Booth, 1991: 322). Nevertheless, there is no consensus on either the very
definition of being emancipated from physical and human constraints, or by which methods emancipation might be gained. As for states, economic, societal and environmental security issues have been added to the previously core political/military security as they have become so influential and challenging for states in post-Cold War politics. All these different dimensions of security need to be balanced carefully as they have certain levels of interdependency of each other in today’s global world.

According to Baldwin, there have been more efforts to redefine “the policy agendas of nation-states [rather] than … the concept of security itself,” (Baldwin, 1997: 5) in the post-Cold War period and that this “has added little to our understanding of the concept of security.” (Baldwin, 1997: 23). In his analysis of the concept, Baldwin suggests that security can be primarily defined in two terms: ‘Security for whom?’ and ‘Security for which values?’. Among other important specifications for security he includes the degree of security, the kinds of threats, the variety of means, the likely costs and the time period. In order to give a definition of security, these specifications should be spelled out. Baldwin argues that there has not been done much new towards the explication of the concept of security in this ‘new thinking of security’ and the “careless use and abuse of the concept may have already rendered [or if it have not yet, it may so] it useless for everyone.” (Baldwin, 1997: 26)

Therefore, the definition of security can be given in different ways depending on the actor and its emphasis of the referent objects, dimensions, purposes and values.

It was noted earlier that while redefining security several scholars favoured a state-centric perspective or they focused on the state as they view themselves as operating in a state-dominated field. This has resulted in some concerns among scholars of CSS for developing a non-statist definition of security. As Tickner states, this change of vision at academic level should also be accompanied at personal and global levels since the “hierarchical boundaries between women and men, rich and poor, insiders and outsiders … have contributed to an exclusionary divisive definition of security.” (Tickner, 1995: 194). She claims that the realisation of a genuine and humanist vision of security that is “a type of security that is not achieved at the expense of the security of others … requires a willingness to move beyond the exclusionary boundaries and identities within which our traditional understanding of security has been framed.” (Tickner, 1995: 195). On the one hand, it has been argued that in order to take the new security agenda seriously, scholars “need to move away from state-centric analyses.” (Bilgin, 1998: 23). It is argued that this is due to the fact that simply broadening the scope of the concept does not justify new thinking about security as it has to be something more radical in terms of understanding what constitutes the whole and how it should be changed in order to achieve a transformation. As noted by Booth, “Security is what we make it. It is an epiphenomenon intersubjectively created. Different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security.” (Booth, 1997: 106). Since scholars, who hold specific opinions on historical, political and social matters, are creating theories about practices, they make a huge contribute to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is why they “could and (should) function as an agent for security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications and the constitutive role of his/her own theorising.” (Bilgin, 1998: 23).
On the other hand, other scholars like Waever and Buzan claim that the meanings of individual and international or global security are too unclear to engage discussions about security and that it is not possible to explain interstate relations and security via this individualised notion of security (Waever, 1996: 104-106). Therefore, the state remains the main focus for the discussion of security issues, although this does not mean that there may be other actors within the security agenda, but it merely means that these actors and their acts do make sense within the current dominant system of interstate practice.

In his analysis of ‘the subject of security’ Walker points out that there are demands for a broader understanding of the concept of security given that military survival is not enough on its own, and that the definition of security should also involve social, cultural, economic, ecological and geopolitical threats from external powers (Walker, 1995: 5). These demands clearly point to the question of ‘whose security is at stake’? In response to this question, Walker claims that “the crucial subject of security, in short, is the subject of security” (Walker, 1995: 9) and that in the contemporary understanding, this subject of security is overwhelmingly referred to as the state. The reason for the state’s domination over the definition of security is not because “conflict between states is inevitable, but because other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable.” (Walker, 1995: 14). Disagreeing with this claim, Linklater points out that the recent literature focusing on the developments of the future of sovereign state and its relations with its citizens examine the transformations of political community and the creation of other forms of community (Linklater, 1996: 288 & Linklater, 1998). However, Walker criticises Linklater’s analysis that posing the problem as a dualism of universality and particularity, and attempting to solve it through the ‘cosmopolitanism’ is profoundly misleading (Linklater, 1999: 151-156). Walker points out that already being a constitutive principle of the system of sovereign states, cosmopolitanism cannot provide the required critique of the state system. Moreover, Walker argues that “if state sovereignty is under challenge, then not only do we have to think long and hard about the possibility of new ways of thinking about universality and difference but also about space and time and self and other.” (Walker, 1999: 155). Hence, Walker suggests that Linklater remains within an orthodox ontology.

According to Wendt, practice is the main tool for constructivists to solve this agent-process-structure problem, since “regular practices produce mutually constituting sovereign identities (agents) and their associated institutional norms (structures).” (Wendt, 1992: 413). He draws attention to the role of practice in reinforcing ideas about structures. As far as the state-centric agenda of IR theory is concerned, Wendt claims that sovereign states will remain politically dominant in the near future and any transition to new structures will be mediated by them (Wendt, 1992: 424). Therefore, Wendt claims that “it makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric”.” (Wendt, 1999: 9). Nevertheless, Wendt accepts that the significance of state is declining or, one might say, that the role of the state and the principle of sovereignty are changing and the other agents rather than state merit more research. He emphasises that state-centric IR theory “can generate insights that might help move the international system
from the law of jungle toward the rule of law.” (Wendt, 1999: 10). In that sense, he suggests that rather than eschew state-centric theorising, critical IR theorists should see that “the state-centred IR theory can only be one element of a larger progressive agenda in world politics.” (Wendt, 1999: 10).

The need for redefining security in the aftermath of the Cold War is due to several dramatic changes of the world’s geopolitical map as well as its profound political/social/economic effects on the international system. Most IR scholars seem to agree with the idea of adjusting the theory to these radical changes in the political realm; nonetheless, their degree of commitment and their incentives for engagement in broadening and deepening the definition of security strongly differ. Not only their approaches differ whilst examining or choosing not to examine different levels, actors and dimensions of security, but also their departing points for such a desire to revise the understanding of security determine the outcome of their theorising. Thus, a realist or neorealist desire to explain international politics within a given structure of anarchical society and a self-help system would result in an emphasis on rational and power-based interactions and a state-centric and state dominant picture of the world politics.

Equally, a critical or CSS theorist’s desire “to contribute to the development of a self-consciously critical perspective within security studies” (Krause and Williams, 1997: vii) and thus, to challenge IR orthodoxy would result in constitutive theorising with a self-reflective view of the existing structures, orders, definitions, etc., with the objective of looking at their construction and exploring how to change or reconstruct them in a better way. Therefore, the redefinition of security from a traditional or a critical standpoint would provide distinctive reflections of what is considered to be important and possible to change while examining security. For states to achieve reflexivity in order to transform the system, “the knowledge produced by reflexive or critical theory is generally more useful for changing the world than working within it.” (Wendt, 1999: 377-378). The desire to reflect upon and to transform the state system or to choose to view it as given and to content with it are both choices of different worldviews carried over to theorising. Yet, the choices of theories like choices of practices contribute to determine what we have and what we will have as a system.

4. CONCLUSION

The concept of security has gone through a vital and intensive theoretical debate in the aftermath of the Cold War. How the concept of security is redefined through widening and deepening of levels, dimensions, agents, and aims of security has been examined in this study. Accordingly, the redefinition of security in the post-Cold War era was analysed through two major theoretical approaches, namely, Critical Security Studies (CSS) approach and Social Constructivism. Adopting an orthodox (i.e. realist) approach did not provide sufficient conceptual framework for the analysis of dramatic changes in world politics combined with globalizing issues in the post-Cold War world. Thus, the CSS perspective and the Social Constructivist approach have provided new theoretical insights for analysing the economic, social, cultural and identity-related aspects of security issues.
The redefinition/reconstruction of security and identity are actually becoming more like two sides of the same coin in the post-Cold War era: with the collapse of the USSR there are no immediate ‘other(s)’ to act as reference points. This loss of a definitive other has impact on security perceptions of international actors. As Lipschutz puts it, to define security “is meaningless without an “other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity.” (Lipschutz, 1995: 9) Thus, defining the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ points out the insecurities. Yet, the definition of identity and the definition/construction of one’s security are continuous social and political processes of practices and perceptions. It may be inferred that ‘other’ or ‘security’ are not defined according to an objective reality of what they are, but rather as a result of how they are perceived intersubjectively. Hence, this intertwined characteristics of security and identity requires further theoretical and empirical investigation.

REFERENCES


