Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods’ National Role Conceptions

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Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods’ National Role Conceptions

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ABSTRACT

This article examines Turkish national role conceptions (NRCs) during 1980–2014 based on the policy statements of eighteen Turkish foreign policy-makers. It questions change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy behaviour by evaluating ‘pre-AKP’ and ‘AKP’ (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) periods. Role theory is employed as theoretical framework to reveal and assess Turkey’s position in global affairs. The NRCs that Turkish foreign policy makers adopted in these periods suggests that there has been both a change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy since 1980.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Role Theory, National Role Conceptions.

Türk Dış Politikasında Değişim ve Süreklilik: AKP ve AKP-Öncesi Dönemlerin Ulusal Role Kavramsallaştırmalarını Karşılaştırmak

ÖZET


 Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Rol Teorisi, Ulusal Rol Kavramları.
Introduction

The main aim in this article is to answer whether there is change or continuity in Turkish foreign policy behaviour especially during the AKP period. Since AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002 policy making elites have aimed to increase Turkey’s sphere of influence in all regions by following proactive policies, which from time to time raised the issue of whether Turkey was moving away from the Western alliance.

The study of foreign policy primarily aims to understand and explore foreign policy behaviours of actors in global affairs in order to describe and analyse international phenomenon. Utilizing role theory, this paper offers an explanation to understand the changing Turkish foreign policy behaviours since 1980 by comparing “pre-AKP” and “AKP” periods’ national role conceptions (NRCs) to see if a change is noticeable. In this way, the article aims to assess the numerous NRCs of “pre-AKP” and “AKP” periods. By analysing Turkish foreign policy behaviours in these periods, it is also possible to reveal difference between governments and leaders based on their specific emphasis on certain NRCs. Role theory and NRCs indicates that there is continuity without significant change in Turkish foreign policy since 1980.

The article consists of three parts. The first part introduces theoretical framework and a summary of the main points of the role theory. The second part deals with the methodology utilized and explain how qualitative content analysis method is conducted. Finally, in the third part of the article, we discuss the research results of role theory in the “pre-AKP” and “AKP” periods and assess Turkey’s national role formation between 1980 and 2014.

Conceptual Framework: The Role Theory

The concept of role was borrowed from the theatre and then adopted in 1930s in social psychology, sociology and anthropology, and later integrated to foreign policy analysis in 1970s. K. J. Holsti’s article, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” initiated the conceptualization of role theory from sociology and adaptation to foreign policy analysis (FPA). His work focuses on the role of leaders to explain and understand the behaviour of states in the international structure through NRCs. Leaders are the representatives of the states at the international level. Therefore, their views and perceptions of the roles that their nations ought to play in the system are important. Leaders’ self-view is also important in determining whether to continue with existing roles or to change them.

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2 Târık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”, Turkish Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 2008, p.3-20; Soner Çağaptay, “Turkey’s Turn from the West”, The Washington Post, 2 February 2009; Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning away from the West?”, Insight Turkey, Vol.12, No.1, 2009, p.205-225.
Role is simply the duties and obligations attached to a status. The definition of the role in foreign policy refers to the perception of the decision makers regarding the duties and obligations of states in the international system. In this context, role consists of a set of expectations attached to state behavior in world affairs. According to Holsti's work, there are three main concepts to understand the role theory: Role expectation, role performance and role conception.

Role expectation is the compromise between ego (self) and alter's (other) expectations. Ego expectation refers to the individual's expectation of what the appropriate role is, and alter expectation refers to the expectation of other actors. In politics, expectations come from self (leaders) and others (other actors in international structure).

Role Performance is the leaders' perceptions that guide them to carry out expected role performances to achieve desired position on the international stage. Holsti defines role performance as "the general foreign policy behaviour of governments [that] includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments toward other states."

Role conception can be defined as a guiding road map based on normative principles that help decision makers to realize expected foreign policy behaviours from themselves and others. Basically, role conceptions help decision makers to simplify political issues. The concept of National Role Conception (NRC) was added to the role theory literature by Holsti. He defines the NRC as:

the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, that their state should perform incessantly in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or within, the external environment.

Adigbuo defines NRCs from leaders' perspective because leaders formulate these conceptions according to their inter-subjective belief. He claims that leaders' inter-subjective "sense of what the nation naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena." Since 1970s, both the number of role theorists in the field of foreign policy analysis and the number of role conceptions have increased.

On the other hand, the literature on foreign policy change is rare and there is a lack of commonly agreed indicators to explain foreign policy change. However, leader driven change is
one of the explanations. The head of the state imposes certain foreign policies and is capable to enforce changes. The NRCs are socially and historically shared concepts and their change and continuation also depend on leadership and administrative changes. The “policy makers’ perceptions of the state’s capability and opportunity to act in the international system” remain the main determinant of NRCs. Cabinet and leadership change is important in understanding policy changes and foreign policy formulations, especially considering the fact that policy making processes and outcomes change as new people come into leadership positions. Therefore, it is important to analyse different leaderships in Turkey during the period between 1980 and 2014. This is important due to differences in ideas, visions, opinions and policies of the various leaders during these periods.

As a theoretical framework, role theory is applicable to different governments, different periods and multiple leaders. This allows us to simultaneously compare and contrast the evolution of NRCs between different periods and leaderships. Therefore, role theory can be adaptable to any period and leader to reveal Turkish foreign policy behaviours and Turkey’s positions in the international system.

**Methodology**

The Turkish NRCs are derived from the policy statements of high-level Turkish decision makers between 1980 and 2014 (see Table 1 for the list of key political figures). It is important to include the Cold War period in this study as it is possible in this way to observe changes and evolution of NRCs over a period.

Coplin argues that the dynamics of the international system determines how a state would behave. Hence, the end of the Cold War generated important changes in states’ policies. As Holsti, Siverson and George underline, “system transformations may also involve the extension of new, or abandonment of previous, commitments and therefore signify a change in the goals and/or objectives of participating actors.” In this context, by analysing the Cold War period it is possible to notice changes of Turkish NRCs, because the change in the system might require adopting new policies that are compatible with the changing environment. Since the 1980s, there have been changes and developments in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish policy makers assumed new roles and commitments vis-à-vis its surrounding regions in a bid to meet and fulfil expectations through different NRCs.

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15 Ibid., p.11-12.
Table 1. Key Political figures in Turkish foreign policy between 1980 and 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Figures</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bülend Ulusu</td>
<td>September 21, 1980 –December 13, 1983</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İltüret Türkmên</td>
<td>September 21, 1980 – November 24, 1983</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenan Evren</td>
<td>November 9, 1982 – November 9, 1989</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgut Özal</td>
<td>December 13, 1983 – October 29, 1989</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Demirel</td>
<td>November 20, 1991 – May 16, 1993</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansu Çiller</td>
<td>June 25, 1993 – March 6, 1996</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesut Yılmaz</td>
<td>June 30, 1997 – January 11, 1999</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İsmail Cem</td>
<td>June 30, 1997 – July 11, 2002</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bülent Ecevit</td>
<td>January 11, 1999 – November 18, 2002</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Necdet Sezer</td>
<td>May 16, 2000 – August 28, 2007</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Gül</td>
<td>March 14, 2003 – August 28, 2007</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</td>
<td>March 14, 2003 – August 28, 2014</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Davutoğlu</td>
<td>May 2, 2009 – August 28, 2014</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main focus in this article is to reveal number of NRCs that were introduced by leaders under different governments in order to capture the static and changing dynamic of Turkish foreign policy behaviours. The article proceeded in two stages. The first stage was the collection of relevant official policy speeches, press conferences and interviews that cover the period between 1980 and 2014. In the second stage, qualitative content analysis method was employed to analyse leaders’ policy statements based on the typology of NRCs. The article relies on the following specific criteria for the selection of speeches that is used in qualitative content analysis:

(a) Only official speeches and interviews relevant to foreign policy and international relations.
(b) Transcripts both in Turkish and English language.
(c) Speeches delivered in various situations and places including parliamentary speeches, annual press conferences, invitational events, conferences, forums and symposiums.
(d) No limit in length of speeches.

The article looked at all the speeches except those that did not fit the criteria. Therefore no sampling strategies were used. The qualitative content analysis part of the coding was conducted with
the assistance of ATLAS.ti data analysis software. In qualitative content analysis technique over 1400 official speeches of eighteen leaders were analysed.\textsuperscript{21}

Some of the leaders’ statements and policy documents were readily available online and had been gathered from official government websites. However, most of the documentation prior to the 2000s were not available electronically so they were collected from the National Library in Ankara, Turkey, and were transformed into digital format for coding purposes.

Typology of NRCs of Turkey in 1980–2014 is as follows:

1. \textit{Regional Leader}: States feel responsible to handle situation and feel responsible for other states in the region.
2. \textit{Regional Protector}: States feel special responsibility to handle regional issues and provide secure environment in the region.
3. \textit{Active Independent}: States formulate their foreign policies independently according to their own national interest rather than the interests of others (as non-aligned states). According to Holsti “the themes suggest active efforts to cultivate relations with as many states as possible and occasional interposition into bloc conflicts. The role conception emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world.”\textsuperscript{22}
4. \textit{Liberation Supporter}: Informal support for liberation movements abroad, though in this national role, conception state does not have responsibility to support it like bastion states.
5. \textit{Mediator-integrator}: States feel responsible to resolve conflicts between other states as a third party.
6. \textit{Regional-subsystem collaborator}: States feel commitments to cooperate in order to achieve wider and better communities.
7. \textit{Developer}: States feel responsible to help or assist underdeveloped countries.
8. \textit{Bridge}: States offers as a common communicator between different countries and cultures and provide exchange of ideas and values.
9. \textit{Faithful Ally}: States have commitment to support policies of other governments in the form of special alliance.
10. \textit{Independent}: In this form of non-alignment, self-determination concept is important as states implement policies in order to reach their national interest without looking at other states’ interests or objectives. “Most statements affirming commitment to the policy of non-alignment indicate that the government will make policy decisions according to the state’s own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other state(s).”\textsuperscript{23}
11. \textit{Example}: States aim to promote their own policies and values in order to increase their influence and prestige in international affairs which refers to be a model for other state.
12. \textit{Protectee}: States feel responsible to provide security and protect other states

\textsuperscript{21} Total coded number of speeches is 1437, though original numbers of speeches were larger than this. However some statements were considered ambiguous after several readings and they were discarded and not included the total number of speeches that were eventually analyzed. The eight hundred and twenty-nine sources were coded for pre-AKP 1980-2002 period and six hundred and eight official speeches were coded for the AKP period between 2002 and 2014.
\textsuperscript{22} Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, p.262.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p.268.
13. **Central Country:** This concept was introduced by Davutoğlu to Turkish foreign policy literature. According to him Turkey as a “central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region.”

14. **Military power:** States’ capacity to use force or the threat of force to influence other states.

15. **Soft power:** States’ “ability to shape the preferences of others” with persuasion than using force. The concept also refers to the means of persuasion to resolve international conflicts.

16. **Strategic Partner:** States that shares policy views on important issues such as economy, regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, and terrorism.

17. **Peace Promoter:** States feel responsible to promote peace by sponsoring or facilitating the integration between conflicting parties.

18. **Global Actor:** States aim to gain more influence in global arena by intervening in global issues and using international platforms

19. **Energy Hub:** States have geostrategic advantage and located between energy rich countries and energy dependent countries.

20. **Rising Power:** States show increasing prominence in their region and play significant role in global affairs; political strength and economic growth.

21. **Facilitator:** States’ effort to facilitate peace talks to maintain dialogue.

22. **Antiterrorism Agent:** States’ fight against terrorism both in national and international level.

23. **Trading state:** States’ increasing trade activities, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.

24. **Kin-country:** States or groups belonging to one civilization naturally try to support from other members of their civilization when they involve in an armed conflict with states or groups from a different civilization.

25. **Regional integrator:** States integrate different regions through economic and political treaties.

26. **Smart Power:** States balance its soft power and hard power through smart strategies.

27. **Leader of Muslim World:** States feel responsible to handle situations related with Muslim countries and feel responsible for Muslim people around the world.

28. **Pro-American:** States have favourable opinion towards America.

29. **Virtuous Power:** States act beyond pragmatic mentality for the best interest of the region beyond its national interest.

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30. **Global Sub-system collaborator**: States feel commitments to cooperate in order to achieve wider and better communities in global context.

31. **Regional Power**: States have power within a geographic region to shape regional developments.

32. **Defender of the Muslim World**: States feel responsible to protect Muslim countries against any attack.

33. **Developing Country**: States have lower living standards and lower industrial production, and highly dependent on foreign financial and technical aid.

The first twelve roles are Holsti’s typology of NRC, while the rest have been found in the official statements of Turkish leaders and formulated by authors.

**Change or Continuity: Turkish NRCs between 1980 and 2014**

In this part of the article, we explore AKP’s new foreign policy activism and compare NRCs findings of “pre-AKP” and “AKP” periods. In total 1437 official speeches were coded for 1980-2014 period. Figure 1 indicates “pre-AKP” period NRCs by numbers.

**Figure 1. “Pre-AKP” Period NRCs**

![Figure 1](image)

During the military regime, Turkey was isolated by Western countries following the September 12, 1980 *coup d'état* and looked for cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries. As a result of this policy, Turkey adopted a “liberator supporter” NRC for Palestine’s right to self-determination. Nevertheless, during this period the military elite strongly emphasized the alliance with the West due to the Cold War politics. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy elites have reshaped the country’s domestic and foreign policies. In this new era, the AKP’s foreign policy makers sought to exploit Turkey’s geostrategic significance by developing and improving its relations with all the neighbouring regions based on mainly soft power and economic interdependencies. Furthermore the AKP governments have aimed to redefine Turkish position

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29 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," *Turkish Studies*, Vol.12, No.4, 2011, p.578.
in global affairs by establishing a new set of foreign policy principles. In this period, Turkey’s Muslim background also became one of the bases of the interests that shaped the country’s foreign policy strategies and NRCs.

Ahmet Davutoğlu was the main architect of AKP’s foreign policy agenda during this period and has formulated several new foreign policy principles. When he became Foreign Minister in 2009, he was able to put into practice the foreign policy arguments he had earlier presented in his book Strategic Depth.30 In the book, he describes a new strategic vision and an increased role for Turkey in the international system through re-assessment of the country’s strategic position in the context of the systemic transformation of world politics. Davutoğlu’s vision of strategic depth aimed at “placing Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical areas of influence”31 by exploiting the country’s historical and geopolitical importance. Davutoğlu outlines three methodological principles of Turkey’s new foreign policies: “Vision oriented”32 policies at the end of the Cold War; “systemic framework”, 33 and “soft power”.34 These methodological principles were the basis of Turkey’s new vision for international performance, and they were complemented by five new operational foreign policy principles: (1) balance between freedom and security (i.e., balance between national security and citizens’ freedom); the (2) “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbours” by improving relations with all neighbours; (3) developing relations with neighbouring regions and beyond through diplomatic discourse and engagement in mediation and political dialogue; (4) using multidimensional (i.e., moving beyond security issues and adding economic, cultural, and political values to promote cultural co-existence) and multi-track (i.e., moving beyond the state-centric understanding toward plurality) policies; (5) rhythmic diplomacy, which involves participating in global and regional matters on international platforms to contribute to peace and prosperity.35 These assertive foreign policy principles aimed at establishing a new style in the country’s foreign policy making, and through these policies, Davutoğlu tried to push through a new set of foreign policy principles based on what he called “normalization” and “de-securitization”36 of Turkish foreign policy by changing the security perceptions of the country embedded in its political culture.37 To promote his policies, Davutoğlu emphasized Turkey’s geographic and historical depths. He argued that by utilizing these depths, Turkey would obtain its deserved position in the regional and international arenas. See Figure 2 for the “AKP” period NRCs.

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
During the AKP period, decision makers put more emphasizes on Turkey’s national interest over its responsibilities as a “faithful ally”, but have also paid special attention not to jeopardize their relations with their allies. Davutoğlu’s strategic depth doctrine challenged Turkey’s “faithful ally” role as Davutoğlu aimed at pursuing more self-confident and independent foreign policy as an “active independent” actor. This was visible especially during the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the March 1, 2003 Bill that if approved, would have allowed the American soldiers to initiate the invasion of Iraq from Turkish soil.38 When Prime Minister Erdoğan evaluated Turkish foreign policy regarding its position in the Iraq four months after the general elections on March 29, 2003, his assessment showed his belief that being a faithful ally to the West does not clash with Turkey’s “active independent” NRC.39 Figure 3 provides comparative results of NRCs among “pre-AKP” and “AKP” Periods.


39 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Speech given at the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of the presentation of 2004 annual budget resolution on March 29, 2003.
Although the soft power concept was introduced by Joseph Nye in late 1980s, it was never used by “pre-AKP” elites to define Turkish foreign policy. Due to Turkey’s insecure neighbourhood and the so-called Sèvres Syndrome, it was argued that both domestic policy and foreign policies of Turkey had been shaped by leaders’ perceptions based on past fears of imminent territorial disintegration of the Republic. Therefore, the perceptions and psychological inclinations of the state leaders had been overwhelmed by the “Serve Syndrome” after the traumatic experience of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920 at the end of the WWI and contemplated to disintegrate what was left the last parts of the Ottoman Empire. It was nevertheless was overturned by the Turkish Independence War and replaced by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.  

Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbours” policy generally aimed at improving Turkey’s relation with all its neighbours. Turkish policymakers at this time believed that the best way to have zero problems with neighbours was through regional cooperation. Thus various trade partnerships for regional cooperation and welfare were created, to achieve a peaceful region for all, and this policy was in line with the soft power concept in his speech when he was the foreign minister. Abdullah Gül pointed out that its consolidated democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the market economy make Turkey a soft power and a centre of attraction.


promoted Turkey’s “regional-subsystem collaborator” role. As Turkey sought maximum cooperation with its neighbouring countries through economic interdependency, it established high strategic council meetings with countries that previously had problematic relations such as Russia due to the Cold War politics, Greece as a result of Cyprus problem, and Syria and Iraq mostly for their support to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party).

During the 1980s, even after the end of the military regime, military elites continued to consolidate their existence in Turkish politics. President Kenan Evren dominated foreign policy making and Prime Minister Turgut Özal mostly focused on domestic issues and economic reconstruction during the Motherland Party governments of 1980s. For Özal’s Turkey, economic growth was the most important component of Turkish foreign policy, which in turn transformed Turkey gradually into a “regional power” and strongly emphasized Turkey’s role as a “bridge” between the West and the East. On the other hand, Davutoğlu rejected Turkey’s “bridge” country role, viewing it as a passing platform simply connecting continents or the Western and the Eastern blocs. He defined Turkey’s new geopolitical NRC as a “central country”. According to Davutoğlu, “a central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.” He believed that a bridge was a passive and an artificial creation, and thus the AKP’s decision making elite has replaced “bridge” NRC with that of a “central country” NRC.

During the military regime and Motherland Party governments (most of 1980s and early 1990s) Turkey’s “regional-subsystem collaborator” NRC was popular among all leaders. It was followed by Turkey’s “protectee”, “rising power” and “faithful ally” NRCs (see Figure 1). The end of the Cold War transformed Turkish foreign policy and raised both the risks and opportunities for Turkey. Turkish policy making elite started to frequently use Turkey’s historical, cultural and linguistic commonalities toward former Soviet countries and Central Asian Turkic states which promoted Turkey as an “example” or model for these countries. During the DYP-SHP coalition government between November 20, 1991 and May 16, 1993 “example” NRC became the centre of Turkish foreign policy by focusing on pan-Turkist cooperation. During the coalition government leaders used the “example” NRC twenty-three times in their official speeches. By adopting both “developer” and an “example” NRCs, President Özal for example led the establishment of a Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in 1992 which was initially established as a technical organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an aim to provide development assistance to emerging Turkic Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly TIKA and Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları, THY) played an important role in Turkey’s active engagement in its neighbourhood and beyond. As a result Erdoğan stated in 2010 that through TIKA, Turkey provided 52 million USD in assistance to the Caucasus and Turkic countries between 1992 and 2002. However during the AKP period,

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42 See Turgut Özal, The opening speech given at the “Work Week” organized by the Commission of the European Communities and Turkey, on September 12, 1988; Vahit Halefoğlu, “World Economic Form”, Speech given at the roundtable meeting in Istanbul, on March 21, 1985; Kenan Evren, “Malaysia TV Interview”, Speech given for TV interview on February 1, 1989.
44 Ibid., p.78-79.
45 DYP and SHP coalition government DYP stands for Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) and SHP stands for Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
this assistance increased to 128 million USD for 2003-2009 period, and compared to 2002, the number of Programme Coordination Offices increased from 12 to 25 in 2011, and to 33 in 2012. Thus through TIKA, the AKP played a “developer” role by turning the country into a donor as well. As a result, Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 2006 and 2009 reached to 700 million USD and in 2010, it had provided 996 million USD in development assistance to 131 countries. In short, Turkish foreign policy makers prompted Turkey’s “developer” role through this NRC in the last decade and increased Turkey’s visibility in the world, which also helped to establish good relations especially with developing countries.

The “example” NRC was on the other hand mostly used as “Turkish model” among the Turkish leaders. This NRC regained popularity during AKP especially following Turkey’s accession talks with the EU and during the Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). During this period, Turkey seemed to successfully reconcile its Muslim identity and Western values, followed a somewhat independent foreign policy and created economic growth. These positive developments promoted Turkey as a model for regional states that were undergoing political transformations. Following the Arab uprisings, the U.S. and the EU have also promoted the “Turkish model” in the region. Turkish foreign policy makers however, insisted that the country was not willing to be a model but could possibly be an inspiration by helping to provide the Turkish experience to those who desired it. Therefore Turkey, as a “rising power” and an “example” in the post-Arab uprisings period, also became a source of inspiration to other countries.

During the RP-DYP coalition government under Necmettin Erbakan’s leadership between June 28, 1996 and June 30 1997 Turkey established closer relations with Muslim countries through a “regional-subsystem collaborator” role. This NRC mentioned nine times by Prime Minister Erbakan and ten more times by other officials. Following the February 28 decisions and Erbakan’s resignation, Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries rapidly deteriorated. The following ANAP–DSP–DTP coalition government experienced failures in foreign policy related issues, such as increased tension with Syria due to Syria’s support for the PKK and the EU did not declare Turkey as a candidate country during the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. During this period Turkish policy makers had to deal domestically with an ever-increasing violent conflict with the Kurdish separatist

47 Ibid.
52 See Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
53 RP stands for Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
55 ANAP-DSP and DYP stands for Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), and Demokrat Turkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party) respectively.
terror organization, the PKK. Therefore, “anti-terrorism agent” NRC dominated Turkish politics during the ANAP–DSP–DTP coalition government between June 30, 1997 and January 11, 1999.

Energy was the most important component of the following DSP–MHP–ANAP\textsuperscript{56} coalition government served from 28 May 1999–18 November 2002. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project promoted both Turkey’s interest in the region and regional cooperation, and highlighted Turkey as an emerging key actor in the region as an “energy hub”. Although Turkey is neither an energy rich country nor has access to energy, its unique location gives it the potential to turn the country into an “energy hub” through bilateral treaties such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. The project has been the centre of the East-West energy corridor that connects trans-Caspian energy resources through Turkey to Europe and also enables Turkey to access Central Asia. The AKP decision makers, too, continued to emphasizes Turkey’s “energy hub” NRC.

During the AKP period, decision making elites mainly stressed Turkey’s “regional-subsystem collaborator” NRC. In this regard, Turkey’s multiregional foreign policy aimed to transform Turkey into a “regional power” and eventually into a “global power”.\textsuperscript{57} Davutoğlu underlined the significance of the “regional-subsystem collaborator” role as a part of his doctrine:

Student depth also rests on creating a sense of regional ownership based on shared interests and common ideals. This can be achieved only through a more effective regional cooperation and active engagement with all regional systems in our neighbourhood... This is why Turkey supports and seeks to promote regional cooperation in its neighbourhood and to boost the profile of regional organizations for that purpose.\textsuperscript{58}

Davutoğlu emphasized that Turkey’s “collective effort will make Turkey a global actor in this century. Turkey’s actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace.”\textsuperscript{59} He believed that Turkey through historical responsibility and contribution to the regional peace and stability eventually would get its deserved position and would be a ”global actor”. Davutoğlu’s rhythmic diplomacy principle was consistent with his “soft power” rhetoric and both “regional-subsystem collaborator” and “global-subsystem collaborator” NRCs. In this way, Turkish foreign policy makers were able to follow a vision based soft power strategies and implement a consistent foreign policy through increasing representation in international organizations. As a result, Turkey became a member in many regional organizations and also a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 2009-10 tenure, member of G-20 (Group of 20), member of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and NATO, OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), and to ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), and has an observer status in the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and in the Arab League.\textsuperscript{60} Turkey’s multilateral diplomacy and as a “rising power” and “developer” state, Turkey became more visible in international platforms. Turkey’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{56} DSP–MHP and ANAP stands for Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), Miliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party), Anavatan Partisi, (Motherland Party) respectively.
\textsuperscript{58} Ahmet Davutoğlu, Interview with Davutoğlu, \textit{AUC Cairo Review (Egypt)}.
\textsuperscript{60} Ahmet Davutoğlu, Interview with Davutoğlu, \textit{AUC Cairo Review (Egypt)}.
\end{footnotesize}
contribution to the United Nations (UN) budget has tripled during the 2013-2015 period, thus Turkey’s rank among the top contributors to the UN budget rose from 25th to 16th and became a full member of the “Geneva Group”, bringing together countries which contribute more than one per cent to the regular budget of the United Nations.61

Turkey’s “developer” role as a commitment to help developing countries became its responsibility as a “global actor” in this period. For instance, Turkey’s financial aid to the Pacific Island States for their development is an evident of its increasing global sensitivity as a “developer” states Turkey does not benefit directly their development. In a similar fashion, Turkey’s capability and commitment to the African countries as a “developer” state also promoted Turkey’s rising power aspirations. Turkey also played a “developer” role as being a donor for various international organizations, such as a 12 million USD donation to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN between the years 2005 and 2006 600,000 USD to the newly-founded “Central Emergency Response Fund”.62

Another prominent NRC during the AKP tenure has been that of the “defender of the Muslim world” NRC, which was used twenty-one times. Davutoğlu alone used it eleven times; he states that Turkey has a responsibility and commitment to protect Muslim countries under oppression.63 This role has been also consistent with the “leader of the Muslim world” NRC. A “leader of the Muslim world” NRC is based on Turkish leaders’ perception of Turkey’s responsibility to handle situations related with Muslim countries and its commitment towards Muslim people around the world. For example, during the OIC conference in August 12, 2014 Davutoğlu underlined the responsibility of the Islamic world to defend the rights of the Palestinian people from Israeli aggression and the necessity for delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza.64 Thus Turkey’s “regional leader” and “global actor” roles included that of being the “leader and defender of the Muslim world” as well.

In the post-Arab uprisings period, Turkey’s economic and political relations have been challenged especially in Libya and Syria. In this period, Turkish foreign policy makers adopted their policies according to the changing environment. This time, Prime Minister Davutoğlu started to use a “smart power” NRC to identify Turkey’s new policy in line the post-Arab uprisings period.65 He also underscored Turkey’s “smart power” capacity as a response to Syria shooting down a Turkish jet in 2012.66 However, after this incident, Turkey changed its rules of engagement toward Syria and on September 16, 2013, shot down a Syrian helicopter, and on March 23, 2014 a Syrian jet when it violated Turkish airspace.67

63 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Speech delivered at the Expanded Extraordinary Meeting of OIC Executive Committee, 12 August 2014, Jeddah.
64 Ibid.
65 The concept of smart power was developed by Joseph Nye to describe the concept of power as a balance between soft power and hard power. According to Nye, there are three ways to influence the behavior of others to obtain a desired outcome: coercion, payment, and attraction. Nye argues that if a state desires to shape the preferences of others, it must follow smart strategies to blend hard power and soft power tools. See Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
67 Ibid.
In June 2013, the AKP’s plan to transform an urban space, Gezi Park in Istanbul into a shopping mall by reconstructing a former military barracks, which was demolished in 1940, triggered widespread anti-government demonstrations throughout Turkey. As the protests worsened the existing polarization between the Kemalist and nationalist circle and the AKP increased authoritarianism, polarization in Turkish society and excessive use of force against the protesters all had negative effects on Turkey’s image in the region, effective ending promotion of the “Turkish model” NRC. As a result, the usage of this NRC has sharply declined in the speeches of the leader after this.

The political transformations in the MENA region following the Arab Spring also challenged Turkey’s soft power potential, and Turkey started to face had difficulties with its “zero problems with neighbours” policy. Turkey’s worsening relations with Syria, Israel, Egypt, and Russia and its deteriorating ties with Iran over the Syrian crisis especially have resulted in country’s inability to shape events in its dynamic region. As a result, NRCs of “civilian power” and “smart power” have become less frequently in the rhetoric and implementation of foreign policy.

Conclusions

Turkish foreign policy has been gradually transformed since 1980. While Turkish policy making elite described Turkey only as a “developing country” in early 1980s, in 1990s Turkish leaders started to exploit Turkey’s geostrategic position in the post-Cold War era as a “regional leader”. Although Turkish leaders frequently used Turkey’s increasing “regional power” and “global power” desire during this period, they were not able to achieve it.

The most significant difference between the “pre-AKP” and “AKP” administrations is the increasing use of Turkey’s “regional-subsystem collaborator” NRC. In their speeches, the AKP foreign policy making elite strongly emphasized cooperative strategies and Turkey’s increasing role in regional cooperation. Accordingly, “regional protector”, “mediator-integrator”, “developer”, “facilitator”, “rising power”, and “global-subsystem collaborator” NRCs are ranked higher by the AKP administration than previous governments. For instance “regional protector” NRC is used eighteen times by “pre-AKP” administrations and hundred and twenty times by AKP policy maker, “pre-AKP” administrations used “developer” NRC twenty-eight times which was used hundred and thirteen times during the “AKP” period.

Davutoğlu’s foreign policy principles and Turkey’s re-engagement with the Middle East, especially the country’s rapprochement with Syria and Iran, have been perceived as moving Turkey away from the West and closer to the East. As a result, Turkey’s foreign policy activism especially in the Middle East has triggered a debate in the west about a “paradigm shift” in Turkish foreign policy. A series of events have also contributed to the belief that Turkey was moving away from

70 See Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy”; Çağaptay, “Turkey’s Turn from the West”; Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning away from the West?”.
72 In March 2003 Turkey refused to allow American troops to be deployed on its territory during the Iraq war. Also, Erdoğan stormed out of a World Economic Forum debate in Davos after a clash with Israeli President Simon Peres over
its Western alliances and toward new alignments with the Muslim world. However, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu strongly emphasized that Turkey’s new vision was not a departure from its previous Western-oriented policies, but simply adaptation to changing variables based on the changing realities of the international system. Therefore, it is possible to say that there has been both a change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy making elites during the AKP period have believed that the international environment is changing, so Turkey’s expectations and also others expectations from Turkey are changing. As a result Turkey’s role performance has changed as well. Especially Davutoğlu argued that the post-Cold War period, its surrounding regions, especially the former Ottoman territories, expected Turkey to play a more proactive role as a “regional-subsystem collaborator”, “example” and “developer” roles. Consequently, Turkish decision makers under AKP rule have aimed to fulfil “Turkey’s responsibilities” to these regions. In order to achieve this aim, AKP elites continued to emphasize on “pre-AKP” NRCs such as “example”, and “regional-subsystem collaborator”, and added new NRCs based on their self-expectation and perceptions of expectation of others, such as “soft power”, “central country”, “global-subsystem collaborator” and “global actor”. Without doubt, Turkey has become more visible in international platforms during the AKP governments, especially through “regional-subsystem collaborator”, “global-subsystem collaborator”, “developer”, “example” and “mediator and integrator” NRCs.

73 Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”.
74 See Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”.
75 Ibid.
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