The Analysis of the Hungarian Government’s Discourse towards the Migrant Crisis: A Combination of Securitization and Euroscepticism*

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ABSTRACT

Since the Syrian crisis, migration has emerged as a rising and permanent discussion of European politics that has both created diversity and caused obstacles in the attitudes and policy orientations across the member states. In addition, the migrant crisis opened a space for Eurosceptic actors to exploit it as an issue for politicization and securitization. Eurosceptic discourse has framed the migrant crisis as a threat to national, economic, cultural and internal security, bringing its securitization aspect into question. In this respect, new security measures, such as border controls and detention, and a discourse that employs anti-migration themes have become visible in many member states. The focus of this study is to analyse Hungary’s overall position and policy orientations towards the crisis in order to deconstruct its main messages, identify the interlocutors and the reasons behind particular perspectives. In this descriptive content analysis, more than 160 official documents have been thoroughly examined. It was observed that in opposition to the European migration governance, Hungary has gone through a securitizing discourse as the first theme. The second theme is that due to Brussels’ policy preferences, which are characterized to be anti-democratic and unlawful, and believed to have created a civilization disaster, Budapest has exhibited a Eurosceptic stance. Hungary’s overall position and policy orientations towards the migrant crisis are concluded to be the combination of securitization and Euroscepticism. Accordingly in the last theme, Hungary’s proposed solution to the migrant crisis, which was framed as a threat, is ‘stopping’ it by initiating new security measures.

Keywords: Securitization, Migration, Euroscepticism, Hungary, European Union

JEL Classification: F50, F52, F55

Macaristan Hükümetinin Göçmen Krizine Yönelik Söylemlerinin Analizi: Avrupa Şüpheçiliği ve Güvenlikleştirmenin Bir Birleşimi

ÖZ

Suriye krizinden günümüze, üye devletler arasında hem tatum, hem de politika yönelimlerinde çeşitliliğe ve engellere yol açan göç konusu; Avrupa siyasetinin artan daimi tartışması konularından biri haline gelmiştir. Göçmen krizi, Avrupa şüpheci aktörlerin konuyu siyasallaştırmaya ve güvenlikleştirmeye meselesi olarak kullanabilecekleri bir alan yaratmıştır. Avrupa şüpheci söylem; güvenlikleştirmeye boyutunu gündeme getirerek, göçmen krizini ulusal, ekonomik, kültürel ve iç güvenliğe bir tehdit olarak çerçevelendirmektedir. Bu hususta, surû kontrolleri ve alıkoyma gibi yeni güvenlik önlemleri ile güç karşılıt temaları kullanan söylemler, Macaristan gibi bazı üye ülkelerde

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 8th Uludag Conference on International Relations organised by Uludag University (Bursa/Turkey) on November 28-29, 2016.
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Doi Number: 10.18657/yonveek.307339
I know and I can hear that also among us here there are faint-hearted people, but you can see that Hungary is also capable of winning battles in Brussels. We are able to protect our culture, our everyday security, and also our economic achievements. (Víctor Orbán, Prime Minister, 2016)

As a peace and welfare project on the continent, the European Union (EU) totalled 15 members after the 1973, 1986 and 1995 enlargements.1 The enlargement process increased due to the fall of the Berlin Wall; many former Eastern Bloc countries, for example, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus (2004), Romania and Bulgaria (2007) became members. At the end of the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states began to incorporate political and economic liberalization processes in accordance to the EU’s regulations and principles. The Union has undertaken significant roles in the political, economic, social and legal transformation of these countries through the membership (external) option/motivation (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004). By 2013, membership of the EU had reached 28 with the accession of Croatia. The enlargement waves had not only led to changes in the corporate restructuring of the EU and union-level policies, but also to structural changes in the internal policies of these new countries.

However, within the last decade, the CEE’s post-communist countries have become more alarmed in terms of European norms and values. Freedom House (2016) currently published a report warning that 29 post-communist regimes have been in decline of democratic standards every year since 2004. The report, entitled “Europe in Question,” underlined the rising populism, xenophobia and nationalism throughout the regions. The migration crisis, originating from the conflicts that brought about political and economic instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa, was identified as the main contributed factor. Contrary to expectations, member states responded differently to the migrant crisis; this in turn led to a...
broader political crisis on how to deal with the migrants at EU level. The current picture, within the framework of the migrant crisis, is a Europe of varied discourses and policy orientations.

In the light of these general observations, this study investigates Hungary’s discourse towards the migrant crisis based on the content analysis of statements, interviews and speeches given by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as well as government spokesperson. Our content analysis primarily examines the attitudes of Hungary’s position and policy orientation towards migration; moreover, it asks, “What is the message?” “Why?” and “To whom?” Our sample consisted of more 160 official documents; each was coded and categorized accordingly. The data was cross-checked by the two authors (researchers) in order to establish reliability for the analysis. A consensus was reached on the establishment of the main codes, categorization and sample selection; however, one discrepancy did arise, that being, a sub-categorization in securitization - economic threat. Nevertheless, an accord did occur at it was determined that economic threat was the least observed threat perception compared to all other instruments of securitization.

Three main themes emerged from our analysis: (I) **Securitization** - The crisis, framed as a security threat, is the root cause of their message (*what and why*). First and foremost, the large majority of the references are geared towards national and internal security; secondly, to cultural security, and lastly, to economic security. (II) **Euroscepticism** – The fight against Brussels (*to whom*) is represented as a negative stance towards EU orientations (*the message*). It has originated from ‘policy’ (migration) and ‘national-interest’ (security) soft-Euroscepticism due to their anti-democratic and unlawful solutions which will end up disastrous for civilization (*why*). (III) **Proposed solution: stop the migrants** (*what message*). Brussels selected specific nation-states directly involved in the crisis; for example, Turkey, Greece and Italy. Both the left wing parties and the general public represent the actors of message elicited in Hungary’s discourse. Hungary’s overall position and policy orientations towards the migrant crisis are concluded to be a combination of securitization and Euroscepticism in a way that has altered the conceptualization of the crisis by Budapest That is, securitization has produced a soft Eurosceptic stance towards the EU, which in turn, has grounded their proposed solutions for the crisis.

This study consists of three parts. First, securitization and Euroscepticism are defined as the conceptual framework of this deductive study. Secondly, the study briefly discusses various conceptualization and policy orientations among the member states involved in the crisis. Lastly, the three themes derived from our coding and categorizations are detailed with sample selections of direct and indirect quotations.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITIZATION AND EUROSCEPTICISM

In the field of International Relations, each major theoretical perspective specifically defines security according to its own definition. Securitization theory, which is rooted in the Constructivist Approach and developed by the Copenhagen School, treats security as a speech act. This particular theory conceptualizes the term “security” in its relation to the process of the “social construction of threats” via speech acts (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 34). At its very core, the Copenhagen School points out that declaring something as a threat is the initial point of the process of securitization (Yuksel, 2014: 170). In this regard, actors, who in essence have socially constructed an issue as a threat, legitimize the use of taking extraordinary measures. Although securitization, in the early beginnings of its theoretical development was primarily defined as declaring something as a threat, this framework has been enhanced by including three units of analysis: the referent object, securitizing actor and functional actors (Balzacq, 2005: 178).

A referent object is an object against which an existential threat is posed. The Copenhagen School argues that a referent object is an entity that must be protected and/or saved from a threat and in order to so, all necessary measures can be taken. In a securitization process, it is possible for the actors to declare more than one referent object (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015: 78). The role of the securitizing actors is to create the perception of the threat towards (against) the referent object(s) followed by their attempts to legitimize their claim(s) (Mandaci & Özerim, 2013: 108). Functional actors vary according to institutional sectors (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015: 82), such as identified as military, political, societal, economic and environmental. These are the actors who have the most powerful influence on security making (Balzacq, 2005: 170).

The success of a securitization process primarily depends on two key factors: 1) the ability of the securitizing actors to frame an issue as a security matter via speech acts and/or facilitating the conditions (whether they exist or not); and 2) the audience, all of which make securitization an inter-subjective process (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 25-31). According to Buzan, in order to evade restrictive ties to traditional security, one must possess a clear idea of the essential quality of security (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 28). That quality is the staging of issues in politics as existential to lift them above politics; in other words, the person(s) who decides on the existential threats is crucial to the credibility of the perceived threat. Since securitizations are mostly performed by state actors, the Copenhagen School’s emphasis is on the state (Floyd, 2007: 41). In this respect, securitizing actors are generally state representatives or political elites since they have access to necessary means.

The conceptualization of migration and/or migrants as a security concern can be argued to have emerged “from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some...
groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals.” (Bigo, 2002: 65). Although migration has consistently been referenced as a security issue with the end of the Cold War, linking migration to a wide range of problems such as criminality, unemployment, cultural and religious threats and political instability is not a new phenomenon (Leonard, 2007: 3). Further, despite the fact that the themes, ways and processes of securitization of migration differ in country specific cases, securitizing actors are found to employ similar security themes such as national, economic, cultural and internal security (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 105).

Under the theme of national security, beyond border security and strengthening border controls, refugee demands, quotas, settlement and citizenship regulations are presented as national security threats which need to be revised and regulated in a way to reduce access to the territory of the nation in question (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 112). In doing so, in-groups and out-groups are specifically defined and those groups trying to enter the national boundaries are viewed as a threat to the nation. In reference to economic security, migrants are linked to current and/or future economic problems. Migrants are characterized as free-riders of social and economic benefits of the welfare state (Yüksel, 2014: 180). Securitization of the welfare state under the economic security theme derives mostly from framing migrants as threats to the labour market, welfare state and social security system (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 116).

The securitization of culture derives from the host culture’s belief that a migrant community is a threat to various components of its culture such as language, religion, traditions, values, norms and institutions. Since migration might change ethnic, religious and linguistic components of the host country’s population, it might be perceived as a threat to communal identity (Stivachtis, 2008: 18). As cultural security is regarded as crucial for nation building, culture is believed to be vital for a nation’s survival (Nowicka, 2014: 130). With respect to internal security, migrants are linked with terrorist activities (Spencer, 2008: 5), ordinary crimes and organized crimes that pose threat to the daily lives of the citizens. An internal security theme is employed to tighten visa and entrance regulations and the tracking of migrants in order to reduce or prevent migrant inflows. Under this theme, the concepts of ‘foreigners’ and ‘terrorists’ are deliberately used to create a perception of fear (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 123).

The term position implies one’s point of view about an actor or issue (Merriam-Webster, 2016) where one has an advantage over his/her rivals or competitors (English Oxford Living Dictionary, 2016). In the competition of political parties, agenda setting, which places certain issues at the center of political attention (Green-Pedersen & Walgrave, 2014), becomes a crucial element. Political actors, by their nature, are expected to advocate for issues that give specific advantages to themselves and their constituencies (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010). Moreover, in proportion to other actors, they exercise substantial influences
that determine the issues that will be covered during election campaigns (Hopmann et al., 2012: 173). In accordance with the benefits or harms that will arise from an issue being placed atop the agenda, political parties may take a positive, neutral or negative stance towards the regarding issue on the agenda. National elites play a crucial role in selecting, framing and institutionalizing the ideas which influence the formation of interests. If they believe that the ideas are aligned with the country’s institutions and political culture, their influence becomes most effective in shaping foreign policy preferences and the policy implementations (Tanil, 2014: 493).

In this context, the term Pro-Europeanism translates into a positive position on the EU and Europeanization. When a political actor adopts this position, the support for the EU, integration and membership is explicitly inferred. Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 300) subdivide this support into two categories - whilst diffuse support signifies the general support of European “ideas,” specific support denotes the general support of European “practices.” Conversely, Euroscepticism connotes a negative and/or rejection position towards the EU, integration and membership. According to Taggart (1998: 366), Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” There are two different types of Euroscepticism, principled (Hard) and contingent (Soft) and each vary with respect to the scope and size of opposition.

In Hard Euroscepticism, the entire EU project is rejected; becoming or remaining a member is absolutely objected. In Soft Euroscepticism, however, European integration is refused on a conditional or qualified basis, which arises from either “policy” Euroscepticism or “national-interest” Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2000: 6). Firstly, the motivation to steer towards policy Euroscepticism is related mostly to the size, level and the content of the integration; nevertheless, it does vary according to the issue, juncture and country in question. On the contrary, national-interest Euroscepticism is observed when an actor objects in order to defend and stand up for the national interest at the EU level. Thus, an actor might adopt a soft Eurosceptic discourse, perhaps not in all circumstances and time, but in terms of detailed and specific issues as a micro/ad hoc opposition. Contrary to the harder version, an actor may still maintain a nominal commitment to EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 7-8).

II. DIVERGENCE AMONG THE EU AND MEMBER STATES’ APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS

From 2014 onwards, Europe has experienced a mass migration, primarily due to the war in Syria. The exodus of millions of Syrian citizens has created multiple routes to Western Europe, one being the Western Balkans route. Moreover, the crisis has significantly intensified the pressure on the EU to develop a common EU immigration and asylum policy, which in turn, has tested numerous
EU institutions due to the differences in member states’ approaches (Human Security Brief, 2016)

One of the most important components of the EU’s overall approach to balance and manage migration flows is to reduce irregular migration (Gökalp Aras, 2016: 196). In this respect, the initial European response to the migrant crisis was to contain the refugees in Syria’s bordering countries under the provision of humanitarian aid distribution, thus allotting time for Europe to reinforce its borders. However, since the crisis became a regional one, there have been variations in member state responses. While some countries like Germany and Sweden adopted a more humanitarian approach by opening their doors to Syrian refugees via humanitarian admission programs (Forced Migration Policy Briefing, 2014), other countries expressed unwelcoming attitudes.

When the number of migrants and refugees attempting to enter the EU peaked at more than a million in 2015, Europe’s common set of administrative rules on processing asylum seekers’ applications, which is applied by the majority of the member states – with the exception of the UK and Ireland – came under scrutiny by many neighbouring countries. The most crucial part of these regulations is the Dublin Regulation, a provision that prevents migrants from applying for asylum in multiple EU countries. Due to the massive increase in the number of migrants and refugees, the system became dysfunctional. Since the system required refugees to claim asylum in the EU country where they first arrived, Greece and Italy encountered an overwhelming burden on processing and accommodating all the arrivals (BBC, 2016).

Germany was the first country to suspend the Dublin Regulation and stressed the need for a common European strategy on migration. The shortcomings of a collective European policy on the migration crisis have been emphasized by the EU at the institutional level (Communication from the Commission, 2015). The EU attempted to restructure the system; however, such actions further revealed the deepening internal divisions among the member states. The EU approved the relocation of 120,000 refugees in September of 2015 with 22 member states in favour through a quota system to which some member states reacted very strongly (Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke, 2015).

Countries that have politically disagreed with the EU’s institutional solution(s) have taken matters into their own hands. For example, Hungary is fencing its border with Serbia, Bulgaria is fencing its border with Turkey (Nougayrede, 2015) and Spain is fortifying its borders that divide its territories of Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco (The Guardian, 2014). Furthermore, Austria, Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia have also enacted measures to increase border restrictions (Human Security Brief, 2016). In addition to these steps, Slovakia’s announcement that it would only accept Christian Syrian refugees under an EU
relocation scheme (BBC, 2015) has changed the dimension in a way that only discourages Muslims from seeking asylum in the EU.

In 2016, the Balkan route was closed. The interruption of the migration flow greatly reduced the number of people marching north from Greece, which led to catastrophic humanitarian issues (Human Security Brief, 2016). The crisis revealed one major discrepancy in the interpretation of the Dublin Regulation, that being that all EU countries would share responsibility in finding adequate solutions for asylum seekers. A more efficient and fairer system based on solidarity has been emphasized by the EU at the institutional level (European Commission, 2016) nevertheless, the actions of many EU countries discouraging migrants from crossing into their territories was the message received.

III. HUNGARIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON THE CRISIS: A COMBINATION OF SECURITIZATION AND EUROSCEPICISM

Understanding how the Hungarian Government conceptualized the migrant crisis as a whole is necessary in order to explain the root causes of its position and rhetoric. Hungary’s conceptualization of the crisis not only underpins their opposition towards the EU and its’ policy orientation, but also their proposed (alternative) solutions. On the whole, Orbán and the state actors’ conceptualization contain all the required instruments of securitization. The content analysis of the documents outline in the introduction affirms that the Hungarian state has framed the current crisis as a direct threat to its national, economic, cultural and internal security. According to Budapest, the migrant crisis is a security threat which necessitates the introduction of taking more measures to control the borders in order to stop the migrants. The polarizing identification of the crisis and related challenges between the EU and Hungary led its government to take a Eurosceptic stance and vehemently criticizes Brussels both in terms of scope and direction of integration in broader terms (Euroscpticism). Hungary believes, that in contrary to what has to be done, Brussels has instituted a policy that is unacceptable, nihilist and incapable of bringing about acceptable solutions.

A. Hungarian Conceptualization of the Crisis: Securitization

The foundation of Prime Minister Orbán’s rhetoric is grounded on the Schengen Agreement, which justifies his strategy by legalism. He and members of his ministry frequently use the words, ‘illegal’ and ‘crime/criminal’ for migrants when referencing the Agreement. In a recent interview, Orbán stated that “Hungary is party to the Schengen Agreement, and we are securing a section of Europe’s common external borders. Illegally crossing a state border is a crime, which must be punished. The rules must be observed, or else the security of the citizens will be lost.” (Speech and Remarks, 13 November 2016). In addition, the Agreement is instrumental in legitimizing Hungary’s actions in fortifying it borders that is; it is merely complying with the burden and responsibility as required by the Agreement. In another statement, Orbán argues that it is the obligation of the Hungarian government to take all precautions to restore law and order and to protect its citizens
against the hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants, who illegally, aggressively and intimidatingly have trampled across Hungary (Orbán, 3 October, 2016).

The second conceptualized frame in the government’s discourse is portraying the crisis as a direct ‘material’ threat to Hungary and to the whole of Europe as well. Threat, terrorism, violence, fear, protection and security are frequent speech acts to politicize and securitize the crisis as a direct threat to the existence. Orbán has explicitly declared, “Uncontrolled immigration has brought an unmanageable terror and public security situation into Europe.” (Orbán, 16 September 2016). According to him, terrorist acts have increased and a kind of semi-war is on-going throughout the continent due to the uncontrolled flow of thousands from areas where Europe and the Western world are labelled as the enemy (Orbán, 31 August 2016). To the public at large, Orbán claims that the migration crisis has the potential to destroy the citizenry’s daily lives (internal threat). (Orbán, 6 September, 2016). He warns Europeans that they are at risk, especially women, kindergarten children (Orbán, 30 January 2016), flesh-and-blood people (Orbán, 30 January 2016), and those who are unable to protect themselves (Orbán, 30 January 2016). To strengthen Orbán’s verbiage, Hungarian Government Spokesperson, Zoltán Kovács publicized selective criminal cases specifically involving migrants in mass media outlets across Europe. He reported “a migrant resisted the police when they tried to escort him to a hearing, another one attacked an armed guard(Government Spokesperson, 10 June 2016); and migrants in a reception centre “kicked in” the window of the neighbouring police academy's sports hall (Government Spokesperson, 6 May 2016).

The perception of threat not only includes a material dimension, but also a normative/cultural dimension as well. As a soft version of populism and xenophobia, the government asserts that, although the cultural threat may in fact be slow, it is insidious in nature. In a recent address to parliamentarians, Orbán stated, “The nature of civilization disaster is that it does not happen overnight. Instead it proceeds slowly, but inexorably, as differences in fertility rates and repeated flows of mass migration change the composition and culture of the European population.” (Speeches and Remarks, 12 September 2016). In parallel, the flow of migrants is associated with the dangers posing to the continent’s cultural identity, where currently, the numbers of communities from foreign cultures are increasing (Orbán, 30 October 2016). Not surprisingly, a mathematical calculation in which migrants are merely instrumentalised by numbers was also mentioned in a speech given by a Hungarian government official (Speeches and Remarks, 2017):

But once we have admitted someone and they have established an ever-growing community here, while our community is declining, then it will be just a matter of time before they introduce their own rules, according to which they live first as a minority legal system and then as a majority one, citing precisely their right to freedom and autonomy.
Lastly, the economic aspect is clearly visible exemplified by the discourses on “finances and social services” (Speeches and Remarks, 29 January 2016) in that it is presented as being under threat in a way that the crisis is securitized as a true economic burden (Orbán, 30 October 2016) whose economic results might be threatened (Orbán, 30 October 2016). Insider (Hungarians) vs. outsider (migrants) is a thematic comparison made by the government in which outsiders pose an economic threat. Orbán warns “It is no accident that in Hungary a year ago we introduced a rule on daily welfare allowances, stating that anyone who arrives here and is here as a migrant – for whatever reason – must be treated in the same way as Hungarians.” (Speeches and Remarks, 28 October 2016).

B. Portraying Brussels as the Root Cause: Soft Euroscepticism

The Hungarian government seems to blatantly avoid discussing the root causes of the current crisis that has originated from the ongoing crises in the Middle East and North Africa. Essentially, Budapest is eager to problematize the EU’s overall position and Brussels’ policy orientations stressing its most likely negative effects on European affairs. Based on the content analysis of the related documents, Euroscepticism in a loud voice is coded as the second main theme in their evaluation of EU and Brussels. The EU’s position and policy orientations towards the crisis are portrayed as anti-democratic and unlawful (Orbán, 3 October 2016), which will end in disaster for civilization (Orbán, 3 October 2016). Orbán (3 October 2016) states, the political elite and their supporters (in Brussels), including their Hungarian supporters, have a vested interest in unlimited immigration and resettlement; and they have a powerful arsenal of weapons. They are loud, anti-democratic and aggressive.

According to the Hungarian government, Europe has but two scenarios to follow as a result of the migrant crisis. First, to “if we surrender to the modern-day mass migration, we will be flooded, the security we have built will evaporate, the threat of terrorism will increase, and the economic results which we have fought so hard for may be threatened” (Speeches and Remarks, 11 November 2016); and second, the other option is to stop immigration, we win a majority in Europe for an anti-immigration policy (Orbán, 11 November 2016). Budapest believes that the bureaucrats in Brussels are oriented to a pro-migrant stance in spite of all the risks and threats (Orbán, 3 October 2016). With a wholesale approach, Hungary rejects the EU’s stance, which they perceive as being unacceptable, unlawful non-implementable. More directly, Orbán declares, “the Hungarian government’s standpoint on migration policy is that to date what we in Europe have been doing has failed, that migration policy has resulted in trouble, terrorism, violence and fear.” (Orbán, 17 February 2016).

Their criticism of EU policy is fictionalised, at most, on quota a system. Orbán perceives the system as an indefensible nihilist idea (Orbán: 18 September 2016) and a misinterpretation of solidarity (Government Spokesperson, 13 November 2015). Government spokesperson criticized the mandatory resettlement
quotas to pose exactly the same kind of danger as the primary form of illegal migration, which he also frames as unfair, irrational, and must be changed (Orbán, 18 September 2016). The ideological left vs. the right contestation emerges as another discourse in a sense that Budapest links the EU’s wrongdoings with the left-wing actors (Government Spokesperson, 6 July 2016). As a result, the left wing political parties in Europe are blamed for being populist in a way that they see migrants as something useful and proper (Orbán, 3 October 2016). The government accuses the leftist of asserting that Muslims will become their future voters (Speeches and Remarks, 2017).

The supranational character of Brussels has received the most weighted criticism. Government spokesperson called for a new line to be drawn between member state’s sovereignty and the spheres of competence of Brussels institutions (Government Spokesperson, 30 September 2016). In March of 2016, Orbán accused certain EU leaders of wanting to create a “United States of Europe,” one that would simply swallow up member states (Chadwick, 2016). However, his government sent a clear message that Budapest had no intention of leaving the EU, but rather stands as a revisionist, awaiting certain changes in EU affairs (soft Euroscepticism). In other words, what they request is the revision of the integration process (Government Spokesperson, 12 September 2016). Orbán suggests, “The Hungarian Government would prefer a strong European Union that is realised via strong Member States. Integration has natural limits and boundaries, and there are areas where we should not force integration processes that clearly do more harm than good.” In a definitive statement, Orbán (14 January 2016) opened up the discussion for a structural change in EU integration and institutions:

> At present, no one would like to make changes to fundamental European documents - say the founding treaty referred to as the European constitution. Because everyone knows that if that debate is opened, it will be very difficult to close it. But I believe that today the European Union is suffering from serious problems - I would call these Brussels – which we will not be able to solve without treaty amendment. Currently, one kind of Brussels - and this has serious consequences, as in the migration issue.

In connection with this, he portrays the Hungarian government to be the voice of people (Orbán, 3 October 2016). As a populist reflection, Orbán’s government repeatedly makes references to public opinion and encourages European decision-makers to pay close attention to the voices on the ground. They believe that today more people in Europe argue in favour of protecting the borders than supporting migration (Orbán, 4 October 2016). In order to strengthen their arguments, Budapest cites two developments on the agenda. The first is the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Hungary links Brexit to the wrongdoings of Brussels, in particular, its handling of the migrant crisis. They allege that the results of the referendum in the UK should be taken as a clear sign targeted at Brussels,
“Brussels must hear the voice of the people. This is the biggest lesson from this decision.” (Than, 2016).

Secondly, on October 2, 2016, Hungary held a referendum on mandatory EU migration quotas. This act was instrumentalised by the government as a weapon against Brussels in which they warned the EU to pay more attention to public opinion. Leading up to the referendum, Orbán’s nationalistic rhetoric stressed to the voters that the referendum was central to Hungary’s national sovereignty (Government Spokesperson, 12 September 2016) and a turning point (Orbán, 18 September 2016) for their future. He asked, the only remaining fair solution was for Hungarians to decide what they want. Who should decide on who may stay and who may live in the territory of Hungary? Who should decide on this: Brussels or Budapest? (Orbán, 4 October 2016). According to government spokesperson, with the referendum, it is Hungary’s intention to send the EU a powerful message that they should stop disregarding the will of the people. He also highlighted that the referendum is not about staying in Europe, but about, the kind of Europe (Hungarians) want (Government Spokesperson, 23 September 2016). He reminded the leadership of the EU that the Hungarian quota referendum places an obligation on Brussels. Following the results of the referendum, the views expressed by Orbán are noteworthy (Orbán, 3 October 2016):

The referendum has achieved its goal, because in Brussels from today onwards we shall not be representing the will of the Hungarian government or its leader – or even the members of the Hungarian parliament sitting here – but the will of almost three million three hundred thousand Hungarian people. Is this a large number or a small number? When we decided to join the European Union, the votes of three million fifty thousand people were enough to join, and now three million three hundred thousand people have voted “no”. In other words, the votes of several thousand more people are surely enough to decide the issue of the migrant quota.

C. The Hungarian Proposal: Stop the Migrants

Government spokesperson problematizes alternative approaches in finding any viable solutions for the migrant crisis. Their approaches and critiques simply ranged between manage vs. control. After publically repeating that the current illegal migration presented a direct threat to the entirety of (defenceless) Europe, Orbán (14 June 2016) proposed, “It is not enough to manage illegal migration, it must be stopped.” Over and over, Orbán (11 November 2016) emphasizes that the only solution is to stop migration. As detailed above, Hungary points to the necessity of a new approach that must be employed to overcome the threat of migration (Government Spokesperson, 8 March 2016). They call upon the EU to change its position and policy orientations, first by redefining the crisis as a security threat instead of linking it to humanitarian and nihilist motivations; and secondly, by proposing new measurements for the “control” of the borders. However, the key and the single pre-condition for their proposal, is that Europeans should first, fight against Brussels (Interviews, 11 November 2016).
Contrary to the argument that border control is unmanageable, Orbán argues that by taking the appropriate measures, it is possible and applicable, he claims, *it is technically possible, it is militarily possible, and the achievements of modern technology are there to be used* (Speeches and Remarks, 16 September 2016). As a general response to the criticisms directed at (towards) Budapest, his government counters by stating what Hungary has done so far, controlling its borders, is moral and rational (Orbán, 16 November 2015). Moreover, Hungary projects itself as the sole protector of Europe, fighting against the “invasion” of migrants (Government Spokesperson, 23 September 2016), and not only for the sake of Hungarian interests, but also in the interests of every European (Speeches and Remarks, 21 October 2016). Next, they offer other EU member countries to take similar security measures by asserting, it “would be also for the interest of Italians and the Greeks to protect the EU’s external borders.” (Orbán, 28 October 2016) In attempts to align other EU members to side with their securitization approaches; Hungary suggests that migration can be stopped by the introduction of new policies detailed below.

Firstly, the EU’s (Brussels) reach should be minimized in order to resolve the crisis. Counter to its supranational gaze, the decision making and the operationalization processes should be re-formulated and based more on nation-states (state centrism). Orbán (16 September 2016) believes, “*The answer should instead be to strengthen the nation states, and not to take powers away from them. The situation now is exactly the opposite of this.*” Secondly, as the Schengen Agreement requires member states to control their borders, all members should fulfil its obligation and responsibility to protect its border. In justifying this directive, Orbán (16 September 2016) states, “*Every nation state itself must meet the obligations for border protection that it has signed up to in the Schengen Agreement. The Greeks must protect the Greek border, the Hungarians the Hungarian border, and so on.*” Currently, according to a Hungarian spokesperson, the problem is a division lies between the member states that comply with the current agreements and regulations, and ones which have not (Government Spokesperson, 14 June 2016).

Thirdly, Budapest has suggested that new refugee camps should be situated (located) outside of Europe’s territorial borders, so that it “would be a welcome solution for everyone if refugee camps were set up - hot spots as they say here - outside EU territory, also, the legal procedures separating economic immigrants from true refugees could be conducted there” (Speeches and Remarks, 7 March 2016).

According to the government, the policy directed at refugee camps is not only rational, but also a moral policy orientation. It is rational in the sense, that it may greatly contribute to inhibiting migration, thus allotting more time for Europe to consider what to do with migrants (Government Spokesperson, 7 March 2016).
In addition, Orbán feels it would be much more humane of disallowing migrants to enter in the first place, rather than removing them by force after they have been in Europe for several months or years (Speeches and Remarks, 11 November 2016).

Fourthly, Turkey is a country of particular importance in the Hungarian discourse with regard to the crisis and policy suggestions. Currently, the atmosphere between Turkey and the EU is very tense and strenuous; Budapest proclaims that European relations with Turkey should be seen through the lens of national interest (Interviews, 11 November 2016). From Hungary’s perspective, Turkey is significant due to its geographical positioning in the region; it is portrayed as the frontline (Turkish-Greek border) (Government Spokesperson, 13 November 2015). Orbán (Speeches and Remarks, 11 November 2016) endorses the most rational approach for the EU is to support the political forces in Turkey, which will assist in creating order, calm, predictability and stability, all in favour of European interest.

CONCLUSION
International migration is one of the most critical challenges that nation-states have faced in the twenty-first century. It has transformative effects on the traditional meanings of statehood, nationhood, citizenship and integration. International migration, in the form of forced displacement and/or mass migration, is usually perceived both as a threat on the state’s territorial integrity and the national autonomy and as an existential threat to the society, which questions security aspects in different dimensions. In this respect, and specifically regarding the Syrian migrant crisis, there has been an increase, both in the security measures, the tightening of border controls and increased detention, and in discourses that employ anti-migration themes. Furthermore, concerning the nation-states that host considerable numbers of forced migrants, they must ensure the needs of the people and take their situations into account. Herewith, the human security approach complements the state security approach in that legal protection and the establishment of structures must be provided to forced migrants to provide access to basic human needs.

In this context, the situation of the Syrian refugees in Europe exemplifies a case in which the state and human security models intersect, a crossroads where EU member states’ responses to the crisis diverge. For the EU, it has become compulsory to propose a common solution to mass migration, whereas, traditionally this area fell upon the member-states’ themselves. As an outbreak occurred between the internal divisions among the member states and the EU at the institutional level, the securitization of the migrant crisis began to unfold.

Hungary, which adopted new security measures, such as border controls and detention, and a discourse that employed anti-migration themes, is presented as a case that conceptualized migration as securitization. In their speeches and policy orientations, a negative rendering of migration is substantially visible. By reifying migrants as threats to national, cultural, economic and internal security of
Hungary and the EU, Orbán’s government has taken a Eurosceptic stance. By doing so, this in turns makes it that much more difficult for the EU to develop a common migration policy in the light of radical differences among the member states and the EU.

The Hungarian case and ongoing discussions pertaining to the migrant crisis open up a broader debate on Europeanization, which has transformed into a more diverging character and led to the disintegration of security governance in the EU. It is recommended for further research to analyze the effects of Euroscepticism on the diverging Europeanization processes, the disintegration of European security and the overall integration process.

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ÖZET

Bütünleşmeyi kapsayan konu ve alanlarda ulus-devletlerin tekelinde bulunan egemenliğin Birlik düzeyine devri ya da ilgili organları ile paylaşımı üzerinden örgütlenen Avrupa Birliği (AB), siyasi tarihin en başarılı barış ve refah projesidir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde genişleme ve derinleşme sürecini yürütten AB, zamanla bölgesel ve küresel bir aktör haline dönüșmüştür. Bu durum, ulus-devlet ile AB’nin sınırlı ve yetki alanları üzerinde zamanla tartışmalar ve kısmi hizmetmelere neden olmaktadır. Özellikle krizli dönemlerde, üye ülkeler içerisinde bütünsel karşıt gruplar güçlenmekte ve Birlik’in yetki ve politikalarına karşı eleştiriler artmaktadır. Karar alıcıların Avrupa bütünsel meseli ile ilgili genel tutum ve destek düzeyi, işbirliğinin yön, boyut ve geleceği belirlediğinden; AB’ye ve bütünsel süreçe karşı olumsuz ya da reddedici bir pozisyon (Avrupa Şüpheciliği), hem mevcut kazanımları hem de gelecek

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vizyonunu olumsuz etkileyebilmektedir. Bu durum ilk olarak siyasilerin söz edimlerinde, devamında taahhüt ve karar alma süreçlerinde ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Kuruluşundan beri en sancılı dönemlerinden birini geçirmekte olan AB’de bahsi geçen siyasi hizleme, özellikle göçmen krizi ile gün yüzüne çıkmıştır. Arap Baharı ile başlayan ve sonrasında Suriye İç Savaşı ile had safhaya ulaşan göçmen krizi; bekleni, öncelik ve çıkar farklılaşması nedeniyle Birlik ve üye ülkeler arasında anlaşmazlıklar neden olmuştur. Birlik’in benimsediği politikalara, farklı siyasi yönelimlere sahip bazı üye devletlerde karşılk bulmamış ve bu ülkelerde siyasi söylemler, artan oranda Brüksel karşıtı bir retoriğe bümnümüştür.


Tehdit algısına dayanın pozisyonu ise Macaristan, göçmen krizine insani güvnerik perspektifi üzerinden yaklaşmaya çalışan Brüksel’e şiddetle karşı çıkmaktadır, AB dış sınırlarında güvenlik önlemlerinin arttırılması yoluya daha korumaci bir yaklaşımı tavsıye etmektedir. Macaristan’ın tehdit olarak resmettiği göçmen krizi için önerdiği çözüm, incelemede ortaya çıkan son ana temadır: AB dış sınırlarında yeni güvenlik önlemleri alarak göçü ‘durdurmak’. 