POLITICAL REGIME DEBATES
IN TURKEY: IS IT REGIME QUESTION OR NOT?

TÜRKİYEYE SIYASİ REJİM TARTIŞMALARI:
SORUN REJİM SORUNU MUDUR?

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Abstract

Countries have different political regimes. Factors proving stability of the regimes are also different. Lacking of functions or corruption of some of these factors, i.e. being instable of regime, cause regime question. In Turkey, from its foundations up to the day, center has accused periphery for creating regime question by the mediation of political actors. Considered closely it is seen that, situations characterized as regime question in Turkey do not overlap the situations which are determined in political science literature as the situations which cause regime question. Consequently, the problem is not a regime question. In Turkey the problem grows out of structuring of the state, characteristics of modernization and narrowness of the political realm.

Key Words: Regime Question, Turkish Modernization, Narrowness of the Political Realm.

Öz


Anahtar Sözcükler: Rejim Sorunu, Türk Modernleşmesi, Siyasal Alanın Darlığı.
Introduction

In Turkey regime debates last to the first years of the Republic. Prior to transition to multi party system, in the period of Progressive Republican Party (TCP) and Free Republican Party (SCP) attempts, opposition parties were accused for creating regime question with respect to the opinions they delivered. 1950-60 period has been characterized as counter revolution afterwards, because of various executions of Democratic Party (DP). Within 1970-80 period when the country overcame a civil war caused by anarchy and terror, Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit, two active politicians of the period, accused each other for being an opponent of the regime. Motherland Party (ANAP) which came into power in 1983, was accused for restarting counter revolution process by the mediation of its executions.

Latterly, regime enmity and regime question has been on the agenda. This depends on Justice and Development Party (AKP) which made up country’s new cabinet. AKP which came into power with an important parliamentary majority accepted Turkey’s EU membership as initial objective. In accordance with this objective made many legal arrangements which stroke out a new course of civil – military relations, human rights, and state – society relations etc. However, several political sections made hard criticisms both prior to and after even every legal arrangement. Even, criticisms vary; since majority of the members of AKP was consisted of former Virtue Party members, which was abolished by Constitutional Court, because of its actions against secular republic principle. Criticisms annotated new arrangements as regime questions were important. Because of this member structure, AKP’s legitimacy within secular, democratic formation was seen moot.

From foundation of the Republic to the day, sometimes rulers has accused opposition for creating regime question and sometimes opposition has accused rulers for creating regime question. Factors causing regime debates and accusation of political party/parties representing periphery, for creating regime question vary. In Turkey, laying a significant stress on freedom of religion and liberty of consciousness of any political party at its program, interpretation of secularism principle as detachment of the state among various religion believers, and even sometimes working up of Constitutional disposal within written rules all may be interpreted as regime question. The actual reason for accusation of TCP and SCP, at Single Party Era, for creating regime question has been their stresses on liberties in general and to freedom of religion and conscious in particular. DP and ANAP also must be mentioned within political activities which are accused for being counter revolutionist because of their standing with freedom. Within the process of President Election, it has been mentioned several times that,
running of Constitutional rules as it is written may cause a regime question. Soysal (2006) predicting that running of Constitutional rules related to President election will cause in a regime question argues that:

An interesting situation: Normally, in every country, when Constitutional rules run exactly, everything goes well and crisis do not come; whereas in our country, if the President election and general elections will be held on time determined by the Constitution, there is no limit to dark scenarios thought from now on.

Even the visible parties of regime debates are government and opposition in fact, actual parties behind the scene are center and periphery. The accused parties are the parties representing periphery faculties of the society. Accusers are rather party/parties which are representatives of secular, bureaucratic, centralist and elitist center. Thus, the problem is reflection of the fault between center and periphery on political competition, rather than being a regime question. Centralization which has occurred in state formation process in Western Europe as coming up against of periphery and center with a multi dimensional and serial structure and as periphery faculties’ becoming a part of the power with protecting their autonomies has occurred in both Ottoman and Republican Era as one dimensional and confrontational. The most important discontinuity in Turkish politics, in other words this deep cliff between center and periphery has deepened gradually in later processes of modernization (Mardin, 1994: 37, 55). As reaction to exclusion effort of the center which is the “major tradition” of Turkish modernization process, from politics of the periphery, which is the “minor tradition”, the periphery has endeavored to infiltrate major tradition (Mardin, 1997: 187).

In this study it will be analyzed the actuality of the regime debates in Turkey. In other words, it will be analyzed that whether the situation determined as regime question is actually regime question or not. To this end, firstly concept of “regime” and regime typologies will be avowed, and then, development of Turkish political regime will be abridged. Lastly, requirements of a regime question will be displayed and it will be evaluated whether these factors exist in our country or not. In this context, it will be argued that it exists a contest in our country between center and periphery which keeps going on modernization process, arrangement of the state and how and how and around which principles political realm will be arranged, how it will be institutionally formed.
The Concept of Political Regime and Different Regime Typologies

The concept of “political regime” has several interrelated meanings. The concept means in international relations a whole of principles, norms, rules and decision making methods which are concededly used by political actors while acting, whereas in political science the concept means rules characterizing State’s formation, intra functioning and its relation with society. Gerardo L. Munck, argues that the concept of regime has two dimensions. These are formal and behavioral dimensions. Formal dimension contains following arrangements: (1) typology of actors who allow acquiring methods of major administrative statuses; (2) methods of acquiring these statuses; (3) methods used in taking binding orders. Behavioral dimension depends on the relationship among actors, formal rules and simple arrangements (Plasser et. al., 1998: 4). Similarly, Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch (1998:5) also argue that the concept of regime has two dimensions. The first dimension is related to administrative statuses and the second dimension is related to both political and civil society. Related to these two dimensions, the concept of regime contains following four elements: (1) absence of open negotiations on conflicts in the society; (2) participation to decision making process and mutual effect of the state and civil society on efficaciousness; (3) effect of the government on the society with respect to methods used in order to preserve present political regime (4) relation among state institutions with respect to decision making process. Macridis, (1986:2) defines political regime as follows: “a set of rules, methods and mentalities arranging the relations between state and society”. Reich (2002:2) argues that the concept of political regime is generally used in social sciences to indicate order of rules and norms both among civil servants and between civil servants and society. The concept is also used to indicate methods of policy making. Rules may be both formal and informal. Even Formal rules are rather predominantly legal; whereas methods are both predominantly legal and administrative; and mentalities are predominantly legal and based on administrative texts, both formal rules, methods and mentalities are predominantly socio-cultural and sociopolitical. The concept of political regime includes internal and external functioning of the state and also includes institutional formation of the state. In order to be able to make a definition including all factors above, a definition can be formed as follows: a political regime is an order consisted of formal or informal principles, norms and mentalities arranging state’s institutional formation, relations among institutions and relations between state and society in a country.
Various regime classifications have been formulized in literature. One reason of this is diversity of non-democratic regimes. The other reason is increase in number of democratic regimes after three democracy waves. In addition, growing old early of present classifications due to political changes (Linz, 1984:9) and; existence of regime classifications of premodern era make multiplicity of the classifications more clear.

In premodern era, many philosophers have made regime classification. From Plato to Aristoteles of Ancient Greek and from Montesquieu to Rosseau of the Enlightenment, it is possible to see detailed information about regime classification. Among the present day classifications are there three forms of classification: democracy and totalitarianism (Aron, 1976), democracy and dictatorship (Moore, 1966; Bobbio, 1989; Alvarez et al, 1996) totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic regimes (Gasiorowski, 1990). Besides these, there are also classifications under the name of hybrid regimes with respect to transitivity among regimes, rather than differentiating regimes with bold lines (Diamond, 2002). Hybrid Regimes of Diamond seems more functional since its analyses of various characteristics of a regime. Similarly, Political Regimes Project of Gasiorowski seems also more with respect to determining that which regime can be evaluated within which typology.

The concept of totalitarian was firstly used to describe the ideology of fascist Italy between 1920-1930. Reuse of the concept after 1950s has included communist regimes besides fascist regimes. Arendt has defined totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship in which ideology has an important role. Totalitarian ideology which aims at altering human nature, both provides legitimacy to the regime and, presents a road map including whole of totalitarian organizations (Brooker, 2000: 8-9). Arendt had not written his work on totalitarianism with an aim of contribution to comparative political science.

Friedrich and Brzezinski (1961:9) have displayed detailed characteristics of a totalitarian system and thus have made the concept of totalitarianism more functional for comparative political studies. According to them, a totalitarian system bears following characteristics: ideology, single party, a terrorist police force, monopoly in communication and arms, a centrally administrated economy. Similarly Aron (1976:284-85) argues that a totalitarian regime must hold following characteristics: a monopolist single party, an ideology giving weight to monopolist single party, state monopoly on mass media, state controlled economy and professional life, an ideological and detective terror caused by overlapping of whole life with the state.
Brooker (2000:17-8) who considers Arendt and Friedrich and Brzezinski’s theories as classical theories of totalitarianism, argues that it has been made important contributions to totalitarianism with second generation theories. Among these, Schapiro as a contribution to classical theories has added continuous mobilization, mass based legitimacy, coerciveness of legal order, existence of a totalitarian leader and the state as an administrative mechanism. Linz (1984:21) has underlined following reality related to totalitarian regimes: whole of the characteristics mentioned above must be hold by a state in order to be considered as a totalitarian state.

Another regime type existed in political regime typology is authoritarian regimes. According to Linz (1964:255) a political regime must hold following characteristics in order to be considered as an authoritarian one: a limited but not responsible political majority, having sui generic mentalities, lack of an intensive and widespread mobilization, a leader or a group of leaders using the power within predictable limits; rather than a detailed, guiding ideology.

Since authoritarian regimes do not necessitate intensive and broad mobilization of the governed, authoritarian regimes are based on a mentality rather than an ideology as totalitarian regimes. However, authoritarian regimes which are at the periphery of totalitarian regimes may be forced to embrace these authorities and use these for their purposes (Linz, 1984: 134-36). Authoritarian regimes can vary with respect to their purposes and structures. These variations are also reflected to authoritarian regimes typologies.

The third type which must be mentioned among regime typologies is democratic regimes. Przeworski, (1991:10) describes democracy as a regime within which political parties lose election. At another search, the definition used is determined as minimalist and it is pointed out that every regime is determined as democracy within which elections are held, and opposition party has a chance to come in power (Przeworski et. al. 1996: 39). Democracies necessitate other political institutions as well as periodic elections. Freedom of expression, alternative information sources, institutional autarchy, and making all citizens able to draw benefit from these, are other political institutions which are necessitated by democracies (Dahl, 2001: 89). The existence and performance of democracies are different phenomena. It is not possible to say that each present democracy has the same performance. Moreover, existence of democracy does not discourage arbitrariness of the governor. Especially a global increase in the number of democratic regimes after the third democracy
view has made performance of democracies more important; and caused in emergence of different democracy attributions.

**The Historical Background to the Evolution of Turkish Political Regime**

The way gone to Republic of Turkey began on 23rd of April, 1920 when Great National Assembly (GNA) is inaugurated. After nine months, GNA has made a written Constitution and promulgated in 21st of January, 1921. With this Constitution, an important step was taken to found a state based on national sovereignty. The system of 1921 Constitution was assembly government based on union of powers. Following legally ending of Ottoman Empire with the abolishment of Sultanate in 1922, the new Turkish State has been founded in 29th of October, 1923 with proclaiming of the republic. With the proclaiming of the Republic, there have been some modifications at 1921 Constitution towards parliamentary system and institutions of Presidency and Prime Ministry have been established. In 1924 the Parliament made a new Constitution. 1924 Constitution kept parliamentary government system which gave power of legitimation and execution to the parliament, on.

In 17th November 1924, the second party of Turkish political life was founded. TCP. The first political party is Republican People’s Party (CHP) which was founded in 9th of September, 1923 TCP, was a liberal disposed party which was founded by former fellows of Mustafa Kemal who were purged by renewing of parliamentary elections decision. The foundation of the first opposition party was not countervailed very optimistically by the two pioneering leaders of the regime.

On the 5th of June, TCP was closed down since it was associated with Şeyh Sait Rebellion, the press and opposition were silenced and all potential power focuses except Kemalists were abated (Zurcher, 1992: 114). Mustafa Kemal seeing that displeasures accelerating within the society in this extraordinary period lasted up to 1930 considered that there is a need to a new opposition party. For this aim, Mustafa Kemal wanted Fethi Okyar to found a new party. Seeing Fethi Okyar hesitant on this subject, Mustafa Kemal conveys that he would be impartial and thus convinces Fethi Okyar. The new party was founded on 12th of August, 1930 with the name Free Republican Party. However, as a result of the event broke out in Menemen country in December 23, 1930 and which is considered as reactionary, SCP was abolished, and from that time to 1946 a single party period was experienced.

The single party period was lived as a period in which freedoms of thought and expression were not ensured; there was not a limited Constitutional system, even it was aimed
at founding a foundation of a secular system, freedom of religion and consciousness was wildly limited. The development of the parties except the party in power was not permitted since it was considered as hazardous for newly established order. CHP did not confine itself only to hold the power; it also aimed at recreating the society towards its values. In this context, societal engineering has become the main mean. With all these characteristics mentioned above, in single party period, the regime has had an authoritarian characteristic, and at times it has also carried totalitarian characteristics. Even transition to multi party political time was achieved without blood and fighting, it has always sheltered important doubts in itself. During transition to multi party political life, the institutional structure of single party period has been protected except the number of political parties (Kara-Incioglu, 2000: 207). According to Karpat (1996) the main aim is a limited democracy with a relatively free opposition, without permitting a change in government.

1950-1960 period passed with a struggle between a hard opposition and majoritarian democracy mentality which limited the opposition, for Turkish democracy. DP made arrangements limiting political life to the parties except itself especially at his second power period; whereas it was trying for democratic winning when it was in opposition. The power-opposition relation which was out of democracy was ended by a coup d’état in 1960. Transition to political life after coup d’état emanated with a new Constitution. The new Constitution brought three new institutional innovations to the system. These were: two houses in the parliament, Constitutional Court and National Security Council (NSC)

The army intervened in the democracy via NCG as not getting along with democracy. In addition, with disintegration of the sovereignty, also civil bureaucracy became rather out of political control. In 1971 as a result of 1971 military memorandum, a government formed consisted of mostly technocrats and bureaucrats. Lastly, in 1980 multi party political life again interrupted because of another Coup d’état. It is tried to make constitutional democratic system work again after a new constitution, when army turned back to barracks in 1983. Again in 28th of February, 1997 Turkish democracy received another Coup d’état which was described as post-modern.

There are different opinions on description of Turkish political regime. Some writers argue that Turkish political regime is Turkish type of Bonapartism (Ozdemir, 1995: 241; Parla, 1994: 138). These writers predicate their argument on continuation of bureaucratic tutelage of military and civil bureaucracy which was seen as over parties and classes. Ozbudun (2003:135) describes Turkish democracy as delegative democracy concept of
O’Donnel. As O’Donnell (1994) mentions, even delegative democracies may be permanent, they are democracies which haven’t succeeded being consolidated. Mostly, dangers of an authoritarian flashback or a rapid advancement through representative democracy are not questions for these regimes.

There exist various criteria in classification of political regimes. Freedoms of organization and speech, election, number and qualification of political parties, representative state institutions, a total ideology, relation between political society-civil society and political coercion are some of these criteria. While Turkish political regime is examined with respect to these criteria we see such a scene: even sometimes it has been interrupted, there exist a democratic regime in Turkey. This democracy is institutionally liberal whereas it is illiberal form the perspectives of operation and essence. With respect to relation between political and civil society relation, it is seen that political society is more dominant and civil society can develop only within the margins which political will permits. Especially within the periods in which instinct of preservation of regime stands on the forefront, illiberal operation and essence of Turkish political regime intensively breaks itself. In the light of these evaluations, it can be argued that Turkish political regime is a hybrid regime. Turkish political regime is a democracy with respect to its name and institutions, however with respect to its operation and essence it is commonly authoritarian and partly totalitarian.²

**Situation in Turkey: A Regime Question (?)**

“Regime stability” concept is treated in different ways with respect to political stability. According to an opinion, political stability is lack of violence. The second opinion equals stability to continuity of the regime. The third opinion which focuses on regime and government structures treats stability as providing citizens to obey basic regulations; and capacity of forming attitudes supporting the regime. The fourth opinion treats stability related to many characteristics of governmental performance such as continuity of governmental structure, capacity of fulfillment of positive compulsions, ability to decrease civil violence and realization of the decisions (Loewenberg, 1971: 182). As it is seen, regime question can be betrayed with reference to positive and negative values. Characteristics expected from a stable regime are; internalization of positive values and not including negative values. The factors affecting regime stability, in other words factors possibly exciting regime questions are as follows.³
1. Inherent Battles  
   - Ethnic, religious or rebellious battles.  
   - Comprehensive assassinations  
   - Political clearances  
   - Coups d’état  

2. Undemocratic Regime Changes  

3. Crisis within and among Basic Institutions of the Regime  
   - Crisis between the Government and the Parliament  
   - Crisis between Government and Army  
   - Government Crisis  

4. Functional Anomaly at Basic Institutions of the Regime  
   - Detrital of parliamentary professionalism  
   - Decomposition of negotiation order and representative characteristic of the Parliament  
   - Detrital in legitimacy of political parties.  
   - Being unable to inspect of Constitutional Juridical  
   - Being seriously damaged of public order  

5. External Intervention  
   - Active attack or occupation.  
   - Ideology exportation and forming internal chaos depending on this exportation.  


Inherent battles, undemocratic regime changes and active attack and occupation substantially cause in regime questions. There is a curvilinear relation between economic development level and regime question. It is possible to occur a regime question in early phases of socio-economic modernization since political stability will be reduced (Huntington & Dominguez, 1985: 11-2). Whether other factors create a regime question or not, may vary from regime to regime and; depending on being fragile or not of the regime. In this context, effects of government changes vary depending on type of the regime. Density of government changes which cause in regime question in authoritarian regimes may not cause in regime question in democratic regimes. Since difference between regime and government is not clear in authoritarian regimes, whereas difference between regime and government is clearer in
democratic regimes (Mishler & Hildreth, 1984: 37), on the contrary, it may contribute to legitimacy of the regime.

Today, in Turkey even none of the factors creating regime question is active. There is no coup d’état or rebellion and also there are no comprehensive assassinations and political clearances. Any change in government has not occurred since 2002. With respect to institutional arrangements, there haven’t been any recent changes in parliamentary professionalism, government-parliament relations, political party system and political party institutionalization, and legitimacy of political parties. It is argued that there is a regime question in Turkey, just because of a concern based on that AKP has a potential for changing basic constitutional order. And this argument is based on fictions devoted to the future. 1982 Constitution which is the latest Constitution of Turkey defines the form of the State as republic, with its first article. And then, in its second article it specifies Republic of Turkey as respectful to human rights, loyal to Ataturk nationalism, democratic, secular and a social state of law. Moreover, according to the Constitution, the State is structurally unitary and with respect to government type, it has a characteristic of parliamentary government. AKP has not changed this constitutional structure up to now. Even in the period of DP government, which was considered as counter revolutionist, had not made any change in the constitutional structure. Thus, how it can be explained that regime question which has a strong historical background in Turkey, has come back into the agenda with the coming to the power of AKP? It is possible to generalize the question, backswepingly. Why the political parties representing the periphery are accused of creating regime question?

Expressions of regime question in Turkey express a counter expression and a disaccord against democratization, thus against handling and reformulation of state-society, state-economy and state-individual relations within changing conditions. However, even the opinions which involve regime stability in continuity of the regime, prefers qualification of “maintenance of a system” to the qualification of “system persistency” (Easton, 1965: 82-90). Anyhow, if the contrary were valid, i.e. if a stable regime were featured as a system which is conserved without any change, every changes aimed at democratization (transition and consolidation) had to be featured as regime question. Affairs lived and being lived in Turkey, are processes of transition and consolidation in context of democratization. In this process, there exist different reasons of seeing these changes as regime question. These reasons are; State question, characteristics of Turkish Modernization and narrowness of political realm.
State Question

The story of development of modern state is also story of society’s being decomposed of state and achieving autonomy against state. In this context, the first institution achieved autonomy against state is religion. The second phase of state-society decomposition is achieving autonomy of economy. However, in this second decomposition there exists a different situation. “Once religion decomposed form the state, crossed state’s path lesser and more deficiently, whereas capitalism had a capacity of determining the conditions of decomposition of itself from the state” (Poggi, 1991: 117).

Beginning of the process of achieving autonomy of society from state with religion and then going on with economy does not mean that this decomposition occurs in the same form at each society. Development of state varies depending on political dynamics and political cultures of the countries. Berki argues that, taking place of state in political culture as a transcendental component (transcendentalism) and taking place of state in political culture as an instrumental component (instrumentalism) cause in discrete results. In transcendentalism the important thing is society. Society is preferential against individuals from many aspects. Transcendentalism embraces sanctifying of the task and wants individuals to direct all their efforts to the task. Whereas at instrumentalism, individuals have peculiar identities, values and aims apart from the society (Heper, 2006: 23-8).

The state prior to civil society and individual in Turkey has a value of almost sacredness. The state is sovereign on the society. Civil society is just a deviant of sovereign state. This situation positions the civil society as an instrument of implementation of state’s empyreal goals; rather than being a power restricting the power of the state. Facts of the state’s being the most concrete paramount power of sovereign will; and belonging of the society and the nation to the State, are the causes of this situation. The nation, the society and the individuals owe their existence to the State. The nation, the society and the individuals have no values independent form the State.

In the countries where the center stands in the forefront and where the level of stateness is not very high, the decisions related to whole of the society come to the fruition by a spontaneous consensus which occurs as a result of conflict of various classes and preferences in context of public good of the society. In the societies where the state has priority, societal good is independent form societal demands. Demands directed to the political regime from society, strained via the norms which are developed independently form
societal will. Demands adequate to norms, are presented to the society as outputs of the system. Demands conflicting with norms, either effect transaction as have never come to the system; or revert to the society as a powerful ban, depending on characteristics of the system. Anyway, the factor determining the level of stateness is society’s potential at solving the conflicts emanated from various preferences as bringing about reconciliation. Being unable to discover this potential sufficiently means counting the sovereign and autonomous state to the process (Eckstein, 1979: 16).

In the societies where the level of stateness is high, this situation is reflected to the attribute of judicial and political regime. In such a society, the State has a determining from judicial (Dyson, 1980: viii), political, societal, cultural and economic aspects. State’s this determining and paramount characteristic is emanated from an established State tradition, and is carried on with modernization project and application apparatus of the State. In context of being basis of regime question debates, the State question in Turkey has two basic reasons. The first reason is the high level of stateness, mentioned above. The second reason is problematic aptitude of the state in context of overallness.

The owing overallness of the State exceeding optimal limits, has two basic reasons. The first reason is the high level of stateness which mentioned above and causes State question. The second reason is being comprehensive of modernization process.

Turkish modernization process is a modernization out of West. The basic characteristic of such modernities is initiation of modernization by the State as lacking of modern individual. Gole (1998) argues that:

State centered modernity (modernization) does not limit itself to politics. On the contrary, it becomes the tool to implement modernity in the realm of culture, gender, lifestyle and identity. Politics thus become the site for modernist, nationalist and religious social projects that compete with each other. Consequently, competing "ways of life" do not appear as personal preferences but as civilizational stakes.

Modernity (modernization) goes ahead more. Alternatives to the whole or some components of Western life style which is identified with modernity (modernization) are determined as regime question at once.

In Turkish modernization process, The State has bounded both the individual and the society as a whole and has tried to compose them socially, culturally, economically, legally and politically; in other words it has tried to transform them. Statist policies performed in economic realm have consequences in favor of State will. With the aim of Westernization of
judiciary, Acts of foreign countries have been brought in by translation method. Social

cultural realms have formed the most weighted part of modernization. The state has become
sole unilateral identifier power within a wide area ranging from dressing style, the language
spoken by and music to be listened to of the people. Dressing style of the people was
considered as outdated, the language spoken was considered as not pure Turkish Language
and radioing of Turkish music listened to by the people was banned for a time by a directive
of Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Seeing of State itself as having priority in spheres as from economy to clothing, from
education to music and its effort for composing these spheres as almost unilaterally, and its
seeing these spheres as parts of the Republic’s regime, thus of the political regime; show that
social and cultural spheres are handled together with the political sphere. Since under
sovereignty of a state there may exist various social segments, such an acknowledgement is a
problematic approach with respect to democracy and political legitimation since it is an
effacement of universal law, as it reduces Westernization to a simple term of wearing hat and
since evaluating music within politics and ideology rather than evaluating it within history
and musicology. In order to gain a legitimate stability of state’s sovereignty, adequate number
of people living under sovereignty of that state to gain stability must both internalize
legitimacy design of the state and participate in reproduction (Tezel, 2004: 25).

There is an inverse correlation between acceptance of legitimacy design of the state by
people living under sovereignty of that state and scope and interventionalism of that state.
Humboldt, argues that various purposes the state embraces, may differentiate both various
apparatus the state uses and its filed of activity. Within the differentiated field of action a state
may use compulsion and coercion; may use methods of encouragement of examples and
persuasion, in order to reach its various purposes. In order to formulate “apparent lives” of the
citizens, the state may hinder the activities conflicting its purposes by using these methods
altogether; even, in order to bring tendencies of the citizens into consonance with its aim the
state may use coercive force on the citizens’ ideas and feelings. Variant methods which will
be used at reaching the aims of the State may influence freedom of the citizens in various
levels. Use of compulsion and coercion methods is possible only with political tutelage; and
where social purposes do not concur with the purposes of the State, and the State intervenes
as a result of this reason, the general course of life will be under supervision of the State; in
the case of using more advanced methods ideas and feelings of the citizens will be under
supervision of the State (Humboldt, 2004: 88).
When the interventionism of the State increase as purpose and instrument/institution in Turkey, coercion it implies also increases. When arrangements which will decrease the level of interventionalism are discussed, statist segments assess these arrangements as an intervention to the regime come on bringing up more coercive policies. Basically, the State’s aiming at providing positive happiness of individual and of the society as a whole and institutionalizing and creating law in accordance with its these purposes within the framework of the happiness principles determined by the State unilaterally; and bringing up discrete ideas of the people who do not agree with the happiness principles of the State are interpreted by statist segments as regime questions. Actually he thing statist segments aim by taking regime question to the agenda is providing continuation of “enchaining free roles of individual energies by the unfair ascendancy of the State”.

As mentioned above, one of the reasons of wideness of the State from the perspective of overallness is high level of stateness. This situation results in a continent transcendental State. Republic of Turkey has inherited a transcendental State and a weak society from Ottoman Empire. In Republican era bureaucratic elites kept on seeing the transcendental State as indispensable way of holding the society together; in this process a consensus composed of inconvertible norms (Heper, 2006: 41, 29). Apart from 2002, claims of unconstitutionality of the acts enacted in accordance with reforms in attending European Union process have lived in the shadow of accusations as annulling unitary structure of the country, engendering dissociation and disintegration. Yet, the state has a centralist and awkward structure in Turkey. In addition, many tasks those undertaken by the State are at the present day out of sphere of duties of states or the mentioned tasks are performed in a form of boosting of the public to the private sector. In spite of this fact resistance of a state at preserving its centralist structure and its overallness causes in a paradoxical consequence which is set by Joel Migdal (2004: 20-3): a state which is sermicicationally strong but actually weak. A powerful state is one which takes its power from its legitimacy in order to persuade and enclose all of its citizens including to opposers. But, in Turkey the State has always tried to find the way of being a transcendental structure upon its citizens (Barkey, 2000: 87).

**Characteristics of Turkish Modernization**

Although various modernization forms may be mentioned when modernization process of modernizing nations is considered, it will be more functional with respect to our study, to sum up different modernization forms within two types, with the help of Chodak’s (1973:263-68) ideas. Chodak mentions two different types of modernization: modernization
as being culture and governed modernization. Modernization as being culture is one which is built up spontaneously as a result of historical dynamics. This form of modernization consists of an economic, political and social developments arising from societies’ inner dynamics and a restructuring as a result of this development. Whereas governed modernization is a complex process in which organizations, institutions and values of the country which will be modernized are likened to those of modernized countries. This process external to society is an aim of implementation of history which does not belong to non Western societies (Turkone, 1994: 60).

The main aim of modernization process which is initiated in care of the State in Ottoman Empire Era was recovery of the State. With Republican Era concern about recovery of the State has shifted to concern about continuity of the State. As Mardin quotes (1994:51) fear between 1920 and 1923 on clash of Anatolia on a basis of lines of the basic groups, was perceived as a deep stream by the builders of Kemalism who were trying to form their center, and this was held as a basic problem of Kemalist policy till the end of single party system in 1950, even it was largely held as secret. So, modernization project was institutionalized with the aim of being absolutely sovereign of State upon society; society was perceived within an abstract nationality as legality of all kinds of possible conflicts was ab initio denied and just a communality in good care of the State. This situation resulted in continuation of Ottoman patrimonialism also in this new term, devotedly (Insel, 1990: 20, 55). Since such a modernization process composes the founding paradigm of the Republican structuring, the Republican structuring was articulated in an exclusive perception based on we and others discrepancy. Transactions aiming at forming the new man who is required by the political regime changing process of which goes on also gave weight to exclusive perception. Because, formation of new man meant formation of new individuals and a new nationality besides forming a social, political and legal order which make new individuals and new nationality form possible and meant legality boundaries of this (Campbell, 1998: 63).

The State had a center which was formed in its formation process and adapted to new conditions as it changed. Formation and alternation form of center also may be accepted as a variable showing type of a political regime. In a democratic system formation and reformation of the center in the course of time eventuates democratically as adequate to the core of the system. In this process none of the effective political segments can be excluded from democratic process. In other words, “every political segment participates in formation process of the center as declaring its preference by the norms application of which is bound to
force use”. In contrast, undemocratic regimes have an excluding characteristic at formation process of center. All discrete political segments out of the sovereign political segment which has carried the State or dominant on the state are not only restricted by the mediation of democratic liberties; mostly absolute legal circumscriptions are held against them and interpretation of these rules are made by the administrators themselves with a wide discretionary power, rather than being made by independent objective institutions (Linz, 1984: 13).

In this regard, within the formation process of the modern State in West, it was essayed many confrontations, by reason of which periphery powers had accorded with the center. Foundation of centralization as accord of periphery powers and center has two important consequences: the first consequence is arriving at a well articulated structure; the other consequence is not losing autonomies of the periphery powers. However in Republican Era, such as in Ottoman Era, confrontations both have been experienced as single dimensional and have been interpreted as collisions (Mardin, 1994: 37). With proclamation of the Republic, since modernization and nationalization processes collided with one another homogenization of the whole people living within the national boundaries, upon an identity whose boundaries are strictly determined became the main target. With the acknowledgement that nationalization gets through an accurate homogenization; and being a nation state gets through an accurate centralization, has given weight to single dimensional relation between center and periphery. The consequence is absolute sovereignty and determining character of the center, propolledness, being unable to be integrated and being unsatisfied of the periphery.

Modernity (modernization) fixed by the State as a whole of specific plans and programs would be performed by the mediation of education pioneered by state intellectuals. However, at this juncture Turkish modernization experience is faced with a bidirectional crisis.

The first crisis is structural integration deficiency. Within the societies which are in a modernization process, because of social change new demands are laid before political regime. These demands are declarations of necessities which are caused by modernization process’ annihilation of the structure and which must be integrated to democratic system. Solving the problems caused by these demands, within the system is compulsory with regard to evolution of modernization process in democratic direction. However, within Turkish modernization process such demands are perceived as regime questions, parallel to this perception demands are frozen or owners of the demands are accused.
The reason why the demands oriented to political regime are perceived as regime question is that Turkish modernization project is contradictory in itself with regard to its main purposes. Turkish modernization project aiming at getting over the level of contemporary civilizations has aimed at “industrialization in economy, making the essence of open minded and free fairy individual-citizen in cultural sphere, and in political sphere it has aimed at democratization –name of which is formally national sovereignty. However, these aims and the principles forming main aims have conflicted by the time. In this process it was evaded both that the demands which are against these main purposes were mentioned and that a powerful organization which makes representation of these demands enable. Demands or movements which in any case goes beyond the boundaries of the modernization project which was fixed by the State as a whole of plans or programs have been made “the other” and made out of political and social representation by the way of imaginary featuring as disrupter, destructive or reactionary. Or, related with the conjuncture, when needed they were intensively suppressed by the accusation of treason felony or being state enemy (Mardin, 1997: 176-93).

The second crisis is the crisis occurred relevant to modernizers. The modernizers are basically bureaucrats and intellectuals. The demand about use of bureaucracy as an instrument at receiving the values of new period to the public caused in continuity of bureaucratic structure inherited from Ottoman Era. Bureaucracy has gained a per se legitimacy with claiming ideological conservation of the new era. With the power it takes form this claim it in patches has opposed to political power against the rising social demands. This situation has caused in overcentralization of State authority, congregation of authorizations in the hands of State elites, and narrowness of the political realm from the perspectives of both subject and functionality.

Intellectuals as peculiar to our country were born to embrace of the State; and in Westernization period they have remained passive, since they were not able to harmonize Western values with their own values. And since they were dependent to state in gaining their daily lives and since most of them were educated with State scholarship, their freedom of thought has become within the limits permitted by the State. With the proclamation of Republic intellectuals were perceived as instruments at socialization of the masses in context of new values. Now the tasks of intellectuals were scientifically forming the present order in accordance with its edited form; and transferring the “actual tradition” of the new order which would be established, to the society (Bauman, 1987: 2). However, the system did not function
as it was edited, a binary consequence occurred with respect to the relation between the intellectuals and the State: in the one and the intellectuals whose organic link with the State grew stronger because of the crisis in modernization process, and in the other hand intellectuals who often came up against the State. The question of intellectual opposition has been perceived by the regime as solved since it was turned out of the system.

**Narrowness of the Political Realm**

The political realm in Turkey is principally, institutionally and conjecturally as narrow as foretelling the functioning of democratic politics. Principle narrowness emanated from the originality of the political realm in Turkish modernization project. Turkish modernization project grounds on a tradition which indexes the politics which makes concessions to social benefit against social demands, to the State which is perceived as the basic political collectivity (Keyman, 2000: 182). The State in Turkish political culture is perceived as the source of all moral and political values. State is a celestial and noble entity and ontologically prior to society. Society is a derivative of the State. Thus, society is internal to the State whereas the State is external to the society is a transcendental entity; has every kind of authority upon the society. When such a perception about State allied with a Platonist idea that philosophical perfection is possible just with a political order established with rational method, politics loses its social character and becomes a technical function. When positivist enlightenment and Jacobin attitudes are added to this, the political realm thoroughly gets narrow. From now on, belief of single good looms large and it is believed that this good may be known just by the State and its organic intellectuals. So, while demands of the public become insignificant, the important thing becomes that the goods in every field known by the State are espoused to the society by the State and its organic intellectuals.

The second reason of the narrowing in political realm is institutional. The segments who loom large institutionally are civil and military bureaucracy. It is necessary to argue civil bureaucracy before arguing the military one. In Turkey mostly military bureaucracy is argued when the subject is narrowing the political realm. However, civil bureaucracy has a determinative and thus narrowing affect on the political realm at least as much as of the military bureaucracy. Ataturk perceived the civil bureaucracy as a machine like instrument. According to this perception bureaucracy is not a whole of institutions who play the role of State by taking political decisions, rather it is a whole of legal-rational, implementing institutions in a Weberian manner. However, whereas Ataturk perceived the bureaucracy as such, on the other hand he aimed at bureaucrats’ being advocators of Ataturkist values
(Heper, 2006: 31, 124). Targeting these two contradicting aims spontaneously is possible only with an intensive supervision on bureaucracy. Where supervision is not adequate, bureaucracy easily reaches a situation in which he becomes decision maker. Just as Atatürk’s actual administration was ended, it is seen that bureaucracy again played an important role in political life, and by the time it riveted its role legally. When acting in such manner, bureaucracy has called upon Atatürkism and so, Atatürkism was used for political purposes as it was transformed to a closed ideology whereas it should be a world view (Heper, 2006: 130). Consequently, bureaucracy who has become immune ideologically and legally reached a position in which it has become criticizer, temporizer and time to time making opposing rules against political power, whereas it should have been implementer of the decisions of the political power.

The narrowing affect of military bureaucracy on political realm grounds basically on two ideological reasons and various reflections of these reasons. Turkish Military Forces (TSK), just after Atatürk endeavored to impose itself as safeguarder and protector of Atatürk, and in general, of basic values of the Republic and with coup d’État of May, 27 1960, it legally has reached its aim. In the Act No.1 enacted by National Unity Committee after Coup d’État it was come up expressions of guardianship and protecting (Ozturk, 1993: 113). Later, this subject is arranged with Turkish Military Forces Barracks Duty Act. At 35th article of the mentioned Act, duty of TSK is “Safeguarding and being on alert for Turkish fatherland and Turkish Republic assessed by the Constitution”. When considered that the word “being on alert” refers to military tasks and the word “safeguarding” refers to political tasks, it may be concluded that TSK is an institution which produces and implements policies as independent from political power. This consequence is one which is undesirable for democracies.

The second ideological reason related to military bureaucracy is that national security is wide-rangingly perceived as an ideology and in MGK every social, economic and cultural case is perceived and tried to be solved form the perspective of security. In 1996, Suleyman Demirel, President of that day, has interestingly argued that “Cabinet is a political institution, but MGK is the State.” Howsoever, with the changes implemented since 2001, the structure and binding affect of decisions of MGK changed to the advantage of civil politics; the narrowing affect of the Army on political realm goes on. Being in a strategic position of the Military, in which it has the right to say the last word about how and by whom the country will be governed, keeps the ways open for the Military at interfering to the politics in discrete times at discrete forms and at various levels (Cizre, 2001: 156).
The third reason for narrowness of the political realm is conjectural. In Turkish political times by the time such periods are experienced that even the written rules of the Constitution were not changed, politics was intensively kept down by civil and military bureaucracy. In such periods, even control process is initiated with military bureaucracy; the process turns into an enclosure process by the help of participations of civil bureaucracy and NGOs to the process. These periods are mostly the ones in which parties representing the periphery are in power, and in which military-civil bureaucracies think that society has been quite out of hand. In this context, the beginning date of the enclosure process held by civil and military bureaucracies is 1950s in which DP was in power. The process which was begun in February, 28 1997 is the last circle of such a process.

Narrowness of the political realm affects policy creating process of the government, negatively. Military and civil bureaucracy take an obstructive attitude by taking some military based principles and their Constitutional position to the agenda within the policy creating process of the government related to various subjects. In the case of standing on its demand of the government, it accused of creating regime question. As explained above, the experienced situation is not a regime question rather it is an aim at making the government in some issues dysfunctional by the help of undemocratic ways. In other words, the work in progress is forcing to make policies within the boundaries of the single ideological paradigm determined by the State. This causes in important consequences in Turkish political life. First of all, political parties in power lose high levels of support, since they become unable to transform their commitments into policies because of the narrowness of the political realm. Losing support causes in contraction in lives of political parties, foreclosing institutionalization because of lack of culture transfer and foreclosing of formation of political traditions. While parties in power cannot become virile, opposers do not create policies about the issues which they think that civil and military bureaucracy would not permit. Since institutionalization of party system requires competitive party system and being autonomous of this system from the State (Randall & Sðvaðand, 2002: 7), thus, political characters of parties both in power or opposition erode; political parties are unable to be institutionalized and institutionalization of the part system as a whole becomes impossible. The other consequence is that, political legitimacy weakens. Believes of the public about the regime weakness since they see that their democratic demands are not actualized by political power, and participation of the public to reproduction of the regime diminishes.
Conclusion

Turkish Republic had an authoritative single party system until 1946. Such a system was preferred temporarily relevant to various reasons. Perhaps the most important of these reasons was that, it was thought that the planned changes would be performed in a short period and easily, when a radical social transmission was experienced. The aim at continuity of this system in an aggravated manner which began after Atatürk’s estranging form active politics went on after his death. However, day by day decrease in legitimacy of the system, and unexpected international developments obliged to change this authoritarian system. In such a conjuncture, democracy was added to the authoritarian system as a patch. This patch of democracy in its first years granted a respite to the public. The aims at making democracy an essence rather than being a patch were labeled with various accusations. Various concepts were used in these accusations. Creating regime question, being regime enemy and high treason are most known of these accusations. The thing interesting is that accusations were made in periods in which democratic consolidation efforts increase. In such periods, new demands come to the system through the society, having democratic reactions in the system of these demands helps integration of the society with the system, and rather lessen discontinuity between center and periphery. The situations perceived as regime question are in fact the situations grounded on Turkish State tradition, characteristics of Turkish modernization and narrowness of political realm. And these situations are perceived as regime question, inadvertently. This inadvertenteness has three reasons. Firstly, parties accused of creating regime question do not attempt at violence and they give voice to their demands within legal boundaries as adequate to the rules of the regime. Demands give voice, are not intended for authorization, rather they are intended for consolidation of the democratic regime. Secondly, in delegative democracies, there exists no risk of an abrupt authoritarian transition. Lastly, bound between democratic and undemocratic regimes are quite solid bound such that it cannot be passed through a slow and indiscernible evolution; such a passing almost always requires a cutback performed as under coercion, unconstitutional activities, a military usurpation, a coup d’Èta or an external intervention (Linz, 1984: 16).

MGK was firstly ordered with 1961 Constitution. According to 1961 Constitution, the structure of MGK is as follows: MGK is composed of the Ministers determined by the Act, Chief of General Staff, and Army representatives. The Act with number 129 and date 1961 determined the Ministers participating in MGK as: Prime minister, vice Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Finance, Transport and Labor; and the ministers related to the subjects within the agenda. 1961 Constitution with respect to Constitution technique, ordered MGK within “Cabinet” rather than within “Administration”. Moreover,
according to 1961 Constitution, notes its conception to the Cabinet as helping to the Cabinet on issues related to national security. However, after 1971 Coup d’eta, MGK conceptions were upgraded as advice to the Cabinet.

2 Even Turkey has transmitted to multi party system, has not embraced to pluralization of political center. Turkey has always endeavored to remain political center as unipolar; and the ideology of single party era has functioned in multi party era as the ideology of unipolar center. Even the function of the ideology varied time by time, sometimes it overlapped with the function in totalitarian systems. Especially, in the process of February 28, opening a file on some civil Cervantes and bereaving from some rights have become definite characteristics of this period.

3 In determining of the factors creating regime question, we drew upon (Huntington; Dominguez, 1985: 11-2), (Mishler; Hildreth, 1984: 35-9) and (Francois; Sud, 2006: 143).

4 Criticisms as making concession to separatism with regard to betterments about basic rights and liberties, especially about education and broadcast with native language; and Public Administration Basic Act Draft Statute which aimed at making the public stronger, are examples of this issue. In fact, the aim was betterments on behalf of the individuals about liberties and making the State which has become clumsy with centralism, more active and more efficient, as re formation on basis of local administration. However, unconstitutionality criticisms were not as dominant as “separatism” criticism.

5 With 1982 Constitution, the structure of MGK was formed on the basis of equality of numbers of civil and military members. With the amendment of 2001, Minister of Justice and vice Prime Ministers ere participated in MGK and thus equality was disconcerted on behalf of civil members, and numerical languardness of soldiers was lessened. Binding characteristic of MGK decisions were removed; with the new Act, MGK meetings were arranged as being held bimonthly rather than being held monthly and assignment of non-military persons as MGK Secretary was made possible. Despite all these amendments, being within the title of “Cabinet” of MGK as formulated with 1982 Constitution; and presence of MGK which makes military participant to the politics within the system keeps going.
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