Explaining the EU’s Security and Defence Policy: The Need for Three-Level Analysis

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ABSTRACT
Although there is not a general agreement among its member states on where the EU should take action, the EU has launched more than 30 crisis management missions since 2003. This article argues that explaining the EU’s action in crisis management requires a three-level analysis that highlights the interaction between the individual member states, the EU’s institutional context and the international levels. Limiting the analysis to the interaction between the EU and its member states will not provide an answer to why and how the EU launches certain missions, whilst it fails to launch others. This argument will be explored through the crisis management missions the EU launched and failed to launch in Africa.

Keywords: EU Crisis Management Missions, Africa, Three-level analysis

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Introduction

Scholars frequently point out that the political and strategic goals of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy on why the Union should intervene beyond its borders, where it should do so, and according to what criteria are poorly articulated. The absence of agreement on the nature and future of the EU’s security and defence policy results with incoherence in the EU actions. Nonetheless, as Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stated, the EU has made rapid progress in this area since 1999 although the security and defence cooperation is probably the area which least leads itself to a collective EU approach. The EU has so far launched more than 30 crisis management missions of both civilian and military nature. In the literature, there is little scholarly focus on how to conceptualize the choices of missions by the EU. Scholars who work on the EU crisis management usually explore single cases, confining their analysis to specific factors that led to the crisis management mission under focus. Studies on Europeanization or on the impact of the EU norms on its member state preferences come closest to an effort of conceptualizing the factors that lead to EU crisis management missions. Nonetheless, as a result of the concern to explore the impact of the EU’s institutional context on member state preferences, these scholars limit analysis to two levels and omit the international level. This leads to leaving cases where the EU’s institutional impact through its principles and norms was not sufficient to galvanize action within the EU framework out of the analysis.

This article argues that in order to understand the EU’s choice of missions, analysis should be extended to three-levels consisting of individual member states, particularly Britain, France and Germany, the EU’s institutional context and the international level, comprising other international actors, such as the US, Russia, the UN or NATO and the target country and regional actors. Limiting the analysis of the EU’s crisis management policy to the interaction between the EU’s institutional context and member state preferences does not provide an understanding of why and how the EU launches certain crisis management missions, whilst it fails to launch others.

The importance of using a three-level analysis as a conceptual tool becomes evident when scholars inadvertently bring in a third level without necessarily addressing its implications. For instance, Frédéric Charillon in his analysis of the emergence of a European security regime alludes to individual and group dynamics that increase the EU activities. For Charillon, group dynamics within the EU may play a role, for instance, if one’s security conception is not shared by a majority of the partners, the risk of being perceived as ineffective by the Union may induce Europeanization. At the individual member state level, benefits determine the willingness to Europeanize. A member state can improve its power and visibility, appear as a normal and legitimate security actor in the international arena or have a say in

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international issues through Europeanization. As can be seen, benefits at the individual level are inevitably related with another level of interaction, namely the international level. A more conscious analysis which makes reference to this missing dimension comes from Eva Gross who relies on the impact of Europeanization, alliance politics and governmental/domestic politics on member states in order to explain the EU crisis management. However, this categorization limits the international level to the alliance politics (NATO) or the member state loyalties to the transatlantic link (the US) and ignores other actors who are located at the international level, such as the target countries and other powers, like Russia. Similarly, Peter Schmidt argues in favour of using three-level analysis in order to understand the EU’s deployment of troops, but limits the third level to the United Nations (UN) in his analysis of two military crisis management missions of the EU to Africa. While the EU member states’ commitment to the UN cannot be ignored, limiting the international level of analysis to the UN weakens the conceptual strength and explanation, since there are cases where the EU member states failed to respond to the UN request for an EU mission, as will be seen below.

These limitations in the literature and the ever widening activities under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), highlight the need for better conceptualization of this dimension. This article argues that a three-level analysis that focuses on the interaction of dynamics within the member states and at the EU and international levels is necessary to understand why and how certain crisis management missions take place, whilst others do not. As will be shown below, the deployment of numerous missions to Africa has been possible within the room for manoeuvre that these three levels allow. The article proceeds with a section on the definition of and rationale for three-level analysis on the EU crisis management. After this, the relevance of this three-level analysis is first explored in the decision-making process prior to the first EU crisis management operation in the DRC (Operation Artemis, 2003). Third, an analysis of subsequent missions that the EU has both succeeded and failed to deploy to Africa follows to test the relevance of this three-level analysis.

Three-Level Analysis in the EU Security and Defence Policy

In order to fully account for the factors that lead to the EU crisis management missions or their absence in different regions, dynamics influential at the member state level, the EU’s institutional context as well as the international level have to be part of the analysis, with the international level extended to cover the positions of not only the US, Russia, NATO, the UN but also the target country and regional actors. One cannot ignore the role of member state preferences and their capabilities in determining the range of EU activities. In terms of the EU’s security and defence policy, since crisis management missions require allocation of substantial financial and human resources, larger member states’ positions are significant. Among Britain, France and Germany, France is the one that actively pushes the EU for taking action in Africa. For France, the EU is valuable as a magnifier as it involves legitimacy and effectiveness by being acceptable to third countries. Europeanized missions also offer the potential to decrease the

8 Interview A with an official at the Council of the EU, 8 March 2006.
financial burdens of a unilateral operation. However, costs that are covered from the EU’s common budget in military crisis management missions is a small part of the overall cost of each military mission. Thus, although one may cite the financial benefit of Europeanizing crisis management missions as the motivation, the EU missions are small in terms of size and short in duration and could supposedly have been borne individually by its larger member states. In such a context, symbolic aspects of the EU crisis management missions come into the picture.

Moreover, the ESDP/CSDP missions have to be collectively endorsed. Therefore, although larger member states of the Union, especially France may be in favour of the EU action, this is not in itself enough to explain the EU’s numerous crisis management missions. Agreement of all member states should be achieved, which means that an intense debate about the rationale and the stakes of the missions under question takes place within the EU. National preferences have to be reconciled by appealing to shared or common goals and interests for the EU to take action. As following sections will show, proving that they can act in unity through missions and that the EU is a credible security actor that can assist the UN is a common interest that influences EU member state preferences. For many member states, these missions, even if they cannot end crises, are a sign of the EU’s ability to take action in crises of concern and a corollary of the Union’s global influence and role in other issue areas.

In this light, one may be tempted to confine the analysis to the interaction between the EU’s institutional context and its member states. However, the action or inaction of the EU in terms of crisis management is not only a function of interaction between these two levels. The institutional competition between NATO and the EU limits the scope of the EU’s actions, which can be seen in the EU’s focus on low-intensity crises. Atlanticist EU member states do not want to harm NATO’s monopoly over high-intensity conflicts. Therefore, whether NATO is interested in the crisis under consideration influences member state preferences on not only whether the EU should take action but also the scope of its action. In other cases, for instance, in its eastern neighbourhood, the EU has to take into consideration the Russian response to its actions, which limits its activities in crisis management. For instance, with regard to the conflict between Georgia and secessionist Republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian military presence, its political influence and economic leverage in the area gives Russia a power of veto when it comes to conflict settlement. Therefore, responses of even the neighbours of the country where the EU will take action become part of the thinking on deployment of the EU crisis management missions. Also, preferences of the target country or regional actors are influential in not only determining whether the EU as a collective unit will take action, but also in shaping the nature of the EU action. Therefore, not only the preferences of other international actors, but also the target country or the regional actors are relevant to the explanation of why the Union takes or fails to take action in crisis management.

The relevance of three-level analysis with a focus on the interaction between these levels is most explicit in the case of Darfur, Sudan. This case shows that seeking the consent of the target country for a peacekeeping mission hampered the international response to the violence. Until a compromise could be found, support to the African Union action - which was accepted by

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9 Ulriksen et al., Operation Artemis, p. 521.
the Sudanese regime - appeared to be the only feasible move for the EU member states.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the EU’s attempts to work with and in support of the African Union (AU - Operation AMIS) were frustrated in 2005 by an institutional squabble with NATO. A resolution was achieved between the Atlanticist and Europeanist member states by NATO agreeing to provide strategic airlift assistance and the EU providing planning assistance and advice on civilian policing of refugee camps. Whereas this arrangement pleased the British, the leading Atlanticist member state, it was unpopular in France, as the French would prefer the EU and not NATO to provide the military assistance.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, factors that lead to EU crisis management missions or their absence should be explored at the member state level, the EU’s institutional context and the international level, with this level extended to cover the positions of the US, Russia, NATO, the UN and preferences on the ground, where the crisis management mission will take place. The relevance of a three-level analysis for understanding the EU’s action and inaction in certain African crises will be shown in the following sections.

The Interaction between the Three-Levels: The EU’s First Crisis Management Mission to Africa (Operation Artemis, 2003)

In order to explain the EU crisis management missions to Africa, British and French national positions should be explored, as these countries are former colonial powers and have the capabilities to take unilateral action in the region. Moreover, between 1998 and 2003, these two EU member states identified Africa as an area for their joint cooperation agenda. However, even this development at the member state level is not in itself sufficient to understand the conditions that made the first EU crisis management mission to the DRC, Operation Artemis, possible in 2003. Analysis of the impact of the EU’s institutional context and the international level is necessary, because even these member states’ preferences on deploying Operation Artemis were influenced by considerations other than honouring their previous agreement on jointly addressing African security problems.

Africa rose up in the British-French bilateral agenda as a result of the reappraisal of traditional French policy towards Africa in the late 1990s and the then British government’s prioritization of Africa in its foreign policy. France faced increasing criticisms against its traditional African policy particularly after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, for which it was seen partly responsible. The genocide in Rwanda led to a massive exodus of people to the neighbouring DRC and accelerated the collapse of the regime of President Mobutu there, a regime which was supported by France since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{15} This additional blow to traditional French African policy, increasing inability to secure influence through Africa in the international arena and budgetary strains led to a reappraisal of this policy. French policy-makers revised their defence agreements with African regimes, closed a number of bases in the region, decided to strengthen African capabilities for crisis management and act together with international partners, if external action was seen necessary.\textsuperscript{16}


The French inclination to move away from unilateralism bore its first fruit at the British-French summit at Saint Malo in December 1998, which is famous for opening the way to the launch of ESDP within the EU. The Franco-British Declaration on cooperation in Africa issued at this summit committed both governments to harmonize their policies, to tackle the debt problem of Africa and to promote a common EU position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa. Then British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s definition of a moral duty to intervene in certain crises and his Labour Party’s priorities to deal with poverty and conflict in Africa, facilitated this consensus on taking joint action to address problems in the region. At their Cahors summit of 2001 and Le Touquet summit of 2003, these countries reaffirmed their commitment to reduce conflict in Africa. However, the only reference to the EU was made in 2001 for holding bilateral consultations before the EU’s Africa Working Group meetings in order to prepare joint positions where possible. The need for cooperation on the DRC crisis was underlined in 2003, but with a view to work together to build a DRC national army. Therefore, a firm agreement between these two EU member states on Africa as the ground, where the ESDP should be active did not exist before the Operation Artemis. This reinforces the need to analyse how national level of preference formation is influenced by the EU and international levels in order to understand the deployment of the EU crisis management missions (including Operation Artemis) or lack thereof.

In May 2003, the UN Mission in the DRC faced humiliation in the face of the increasing violence in Bunia, since it had limited number of soldiers in the area whose mandate excluded protection of civilians. Under this circumstance, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called French President Jacques Chirac and the EU High Representative Javier Solana in order to ask for support for the UN Mission. The French were willing to take the lead and launch an EU mission. Focussing the EU’s attention on this region has been a declared French objective since 2001. However, special attention had to be paid to the Rwandans who were against a French presence.

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22 Declan Walsh, “A Prayer for the Dying; A Deadly Combination of Tribal Infighting and International Rivalry,” The Independent, 10 June 2003, p. 2-3.


in the region because of the perceived French role in the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s consent was achieved, thanks to the efforts of the EU Special Representative to the region, who secured the British efforts to convince the Rwandans. However, partly because of the guarantees given to Rwandans in order to convince them that there was no ulterior French motive, the mandate of the operation had to be short and limited to Bunia in Ituri. France was keen to have the UK on board and to intervene on the basis of a UN Chapter VII mandate to alleviate these concerns.25

The UK eventually agreed to contribute to an EU mission by sending 88 troops in total, the majority of which were Royal Engineers who upgraded Bunia’s airfield. The remainder were staff officers and support personnel.26 The UK consent and contribution to an EU mission in the DRC did not come forth as a result of its national interests in this country or their previous agreement with the French to jointly address African conflicts. Being a member of the UN Security Council like the French, British diplomats thought that something should be done as the credibility of the UN was at stake. In addition, this mission was a means for the EU to establish itself as a security actor and to defy arguments that the EU is too weak to react in areas where it is the major donor.27 Moreover, since the first EU operation in cooperation with NATO was already launched in the Balkans and the British agreed to the possibility of EU interventions autonomous from NATO in 1998, an opposition to this mission could not be put forward. Besides, as NATO was involved in Afghanistan, and was considering a potential involvement in Iraq, Africa was not on its agenda.28 The British involvement was also facilitated by the US position which did not oppose the idea of an EU operation without NATO assets. The US was not only willing to ease transatlantic tensions over the Iraq war, but also was reluctant to get entangled in Africa. Therefore, for both the EU member states and the US, this mission was also a gesture to mend the transatlantic link.29

Member states, for whom the risks involved in the mission were a source of concern, such as Germany, considered it significant in terms of the ESDP’s future, since it brought closer the UK and France, who represented divergent positions, Atlanticism and Europeanism, respectively.30 Furthermore, the EU High Representative Solana, by publicly evoking the UN’s demand for an EU mission made it difficult for the member states to oppose this mission.31 The European Commission supported the launch of this mission as well, since its own presence and investment in the DRC could be jeopardised if the situation was not brought under control.32

25 Interview B with a Member State diplomat, 27 June 2006.
30 Joschka Fischer, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Speech at the German Bundestag Debate, 18 June 2003.
31 Interview E with a Member State diplomat, 17 March 2006.
32 Petar Petrov, “Early Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights From the Operations Concordia and Artemis”, Sophie Vanhooonacker, et al. (eds), Understanding the Role of
Therefore, the mission became possible mostly due to the commitments of the EU member states to demonstrate that the EU is a credible security actor that can take action, although of course this action was not contested by other actors at the international level. After the UN Security Council’s authorization in June 2003, the EU launched its first fully autonomous military crisis management mission outside Europe, with France as the Framework Nation that provided the operation headquarters.

To sum up, although Africa was identified as an area where Britain and France could cooperate both bilaterally and within the EU framework, these EU member states reached a firm and clear agreement on the region as the ground where the EU should launch crisis management missions after the deployment of Operation Artemis to the DRC in 2003. When the issue came to the EU agenda, member state preferences were shaped by concerns of proving that the EU is a credible security actor able to assist the UN, although one may cite additional concerns on the part of France. Therefore, in order to answer why and how the EU crisis management missions become possible there is a need to pay attention to how the national level of preference formation is influenced by both the institutional context of the EU and the international level. The EU member states’ collective decision on deploying this mission in order to improve the EU’s international standing has been possible under permissive conditions at the international level. The analysis of a context wider than the EU’s institutional context shows that the EU action in this case became possible thanks to the indifference (NATO and the USA), weakness of other international actors (the UN) to take action and the unwillingness of regional actors to see individual actions of former colonial powers. Regional actors’ preferences were also influential on the mission’s mandate. Therefore, this case draws attention to the importance of approval or external recognition by relevant actors in the international arena for the EU to launch crisis management missions. In other words, in order to reach a full account of the dynamics behind the launch of crisis management missions, not only the interaction between the member state and the EU levels, but also between these and relevant international or regional actors has to be taken into consideration.

The Interaction between the Three-Levels: The EU Action and Inaction after Operation Artemis

Operation Artemis led to a process whereby an institutional interest in Africa developed under the EU’s security and defence policy. In the DRC, EU activities continued by civilian crisis management missions, which are far less controversial than the military missions at the member state and international levels. The Commission’s support for a police training project was followed by the deployment of the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) in 2004 and a security sector reform mission, EUSEC RD Congo in 2005.

In view of these EU commitments and activities in the DRC and Africa between 2003 and 2005, it seems surprising that it took almost three months for the EU member states to positively respond to another UN request for crisis management forces for the DRC’s 2006 elections. This case also draws attention to the need to analyse the interaction between three

Bureaucracy in the ESDP, European Integration Online Papers (EIOP), Special Issue, Vol 14, No 1, 2010, p. 201.

levels in order to understand which missions are launched under the EU umbrella. After the UN request in December 2005, EU military planners became embroiled in disputes over the mandate, the logistics, and in which country the military planning would be prepared. Internal debates within member states questioned its rationale and potential risks and which member states would contribute to the force. France argued that it had already taken the lead of Artemis, Britain pointed to its engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq and Germany to the domestic pressure not to use military power in Africa. Although Africa was not Germany’s priority, French policymakers convinced their German counterparts to lead this mission at their high-level bilateral meetings, pointing to the need to take responsibility within ESDP and arguing that it is their turn to take the lead, as Artemis was French-led and Althea in Bosnia has been British-led. An agreement to launch another EU military operation (EUFOR RD Congo) under German leadership with a big French contribution was reached eventually in April 2006.

During this process, actual reality on the ground in Congo appeared to be only secondary to the concerns of domestic repercussions of contributions to the EU force, reflected by the mission’s limited and risk-averse mandate in terms of geography and duration. Of the 780-strong German contingent, only about 100 soldiers were to be deployed in Kinshasa and the overwhelming majority of them were to be on standby in the neighbouring Gabon. While domestic repercussions of contributing to this mission limited the scope of the EU action, a common member state interest to bolster the ESDP’s credibility has been influential in bringing forth the approval of the mission, similar to the launch of Operation Artemis. Member states were prompted to send a message to the international arena on the EU capability for common action after the rejection of the EU constitution in the French and Dutch referenda in 2005. As can be seen, the EU’s collective decisions on the crisis management missions are not only a function of considerations either at the member state or the EU levels. Put differently, member state preferences are influenced not only by concerns at the domestic level and the EU’s institutional context, but also by considerations about the international level.

The EU managed to launch another mission for security sector reform (EUPOL RD Congo) in 2007 in order to replace EUPOL Kinshasa. However, it failed to respond to the official UN request for another military mission a year later. Germany and the UK, whose battlegroups were on standby for an EU mission, opposed an EU action. The UK argued that the UN had to be more effective. In fact, the British troops which were in name its battlegroups for the EU were actually resting between their deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany raised concerns about being used as a cover for ‘certain partners’ to legitimize intervention in their former colonies and rejected to be influenced by factors that led to its participation in previous EU missions in Africa. It is interesting that, on this issue even the French argued that the UN should reshuffle 17,000 soldiers who were based in various parts of the DRC in order to

38 Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the EU military operation in support of the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) during the election process, 27 April 2006.
41 Menon, Empowering, p. 236
reinforce the weak existence of 800 soldiers in Goma (eastern Congo), where violence escalated.\textsuperscript{42} Arguably, another explanation for this EU inaction is the possibility that these EU member states waited for the ongoing secret talks between the DRC and Rwanda\textsuperscript{43} to bear fruit against the rebel leader who wreaked havoc in eastern Congo at the time. Therefore, this case shows that the impact of the EU goal to implement multilateralism by working in cooperation with the UN fades into the background depending on the situation on the ground.

Developments in or preferences of the target country and regional actors as well as the member states’ domestic reservations based on these also explain why the EU member states decided not to extend the security sector reform mission they launched in Guinea-Bissau in 2008. This mission was compromised by the lack of available personnel and the inability of the host country in laying down the necessary conditions for its work. Increasing risks after an attempted coup in the country led the EU to end its involvement in Guinea-Bissau through this mission and leave the area to the UN.\textsuperscript{44}

The next EU military mission to Africa, EUFOR Tchad/RCA aimed to contribute to the protection of the UN personnel, facilities and equipment as well as the refugees and displaced persons that mostly fled Sudan.\textsuperscript{45} The mission once again reveals that the EU crisis management missions take place within the room for manoeuvre that the member state, the EU and the international levels (including the target country preferences) allow. While France pushed the EU to take action, many member states, including the UK, shared the concern “about the refugee crisis and the possibility that genocide might be occurring in Darfur, which gave rise to a diffuse sense that the EU needed to be seen ‘doing something’”.\textsuperscript{46} However, the member states insisted that the force should operate in an impartial manner, since they did not want to be associated with the French support to the regime of Idris Déby in Chad, which was under threat by the rebels that were supported by the Sudanese regime. The inscription of neutrality to the mission made it possible for Ireland (a neutral EU member state) to take its command, although the French had to provide much of the personnel after five force-generation conferences within the EU did not produce sufficient troops. Besides, the mission’s mandate was limited at the Chadian President Idris Déby’s insistence that he would not accept a mission on the border between Chad and Sudan. Moreover, despite the UN estimates for an adequate force to be much higher, the EU member states could only afford 3700 troops, given the simultaneous NATO requests for increased contributions in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{47}

Another EU military mission, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (Somalia) has been a response to the UN Security Council’s calls for protecting the delivery of UN humanitarian assistance through


\textsuperscript{47} Haine, The Failure, p. 594-595.
the World Food Programme to Somalia. As usual, France advocated an EU operation, since this would help its own anti-piracy policy and improve the EU’s security policy. Germany’s preference for an EU mission was a result of the government’s concern to avoid public criticisms against participation in another ‘controversial’ NATO or US-led operation, as in Afghanistan. For Britain, NATO would have been the first choice. However, since NATO was overstretched, an EU mission was useful in order to relieve the burden on the US and NATO for other activities. Moreover, the British permanent representation to the EU saw this as an opportunity to defy arguments that the UK was not sufficiently contributing to the ESDP. The UK’s positive response was also motivated by the “lobbying by private sector actors keen to maintain London’s status as the city that hosts the International Maritime Organisation and a major international hub for commercial shipping”. It is also notable that the secretary-general of the European Community Ship-owners Association (ECSA), which claims to speak for 41 percent of the global merchant fleet, was calling on the EU member states to take more forceful action in the area. As a result, the mission’s operational headquarters has been Northwood, UK. This military/naval operation was followed by an EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) in 2010, which aimed at training of Somali soldiers in Uganda, a secure environment that avoids domestic repercussions.

As can be seen, there is a pattern that shapes the EU’s decisions on crisis management missions, despite the fact that the EU does not have a programme or agreement that guides its choices of missions, as many scholars point out. While member states’ preferences are clearly under the influence of a common interest to improve the credibility of the EU as a security actor, domestic reservations about risks and costs, considerations about other actors, such as the US, the UN, NATO but also the target country and regional actors exert simultaneous pressure on these. The need to engage in an extended three-level analysis that includes these could not be clearer in the example of recent Libyan crisis. Britain and France cooperated with the USA and the Arab League and eventually NATO has provided the organizational framework for the enforcement of a no-fly zone. Germany abstained during the UN Security Council vote on the resolution which made this action possible. The EU member states were divided over the appropriate response to the situation in Libya and they lacked the collective capability to sustain such a military operation without American support. Had the EU’s institutional goals and interests been the only effects on its member state preferences, these should have prompted action under the EU umbrella in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis in a neighbouring country.

Conclusion

This article has also shown that the impact of the EU’s institutional context on member state preferences is not an inevitable dynamic when it comes to launching crisis management missions. Dynamics at the international or member state level may work to undermine the influence of the EU’s institutional context and result in its inaction, as shown by the failure to

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49 Germond and E. Smith, Re-Thinking, p. 584-585.
50 Chafer, Anglo-French, p. 80.
51 Germond and E. Smith, Re-Thinking, p. 580.
53 Rummel, In Search, p. 612.
launch a military crisis management mission to the DRC in 2008, despite the UN request. What makes Africa the most convenient area for the EU actions are the permissive conditions at the international level, including the indifference (NATO, the USA) or weakness (the UN) of other international actors and the relative ease of approval for these missions by the actors in the region who would prefer the EU’s action to individual actions of former colonial powers.

As the section on Operation Artemis has been shown, even a prior agreement between Britain and France on jointly addressing African security problems was not a guarantee that this EU mission was going to be launched. Above mentioned permissive conditions at the international level facilitated the impact of the EU’s institutional context, which calls for fulfilling the common goal of projecting an EU image as a credible security actor. For instance, German decisions in favour of the EU crisis management missions in Africa have been results of the member state, the EU and international level dynamics, although military intervention in Africa has not traditionally been part of German foreign policy. These decisions were limited by domestic reservations about neutrality, casualty avoidance, early exit and costs. However, through these Germany tried to fulfil its commitments to improve the Franco-German cooperation, multilateralism with the UN and the ESDP/CSDP.\(^{54}\)

In addition to these, cases of inaction or limited action by the EU in Africa strengthen the relevance of an analysis that highlights the interaction between three levels for explaining the deployment of EU crisis management missions. Developments or preferences of actors at the international level influence member state decisions on the EU crisis management missions. For instance, in all the EU missions launched in Africa, British preferences have been shaped under the influence of the US and NATO positions. The British priorities to act through NATO in order support the African Union in Sudan and to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya exemplify this. Moreover, the EU member states seek endorsement from the target country or regional actors and this not only factors in the decisions about the scope of the mission but also whether there is going to be a mission or not. The EU failed to launch a mission to Sudan partly because of this and geographical limits to the operation mandates of Artemis (2003) and EUFOR TChad (2008) were shaped under the influence of preferences of the target country or regional actors.

To conclude, in order to arrive at a full understanding of why certain EU missions to Africa materialize, whilst others fail a three-level analysis is needed. While member states’ preferences are under the influence of a common concern to develop the EU’s security and defence policy by addressing Africa’s security problems, domestic reservations and considerations about other actors at the international arena, particularly the UN, the US and NATO, as well as the responses of the target country or regional actors influence these preferences simultaneously. To reiterate, the EU crisis management missions to Africa and, possibly other areas take place within the room for manoeuvre that the member state, the EU and international levels allow.

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\[^{54}\text{Haine, The Failure, p. 597.}\]


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