

Multiculturalism as a Defensible Ideal

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Abstract

Multiculturalism has been a controversial issue for years. Numerous scholars have discussed on it, examined societies with different cultural communities, and come up with two main different arguments. One of such arguments alleges that the idea of multiculturalism is a threat for countries, especially the countries that follow liberal aspect, thus it is not desirable. The other argument alleges that multicultural accommodation has merits to establish harmony especially for countries with different communities, separated cultures so on. In this paper, we aim to discuss briefly the idea of multiculturalism. After clarifying what multicultural accommodation is, we invoke Kymlicka's, one of the dominant multiculturalism theorists and advocates, thoughts, and then we appeal the arguments against them. While doing this, Brian Barry's, a political philosopher who was one of the solid opponents of multiculturalism, is our main objector. We focus mainly on the egalitarian critics of multiculturalism on the one hand; and try to reveal some problems for cultural rights on the other. The cases, also the problems, in the paper is taken from western countries but they all have merit to understand all multicultural conflicts and their remedies. Therefore, what we hope is to give possible perspectives for Turkey that has begun to face the difficulties of multiculturalism because of millions of refugees.

Keywords: Multiculturalism, multicultural accommodation, cultural rights, differentiated rights

Savunulabilir Bir Gaye Olarak Çokkültürlülük

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Öz

Çokkültürlülük yıllardır tartışmalı bir konu. Birçok bilim adamı çokkültürlülük üzerine fikir yürüttü, değişik kültürel topluluklarca meydana gelen toplumları inceledi ve temelde iki farklı argüman öne sürdüler.. Bu argümanlardan birisi, çok kültürlülük fikrinin, özellikle de liberal yönü takip eden ülkeler için bir tehdit olduğunu iddia etmekte. Diğer argüman, çokkültürlülüğün özellikle farklı kültürel topluluklara sahip ülkeler için uyumun sağlanmasında önemli bir faktör olduğunu öne sürüyor. Bu çalışmada kısaca çokkültürlülük fikrini tartışmayı amaçlıyoruz. Çokkültürlü barınmanın ne olduğunu açıkladıktan sonra, baskın çokkültürlülük teorisyenlerinden ve savunucularından Kymlicka'nın teorisinden yola çıkıyor ve bu teoriye karşı çıkışları gündeme getiriyoruz. Bunu yaparken, çok kültürlülüğün sağlam muhaliflerinden biri olan siyasi filozof Brian Barry'nin ana itirazımız olarak Kymlicka'nın karşısında duracak. Bu çalışmada esas olarak bir yandan çokkültürlülük hakkındaki eşitlikçi eleştirilere odaklanırken diğer yandan kültürel haklar açısından bazı problemleri açığa çıkarmaya çalışık. Makaledeki durum ve sorunlar batı ülkelerinden alındı yine de bahsi geçen bu durum ve sorunlar, çok kültürlü çatışmaları ve çözüm yollarını anlama açısından yararlılar. Dolayısıyla yukarıda sayılan motiflere ek olarak bu çalışmada güdülen asıl amaç, milyonlarca sığınmacı nedeniyle çok kültürlülüğün zorluklarıyla yüzleşmeye başlayan Türkiye için olası bakış açılarını vermektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Çokkültürlülük, çokkültürlü barınma, kültürel haklar, farklılaşmış haklar

Introduction

Imagine two persons (person 'a' and person 'b') living in the same country and suppose that "a" is a member of the dominant culture/society in country "A" and person "b" belongs to the minority culture/group. At this point, it does not matter if person "b" migrated that country from say country "B", was born in that country from migrant mother or an indigenous person of that country. The only important thing about person "b" is that she does not belong to the majority culture/society in country "A". She might choose to shape her public life like person "a". Nevertheless, this would be insufficient for us and in this case, we would not need to think of multicultural accommodation. Just make the things proper for our discussion about multiculturalism let's imagine person "b" does not want to live like person "a" in the society. For person "b", the public life that person "a" lives, the law that person "a" follows do not fit her. Therefore, she wants/demands to live different public life, which would fit her culture, different law that would fit her religion. Does she have right for her demands? This is the main and basic question about multiculturalism. This essay's purpose is exactly to seek answers for this question. Whether she has the right or not? If she does, how could her demands be made actual? If she does not, what are the reasons behind this?

The paper is divided into two main sections. In the first section, it is presumed that the person has right to demand another public life/bouquet of law which suits her. In this part, we try to understand what multiculturalism is, what it stands for and how it could be achieved. In the second section, it is presumed that she has no right to demand another public life/bouquet of law that suits her. The presumption's main claim is that the life that suits person "a" must also suit person "b" since she lives among people like person "a" otherwise it would be unfair and unequal. In this part, three cases, which are of demands of differentiated laws or exemptions, are also discussed. Hereby we will be able to discuss or answer the main question of the paper. In other words, we can discuss both the limits and merits of multicultural accommodation. Before skipping the next part, it must be said that evaluating the notion of multiculturalism is not an easy task and all evaluation attempts provoke/produce new questions.

Multicultural Thought

Many states are hosting different cultures, religions within their borders. In a country there may be people who belong to minority nations (Catalans, Kurds, Arabs), follow different religious rules (Orthodox or Catholic in Middle East, Muslims in western countries), part of indigenous community (aborigines in Australia, Native Americans in North America). These differentiated people may demand different things than the people who belong to dominant cultures; or the laws and rules in a specific country may be designed for the dominant culture. Thus the minority alleges that the laws, rules, regulations do not fit their *modus vivendi*. The problems of this diversity may be dealt with two basic ways. One of such ways refers to uniformity. This suggests that even if there are different demands, lifestyles, different religions/languages there must not be different laws/rules but “one law for all” (Barry, 1997, pp. 4). The second suggests that the diversity and the people’s demands must be recognized and respected and the rules must be tailored for those people. Multiculturalism is a thought that advocates the second (Kelly, 2002, 5; Modood, 2013, pp. 2; Levrau & Loobuyck, 2013, pp. 102; Watson, 2000, pp. 2).

How Did We Reach the Idea?

Some ideologies, that gained more power especially after the French Revolution, have caused a new form of states: nation-based states. According to the new form, the dominant nation in a specific country was seen as the owners of the country (there were some minorities that pretended and was seen as owners in some colonized countries but we have to keep it in our minds that it was a cause of colonization). For instance, the language that was used in a country had to be the language that the dominant national group used; the history/myths had to praise the dominant groups not the minorities. If one had belonged to the dominant nation, she would not have been a subject of exclusion or assimilation. If the person had not belonged to the majority, the majority would have assimilated or excluded her (Kymlicka, 2007, pp. 61, 62). Nation-states were a trend. The trend, especially in Europe, broke empires into pieces of relatively small nation-based states.

Almost all nation-based states had followed this pattern, even if they hosted more than one nationality. However, it was inevitable that these kinds of policies would have caused contestations arising from minorities so they have contested and demanded more multicultural state. These contestations might be seen as first steps to a multicultural idea. Yet, what should be the principles of this kind of state? How does it look like?

A Multicultural State and Its Obligations

According to Kymlicka (2007, pp. 65-66) a multicultural state has three such general principles:

1. A multicultural state must reject the idea that sees dominant groups as the owners of states; instead, all citizens must possess the state equally.
2. A multicultural state must reject assimilationist policies and exclusions; instead, all citizens must be seen as equal and full citizens in political life without denying or hiding their own ethnic or cultural identities.
3. A multicultural state must acknowledge that there was injustice for minority groups before itself, so it must offer remedies to such groups.

These principles could create a country that is fairer and more equal for minorities. However, minorities are also different from each other. Kymlicka (2007, pp. 66-74) defines three kinds of such minority groups (*indigenous people, substate/minority nationalisms and immigrant groups*) and suggests some specific policies to create more multicultural form of state. The policies that he suggests are different for each kind of minority groups as they are different from each other.

First, for *indigenous peoples* there are 9 policies that a multicultural state must implement (2007, pp. 67): Their (1) land rights, (2) self- government rights, (3) cultural rights, (4) customary laws must be recognized; (5) new treaties and/or historic ones must be signed and upheld; (6) their representation in central government must be guaranteed; (7) their distinct sta-

tus must be affirmed constitutionally or legislatively; (8) international instruments on their rights must be supported; (9) the members of these communities must be given affirmative action.

Second, there are 6 policies for *substate/minority nations* (2007, pp. 71): (1) they must be given territorial autonomy, (2) the language that they use must be given an official character, (3) their representation in central government must be guaranteed –as indigenous people-, (4) their language universities/colleges must be funded, (5) “multinationalism” must be affirmed constitutionally (6) they must be given international personalities.

Third, for *immigrant groups* there are 8 policies (2007, pp. 73-74): (1) multiculturalism must be affirmed constitutionally/legislatively, (2) multiculturalism must be adopted in school curriculum, (3) ethnic representation or sensitivity must not be ignored by public media, (4) Some legislations like dressing or Sunday-closing must be made proper for them, (5) they must be allowed for dual citizenship (6) their ethnic organizations or cultural activities must be supported (7) bilingual education must be rendered to them (8) disadvantaged immigrant groups must be given affirmative action.

Decisively, implementing these policies is a troublesome task. One state may have just one kind of majority, two different kinds, or even the third kinds together. As Kymlicka points out (2007, pp. 70) even states that respect multicultural accommodation have trouble advancing in all tracks. For instance, Switzerland has advanced for accommodation of national minorities but it also treats migrants exclusionary (Kymlicka, 2007, pp. 74). Alternatively, Sweden, in which year 2006 was declared as the year of multiculturalism (Tawat, 2014, pp. 205), does not fulfil the demands of indigenous Sami people (Kymlicka, 2007, pp. 68). It is also true that even if all three-minority groups have challenged against to dominant group to get their rights, it does not imply that all the three groups support each other’s challenges (2007 Kymlicka, pp. 79). Besides, all of the twenty-three policies are disputable, if not problematic. We will discuss some of them in the next section, but before moving the next section, we would like to mention briefly recognition and distribution.

The concept of ‘Politics of Recognition’ is used as if it is synonymous with multiculturalism. There is no doubt that recognition is fundamental for multiculturalism (Modood, 2013, pp. 52). Nevertheless, it may not be

true to degrade multiculturalism to recognition as Barry (2001, pp. 5) does. Multiculturalism also implies redistribution (Levrau & Loobuyck, 2013, pp. 102). Indeed, the two notions are interrelated (Tuly, 2002, pp. 111). However, redistribution follows recognition. For redistributing of power and resources, firstly, dominant nation must recognize minorities. Moreover, power and resources does not necessarily mean economic power/resources. In countries like Spain, Malaysia or Indonesia national minorities (Catalans and Chinese) do not suffer from lack of economic resources or economic powers. Yet they have obstacles related with culture and representation (Kymlicka, 2014, pp. 85).

The Critics Of Multiculturalism And Their Critics

On Equality in a Society

Theorists of multiculturalism claim that it is unfair if there are none special arrangements for different cultural practices and religious beliefs. Since same law for everybody might not have the same impact on different people; in order to treat all citizens equally, the best way is differentiated treatment (Malik, 2012, pp. 34; Banting & Kymlicka, 2013, 592; Parekh, 2007, pp. 410; Levrau & Loobuyck, pp. 102). Opponents of multicultural accommodation agree that any general law affects different people differently. Even if they cause problems, heretofore they have caused not many problems but few (Barry, 2001, pp. 21). But there is nothing unfair about it, if they create equal opportunities. Barry (2001, pp. 32) gives us his reasons:

“From an egalitarian liberal standpoint, what matters is that equal opportunities. If uniform rules create identical choice sets, then opportunities are equal. We may expect that people will make different choices from these identical choice sets, depending on their preferences for outcomes and their beliefs about the relation of actions to the satisfaction of their preferences. Some of these preferences and beliefs will be derived from aspects of a culture shared with others; some will be idiosyncratic. But this has no significance: either way it is irrelevant to any claims based on justice, since justice is guaranteed by equal opportunities.”

In other words, liberal premise on fairness is hooked with distribution of opportunities, resources and rights. On these, subjects do not matter. If

one has as an equal claim on say society's resources as the other one, then it does not matter if one of them gets more satisfaction from the resources than the other (Barry, 1997, pp. 5).

Barry (2001, pp. 34), then, discusses two situations: One is about possible rapists and the rapists' subjects. The other one is about potential paedophiles and the paedophiles' subjects. After he says that the general law affects all the sides differently though it is pointless to claim that the general law, that protecting the subjects against the would-be paedophiles and the rapists, are unfair.

On Religion and Culture

Multicultural accommodations, as it is mentioned above, imply equal and fair accommodation of different cultures and religions in a state. A society would be a fair society for all subordinate groups, if different cultures and religions are equally recognized, equally respected in the society. On religion, what the defenders of multicultural accommodation claims that in every countries people who believe different religions must be fairly and equally treated in private sphere as well as in public sphere. Multicultural aspects would be remedies for religious conflicts that we have encountered a lot. Yet, are these remedies fair and/just, compatible with the ideas of liberalism?

Culture also occupies an extensive ground for multiculturalism. The advocates of multiculturalism presume and claim that minorities have cultural rights and their cultures must be preserved. There are also counter arguments for their assumptions/claims. Such arguments allege that there are no cultural rights but individuals do have rights (Kukathas, pp. 1992). It is artificial to insist on preserving minority cultures as they live, grow, encounter with other cultures and change (Waldron, 1992, 787-788; Kukathas, 1992, pp. 123; Nathan, 2010, pp. 137). Someone might use culture as an opportunistic defence and there will always be difficulties to understand the matter that someone does whether because of culture or not (Philips, 2007, pp. 80), and multiculturalist policies or multiculturalist view exaggerates the role of culture over people (Philips 2007, pp. 64), and recognizing all cultures equally is indeed logically impossible (Joppke, 2004, pp. 242).

Being a law-abiding citizen might be hard when a citizen finds the law against her religious beliefs and cultural practices. Here we would like to take some cases, related with religion, if not culture, argued in terms of multiculturalism. Our aim here is that to present the opponents', the proponent's' and our own ideas on the cases. We have chosen three such cases, which we think, would be suitable enough for our discussion

Halal or Kosher Butchering: The first case is about halal or kosher butchering. As it is known, slaughtering animals before stunning them is banned in some states (Levine, 2011, pp. 209) or there are efforts for banning (Havinga, 2010, pp. 227). It is such an issue that defenders of multiculturalism highly opposed as some people cannot eat meat products that are not proper for their religions. The proponents of multiculturalism allege that people, who want to eat halal meat products, should be given this opportunity. If there is a law that prohibits kosher or halal butchering, it should be annihilated because it is not fair for people who cannot eat meat that is not proper in their religion. For the proponents the law that prohibits halal or kosher butchering, even if at the first glance they look equal as it is for everybody in that society or state, is not fair, but discriminatory.

However, the opponents contemplate differently. For instance, as Barry remarks (1997, pp. 5) people who cannot eat the meat products because of their religious sensibilities, do not have to eat meat, since eating meats is a religious duty for no religion. Therefore, the law is not discriminatory. The laws regulating animal slaughtering may have some merits. Killing an animal when it is conscious may be seen brutally and in-humane for many people (Zivotofski 2011, pp. 761) and it may be mandated (in fact, has been mandated in many countries) stunning the animals before killing them. So it is also suggested that in-humane sides of religions or cultures need reforms (Casal, 2003, pp. 21). What Barry (2001, pp. 35) suggests means that there are two options for people who cannot eat non-halal meat. First, they could change their attitudes on eating only halal products; second, they could choose eating no meat at all. In other words, if one is not able to eat animals, that are stunned before being killed, for religious or cultural obligations could not demand any exemptions on the prohibition. However, one (a vegan and/or an animal rights defender) could allege that, killing animals are in-humane at all no matter what the

way that they are killed. Let us imagine that an animal right defender and/or a vegan was able to change the law and banned animal slaughtering completely. You may wonder whether Barry, if he was alive, would suggest that ‘since no religion or culture force people to eat meat, we do not need to eat meat.’

As it is impossible to ask animals’ consent, animal slaughtering must be banned, if we think of animal rights. However, if it is not the subject then the people who demand eating halal or kosher meats must be given the exemption in a state where there are regulations about animal slaughtering. On the contrary, of Barry’s ideas, this would be a fair and an equal way. Saying “if you cannot eat do not eat” is an arrogant way as it does not threaten any other people in the society and it does not challenge the tenants of liberalism. Like he said (1997, 4) “Everybody can do as they like, it is suggested but only if what they like is compatible with the tenets of liberalism”

Kirpans: Weapons or Symbols: The second case is of wearing *kirpans*. As it is known, Sikhs wear kirpans because kirpans are a part of their religion (Juss, 2012, 790). On this issue, advocates of multicultural accommodation demand exemptions of carrying kirpans because state and society must respect people’s religious beliefs and Sikhs see them not as knives, but as symbolic items like the Cross for Christians or maybe as an amulet in Islam. Yet again Barry (2001, 38) has a different point of view. For him, logic of the law that prohibits carrying knives in public space is to defend citizens without arms. Like the rapist example, the law protects some (unarmed citizens or would-be subjects or rape) while prevent others (armed citizens or rapist). Therefore, there is nothing unfair, unjust or immoral about the law, even if they ban some people carrying “weapons”. Maybe, for Sikhs kirpans are a symbol but for any other individual it might not be. The other individual may see it as a weapon that gains an advantage to bearer over the others.

As Jeremy Waldron (2002, 7) points out “the Sikh’s religious obligation is an obligation to present himself in public as a combination of a saint and a warrior.” We must admit that as a warrior’s item a kirpan is a dangerous item, even if it is assumed that they are used for ceremonies or as symbolic items, especially in some cases like in a psychiatric clinic it would be more dangerous (Singh, 2004, 94). So if we seek inequality in rules or laws, on

the contrary of the first case, the exemption that gives right to wear “weapons” to Sikhs is unequal for people who cannot get this exemption. There are forms (small and not so sharp) of Kirpan that is not as dangerous as the other forms. Insisting on wearing the most dangerous ones is another unacceptable matter. Besides, if it is seen just as a symbol we should not think a kirpan without its sheath. A kirpan, which is conjoint to its sheath in other words that cannot move off from its sheath, would not be illegal and dangerous for other people and its symbolic role would be fulfilled.

Sikhs Turban: The third case is about wearing Sikhs Turban. Sikhs wear turban as a part of their religion (Walton-Roberts, 2013, 319). If a kirpan represents the warrior part, turban represents the saint part of a Sikh. It is also a symbol of male honour (Kalra, 2006, 82). However, it disallows to its wearers from wearing some other things like caps, or crash helmets owing to its size. In many countries, a bus driver has to wear a cap and a motorcycle rider has to wear a crash helmet that a practising Sikh cannot. So what happens if a Sikh wants to be a bus driver or to drive a motorcycle? If there is a law that makes obligatory wearing crash helmets or caps and there is no exemption for Sikhs, they cannot be a bus driver and ride a motorcycle. Nevertheless, in the UK, in which wearing crash helmets is an obligation for motorcycle drivers, they have gained exemptions for it (Parekh, 2007, 400-401).

The law that mandates wearing crash helmets for motorcyclists are indeed beneficial for both motorcyclists and other individuals in a liberal society. It (1) protects the wearer from dead or injuries and (2) avoids other individuals to join the payment of possible costs as in a liberal society where there is a national health system; all of the expenses meet by all citizens. On the issue, according to Barry (1997, 6) there should be no exemptions, and: “Sikhs will have to choose between some reinterpretation of their religion and riding a motorcycle.” Here again he is robust. However, there are also contra arguments. One such argument alleges that turban, in a way, provides protection at least in a minimum expected level and if the burdens of injury were placed on victims denying wearing crash helmets, it would not be against the principle of equality while respecting differences in a society (Parekh, 2007, 401).

This issue is different that the kirpan issue. Whilst, there is a danger for other individuals in the former one, the latter one is much more related

with the performer. Besides, what Parekh (2007) says have merits. Instead of annihilating the exemption, making it better in terms of equality would be better. However, giving the exemption to Sikhs causes another question: Why just Sikhs? As Sikhs not the only group, that demands the exemption. Hell's Angels for example have problems with wearing crash helmets as well. As we mentioned, multiculturalism defends equal recognition of culture (Kelly, 2002, 4). Nevertheless, Waldron (2002, 21) justly asks: "Why is it fair to give the benefit of the exemption to the group claiming it on cultural or religious grounds?" From our point of view, if a group should get the rights or exemptions because of their religious beliefs or cultural practices, another group, that have merits in their demands of exemptions, should also get the exemptions. A discussion on it might go beyond our main purpose. So now, we would like to criticise some of multicultural policies that Kymlicka (2007, 66-74) offers and complete the paper.

In sum, it must be thought deeply before practicing multicultural accommodations. On the one hand, multicultural accommodations may cause problems from time to time, so they should not be implemented. Some other times, on the other hand, they remove unfairness and inequality so they should be implemented.

Words on Kymlicka's Multicultural Policies

In section 2, the policies that are offered by Kymlicka were mentioned. Now it is time to discuss some (not all as they are twenty-three and we do not possess enough space for all) of them. We would like to discuss all of three minority groups separately.

Our first concern is that of, specifically, recognition of self-government of *indigenous peoples*. Kymlicka defends nine policies for indigenous people should be implemented by states toward more fair and equal countries. Although the policies would cause desirable affects for fairness in one country, these nine policies might separate these people from the dominant group or other minority groups and harm the entity of the country. Maybe, the policies do not have merits to divide the people from majority singly, but all together, they may cause separation or at least harm harmony. They might demolish fairness in society, but also segregate communities and causes fragmentation (Modood, 2013, 10-11). Especially

when the recognition of self-government combines other policies, the indigenous groups would have no reason to live with majority under the same umbrella.

Our second concern is about international personalities of substate/minority nations. Kymlicka offers that they should have their own Olympic teams for instance. However, international sport events provide togetherness and what he offers would cause separateness. Malaysia could be given as a proper example for the case. Malaysia consists of three different nations, Malays, Chinese and Indians. When their national badminton team plays matches, all of the three nations support that team no matter what the player's nationality. It is valid for Turkey as well. When the national football team plays in a big tournament, most of the Kurds support the team even though there are no Kurdish players in the squad. These events should be seen as a glue that holds them together.

Our third concern is of migrants in general in terms of multiculturalism. In any society, why should they be given exemptions and rights that Kymlicka suggests? There should be difference between the former two groups and migrants. Majority should respect all of the three minorities' religions and cultures but recognizing and giving exemptions is another matter. There is no reason for states to make laws that suit these immigrant communities but not suit the dominant groups. Overall, migrants change their living space, and migrate to that country. Therefore, they also have to change their way of living or at least must not insist on living the same life that they lived in their home country. By doing these, they may feel that the country, they migrated to, becomes their new home. As an example, imagine an employer who offers an employment opportunity for people. Many people would apply for the job. Among the people, there may be migrants. While choosing the employees, the employer might consider language abilities of the applicants, and eliminate migrants whose language abilities do not meet the demands of the employer. Here it could be said that the behaviour of the employer is unfair, so the migrants have the right to complain about it. However, as Barry (1997, 8) emphasises they should have prepared themselves for the requirements of their new society. If they do not, they do not have the right to complain.

Conclusion

There are many examples that show, religious beliefs and/ or cultural practices contravene the laws of some countries that host different religions/cultures. On the one hand, there are advocates of multicultural accommodation. A multiculturalist thinks/advocates that all laws and practices of minorities must be respected; recognized and current laws must be enacted suitable for them. On the other hand, there are opponents of multicultural accommodation. An opponent may think (indeed some of them do think) there must be one law for all people living in a country and any exemption from it is unacceptable. There are also arguments that allege some exemptions might be accepted but it depends on their content.

In this piece, after clarifying what multicultural accommodation is, we invoked Kymlicka's, one of the dominant multiculturalism theorists and advocates, thoughts, and then we appealed the arguments against them. While doing this, Brian Barry's, a political philosopher who was one of the solid opponents of multiculturalism, was our main objector. We focused mainly on the egalitarian critics of multiculturalism, but try to reveal some problems for cultural rights. We discussed three cases (Halal or kosher butchering, kirpans and turban), and advocated that multicultural accommodation sometimes fits the situations, reality, equality and fairness premises. For example, whereas it fits with the butchering case, it does not fit with the kirpan case. Lastly, we attempted to reveal problems behind Kymlicka's thoughts as briefly as we could because to do this adequately, one needs more space, it requires much more space than we have had. Our main purpose had been to discuss whether multiculturalism is a defensible idea or not. It is still not easy to say yes or no, as it is complicated. Besides, the answers would not be among the perfect ones. Yet, plausible answers would also be sufficient. In the light of the complexity and in terms of examples, realities and mostly assumptions, our answer for this discussion was, if the potential specific arrangements or exemptions for minorities would not cause a worse situation (this piece claims that they sometimes do) than the situation without these arrangements or exemptions multicultural accommodation has merits, thus it is defensible. Hopefully, these arguments and critics would be helpful, if not a remedy for Turkey to understand people from different cultures and live with them.

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